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This research aims to investigate the development approaches, operational experiences, and 
market influences of foreign invested travel service (FITS) companies, including travel 
agencies and tour operators, in China in the opening decade (1998-2007) of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in the industry. It also examines the Chinese business environment for the 
development of the FITS sector in the country. The investigation was conducted through some 
focused aspects, including different roles of three major locations; the setup and licensing 
process in the FITS sector; the FITSs’ original countries and relative features; their ownership 
and management structures; their major target markets and profitability; the FITS’s HR 
strategies on the local employment; the relationships between the FITS sector and the 
indigenous services, and the overall environment, as well as the opportunities and challenges 
for the sector’s development in China. The research focuses on three locations, Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangdong province which host almost all the FITS companies (27 registered 
in total) in China in the decade. The methodology combines the study of both primary and 
secondary data, with interviews being undertaken with the FITSs (29 formal interviews with 
14 FITSs) and a questionnaire survey towards 150 Chinese travel services in the locations. 
  
Given the understanding of existing literature on the travel trade business, FDI, China’s 
economic and political foundations, and the opening of the Chinese tourism industry, the 
thesis argues that the development of the FITS sector in China was substantially constrained 
and shaped by the protectionist policies of the Chinese government in the first opening decade. 
The government’s strong power through policies and SOEs is also one of the most 
considerable challenges for FITSs in China. However, the FITS companies were not passive 
actors in this situation, but developed a range of strategies in response to the changing 
regulatory framework, which effectively shaped a rapidly emerging sector and its relations 
with endogenous companies. The research is important also because there are positive 
opportunities in the country for the future development of the FITS sector, in response to 
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1.1. The Context of the Research 
The rise of the economy of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) has been 
regarded as one of the most significant economic and developmental themes of the 21st 
century. The Chinese tourism industry today is a market that can not be ignored, not only for 
the world tourism industry, but also for academic study. The website of the China National 
Tourism Administration (CNTA) shows in its introduction that: 
Since the initiation of the policies of reform and opening to the outside world in 
1978, China’s tourism has entered a stage of rapid development. In 1999, the 
number of tourists entering China reached 72.8 million, of which 8.43 million were 
foreign tourists, 40 times the figure for 1978. Consequently, the foreign exchange 
income from this industry reached US$14.1 billion, 54 times that of 1978. Currently, 
China has become an important tourism destination in Asia, and the fifth large 
tourism country in the world. Domestic tourism is also growing vigorously. With the 
improvement of the Chinese people’s living standards, Chinese citizens have an 
increasingly strong interest in travelling abroad. In recent years, Chinese citizens 
have travelled to Southeast Asia and Europe. Foreign travel agencies are now 
opening offices in China to attract Chinese to travel abroad. Now, China is fast on 
its way to becoming a country with developed tourism, and constantly improving 
tourism facilities and services. It is estimated that, by 2020, China will be the 
world’s No. 1 tourism destination and the fourth-largest nation of tourists 
(http://en.cnta.gov.cn, 2004). 
 
It was true that the development of the Chinese tourism industry had been very rapid during 
the last three decades following the open and reform policy of the country, and especially 
since China's entry into the World Trade Organization (hereafter WTO). It is suggested that 
‘tourism has become a strategic industry in China’s development of a socialist market 
economy’ by the start of the twentieth century (Zhang, & Lew, 2003, p3). In 2007, the total 
inbound tourists (including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) numbered 131.87 million, with 
total revenue in excess of US$ 41.9 billion, increasing by 5.5% and 23.5% over the previous 
year respectively. Among them all, there were more than 26 million inbound visitors from 
foreign countries. The same year (2007) saw Chinese outbound tourists reaching 40.95 
million, with a year-based increase of 18.6% achieved. According to CNTA’s ‘10th Five-Year 
Plan and Long-Term Goal Outlines up to 2015 and 2020 for Tourism Development in China’ 
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(CNTA1, 2001), by 2020, China is estimated to receive between 210 to 300 million inbound 
tourist arrivals, including 31 to 45 million foreign tourists. It was also forecast by the World 
Tourism Organization (WTO1, 2001) in its 2020 Vision report that China would be the 
number one tourism destination and fourth ranked tourist-generating country in the world by 
2020, with 137 million inbound visitors and 100 million outbound tourists. Although 2008 
witnessed a world-wide economic recession, China received 130 million inbound visitors and 
over US$ 40 billion in international tourism receipts (CNTA, 2009). The significance of the 
Chinese tourism industry has been recognised by the world tourism industry.   
 
However, in terms of being an internationally recognisable academic field, the total number of 
the research projects and papers focusing on the development of the Chinese tourism industry 
is still limited. There are many Chinese domestic researchers working on relevant topics 
based on Chinese styled research traditions and published in Chinese. However, there are few 
English articles written about the Chinese tourism industry and travel trade sector published 
in international journals, and only a limited number of books in English available in this field. 
These include Wen and Tisdell (2001), Lew, Yu, Ap, and Zhang (2003), Zhang, Pine and Lam 
(2005), and Ball, Horner, and Nield (2007). The lack of international academic research on 
the relevant topic of China’s tourism has constrained international understanding, 
communication and cooperation opportunities between tourism in China and other economies. 
Given the fact that the development potential of the Chinese tourism industry is great, 
demands to study and understand the tourism marketplace of China has become increasingly 
significant. Thus, the Chinese tourism industry and its internationalisation approaches were 
originally chosen as the subject of this research project. 
 
However, considering that there have been general introductory works on Chinese tourism, 
like Lew, et al (2003), this research intended to make further efforts on a focused business 
sector where more study is required. With the recommendations from a major officer in 
CNTA and some well-known Chinese academics, the opening process of the Chinese travel 
trade sector was finally selected as the focus of this research for the following reasons. First, 
the travel trade industry is an intermediary which often plays the role of a promoter of the 
whole tourism industry. It connects almost every element of tourist activities, serving not only 
travellers, but also destinations, hotels, airlines, and other tourism facilities, such as casinos, 
museums or visa offices. Thus, the opening level of the Chinese travel trade business 
determines the speed of overall internationalisation process of China’s tourism industry. 
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Second, after the Chinese government allowed the establishment of the first foreign invested 
travel service (hereafter FITS) in 1993, there had been fewer than 30 FITSs registered in 
mainland China by 2007. Given that hardly any research has been undertaken on this 
particular industry, the efforts of this research will be meaningful. Third, the development of 
the travel trade industry in China is very different from the rest of the world and has been 
experiencing dramatic changes during the last three decades, especially since the 1990s, 
resulting from both domestic economic and political dynamics, and from some worldwide 
forces, such as the commitments of WTO, and the evolution of the Internet and information 
and communication technologies (hereafter ICTs). Therefore, it was eventually decided to 
investigate the development of the FITS sector in China. The key purpose of this thesis is to 
examine the development strategies and features of the FITS sector in China in its first 
development decade, and the essential local business environment that can substantially 
influence the FITS business. 
 
 
1.2. The Aims and Objectives of the Research 
1.2.1. The Aims of the Research 
In general, the FITS sector in China can be divided into three types: Chinese-controlled Sino-
foreign joint ventures (JVs), foreign-controlled Sino-foreign JVs and wholly foreign owned 
travel services. Chinese-controlled Sino-foreign JVs are those companies at least half of 
whose shares belong to Chinese investors; foreign-controlled Sino-foreign JVs are generally 
administrated by the foreign partners because they hold the majority of the companies’ shares; 
and, foreign wholly owned travel services own 100% of the company’s shares as well as 
overall control. FITSs are relatively new businesses in China, dating from 1998 when the first 
JV, LiTian (Diethelm) Travel Co., Ltd, was officially set up in Yunnan province. Since then, 
many questions about them have arisen, but not been carefully addressed. For example, what 
are their development plans in China? How are they performing? How can the Chinese policy 
and market environment affect their performance? What are the advantages and challenges for 
them to invest and expand in China? Therefore, the aims of this thesis are designed to 
investigate the development of FITSs and the business environment in China during 1998 to 
2007, expressed specifically as follows:    
 
Aim One: To analyse the features of development approaches and operational experiences of 
the FITS sector in China in the decade from 1998 to 2007;  
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Aim Two: To investigate the relationship between the FITS sector and the Chinese indigenous 
travel trade sector from 1998 to 2007; 
 
Aim Three: To research the general investment environment for the FITS sector in China 
from 1998 to 2007, as well as the opportunities and challenges for the sector in the future. 
 
 
1.2.2. The Objectives of the Research 
Based on the three aims, the objectives of this research programme are presented for each 
objective as follows:  
 
Objectives, Aim One: 
Ø (1A) To research the reasons of FITSs’ selection of investment locations in China in the 
decade (1998-2007), and the major differences in their operational strategies related to 
the choices of registered locations;  
   
Ø (1B) To study the concerns and reactions of FITSs towards the business registration 
process in China, and special strategies applied in the sector for set-up; 
  
Ø (1C) To investigate the counties/regions of origin of FITSs, as well as particular 
operational patterns or characters related to their original background;  
 
Ø (1D) To research the corporate strategies of FITSs, in terms of the formation of entities in 
China, including the ownership and management structures of the companies; 
 
Ø (1E) To understand the similarities and differences in the selection of target markets of 
FITSs, and the reasons and features of their marketing strategies (as well as the financial 
results/profitability of the companies if applicable); 
 
Ø (1F) To examine the major employment strategies of FITSs in China, and their desires or 
concerns relating to the local labour market.  
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Objectives, Aim Two: 
Ø (2A) To research the competition and collaboration between the FITS sector and Chinese 
indigenous services, as well as the impacts of the entry of FITSs upon the local industry; 
 
Ø (2B) To investigate the attitudes and relative reactions of the Chinese local travel services 
towards the entry of FITSs. 
 
Objectives, Aim Three: 
Ø (3A) To analyse both the economic and political environment in China for the entry and 
expansion of international travel trade businesses;  
 
Ø (3B) To identify facilitative influences and key barriers existing in the Chinese travel 
trade industry for the further development of FITSs in China. 
 
 
1.3. The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises 11 chapters, including an introduction, four literature review chapters, a 
methodology chapter, four analysis chapters and the conclusion. The first chapter aims to 
provide an overall view of the reasons and purposes of choosing this research topic, aims and 
objectives of the research, and the major contents of the each chapter of the thesis. Issues 
about the geographical and time scopes of this thesis are also introduced in Chapter One. 
 
Chapter Two examines the nature and characters of the travel trade business, including tour 
operators and travel agencies, in an international perspective. The development trends of the 
travel trade industry, such as increasing internationalisation activities and the prevalence of 
on-line ICTs, are also emphasised with a discussion on the relative impacts upon the future of 
travel trade business. Moreover, the chapter makes a brief study of the travel trade industry of 
China, which indicates that the industry in China is different from that in the outside world, 
especially developed countries, such as Britain, Germany, and America. Without a clear 
division between the wholesalers and retailers and limited development of outbound travel 
market, China tends to see slower and fewer impacts from the trends of globalisation and the 
application of GDS and Internet-based ICTs, compared with developed economies. The 
Chinese travel trade industry may not take the same path as more developed western markets.   
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Chapter Three reviews the literature about Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and other 
internationalisation methods in general terms. FDI in tourism is also examined. This chapter 
will introduce the definitions, reasons, means, features, and impacts of FDI. It also 
investigates some non-equity forms of internationalisation like licensing, franchising and 
management contracts. However, it is found that the measurement of internationalisation 
processes, including FDI, in the tourism industry has always been a difficult task, resulting in 
a lack of detailed data available for research. Despite this, the chapter aims to summarise the 
most popular methods of internationalisation applied in three main tourism sectors, including 
hotels, airlines and tour operators. In conclusion, FDI in tourism is very limited in size and 
mostly found within developed economies.  
 
Chapter Four focuses on the general political and economic environment of China. China's 
political regime, on both state level and regional level, is briefly examined, with a discussion 
of the literature concerning tourism planning and government roles in tourism. Moreover, the 
country’s economic circumstances, especially its economic open and reform process and the 
importance of state owned entities (SOEs) are also investigated. Furthermore, the chapter 
aims to explain the contributions, forms and features of FDI in the economy of China, which  
helps develop an understanding of the FDI in the Chinese tourism industry. Essentially, strong 
political influences on economic development are an important consideration in the country. 
 
Chapter Five continues the emphasis on China, but focuses on the tourism industry. The 
chapter reviews the development and history of the Chinese tourism industry using a division 
of four periods. The responsibilities of the national tourism board, CNTA, are also briefly 
examined. In order to guide further study on the FITS sector in China, previous research 
about foreign influences in the hotel sector and tourist attraction sector in China is reviewed. 
Moreover, a summary about the Chinese local travel trade business and about the FITS sector 
is also discussed in this chapter, followed by an introduction to China's commitments to the 
opening of travel trade business for accessing WTO in 2001. Thus, the purpose of the chapter 
is to outline the structure and major features of the Chinese tourism industry, and the 
expansion methods of foreign corporations in the major tourism sectors of the country. In 
addition, it will also provide details regarding the birth and development of the FITS sector in 
China. 
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Based on the comprehensive review of the relative literature presented in the previous 
chapters, Chapter Six explains the selection of research methods in this project, according to 
the aims and objectives. Primary data was regarded as the core data resource for this research, 
including interviews and a questionnaire survey conducted in three main research areas, 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong, although secondary data was also important. In total, 28 
travel trade companies, including all 27 FITSs are studied in this thesis, with 18 formal 
interviews conducted with 15 companies. In addition, more telephone interviews were made 
to all FITSs to complete the data collection. In terms of the questionnaire survey, the local 
travel services of each research location contributed 50 valid questionnaires, making a total of 
150 for the whole survey. The methods of both the interview survey presented as case study of 
the thesis, and the questionnaire survey analyzed by SPSS will be fully explained in Chapter 
Six. 
 
The next three chapters all share a very similar structure, but each focuses on one of the three 
locations. Chapter Seven presents the research segment for Shanghai, where the survey was 
started, followed by Chapter Eight for Beijing and Chapter Nine for Guangdong province. 
Each of the three chapters investigates the investment environments, and the tourism 
development and resources of the corresponding location, along with the general features of 
FITSs in the each location. In addition, in-depth case studies will be used to improve the 
understanding, analyses, and findings concerning FITSs in the different locations. However, 
two major cases were selected in the locations of Shanghai and Guangdong, while three cases 
applied in the capital city, Beijing, where more than half of all FITSs were located.  
 
Given the abundance of data presented in chapters Seven to Nine, Chapter Ten combines 
relatively comparable data, making comparisons and analyses and leading to research results 
which address the aims and objectives of this thesis. The final chapter, Chapter Eleven, 
reviews all the previous chapters by connecting the studied literature with the major results 
derived through the primary data. Moreover, key findings and contributions of this thesis are 
emphasized in the final chapter, together with a conclusion regarding the limitations of the 
research, and further research suggestions raised by this academic project.  
 
In general, many unique development approaches of FITSs were detected and explained in 
this research. The thesis argues that the travel trade industry in China was tightly controlled 
by the Chinese government, and the development of the FITS sector in China was essentially 
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confined by relative policies, such as qualification, licensing and limited permission of access 
to the local marketplace in the decade from 1998 to 2007. These policies were designed to 
protect the interests of major indigenous players who were mainly SOEs. However, the 
opening process is ongoing, and will continue in the following decades, although it may be 
considered slow. It is expected that in due course a more open market will probably be seen 
first in some designated locations, such as province of Guangdong or Hainan.  
 
Moreover, compared with the local services, FITSs had some advantages in the early opening 
stage, resulting from their more advanced management skills and technologies, and more 
mature international network resources. Furthermore, the impacts of the FITS sector upon the 
Chinese local sector were still limited, with more collaboration than competition perceived. 
However, competition will be increasing dramatically in the Chinese fast growing market 
segments, such as corporate travel, travel for meetings, incentives, conferences and 
exhibitions (MICE), and luxury leisure travel, especially if the outbound segment further 
opens. In addition, the large number of small and weak Chinese indigenous travel trade 
businesses will provide great opportunities for the FITS sector, through either collaborations 
or acquisitions. On the other hand, the relationship between large Chinese state-owned travel 
services and FITSs will become more complicated, as they are not only the biggest partners 
but also the major rivals of each other in the Chinese travel market in the future.  
 
 
1.4. Two Important Declarations  
1.4.1. The Exclusion of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
Although Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are important components of China, their market 
environments are very different from mainland China in both economic and political terms. 
Under the concept, ‘One Country Two Systems’, Hong Kong and Macao have been 
internationally recognized as Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of China, which means 
‘inalienable part of the People's Republic of China’ since 1997 for Hong Kong and 1999 for 
Macao respectively (as was described in ‘The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Of The People's Republic Of China’).They are authorized to exercise a 
high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, in 
accordance with the related laws. Generally, the market characters and structures of Hong 
Kong and Macao are significantly different (basically smaller but more advanced), compared 
with the Chinese mainland marketplace. 
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However, the more critical issue is the status of Taiwan. Datamonitor (2004, p16) provides a 
brief explanation that:  
The Beijing authorities view the island across the Taiwan straits from the mainland 
as a renegade province since the Kuomintang nationalist movement, rulers of most 
of China during the inter-war period, made it their base following their 1949 defeat 
at the hands of Mao’s forces. For as long as the nationalist controlled Taiwan and 
both sides claimed to be the legitimate rulers of the whole of China, the issue of 
independence was not on the cards. Both Taipei and Beijing agreed that the two 
Chinas would eventually be reunited, --- Moreover, as the two Chinas become 
increasingly linked by trade and investment, both sides have more to lose in any 
such conflict, ---. Nevertheless, the fear of war in the Taiwan straits, and the US role 
in any such conflict, continues to cause many sleepless nights in the foreign policy 
think-tanks of Washington.   
 
Although the disputation has not yet resolved a final settlement between mainland China and 
Taiwan, most countries including America have officially confirmed ‘only one China, the 
People’s Republic of China, Principle’. Therefore, this thesis will list Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan as a province or local administrative region when discussing geographical topics. 
However, in terms of the economical statistics applied in this thesis, Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan will be categorised into cross-border, or international categories, because of the 
substantially different political and economical systems between the three regions and 
mainland China.  
 
1.4.2. Time Scale of the Thesis Focus from 1998 to 2007 
As mentioned before, this thesis investigates the FITS sector’s first development decade in 
mainland China after its opening. Thus, the findings of this research only represent the cases 
and phenomena of the FITS sector in China from 1998 to 2007 which can be regarded as the 
infant stage of the sector. As the whole research project spanning over five years from the 
original design at the end of 2004 to the final submission in August 2010, there are some 
materials published after 2007 also applied in the thesis, including some statistics of 2008 or 
data of 2009. However, the data in this thesis was selected to serve the aims and objectives of 
the research, focusing on the development of the FITS sector in China during the decade from 
1998 to 2007. In order to keep the studied data comparable and analysable throughout, most 
statistics especially those regarding the Chinese tourism industry were of the years up to 2007. 
Thus, it is important to emphasize that most findings of this thesis should be considered as 
particularly relevant within the time scale of 1998 to 2007.  
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Chapter 2 
The Study of Travel Trade Business 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the performance of the international travel trade business 
in the marketplace of China. Therefore, it is important firstly to present a study on the nature 
of the travel trade business. In western literature, the business is usually regarded as 
comprising two main components, tour operators (TOs) and travel agencies (TAs). Based on 
the western literature, this chapter will examine the characters of the two types, the 
differences and relationships between them, and the dynamics of the business. In addition, 
there is a need to compare the travel trade business between more advanced western markets 
and that in China. The purpose of this chapter is to help understand the subjects of this study 
(who they are), and their fundamental and diversified functions, as well as some major issues 
concerning the changes and challenges of the business in practice. An understanding of these 
topics will support the procession of a more focused study on the business in China in later 
chapters.  
 
Therefore, this chapter reviews the traditional definitions, roles and functions of the two 
sectors, which is followed by a brief comparison of the two types of business. The two 
divisions, TOs and TAs, are studied separately in some details about their different 
characteristics, with a discussion for each division regarding current development trends 
which are fueled by the advancing Internet technology in the market. This is followed by an 
investigation of the relationship of the two business sectors. A further investigation is included 
focusing on the differences in the relationships between more advanced economies and less 
developed countries, such as China. The chapter concludes that the two types of business have 
not only complemented but also competed with the each other. Subsequently, they are both 
challenged by the growth of the direct distribution channels applied by the principal service 
providers. However, unlike the western marketplaces, the boundary between TOs and TAs is 
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not necessarily clearly identified in China. Strategically, the information and communication 
technology (ICT) revolution is not the most crucial challenge for the travel trade businesses in 
the country.   
 
 
2.2. Definitions of TOs and TAs 
Although the research priority of relevant academic fields shifted to the impacts and 
applications of the ever-changing e-tourism intermediary system from the basic nature of the 
businesses since late 1990s, it is still important for this thesis to consider the traditional 
division between TOs and TAs, based mainly on western studies. The TOs are often classified 
as the wholesaler of the industry, especially in the United States, in the sense that they 
purchase services, and break bulk (i.e. buy in large quantities in order to sell in smaller 
quantities) (Holloway, 2002; Cavlek, 2006). They operate between the producers of the 
primary services and the travel retailers. However, TOs can also be seen as a producer who 
takes raw materials, like hotel beds and airline seats, and processes them into ‘a 
“manufactured” product which it then sells’ (Horner & Swarbrooke, 1996, p.307) directly to 
consumers, or indirectly through travel agents to consumers (Urry, 1990; Ioannides and 
Debbage, 1998). In short, the service which TOs provide is to buy in bulk, and thus secure 
considerable discounts from primary suppliers which could not normally be obtained by the 
customer buying direct.  
 
The business of TAs, in other words, retail travel, ‘is the distribution element in the tourism 
marketing system. It is, in general, the interface between the producers, TOs, hoteliers, 
airlines and other transport operators, for example – and their customers’ (Horner et al, 1996, 
p.335). Thus, TOs are one of the tour product suppliers of TAs who take the role as a sales 
outlet and front stage of the industry. However, it is noteworthy that TOs and TAs, can both be 
recognized as a trader or intermediary between the tourist facilities of destinations and tourists, 
which is a common and essential nature of both businesses. Thus, although there may be other 
bodies like credit card companies, involved as an intermediary, TOs and TAs traditionally 
make-up the so called travel trade industry (Pender, 2001; Buhalis, 2000). 
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In the travel trade, the common product is tour packages after TOs 'packaging into single 
products the various elements serving the travel experience (i.e. flights, accommodation, tours, 
ground transfers)'  (Ioannides, 1998, p139), which are also known as inclusive tours (ITs) 
without flight tickets, or air inclusive tours (AITs) with flights covered. According to Cavlek 
(2006), tour packages make up over 50% of total agency sales in Europe and about 30% in the 
USA. Thus, TOs being the creators of the packaged holidays, and TAs who traditionally 
assume the crucial role of selling the packages are two significant players and cooperators in 
the travel trade. In many western countries, it is very often the case that a TO and a TA are in 
the same ownership while operating as separate entities, such as First Choice Holidays and 
one of its TAs, Travel Choice. As the two sectors are closely related, Buhalis (2000) illustrated 
some essential functions and benefits enhanced by TOs and TAs as a whole travel trade 
industry (see Table 2.1).  
 
However, given the increasing use of the Internet in the tourism industry, there has been a 
perceived growth in direct distribution, resulting in greater proportions of travel products 
being sold to travelers without a use of a middleman. This method has been used by an 
increasing number of industrial principals, such as hotels, airlines, and TOs. It is clear that 
both the business of TOs and TAs are under the threat of direct travel distribution (Ioannides 
and Debbage, 1998, O'Connor and Murphy, 2004), in terms of them being an intermediate 
trader. However, the extent to which technological development impacts on the future of the 
two types of business differs. This results from the respective features and industrial functions 
of the two businesses. Moreover, it is important to understand that the development of the 
Internet and e-travel distribution channels offers not only challenges but also gives 
opportunities to the traditional travel trade businesses (Alvarez, Martin, and Casielles, 2007), 
including the increasingly efficient management tools through the application of Web 2.0 for 
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Table 2.1.  Functions of the travel trade sector 
l Identify consumers' needs, requests and expected experiences; 
l Assemble tourism products from different providers; 
l Provision of co-coordinated and seamless tourism products; 
l Facilitated the selling process by reserving and issuing travel documents; 
l Reduction of prices by negotiating and pre-purchasing tourism products in bulk; 
l Ameliorate inventory management by managing demand and supply; 
l Issue and deliver travel documentation, i.e., ticketing, vouchers, etc; 
l Assessment of quality of facilities and products; 
l Assistance in legal requirements for consumers, e.g., visas, and for suppliers; 
l Facilitated communications between consumers and suppliers, especially  in multilingual and 
multicultural environments; 
l Reduce the perceived risk for consumers;  
l Provision of information by using leaflets, brochures and so on; 
l Consumers guidance/ advice/ consultation; 
l Undertake pre- and post- experience marketing research; 
l Facilitation of access to often remote destinations; 
l Establish a clearing system where each channel member receives payments for services; 
l Spreading the commercial risk involved between channel members; 
l Arranging details and ancillary services, such as insurance; 
l Assume risk when pre-purchasing tourism products; 
l Promotion of particular products or packages, in co-operation with suppliers; 
l Promotion of distressed capacity in low period and at the last minute; 
l Complaint handling for both customers and industry. 
Sources: Based on Buhalis (2000) 
 
 
2.3. The Business Nature of TOs 
2.3.1. Segmentation of TOs 
Different business approaches may be examined according to the size of the operators. The 
size of TOs is an important factor as there are obvious difference between the major European 
large scale TOs, such as TUI and Thomas Cook, who move literally millions of tourists 
annually, and the small specialist operators who may only handle a few hundred customers a 
year. This can be linked to two other issues, namely ownership and marketing objectives. The 
large TOs often belong to big corporations with other business interests, such as American 
Express’s corporate travel business and its primary credit card services. Conversely small 
operators tend to be owned by individuals or families and can even be run as a ‘hobby’ or 
part-time business, for example, special interest and activity holiday operators in skiing 
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(Horner et al, 1996, p.308). The two types of operators therefore tend to have different target 
markets, in terms of both tourist types and volumes.  
 
Secondly, another method of segmentation that may be used is outbound, inbound, and 
domestic TOs, according to their geographical emphasis in production and marketing. 
Outbound TOs are those who organize and market tour products for residents from the nation, 
where the operators are located, (going overseas to other destination countries, where the 
tours are arranged). Since the end of the Second World War there has been significant 
movement of people between countries for both leisure and business purposes. From that time 
the business of TOs started to boom. The market for overseas travel is normally concerned 
with higher budgets for accommodation and flight tickets, and generally greater expected 
nights of stay than a domestic travel, as well as an implication of stronger demands of tourists 
using an intermediary for information and discounted prices. Thus, the outbound travel 
market traditionally was regarded as the prime business ingredient of the TO sector.  
 
Moreover, the inbound TOs, located in a destination country, generally deal with travel 
products for foreign visitors to come and visit the destination. Some of the large ones may 
also be called destination management agencies, who may sell their packaged or 
semi-packaged tours to both outbound TOs and TAs in generating countries. However, the 
majority of the inbound TOs are merely ground handling agents, collaborating with foreign 
TOs. Furthermore, the domestic TOs are those who organize packaged holidays to a 
destination within the country where the tourists reside. They are often considered as highly 
fragmented sector made up of: 1) a large number of relatively small companies; 2) a number 
of ‘direct marketers’ who prefer not to use retail travel agents.  
 
Thirdly, there is another main distinction drawn between mass market and specialist TOs. 
‘Mass market TOs arrange travel for the majority of holidaymakers traveling on inclusive 
tours. The focus of these companies is on high turnover with the aim being to maximize load 
factors on the travel portion and to negotiate very low rates with the accommodation supplier. 
--- through volume buying’ (Pender, 2001, p.9). One feature is that they tend to deal with 
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package holiday products with wide public appeal usually visiting popular, and highly 
developed destinations, and well-known hotel chains. However, specialist TOs ‘tends to deal 
with niche products and markets. The focus might be on a particular activity, travel to a 
geographic area such as a continent or country, or a certain type of holiday maker’ (Pender, 
2001, p.11). In general, specialist products are less price sensitive than the mass market type. 
In addition, Pender (2001) offered some of the defining characteristics of mass market and 
specialist TOs (see Table 2.2). Today the distinction between the two types is less clear than in 
the 20th century. This is because more and more mass market TOs have adapted traditional 
mass production into new forms of large volume flexible production, in order to hedge 
dynamic demands and increasing competition in the marketplace (Shaw and Williams, 2002).  
 
Table 2.2.  Defining characteristics of mass market and specialist TOs 
Mass Market Specialist 
Strong buying power; 
 
Holidays with wide public appeal; 
 
Distributions is usually by travel 
agent; 
 
Destinations/hotels are often treated 
as substitutable; 
 
Standardized brochures are often 
used; 
 
Linked often to a travel agency chain; 
(Typically the ‘sun, sea, sand’ 
holiday). 
Specialists by type of holiday, destination or mode of 
transport, for example: cruising or ski holidays; 
 
Relatively small (often providing holidays for only one 
or a few niche markets); 
 
Flexible operators who can respond quickly to and direct 
changes in market demand ; 
 
Distribution is usually direct as it can be difficult for 
small TOs to achieve distribution via the travel agency 
sector; 
 
Travel agents are often less familiar with their product. 
Source: Pender (2001)  
 
2.3.2. The Traditional Nature and Characteristics of Tour Operating    
A tour package is composed of a series of integrated travel services, each of which is 
purchased by the tour operator in bulk and resold as part of a package at an all-inclusive price. 
These services usually consist of an aircraft seat, accommodation, and transfers and tours in 
the destinations. It is also possible to include other services such as catering, excursions or car 
hire. The success of the operator usually depends on its ability to buy its individual raw 
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products, package and sell them at a price lower than what the customers could obtain 
themselves. However, they may only keep prices low either by restraining profits, or by 
cutting costs, and sometimes, by running their own airlines and accommodations.  
 
Despite attempts to lower the costs and prices, the tour operating business 'is very complex, 
highly demand driven and very risky' (Cavlek, 2006, p163). The main risks in the business are 
traditionally concerned with appropriate projections of prices, in accordance with the forecast 
of tourism demand and capacity. Traditionally, a TO has to finalize the prices of packaged 
tours at the latest half a year before the tour operation starts. As they may have to buy some 
elements, such as rooms and flights, of the packages many months before the products sold, 
and these purchased services are perishable, their risks are obvious. Moreover, given most 
destinations of the tour packages are in foreign countries, the fluctuation in the exchange of 
currencies is another considerable risk for the business. Therefore, as Cavlek (2006, p167) 
further marked, 'this business activity is highly dependent on economic movements on the 
generating and receiving markets', and is 'one of the riskiest industries'. Furthermore, as Table 
2.3 shows, most tour operators only achieve a profit of one to two percent. The business is not 
only risky, but also embodying a nature of having a very low profit margin (Laws, 1997; 
Holloway, 2002; Cavlek, 2006). 
 
Although the tour operating business is considered very fragile, being a multi-billion dollar 
industry, TOs have developed complex organizational and management structures. Especially, 
yield management, to 'govern and to modify prices depending on actual demand' (Cavlek 
2006, p.170), has become a priority for corporations in the leisure travel markets. However, 
the development of ICTs has not only changed the consumer behaviour of tourists, but also 
transferred the distribution approaches of the tourism industry. In the past, preparatory work 
of tour operation had to be undertaken over one year ahead before the products were sold, 
which certainly emphasizes the high costs and risky nature of the business of TOs. Nowadays, 
TOs have updated to changing market trends, and created self-tailored online dynamic 
packages, which account for a significant share of total sold packages in Europe in 2007 
(Freitag and Pyka, 2008). 
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Table 2. 3. Income statement of a large vertically integrated tour operator  
Expenses or Profit  % of Overall Sales 
Expenses for leisure travel services 69 
Cost of materials (operating supplies for aircraft, 
goods purchased and similar) 
4 
Hotel services  36 
Flight and technical service costs 20 
Fees  5 
Transfer and other transportation costs 1 
Other costs of purchased services 4 
Gross profit 31 
Personnel expenses 10 
Other operating expenses, depreciation and 
amortization 
20 
EBITA (earnings before interests, taxes and 
amortization) 
1 
       EBTA (earnings before taxes and 
amortization) 
  ( 0.8 ) 
TOTAL 100 
Sources:  Based on Cavlek's table (2006, p. 167) 
 
2.3.3. The Production Programme of Tour Operations 
Typically, TOs will follow a set pattern in terms of the planning and creation of package 
holidays, as outlined in Figure 2.1. The production programme of a TO can be shown in four 
stages: Market research, Negotiating, Pricing, and Promotion. First, it is always essential that 
TOs should undertake market research prior to implementation of any season’s holiday 
programme. Keeping abreast of changing consumer tastes is a prerequisite of business success, 
as this will enable the company to make a more confident decision when competing in the 
marketplace. The main responsibilities of the market research often include the following 
three aspects: to determine the proper capacity of the market; to investigate rivals and pricing 
conditions; and to assess the accessibility of the host country. For example, it is vital to 
research the transportation facilities of a destination, as well as the local political and cultural 
issues concerning the possibility of a hostile relationship between the generating countries and 
the destinations, or custom conflicts between tourists and the host communities. 
 
Second, when negotiating contracts, TOs needs to establish the availability of elements of the 
package and to obtain a price that ‘will be attractive to customers yet profitable to the 
company’ (Pender, 2001, p.37).  The expected volume of passengers to be carried, as well as 
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the reputation of the TO, usually influence the results of the negotiation, including prices, and 
forms of support. However, a recent trend is that more and more TOs ‘are showing renewed 
interest either in owning hotels at the destinations or at the very least having far more say in 
their (the hotels’) management’ (Holloway, 2002, p. 244). Similarly, in order to reduce the 
average cost, it is not unusual that the larger TOs have their own charter airlines. 
 
Figure 2.1. Main production stages for package holidays  
Stage 1                         Market research 
                            
    Time-scales                                 Capacity 
 
Stage 2                          Negotiating for supply 
 
Transport              Ancillary services               Accommodation 
 
Stage 3                           Pricing the package 
 
 
Stage 4                    Executing the promotional programme 
 
Brochure design and printing     Launch      Advertising      Sales promotions, etc. 
 
Sources: Pender, (2001) 
 
Third, given seasonality being a strong characteristic rooted in the travel products, TOs’ 
pricing strategies are deeply influenced, reflecting different supply and demand relationships. 
Typically, there are high season price, low season price and shoulder season price, as Pender 
(2001, p.42) indicates: 
‘High season  The most popular dates, typically those during the school holidays for the 
family market, are often priced more expensively than other times. High seasons can vary 
between different holiday types. Ski holidays for example tend to show peak demand at 
different times to other types of holiday. 
Low season  The cheapest dates are usually those when demand is poor as might be the case 
during the rainy season in some countries. 
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Shoulder season  Those dates not referred to as high or low season are often referred to as the 
shoulder season.’  
How to make the price appropriate is always a key issue for the success of TOs. As Holloway 
(2002, p. 246) states, ‘The price must be right for the market, right compared with the price of 
competitors’ package tours, and right by comparison with the price of other tours offered by 
the company’. The mass-market TOs must take account of both recovering overhead costs, as 
well as their competitors’ prices, since the market is extremely price elastic, especially in the 
shoulder season or off-season. In addition, other elements, such as the location of departure 
airports, or the time of leaving, or the fluctuant exchange rates between the origin markets and 
destinations, can also exert considerable influence on the prices. 
  
Lastly, promoting and distributing the packaged products is an essential process in the 
achievement of a good sale season. Traditionally, holiday brochures are widely used as the 
visible face of the package tour industry, given the intangible nature of the tourism product. 
The brochure accounted for a significant proportion of most mass market TOs’ marketing 
budgets, together with the emergence of video and CD-Rom in 1990s. However, the 21st 
century has seen an ICT revolution in the tourism distribution system with the increasing 
application of 'New eMediaries', namely the Internet, interactive digital television and mobile 
devices, leading to more efficient information management skills in the industry (Buhalis and 
Licata, 2002, p.207). As a result, tourists have been enjoying searching and booking 
destination services through the Internet at their convenience, contributing to a growing 'direct 
distribution system' of the marketplace (Papathanassis and Buhalis, 2007; Henrik, 2008) and 
having substantially changed the ways TOs communicate and interact with all their partners 
during the promotion and distribution process (Buhalis, 2003).  
 
For TOs, this trend in distribution means both challenges and opportunities (Buhalis, 2003; 
Alvarez et al, 2007). On the one hand, their major products, tour packages, can be seen and 
purchased directly by customers, without paying commissions to TAs, and without the costs 
of street shops. In addition, the effects of ICTs have also opened ways to improve the 
management of business relationships with customers, partners and other stakeholders. On the 
other hand, if travelers buy accommodation and flights directly on-line for their trips, TOs 
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will lose the business, and even their value in the distribution system of the industry. Presently, 
evolutionary direct and traditional indirect distribution approaches are both applied by TOs 
and other travel principal services, such as hotels. It is believed that both direct and indirect 
channels can find their different value and potential in the tourism distribution system in the 
future (Law, Leung and Wong, 2004).  
 
2.3.4. Crucial Trends in the Business 
Globalisation has become a widely used term in the tourism industry, and the actual process 
of globalisation has caused substantial impacts on the market of TOs. According to Shaw and 
Williams (2004, p 4-5), 'financial services, currencies, corporations, markets, governments 
and governance, cultures and corporeal mobility are no longer constrained by national spaces'. 
They also described a key aspect of globalisation as 'networks and systems of interchange or 
the interconnectedness of places and spaces', featured by 'increases in both the geographical 
reach and intensity of interconnectedness' (Shaw and Williams, 2004, p5). As TOs' major 
products are overseas packaged tours, their outsourcing nature makes them one of the most 
active businesses in this respect. They look abroad, not only searching for ideal and potential 
destinations and supply partnerships, but also for more opportunities in which to expand and 
to enhance their economies of scale through purchasing powers. Facilitated by the advancing 
ICTs, TOs, especially large mass market TOs, will be devoting themselves to building global 
networks. 
 
Second, given a fierce competitive environment within the global travel industry, there has 
been an apparent escalation of mergers and acquisitions in the TO sector (Henrik, 2008). 
Since the late 20th century, this business practice has dominated the American, British and 
other European TO markets. Especially in the UK, given the green light for the future mergers 
by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Now the Competition Commission) in 1997, 
the big TOs have sharply increased their market consolidation with a series of projects of 
mergers (Holloway, 2002). Generally, there were two directions of mergers and acquisitions 
observed: horizontal integration among the tour operator sector, and vertical integration, more 
meaningful and powerful, between TOs, their suppliers (such as hotels), and their retailers. 
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Table 2.4 gives some British examples of the relationship between major TOs, air lines and 
TAs (which would be changed constantly through time). In fact, after the mergers of Thomas 
Cook with MyTravel, and TUI with First Choice, the European travel market has witnessed an 
era dominated by a pair of rival travel giants (Lambert, 2007). Such consolidated links 
enables TOs to control the standards of the package, enhance profitability, and secure 
availability of air seats and hotel rooms for their clients, especially in high-seasons.  
 
 
Table 2.4. Examples of links between UK’s tour operators, airlines and travel agents 
Owned Airlines TOs Linked Travel Agents 
Thomson Fly Thomson Travel (merged by  
TUI in 2000) 
Lunn Poly, Travel House, Portland 
Direct 
First Choice Airways First Choice Holidays (tied up 
with TUI in 2007) 
Travel Choice,  Edipse, 
Bakers Dolphin,  
Holiday Hypermarket 
Thomas Cook Airline Thomas Cook (merged with 
My Travel in 2007) 
Going Places 
Source: Based on Holloway (2002) 
 
 
Third, the significance of the Internet as both an information display channel and a direct 
distribution method has been an essential challenge for TOs, as they have to invest to keep in 
line with the advance of technology. For TOs, the increasing application of the Internet means 
both opportunities and threats to the business. It is the on-line channel that increases the 
possibility of direct sales and brings instant cash inflows without the cut of commissions to 
TAs. However, as the principals, for example hotels and airlines, were also utilizing the 
Internet to directly contact travelers, the value and appeal of packaged tour services has been 
challenged. Therefore, it is crucial strategically that TOs should develop with advanced 
Internet-based tools, such as the intranet and extranet, providing more additional values to 
their products, in order to gain future competences (Buhalis, 2003).   
 
2.3.5.  Summary of the TO Business 
As Holloway (2002) and Cavlek (2006) emphasized, TOs being the wholesaler of the tourism 
industry, purchase services from the producers of the primary services, such as hotels, and 
break bulk to sell to the travel retailers. In order to understand the nature and main characters 
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of the TO business, we first looked at the different segments of the business, from 
international giants to small firms, from outbound, inbound to domestic TOs, and from mass 
market TOs to specialists. Next the nature of high risks and low net profits was emphasized, 
which highlights the importance of yield management for the success of a TO. New forms of 
products like online self-tailored dynamic packages were increasingly applied to help reduce 
the risks from uncertain market demands. Moreover, we examined a traditional four-step 
operation process of TOs, including doing market research, negotiating for supply, pricing the 
packages, and promoting for a good sale. These aspects were regarded as the core business 
contents for TOs who are experiencing dramatic changes resulting from the increasing 
application of ICTs and Internet-based management tools in the global marketplace.  
 
In this section, some of the major trends of the TO business were also briefly explored. 
Globalization, in terms of both geographical reach and intensity of interconnectedness, was an 
important issue in the industry (Shaw and Williams, 2004). Mergers and acquisitions were 
another widely utilized strategy among TOs, especially in those developed economies like the 
UK and USA (Henrik, 2008). Furthermore, the Internet and other new ICTs, such as mobile 
devices, have stimulated the essential growth of direct distribution of the tourism industry 
(Papathanassis and Buhalis, 2007), which means both opportunities and challenges for TOs 
(Buhalis, 2003). However, it is important to note that there has been a lack of detailed 




2.4.  The Business Nature of TAs 
2.4.1.  The Nature of Tourism Distribution  
Traditionally, the TAs act as the middlemen, or as a form of indirect distribution for most TOs 
and travel principals, helping them to sell products, and to provide customers with necessary 
information and advice before their departures. In return, they receive payments/commissions 
from those principal companies, including TOs, typically in monthly or seasonal bases for the 
sales they have achieved. However, the agents’ earliest role was to sell shipping and rail 
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services. This has changed following World War Two, given the rapid development of air 
transport facilities. In the past, shipping, or railway and coach operators established city 
centre terminals in order to dispense tickets directly and easily to the public. As the airlines 
developed, their terminals were situated well away from the city centres. They chose to use a 
convenient network of established travel agents rather than setting up their own chains of 
sales offices in city centres. 
 
After a handful of retail entrepreneurs had the vision that they could buy air seats in bulk and 
then sell with low prices, a huge mass market of outbound air package tours were developed 
by organizations, such as Thomas Cook. Therefore, as Holloway (2002, p.264) remarks, ‘it 
was the travel agents themselves who developed the first air package tours’ which has brought 
retailers’ their largest source of revenue. In other words, originally it was TAs who 
transformed themselves into TOs. It seemed that the development of outbound tourism and air 
package tours was the most essential cause of the division between TAs and TOs. 
 
The main role of TAs is to provide a convenient location and outlets for the purchase of travel, 
in addition to being a source of information and advice on travel products. A full range of 
services includes: selling air tickets, cruise and ferry tickets, rail and coach transport, car hire, 
hotel accommodation, overseas or domestic package tours, and other ancillary services, such 
as travel insurance, and foreign exchange, as was as travel documentation services such as 
visa application. As not all of these services are profitable, a very thin profit margin is a 
feature of retail travel, typically between 5 to 15 % among different products. However, there 
is a trend among principals, especially airlines, to pay even lower level of commissions to 
TAs, as a result of increasing opportunity to sell directly to the travelers (Hatton, 2003).   
 
The business of TAs is dissimilar to most other types of retailers, in the sense that travel 
agents do not need to purchase a product in advance, which means no stock of travel products 
(Buhalis, 2003). Thus, there are two implications for the businesses. First, the cost of setting 
up the business is relatively low compared with other businesses. Second, TAs are not 
necessarily seeking to dispose of purchased products, and thus display less brand loyalty 
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towards a particular product or company. However, in order to achieve higher commissions, 
many TAs have their preferred principal brands, resulting in selective advices and limited 
choices for their customers. Moreover, as mentioned above, for many TOs and TA chains, it is 
not unusual that they may be constrained by the same ownership. In such cases, the TA then 
tends to push their kin companies’ products, and thus, their sales are often classified into the 
definition of 'directional selling' (Holloway, 2002).  
 
In addition, it is worthwhile to review the tourism distribution system again using Renshaw’s 
(1997) comparison of travel distribution to other distribution channels (see Figure 2.2). 
Obvious differences can be seen between the two models, not only the different players in the 
two systems, but also the multi-channel approaches displayed in the travel industry. Unlike 
many other industries, direct sales from producers, as well as from middlemen, to customers 
were particularly common in the travel industry, and are becoming even more convenient, 
facilitated by Internet-based ICT applications, especially mobile and wireless technologies, 
such as PDA and 3G, referred to as ‘m-commerce’ by Buhalis and Licata (2002) (see Figure 
2.3). It is also notable that with the introduction of smart phones and the i-phone, 




Figure 2.2. A comparison of distribution channels.  
Other Industries                             Travel Industry 
 
Manufacturers                         Principals (transport/accommodation) 
                                                 
Wholesalers                                            TOs 
 
Retailers                                            Travel agents  
                                                       
Consumers                                          Tourists 
 
 
Source: Renshaw (1997) 
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Figure 2.3. New intermediary framework in the tourism industry  
 
Sources: Buhalis and Licata (2002, p209) 
 
Table 2.5. Arguments for and against the disintermediation of TAs 
Arguments for the disintermediation of TAs Arguments against the disintermediation of TAs 
TAs currently add little value to the tourism 
product, as they primarily act as booking offices 
TAs are professional travel advisers and offer 
valuable services and advice 
TAs merely manage information and undertake 
reservations  
TAs use expertise to save time for consumers 
TAs are biased, in favour of principals who offer 
override commissions and in-house partners 
Technology is difficult to use and expensive to 
acquire for individuals 
Experienced travelers are much more 
knowledgeable than TAs 
A large part of the market is computer-illiterate 
and unwilling to improve its skills 
Visiting TAs is inconvenient, time- consuming and 
restricted to office hours 
The more complex computers and the Internet 
become, the more people need experts to use 
them 
Commissions to TAs increase the total price of 
travel products ultimately 
TAs offer free counselling services and add 
value by giving advice 
Personnel in TAs are often inadequately trained 
and inexperienced 
Electronic intermediaries primarily serve the 
business market and are more expensive 
There is a gradual increase in independent 
holidays and a decrease in package holidays 
There is currently limited provision for the 
organized inclusive tourist on-line 
Technology enables consumers to undertake most 
functions from the convenience of their armchairs 
TAs can achieve better prices through the right 
channels and deals and by buying in bulk or 
through consolidators 
Electronic travel intermediaries offer a great 
flexibility and more choice 
TAs offer a human touch and a human interface 
with the industry 
A number of themed/specialized web portals 
emerge to serve niche markets 
TAs reduce the insecurity of travel, as they are 
responsible for all arrangements 
The re-engineering of the tourism industry (e.g. 
electronic ticketing, no-frills airlines, airline 
commission capping, loyalty schemes) facilitates 
disintermediation 
Internet transactions are not secured or reliable 
yet and consumers are not willing to provide 
credit card details 
Source: Buhalis (2003, p271) 
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The increasing application of the Internet and ICTs has caused restructuring in the tourism 
industry, especially in the tourism distribution system (Egger and Buhalis, 2008). The future 
existence of the travel agency business has been discussed among researchers, such as, Milne 
and Gill (1998), Barnett and Standing (2000), Anckar (2003), Cheyne, Downes and Legg 
(2005), and Alvarez et al (2007). Buhalis (2003) provides a clear vision about the prominent 
arguments for and against viability of the TA (See Table 2.5). The prevailing direct sales of 
principals have indeed threatened the traditional income streams of TAs. However, the 
technology revolution has also brought business opportunities with increasingly clever tactical 
planning and operational management tools which were demonstrated in Table 2.6. The future 
of TAs depends on their capacity of adoption of both market dynamics and technology 
applications. The key to their survival lies on their ability to find themselves value and 
position in the new era of tourism (Page and Connell, 2009). 
 
Table 2.6.  ICT-enabled tactical planning and operational management tools 
Internet/Stakeholder 
-wide systems 
Extranet/partner systems Intranet/internal systems 
Network of networks 
interconnecting everybody in 
the world 
Private intranet accessible to 
authorized outsiders 
Internal network based on 
Internet and World Wide Web 
technology and standards 
-Selling and eCommerce 
 
-Branding building  
 
-Loyalty clubs and affiliations 
 
-Communication and 
interacting with all stakeholders 
-Communications and 
interacting with partners 
 
-Interacting with stakeholders 
 
-eBusiness functions 
eSales and marketing 
eProduction and manufacturing 
eProcurement 
eAccounting and eFinance 




Check-in and billing procedures 
Routing and scheduling 
Coordination of production 
 
-eBusiness functions 
eSales and marketing 
eProduction and manufacturing 
eProcurement 
eAccounting and eFinance 




Source: Buhalis (2003, p182) 
 
2.4.2.  Segmentation of the TA Sector 
Traditionally, there have been four major methods used to categorize TAs. First, there is a 
four-level distinction by geographical spread: multinationals with offices in over one country, 
national multiples with offices throughout a country, regional multiples with a number of 
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offices concentrated in one region of a country, and independents with one to a handful of 
branches (Buhalis, 2003). The second way of categorising TAs is according to the type of 
business focus, or say, the segments of focused markets. In this respect, four main categories 
are recognized: holiday shops (or referred to as leisure agents), business travel agents (or 
referred to as business houses or corporate TAs), general agents (dealing with both leisure 
holidays and business travel), and air services, including air brokers and consolidators, and 
solely ticketing agencies (Holloway, 2002). Third, there are divisions between traditional TAs 
with high-street shops and an online presence, and on-line TAs, which are wholly dependent 
upon contact with the clients through virtual space (Buhalis and Licata, 2002). Finally, there 
are differences between large tourism groups where TAs are a grouped business link to other 
services like airlines or TOs by ownership, and, independent TAs who follow their own 
interests (Cooper & Fletcher & Gilbert & Wanhill & Shepherd, 1998.).  
 
2.4.3.  Profitability of TAs  
The traditional and major revenue and profit of a travel agency is derived from a commission 
payment – a percentage of the value of sales achieved for a principal company. Other sources 
of revenue are outlined in Table 2.7. However, the net margin of a travel agency is very thin, 
as a previous study found that on average, ABTA members retained less than 1 % of their total 
turnover after expenses (ABTA, 2005).  
 
 
Table 2.7. Additional sources of travel agency earnings  
Overrides: These represent an increase in the level of commission not linked to sales performance; 
Incentive payments: These represent an increase paid for the achievement of a certain level of sales; 
Ancillary services: These include the sale of such things as holiday insurance and transport to airports; 
Referral vouchers: These are issued by principals (hotels, car hire firms, etc,) in exchange for a travel 
agent’s recommendation to clients. The agent receives commission or a standard payment once the client 
presents the voucher, makes a booking and pays directly; 
Interest on money held: Money received by an agent from a client but not yet passed on to the principal, 
sometimes known as ‘pipeline money’ that can be used to earn interest for the agent; 
Service charges: Service charges are means of recouping money on a transaction (telephone booking or 
visa application for example) that it might otherwise cost the travel agent to carry out rather than a main 
source of income for an agency. 
Source: Pender (2001, p.62) 
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However, there has been a tendency among principals and TOs moving towards a tighter 
policy of less commission for TAs, or sometimes, the introduction of fixed minimum 
payments for the sales via travel agents. In the UK, Thomson led the way in reducing basic 
rates of commission to TAs and introducing a complex reward system including directional 
selling. In 2003, British Airways announced it would reduce TAs’ bonus payment to 1 percent, 
followed closely by Iberia, Finnair, Lufthansa, and British Airways, as well as SAS 
announcing a payment of Є 1 for each ticket issued in Finland (Hatton, 2003). The airlines’ 
suggestion to TAs is for the introduction of service fees by the retailers themselves for 
customers. Evidence from the USA tends to support the view that service charges are difficult 
to impose. Commissions were scrapped by the airlines in America in the mid-1990s, but the 
public resisted the attempts of adding service fees and turned to booking on line (Holloway, 
2002).   
 
Thus, the future viability of the TA business is substantially challenged, especially for those 
small and medium sized independents. In fact, the whole intermediate trade in tourism has 
undergone dramatic changes, and has witnessed increased dynamism, driven by the rapid 
development of ICTs and the Internet (Buhalis, 2003). The future of TAs requires not only a 
high degree of flexibility and willingness to innovate, but also the relocation of their assets to 
provide creative and value-adding services in a new tourism system. One way is to transform 
themselves from ‘being booking offices to being travel managers and advisers’ (Buhalis, 2003, 
p275). Closer communication with customers and dynamic interactions with all stakeholders 
will become a crucial task for the survivors of the business sector (Egger and Buhalis, 2008).  
 
2.4.4.  The Trends in the TA Business  
Similar to the TO sector, the concentration of large scale multiple TAs have been a key 
characteristic in the TA sector with numerous mergers and acquisitions. Renshaw (1997) 
describes a phenomenon known as the ‘March of the Multiples’ (MOM) which focuses on 
agency mergers and takeovers, with major motivations outlined in Table 2.8. Most players 
have realized that ‘only through close collaboration with others will they be able to compete 
on price’ (Holloway, 2002, p.281-2). This implicates a prevailing desire in the sector to 
enhance purchasing power for negotiating over higher commissions. As a result of these 
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movements, the retail sector has seen a concentrated growth into consortia, especially among 
the multinationals and multiples, along with vertical acquisitions between TAs, TOs, and 
airlines. 
 
Table 2.8. Motivations and advantages for MOM 
Economies of scale (cost efficiencies i.e. spread of advertising costs); 
Increased assets (offices); 
Addition of expertise (staff); 
Reduction in competition (by buying it up); 
More bargaining power with principals (possibly leading to lower prices and more support); 
Enhanced public awareness (through branding opportunities common shop-fronts, etc.) 
Geographical spread (increased distribution) 
Source: based on Renshaw (1997); Pender (2001, p.57-8) 
 
Moreover, the business of TAs has been a polarized industry, similar to the TO sector, with 
just a few large multiples at one end of the spectrum and thousands of independents at the 
other. The average turnover for these independent agents is, however, far less than that for 
branch outlets of multiple chains. In other words, the latter in fact achieves far higher market 
shares overall (Page and Connell, 2009). Building up consortia, affiliations and alliances, and 
different levels of collaboration will provide small to medium sized independents with 
opportunities to increase bargaining power, reduce costs, and share risks.   
 
Lastly, the influences of the Internet, such as the increasingly popular direct communications 
and transactions between the principals and travelers, are too vital to neglect. The prevailing 
utilization of ICTs by principals and tourists, and the direct sales through such ICT 
development have certainly threatened the existence of TA business. Table 2.9 provides an 
overall view on the major channel development of the Internet in tourism in the last decade. 
There is no denying the case that the online competitions from ‘cybermediaries’ (Egger and 
Buhalis, 2008) for legacy TAs are various and fierce.  
 
However, it is also true that ICT applications can also increase the management and 
communication efficiency of TAs via Internet based tools, such as intranet and extranet. But 
‘low profit margins and a traditional reluctance to invest in assets have deprived agencies of a 
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wide range of critical tools, preventing them from taking full advantage of the emerging ICTs’ 
(Buhalis, 2003, p272). Thus, Barnett and Standing (2000) proposed that TAs should more 
positively reposition themselves with the support of an effective on-line strategy. They 
introduced seven on-line models for TAs to apply (namely, virtual faces, co-alliances, star 
alliances, value alliances, market alliances, virtual brokers and virtual spaces), and suggested 
that 'an awareness of the range of organisational forms, together with an appreciation of their 
potential for application, will aid successful adaptation by travel companies within a changing 
business environment' (Barnett and Standing, 2000, p.144). Moreover, as Cheyne et al (2005) 
remarked, enforcing a number of service dimensions, such as reliability and handling 
complexity, may also help the business to maintain tourists' patronage. 
 
Table 2.9. Characterized use of the Internet in tourism in the 21st century 
-Reservation systems and global distribution systems (GDS) 
-Online travel agencies (e.g, Expedia) 
-Search engines (e.g. Google) and meta-search engines (i.e. those which send a computer user’s request to 
several search engines or databases and displays the results as a single list with the source) such as Kayak 
-Destination management systems such as VisitBritian.com  
-Price comparison sites (e.g. kelkoo, travel supermarket) 
-Individual suppliers’ and intermediaries’ websites and increasingly the rise of social networking sites.  
Source:  Page and Connell (2009, p. 133) 
 
2.4.5. Summary of the TA Business 
Although as we have known that the TO business was originally created through the 
transformation of earlier TAs, stimulated by the development of outbound tourism, there are 
significant differences between the two types of business. TAs, being the interface between all 
other travel service providers and tourists, are essentially the distribution element for the 
tourism products, including tour packages of TOs. Traditionally, TAs have advantages of city 
centre shops when attracting customs, as the visible premises can alleviate uncertainty feeling 
of tourists when purchasing the intangible products. In short, TAs serve both the industry and 
tourists, making a living by receiving commissions from what they achieve in sales.   
 
Moreover, TAs do not have to invest in a stock of travel products, and thus the cost of setting 
up the business is low, which results in the majority being small/medium sized entrepreneurs 
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in the TA sector. However, there are also a number of large brands of TAs mainly in the form 
of chains. It is evident that vertical integrations of TAs, TOs, and other principals like airlines 
will inevitably impose loyalty bias on TAs to the kin companies’ products. In addition, given 
the increasing direct sales and reducing commissions of principles, facilitated by 
Internet-based ICT applications, the traditional TAs’ distribution capacity has been seriously 
challenged. The future existence and value of TAs in new tourism era are questioned.  
 
Furthermore, there are different types of TAs, namely multinationals, national multiples, 
regional multiples, and independents according to geographical spread; holiday shops, 
business TAs, general agents, and air services depending on business foci; traditional TAs and 
on-line TAs in terms of their business platforms; and, large grouped TAs and independent TAs 
depending on size. Additionally, the nature of very low profitability of TAs is also a critical 
and noteworthy feature, accompanied by narrowing commission streams in the marketplace. 
The answer to the future of the TA business lies in two key issues: technologies and services.     
 
Finally, the important and main future tendencies and trends among TAs should be 
summarized. First, the pursuit of growing economies of scale has become a favorite strategy 
for most TAs, with numerous mergers and acquisitions carried out not only among TAs, but 
also between TAs and other business sectors, such as TOs and airlines. Second, for small and 
independent TAs, establishing consortia, affiliations and alliances is an increasingly important 
strategy to enhance competence. Third, it is crucial to emphasize that to equip themselves 
with advanced ICTs, and to improve professional service dimensions are the keys for TAs’ 
survival in the increasingly dynamic market. 
 
 
2.5.  The Relationship of TOs and TAs 
The relationship between the TOs and TAs is detailed and complex. Perhaps the most 
interesting feature of the relationship is that, on one hand the two sectors mutually 
complement each other, making up the travel trade/travel service sector. Conversely they also 
compete for market shares and customer, ‘disintermediating’ each other (Egger and Buhalis, 
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2008, p.86). As shown in Figure 2.2, both the complementing and competing relations exist 
simultaneously in the travel trade sector with various distribution channels. When they are in 
the traditional indirect approach, ‘principals – TOs – travel agents – customers’, they play 
their distinct and collaborating roles. However, given the increasing opportunities of direct 
distributions, mostly resulting from ICT development, the two businesses are also rivals 
fighting for customers and profits. In addition, both TOs and TAs are facing threats from the 
principals’ application of ‘business to consumer’ (b2c) channels, including call centers and 
on-line shops, resulting in increasing levels of direct sales to principals and the challenge of 
disintermediation to the travel trade business sector, including TOs and TAs.  
 
Thus, the future of the travel trade industry is uncertain, but two assumptions can be made 
here. First, the bigger brands will have advantages over the smaller names in the travel trade, 
facilitated by increasingly consolidated power. Mergers, integrations, and the alliances that 
are reshaping the industry are the best proof of the advantages of economies of scale pursued 
by travel trade businesses. Second, TAs tend to face more crucial difficulties than TOs, under 
the pressure of direct sales via e-tourism distribution, as TOs maintain the value of 
bulk-buying and low priced packages. However, some TAs have started to take dynamic 
packaging as one of their services for tourists (Page and Connell, 2009). It is possible that the 
boundary between TOs and TAs in advanced tourism markets may vanish or become blurred 
in the future.    
 
Therefore, TOs and TAs should be regarded as two functional definitions rather than two 
distinct business attributions. Essentially, the two sectors could be recognized as two major 
functions or processes of the travel trade/travel service industry. As there were market needs 
or inducements, the functions of marketing and sales was separated and specialized, with one 
division pursuing success on marketing and out-sourcing as TOs, and the other focusing on 
the achievement of sales as TAs. The inducing force for this separation was mainly the 
development of international holidays, which originally involved the unfamiliarity and 
insecure feelings of the consumers who lacked experience, and purchased all inclusive 
holidays at a discounted price. As a result, some of the larger agents with the capacity for 
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capital investment for overseas events concentrated on becoming a marketing-orientated 
business and turned into TOs, while other TAs adhered to the retailing business within 
national markets. This assumption of the separation between TOs and TAs is based on the fact 
that TOs were originally transformed from TAs soon after the birth of air transportation and 
the development of outbound tourism in more advanced economies. An implication is that 
there should be differences between nations where outbound tourism is mature, such as the 
USA and the UK, and nations with a developing tourism industry. The travel trade industry in 
China appears to support this assumption.  
 
 
2.6.  Travel Services in China 
The assumption that the division of TOs and TAs are caused by the development of air 
transportation and outbound tourism demands, implies that there are differences between 
diverse economies. Table 2.10 demonstrates four types of tourism development approaches 
among different economies. Since more advanced countries, such as the type A and type B 
countries in Table 2.10, witnessed earlier developments of both domestic and outbound travel 
than less developed economies like China, the division of TOs and TAs is more likely to 
happen earlier in these developed economies.  
 
Table 2.10.  Four types of tourism development  
 Ist  Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage  Examples 












Japan and other 
Developed 
Countries 






Countries,  such 
as China 
Type D Inbound    Less Developing 
Countries 
Sources: Based on Tamamura (2002) 
 
                                                                                                              34 
 
Although Table 2.10 illustrates the different tourism development approaches of countries, the 
relationship between the different approaches and the evolution of the travel trade industry in 
different economies have not been systematically studied by any researchers. However, it is 
noteworthy that the tourism industry in China follows Tamamura’s (2002) TYPE C pattern of 
development, accompanied by a blurred boundary between TAs and TOs. Without the 
division, the whole travel trade sector is called travel service industry officially in the country 
(Qian, 2003). The Chinese outbound travel market has been developing rapidly in recent years, 
with a faster growth speed compared with other countries. It is important to observe that there 
have been recent proposals in the industry in China, calling for a division between TAs and 
TOs. However, in global tourism, both traditional TOs and TAs are facing substantial 
challenges from the e-distribution system, and thus the integration and association between 
TOs and TAs have been applied as a beneficial strategy. The call for separation in China’s 
travel trade sector in response to the development of the outbound travel market, and the 
tendency to integrate in order to manage the challenge of the disintermediation forces from 
the Internet and ICTs make the future of the Chinese travel trade sector unpredictable. 
 
In the example of China, a travel service still covers the functions of both packaging and 
selling, which many TOs and TAs in the world tourism market aim to do. In the new online 
tourism era of Internet based ICTs and e-distributions, whether China still needs to follow the 
path of more developed markets to divide the systems of TOs and TAs is uncertain. However, 
it is important to realise that the Chinese travel service industry is a unique marketplace. On 
one hand, the industry saw a lagging GDS development, resulting from the monopoly of the 
Chinese distribution system, Travel sky. On the other hand, China has embraced the world’s 
largest number of Internet users with over 384 million people registered on-line, up 50% over 
the figure for 2008, exceeding the total population of America (McKinsey Quarterly, 2010). 
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2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the principal concepts of the travel trade including TOs and TAs. 
The roles and functions of the two sectors were described and compared briefly, followed by a 
separate examination of each. In the study of TOs, the chapter investigated the segmentation 
of the business, the nature and the process of tour operation, and the development trends of 
the sector. For the TA sector, the following concepts were discussed: the nature and features of 
tourism distribution, the classifications of the sector, profitability of the business, and trends 
in the industry. The relationship of the two sectors was then examined and concluded that the 
both sectors complemented and competed with the each other. In addition, an assumption was 
raised that the separation of TOs and TAs was the result of the development of air transport 
and outbound holidays in most developed countries. However, this might not be necessary in 
still developing countries like China, as the traditional distribution environment has been 
challenged by Internet-based ICT applications and e-distribution.  
 
In conclusion, the TOs and TAs are essentially homologous as both being the intermediary 
between the principal service providers and the consumers. Changing business climates, 
especially the increasing application level of direct e-distribution system, offered the travel 
trade industry both threats and opportunities. Four important keys for the future of the travel 
trade sector were identified: the establishment of consolidation and collaboration within the 
industry, closer communications and interactions with customers and stakeholders, updated 
application of ICTs, and, more specialized and creative services. It is important to emphasize 
that the travel trade industry in China may develop in a very different way from the industry 
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 Chapter 3  
Foreign Direct Investment and Its Role in Tourism  
 
3.1.  Introduction  
This thesis aims to develop an understanding of international investment in the Chinese travel 
trade industry. In Chapter Two, the travel trade businesses and its development are explained, 
based on western literature. Also in this chapter, the concepts and features of cross-border 
investments in the context of the global tourism industry are examined. In general, 
international investment which concerns capital movement across the borders of diverse 
countries may be divided into three types: Foreign Direct Investment (hereafter FDI), 
Portfolio Investment, such as equity securities, bonds, and options, and other investments, 
including trade credit, loans and financial leases (Lipsey, 2001). The FITS sector targeted in 
this research is concerned with those companies who are officially registered as new 
corporations in China (classified as FDI). It is these firms that form the focus of this chapter.  
 
The data provided by the International Monetary Fund (hereafter IMF) indicate that FDI has 
been an increasing part of total international investment flows since the early 1980s, 
especially in developed countries (IMF, 1993; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). This has 
led to a further series of liberalization movements since the 1990s. The magnitude of FDI in 
services has increased dramatically, accounting for over 70% of total global FDI in both 
inflows and outflows (UNCTAD, 2004), with tourism accounting for more than one-third of 
the total global service trade (WTO, 1998). However, as Endo (2006, p600) claims, 'the 
picture of FDI in tourism is unclear', mainly resulting from the difficulty in obtaining 
comprehensive and comparative data. Therefore, a study of some of the fundamental concepts 
about FDI, and previous research relative to FDI in the tourism industry will be necessary.  
 
First, the chapter defines FDI activities, and then introduces their purpose, forms, features, 
and impacts. The chapter then reviews some of the previous studies concerning FDI and other 
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modes of internationalization in the tourism industry. Different types of multinational 
operations, as well as diverse overseas entry modes, of the industry are briefly examined. 
Moreover, three major tourism businesses, where foreign operations are most apparent, 
including hotels, airlines and travel trade, will be investigated, in terms of distinctive features 
of their internationalization strategies. Using this structure, this chapter aims to develop an 




3.2. Definitions of Foreign Direct Investment 
As Lipsey (2001, p.2) reveals, the concept of FDI has been defined 'in different ways by 
different countries and the definition has changed over time'. However, the current dominant 
definition prescribed by the IMF (1993), and endorsed by Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996, states that  
‘Direct investment is the category of international investment that reflects the 
objective of a resident entity in one economy obtaining a lasting interest in an 
enterprise resident in another economy (The resident entity is the direct investor and 
the enterprise is the direct investment enterprise). The lasting interest implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise 
and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the 
enterprise. A direct investment enterprise is defined in this Manual as an incorporated 
or unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, who is resident in another 
economy, owns 10% or more of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an 
incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise)’ (IMF, 
1993, p.86).  
 
The IMF’s definition ignores the notion of control by the investor in favour of an emphasis on 
‘the lasting interest’. However, from the viewpoint of a host country, and for analyzing 
production, trade and employment, the idea of control remains the preferred concept 
recognising three major types of FDI. The first type is ‘foreign -controlled resident 
corporations’ whereby more than 50% of the invested entity's shares are owned by foreign 
parents. The second is ‘associates’ of which foreign ownership of equity is between 10 to 50% 
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts (ISWGNA), 1993, p.340-341). In 
addition, if a foreign investor holds the entire equivalent and control of the direct investment 
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enterprise in a hosting country, it is then recognized as a wholly owned foreign enterprise 
(hereafter WOFE). 
 
In addition, it is worth mentioning two related but different perspectives in the study of the 
FDI phenomenon. The first is referred to as ‘the international finance, or macro view’, while 
the second ‘is the industrial organization, or micro view’ (Lipsey, 2003, p288). The macro 
view sees FDI as a particular form of capital flow ‘across national borders, from home 
countries to host countries, measured in balance-of-payments statistics.’ (Lipsey, 2003, p288) 
However, the micro view attempts to explain the motivations of international investments. It 
also examines the consequences to the investors and to home and host countries ‘of the 
operations of the multinationals, or of the affiliates created by these investments’ (Lipsey, 
2003, p288). It is clear that the focus of this thesis is mainly on firm behavior and 
management applications from a micro view, albeit macro statistics also play an important 




3.3. Reasons and Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
3.3.1. Reasons of Foreign Direct Investment 
The reason for conducting business activities, including FDI, essentially, is the pursuit of 
material or monetary benefits. For countries having superabundant savings, international 
capital flows provide the means to invest where returns are higher than at home. According to 
Lipsey (1999), the general impression of the relatively stable nature of FDI, compared to 
other types of capital investments, such as portfolio investment, has been perceived. However, 
apart from this most fundamental pursuit for financial profits, other objectives may be 
involved when applying FDI, including market pressures from globalization and competition, 
pursuit of economies of scale, tax evasion, knowledge learning, and risk sharing.  
 
First, there is an important reason which refers to the globalization of market demands and 
competition. As Hill (2003, p. 6) states, the globalization of markets 'helps the merging of 
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historically distinct and separate national markets into one huge global marketplace'. In this 
global market, firms may frequently confront each other as competitors in nation after nation, 
such as Coca-Cola with Pepsi, Boeing with Airbus, and some of the world’s largest retailers, 
Wal-Mart with Carrefour and Tesco. If one firm moves into a new marketplace, its rivals will 
seek to follow immediately to prevent the firm from gaining or consolidating first-mover 
advantages (Knickerbocker, 1973).  
 
As firms follow each other around the world, they bring with them many of the assets that 
served them well in other national markets, including their products and market strategies. 
Therefore, over time, these companies can develop their competitiveness supported by an 
international context of operation (Alexander, 1997). Moreover, it is often the case that the 
global movements of the existing clients of multinationals may also induce their actions of 
overseas expansion (Hill, 2003). This occurs especially among those large multinationals who 
often play a prior role in an emerging or potential market. 
 
Second, pursuing economies of scale may also inform FDI strategy (Knowles, et al, 2001; 
Hill, 2003), providing the means to reduce overall costs, to increase gross turnover, and to 
enhance global networks, brand reputation and negotiation power. Moreover, foreign 
establishments can also help multinationals to source goods and services from locations 
around the globe to take advantage of national differences, not only in the cost and quality of 
factors of production like labor, energy, land and capital, but also to facilitate product 
differentiation and the establishment of market niches, which refers to 'location specific 
advantages' (Dunning, 1977). By ‘transfer pricing’ and ‘income shifting’ through an operation 
to set up prices for sales between branches of the multinationals in different countries, they 
have been able to maximize profits through their global presence (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; 
Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003).  
 
Third, international investors engage in FDI to reduce or avoid the high cost of taxation in 
their home countries (Knowles, Diamantis and El-Mourhabi, 2001). Many host countries, 
especially developing economies, utilize a lower tariff than others, or start-term exemption 
policies for foreign enterprises. As the parents of FDI entities could choose the destination of 
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their duty in the country having the lowest tax rate, many multinationals are involved in tax 
evasion or avoidance via FDI strategy. 
 
Furthermore, to gain first-hand operational experience in a potential market, or to learn more 
advanced knowledge and skills from host countries can also be a reason for setting up an FDI 
project (Alexander and Doherty, 2009). Fifth and finally, having presences in different 
economies has also been regarded as a strategy to spread and hedge risks (Alexander, 1997) 
by balancing diverse investment performances in different economies. However, all of the 
above six reasons of FDI can be generally categorized into two most essential motivations, as 
driven by either profit desires or market stress.  
 
Similarly, Lim (2001) asserts that there are two main types of FDI operations, although they 
are not mutually exclusive. One aims to better serve different local markets, which is also 
called ‘horizontal’ or ‘market seeking’ FDI, involving building duplicate plants in a foreign 
location. The other type is in search of low-cost inputs, often called ‘vertical’ or ‘production 
cost-minimizing’ FDI, usually encompassing ‘raw material seeking’ activities (Lim, 2001, p 
11). Moreover, the former type tends to replace exports, while the later is normally 
export-oriented (Lim, 2001). 
 
Additionally, it is worth mentioning two major theoretical differences on FDI between 
conventional and unconventional models. In sum, conventional models treat FDI as ‘the 
outcome of competitive advantage based on possession of unique assets’ (Moon and Roehl, 
2001, p.198). Dunning’s (1979, 1981, 1988) eclectic paradigm which explains ownership 
advantages, location advantages and internalization advantages of FDI is one of the most 
representative contributions in conventional theories. However, the latter model argues that 
unconventional FDI activities have become more active than ever in investing in global 
markets for different strategic reasons. Unconventional FDI labels two types of firms: 
strategic investments and investments from less developed countries. The both types are 
sharing one important character that the firms invest abroad to redress an imbalance in their 
competitive or resource position, reflecting the lack of advantage. Thus, the unconventional 
investments are ‘basically asset-seeking investments and are different from the conventional 
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asset-exploiting investments’ (Moon and Roehl, 2001, p.199). Furthermore, although 
traditionally, the conventional model is more popular than the other, unconventional 
investments are also applicable in both developed markets and emerging economies like 
China, as Luo and O’Connor (1998) have documented in respect of the development of 
‘strategic investors’ in China in late 1980s and 1990s.   
 
3.3.2. Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
Lim (2001) suggested that both horizontal and vertical FDI may be affected by a number of 
determinants, including economic distance (transport costs), size of the host market, 
agglomeration effects, transaction cost, fiscal incentives, business/investment climate, trade 
barriers/openness. His empirical findings are also evidence that market size is the most robust 
positive FDI determinant although other determinants, such as quality of infrastructures, 
political/economic stability, and free trade zones of the host countries, are also vital. In 
addition, Cheng and Kwan (2000) also suggest that the attractions of host countries for FDI 
will increase, correlating to the market size, infrastructure, preferential policy, sufficient 
education institutions, and high concentration of other FDI projects. In research-intensive 
industries, high R&D intensity of a location is also a positive determinant for FDI (Chung and 
Alcacer, 2002). Moreover, Hong and Chin (2007) find that large market size, good 
transportation infrastructure, low labor costs, and high labor quality are positive factors for 
attracting FDI in China. In general, these location-specific determinants have influenced the 
allocation of the global FDI flows to cluster in certain locations, ‘sometimes referred to as 
‘agglomeration” (Lim, 2001, p.11). They are usually more developed countries/regions 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). 
 
Thus, Guimaraes, et al (2000) consider agglomeration as a principal determinant of FDI, and 
find that agglomeration economies are decisive location factors. They regard agglomeration 
as a fundamental explanation of urban growth, productivity and investment. In short, 
agglomeration engenders economies consisting ‘of those positive externalities resulting from 
the spatial concentration of existing economic activity’ and features, such as specialized labor 
markets, supplier networks, and knowledge spillovers (Guimaraes, et al, 2000, p.122). 
Especially, service agglomeration economies, relating to concentration of tertiary sector, such 
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as business and financial services, were found to have notably strong effect for the location 
choices of FDI (Guimaraes, et al, 2000; Hong and Chin, 2007). The relative importance of 
service agglomeration indicates that ‘developed urban areas will continue to attract most FDI 
(Guimaraes, et al, 2000,p.133). 
 
 
3.4. Different Forms of Foreign Direct Investment 
As indicated, FDI occurs when a firm invests directly in facilities or entities, typically 
corporations, 'to produce and/or market a product in a foreign country' (Hill, 2003, p.204). 
Hill explains two main forms of FDI taken by most international investors. The first is a 
green-field investment, which involves the establishment of a wholly new operation in a 
foreign country. The second involves acquiring or merging with an existing firm in the 
foreign country.  
 
The data from UN suggest the majority of cross-border investment is in the form of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) rather than green-field investments, especially stronger in 
developed nations than developing ones (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). ‘Between 1987 
and 1999, the value of cross-border M&As into developed countries grew at 20 percent 
annually and was never less than 77 percent of all FDI flows into developed countries. In the 
case of developing nations, the ratio of the value of cross-border M&As to FDI was about 33 
percent in 1999, although this represented an increase from about 10 percent a decade earlier’ 
(Hill, 2003, p.211). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (2006) research shows that 
cross-border M&As in the developed world made up about three-quarters of the global total. 
China, mixing both developed and developing economic features, has witnessed a constrained 
development of cross-border M&As. Huang, et al (2006) indicate that foreign M&As of 
Chinese companies and assets is a relatively recent development, and related rules and 
implementation regulations are still in the process of establishment. However, the opening and 
surge of foreign M&As in China is irrevocable (Webre, 2005).   
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Table 3.1. Six modes of internationalization activities  
First, exporting mode avoids the high costs of establishing manufacturing facilities in the host country by 
purchasing local similar products. Moreover, in a turnkey project, the contractor agrees to handle every 
detail of the project for a foreign client who is handed the ‘key’ to a plant that is ready for full operation 
after the contract completed.  
 
A licensing agreement, which is recorded in FDI category, is an arrangement 'whereby a licensor grants the 
rights to intangible property, including patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, copyright, and 
trademarks, to another entity' (the licensee) for a specified period, and in return, the licensor receives a 
royalty fee from the licensee (Hill, 2003, p.482). Licensing is attractive in such cases: a) when a firm is 
unwilling to commit substantial financial resources to an unfamiliar or politically volatile foreign market; 
b) when a firm wishes to participate in a foreign market but is prohibited from doing so by barriers to 
investment; c) when a firm possesses some intangible property that might have business applications, but it 
does not want to develop those applications itself. But, there are disadvantages, such as no tight control 
over production and marketing, limited profits and return, and losing advantages of the licensed technology.  
 
Franchising is a specialized form of licensing in which the franchiser not only sells intangible property 
(normally a trademark) to the franchisee, but also insists that the franchisee agrees to abide by strict rules as 
to how it does business. Also, the franchiser will assist the franchisee to run the business on an ongoing 
basis, with a return of royalty payment which can be some percentage of the franchisee’s revenues. The 
advantages of franchising are very similar to those of licensing. The firm is relieved from costs of opening 
a foreign market on its own. However the mode often challenges the capability of a franchiser, in terms of 
quality control, which ‘can extend beyond lost sales in a particular foreign market to a decline in the firm’s 
worldwide reputation’ (Hill, 2003, p.486) 
 
An equity JV is jointly owned by two or more otherwise independent firms. This mode has long been seen 
as a popular method for a foreign firm to enter a new market. The most typical JV is a 50/50 venture. 
However, some firms may seek JVs in which they have a majority share and thus tighter control. Using JV 
mode, the foreign firm can benefit from the local partner’s knowledge of the host country, especially about 
the competitive conditions, and policy and business systems. (Knowles, et al, 2001) In fact, in many 
countries, political considerations make JVs the only feasible entry mode. However, major disadvantages 
with JV mode include: risks of technology transfer to less advanced partners, and conflicts and battles for 
control between parent firms which may lead to the dissolution of the JV.  
 
Finally, in a wholly owned subsidiary, an investing firm owns 100% of the entity's shares by the way of 
either setting up a new operation (a green-field venture), or fully acquiring an established firm based in that 
host nation. Many high-tech firms prefer this entry mode for overseas expansion to reduce the risk of losing 
control over their technological competence. Moreover, this mode gives a firm tight control and full 
flexibility over strategic operations in different countries, which is important for multinationals when 
engaging in global coordination. However, ‘Establishing a wholly owned subsidiary is generally the most 
costly method of serving a foreign market’ (Hill, 2003, p.488), whatever via a green-field venture or by 
acquisition.  
Source: Based on Hill (2003) 
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From a wider perspective, internationalization activities generally may involve six major 
modes (Hill, 2003), including exporting, turnkey projects, licensing, franchising, establishing 
a joint venture (hereafter JV) which is also called equity JV with a host country firm, or 
setting up a new wholly owned subsidiary in the host country (see Table 3.1). Among the six 
approaches, exporting and turnkey projects are more often seen in the manufacturing industry. 
Manufacturing firms may begin their global expansion as exporters and only later switch to its 
original nature. Start-up of turnkey plants is common in industries like chemical, petroleum or 
metal refining industries. In the hotel industry, however, a similar approach, the so called 
‘build operate transfer’, is often seen in developing markets (Knowles, et al, 2001). The other 
four modes are more frequently applied in tourism. However, as a foreign licensor or 
franchiser does not necessarily invest in the contracted projects in the host economy, owning 
no shares of the projects, the two modes are not categorized in FDI. Thus, FDI in tourism are 
generally in two forms, either JVs or WOFEs, and the two modes can be applied either 
through a green-field investment or by M&As (Wei, Liu and Liu, 2005). 
 
The choice of foreign entry mode has been the core topic of many recent theoretical and 
especially empirical investigations in international management research. According to 
Slangen and Hennart (2007), the focus of these studies has been mainly on the choices 
between: a) contractual/non-equity modes and equity modes (Globerman and Nielsen, 2007); 
b) JVs and WOFEs (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Wei, et al, 2005; Alcantara, et al, 2006); and 
c) green-field investments and M&As (Liu and Zou, 2008). However, the entry mode choices 
of foreign firms firstly have to adapt to the policies and regulations on foreign ownership of 
the host country (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Globerman and Nielsen, 2007). Local 
restrictions on foreign entry mode have been observed as an instrument to protect indigenous 
interests of host countries (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Mattoo, et al, 2004).  
 
In general, the determinants of foreign entry mode choice are attributed to a combination of 
both foreign side and host side facts. There are firm-specific reasons, such as the size of 
investment, the condition of host country experience, and the level of asset intensity of 
investment, which can substantially impact the mode choice of multinational (Wei, et al, 
2005). The relation capital, as well as geographic and cultural proximity, between foreign 
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firms and host country firms is also regarded as an important determinant (Pennings and 
Sleuwaegen, 2004). Moreover, a host country may set up restricted requirements on foreign 
entry modes in favour of certain types of enterprises, such as giant multinationals, or 
high-tech businesses, or most favoured nationalities (Golub, 2003). Measures of limitations 
on market access to reserved industries or business sectors are also typical in host countries 
(Altenburg, 2004). Thus, in the same market, foreign firms with different backgrounds may 
experience substantial differences, which will result in diverse investment forms. Lastly, the 
investment climates of both the origin and host countries, such as tariff diversities, and 
degrees of market saturation, can also play a crucial role on the mode choice (Alexander and 
Doherty, 2009).    
 
However, in general, M&As make up the vast majority of FDI flows, compared to green-field 
investments, especially in more developed economies, such as OECD countries/regions 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). Mattoo, et al (2004) argue that an overall reduction in 
the cost of cross-border technology transfer in the global market helps the shift of firm 
preferences over entry modes in foreign markets towards acquisition. In terms of mode choice 
between JVs and WOFEs, much attention has been paid to the extent to which foreign and 
local firms are willing to cooperate (Pennings and Sleuwaegen, 2004). The role of trust 
between partner firms is a key issue in the choice between JVs and WOFEs (Ng, Lau and 
Nyaw, 2007). For example, in the case of China, there is a tendency to set up a WOFE instead 
of a JV because many foreign firms are ‘frustrated with JV performance and a volatile 
regulatory climate’ in the country (Deng, 2001). However, Alcantara, et al (2006) claim that 
the JV mode still has its legitimacy, as it enables foreign firms to complement their lack of 
local knowledge.   
 
 
3.5. Major Features and Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment 
3.5.1. Features of Foreign Direct Investment 
There are two key issues associated with the operation and management of FDI worthy of 
studying: the determinants of location selection and the Challenges for FDI. First, Alexander, 
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et al (2007) indicate that geographical and cultural proximity is still a strong underlying factor 
influencing international retailers’ decisions when selecting foreign markets. Their 
‘predilection for expansion into geographically proximate markets was evident’ around the 
globe (Alexander and Doherty, 2009). As geographical proximity usually means similar 
cultural understandings, high control, and low management costs, it is, in fact, a significant 
determinant of FDI in most industries. Thus, Grosse and Trevino (1996) suggest it is evident 
that geographical and cultural distance between FDI origin and host countries was negatively 
and significantly correlated with FDI inflows. In other words, first movers into a new foreign 
market are more likely to be those from neighbouring economies (Li, et al, 2001). Moreover, 
Ford, et al (2008) find that there are differential growth effects of FDI, resulting from various 
factor endowments, such as technology in source countries. Thus, for host countries, the 
origin of FDI is a significant matter, although it is difficult to identify the particular features 
of every single country.  
  
Second, it is important to look at the challenges of FDI firms in a host country. One of the 
most significant issues is about the challenge of human resource (HR) management in FDI 
operation. This covers the problems in the recruitment of both key managers and other staff. 
Traditionally, the manager posts of FDI firms rely on expatriates, especially ‘in institutional 
distant environments for reasons related to the efficient transfer of management practices and 
firm-specific capabilities’ (Gaur, et al, 2007, p.611). However, there has been limited success 
of expatriation in global business (Harvey, et al, 2001). Wang and Nayir (2006) indicate that 
all the social contextual factors of a host economy, including local economic conditions, local 
religions, political ideologies, and cultural distance, can reshape expatriated managers’ 
behavior patterns, capacities and performances, and thus impact the investment result.  
 
Moreover, deep-seated differences in cultural values between expatriates and local staff is 
another considerable challenge, labelled as ‘cross-cultural leadership’ in international 
businesses (Chen and Tjosvold, 2005; Hong, et al, 2006). Thus, HR candidate pools with a 
combined application of host country nationals, parent country nationals and third country 
nationals are advocated (Harvey, et al, 2001). But it is always a crucial challenge to seek out 
local skilled managers (Lenartowicz and Johnson, 2007) in emerging market economies, such 
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as China where having a serious shortage of local management talents (Farrell and Grant, 
2005). To alleviate such HR shortages, offering pre-job and on-job trainings to local 
employees is an essential management approach of FDI firms (Harvey, et al, 2001; 
Lenartowicz and Johnson, 2007).  
 
There are other challenges in the management and operations of international business. For 
instance, Pan, et al (2007) examine the dynamic nature of cross-cultural partner relationships 
between not only JV partners but also of collaborating firms. In addition, Haley (2003, p237) 
investigates the business risks of FDI, and finds that it is ‘especially precarious in volatile 
information-poor emerging markets’, such as China. Last but not least, a foreign producer 
may also pay for their misunderstanding about the demands and customs of a local market 
(Lawrence, 2000; Haley, 2003). Other challenges include different policy/institutional 
variables of a host economy, such as the degree of openness, exchange rate distortions, 
contract enforcement, nationalization risk, bureaucratic delay and corruption (Gastanaga, et al, 
1998). Thus market research and consulting local experts have been regarded as the 
fundamental process of FDI by most multinationals.  
 
3.5.2. Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment 
Although most literature support the concept that inward FDI can benefit the host country by 
generating spillovers to the rest of the economy, (apart from the direct capital inflows and 
creation of job opportunities), a number of researchers have testified that spillovers from FDI 
can be negative, depending on various determinants (Lall, 2000; Lin, et al, 2009). In fact, as 
Lall (2000) reveals, the economic effects of FDI, encompassing a complex package of 
dynamic attributes that are difficult to separate and quantify, are very difficult to measure 
accurately. However, some major spillovers of FDI have been recognized, including: 
technology transfer, skills and management, market access, and environment (Lall, 2000; Lin, 
et al 2009).  
 
On one hand, the transfer of technology and management skills between foreign and domestic 
firms was regarded as the most desired positive effects and has been tested widely, such as 
Jacob and Groizard (2007) focusing on service industry. Conversely increasing market 
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competition which may result in the crowding-out of domestic firms was concerned as the 
major negative spillover to the host economy (Konings, 2000). For example, in Young and 
Lan’s (1997) study about FDI in China, both positive and negative spillovers were detected. 
However, they also assert that given China’s developing country status and technological 
capacities, the future will see substantial opportunities for increased technology transfer to 
offset the negative spillover. Therefore, the tradeoff between the ‘pros and cons’ of FDI is a 
dynamic process, highly dependent on the factor endowments of the host countries, and 
changing over time. 
 
 
3.6. Foreign Direct Investment in Tourism 
The tourism industry is, in fact, one of the world’s largest and most complex industries. As 
Sinclair and Stabler (1997: 58) remarked, the tourism industry ‘involving transport, 
accommodation, catering, natural resources, entertainments and other facilities and services, 
such as shops and banks, travel agents and tour operators’. It is clear that as a unique 
economic phenomenon, tourism embraces a range of diverse businesses. However, this nature 
of the industry has also caused difficulties when systematically examining FDI activities in 
the industry. Moreover, there has not been a standardized principle for the compilation of FDI 
statistics in the industry among different countries. As the 'industry classification used in FDI 
statistics at national and international levels does not correspond fully to the wide range of 
activities that tourism covers', measuring the volumes, patterns, and impacts of international 
tourism-related investments seems almost impossible (Endo, 2006, p601).  
  
Despite these considerations, many researchers have attempted to investigate cross-border 
investment and expansion in particular sectors of tourism, such as hotels (Dimou, et al, 2003) 
and airlines (Findlay and Goldstein, 2004), or in a particular country or macro region like 
Europe (Montanari and Williams, 1995). Moreover, Dunning and McQueen (1981), Tisdell 
and Wen (1991), Contractor and Kundu (1995), Dunning and Kundu (1995), Kundu and 
Contractor (1999), and Sanford and Dong (2000), focusing on the relation between FDI and 
tourism, argue that tourism growth, particularly business tourism, is an important determinant 
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of subsequent new FDI in the industry. Conversely, with the example of China, Tang, et al 
(2007) evidence that FDI plays a significant role in expanding the tourism industry. Velde and 
Nair (2006) also suggest the important impacts of FDI policies on the development of tourism 
in the host country. Thus, there is a mutual relationship witnessed between FDI and tourism. 
 
Based on the contribution of previous research, it is feasible to summarize the major modes of 
three sub-industries where internationalization strategy is most frequently applied. These 
sectors are: hotels, airlines, and tour operators (including their retailers). A general study of 
FDI in these major sectors as presented in the following sections provides a guide for the 
study of this thesis.  
 
3.6.1 Diverse Transnational Companies in the Tourism Industry  
It is noteworthy that transnational companies are engaged in many different forms of 
international tourism activities. Shaw and Williams (2004, p. 60) draw three functional 
differences among multinationals in the tourism industry, including: trade-based firms, 
engaging in sending tourists abroad and sub-contracting the overseas provision of all services, 
such as TOs and TAs; production-based firms like hotels, having presences in multinational 
destinations and providing tourism related services to international tourists, mainly based on 
services in destinations; and, marketing-based firms: horizontal expansion in order to sell 
tourism products in other national markets, for example, airlines.  
 
Moreover, Alexander and Myers (2000) attempted to establish a framework which can be 
used to examine the different internationalization processes of retail business in both market 
and corporate terms (see Figure 3.1). They suggest that global firms may 'have successfully 
achieved the integration and development of internal facilitating competencies as well as the 
extension and exploitation' of different levels of markets in the world. In contrast, a proximal 
organization 'remains within an extension of the domestic environment' and has sought little 
geocentric development to international markets (Alexander and Myers, 2000, p347). Taylor 
and Thrift (1986) also provide a classification to identify the diversity of international 
activities, including global corporations, multinational companies, and national-orientated 
firms with international interests. Additionally, Go and Pine (1995) provide a similar 
                                                          50
distinction regarding the typology of transnational companies, focusing on the hotel industry 
recognizing four types of international investment strategies. These are identified as 
Ethnocentric, Polycentric, Regioncentric, and Geocentric (see Table 3.2). However, in 
contrast to the large size of the tourism industry, ‘there are few global or geocentric 
companies in tourism', although some international airlines and hotels aspire to be such (Shaw 
and Williams, 2004, p.63). 
 
Figure 3.1.  Typology of international retailers in market and corporate terms 
 High    
              
 Multinational                  Global 
Market  
Extension                                               
   
 
 Low                    Proximal                 Transnational 
               
 
 Ethnocentricism                 Geocentricism 
                                    Corporate Perspective      
Sources: Alexander and Myers (2000) 
 
Table 3.2.  Typology of transnational companies by international orientation 
Type Characteristics 
Ethnocentric Home-country orientated; operations abroad mostly limited to foreign 
markets similar to those in home country 
Polycentric Host-country orientated; foreign subsidiaries managed by nationals, and 
firms are administered on diverse national bases 
Regioncentric Macro world-region orientated; based on markets with similar economies 
and cultures, and offering significant economies of scale 
Geocentric Globally orientated; standardized products sold widely across diverse 
world markets 
Sources: Go and Pine (1995: 4-5) 
 
3.6.2 Different Internationalization Methods in Tourism  
Although the tourism industry appears to be at the forefront of global business activities with 
the focus on the movement of tourists among different countries and regions, the industry, in 
fact, has not fostered as many global corporations as is evident in other industries (Shaw and 
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Williams, 2004; Endo, 2006). Most tourism multinational companies were either primarily 
founded or strategically based in the developed economies, including the European Union, 
Japan, and the United States (Fayos-Solà & Pedro Bueno, 2001; Whitla, et al, 2007). Given 
the fact that the majority of tourism businesses are small to medium sized enterprises, FDI is 
not the most frequently applied method in the internationalization process in tourism 
(UNCTAD, 2004; Endo, 2006). 
 
As with the general study on the internationalization modes presented earlier in the chapter, 
Endo (2006) identified five major methods of internationalization in tourism. They are: 
majority equity investment with 100% or majority ownership; minority equity investment 
with 10-49% equity holding; leasing agreement; management contract, and franchise 
agreement. Among the five methods, the first two, either by green-field investments or M&As, 
are categorized into FDI. However, the three other modes, classified as non-equity forms are, 
in effect, more frequently applied by tourism businesses.  
 
The most essential reason for the preference of non-equity approaches is that they concern 
less capital risks than FDI, which is extremely important for fragile tourism firms. Moreover, 
as studied before, the determinants of entry mode to a foreign market depend on the factor 
endowments of host countries, including: cultural/historical/geographical distance from the 
origin country, political and economic stability, socio-economic environments, privatization 
of the industry, liberalization of FDI regime, quality of infrastructures, labour cost and quality. 
Additionally, the choice of internationalization strategies by a tourism firm is also affected by 
the firm's competitive advantages, and necessary resources available for the firm (Lafferty and 
Van Fossen, 2001; Brown, et al, 2003; Higon, et al, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize the unique significance of partnership and alliances 
to the globalisation process in tourism, as agreements between tourism firms have become 
one of the significant business trends in recent years (Archambault 2000, Dimanche and Jolly, 
2006). And this trend has particularly been true of the airline industry (Wang and Evans, 
2002). A broad definition of inter-firm alliance considers ‘an alliance to be any transaction 
where partners share some interests, and have intimate, harmonious and emphatic 
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relationships’, which can be further explained by ‘the reduction of transaction costs (Hennart 
1988), as well as cost sharing, risk sharing (Kogut 1988), synergic effects, increase of market 
power, resource transfer (Hamel 1991; Mowery, et al. 1996; Kumar and Nti 1998; Si and 
Bruton 1999), or knowledge creation (Inkpen 1996)’ (Dimanche and Jolly, 2006, p192). 
 
Finally, as mentioned, there are three functional differences among multinationals in tourism, 
including: trade-based firms, such as TOs and TAs; production-based firms, like hotels; and 
marketing-based firms such as airlines. It is clear that different business natures can result in 
respective preferences and features when applying global expanding strategies. Generally, 
airlines and hotels, have been the two industries featured in many of the previous studies, 
leaving other tourism sectors a relatively large gap. In the following section, the two 
sub-industries will be examined briefly, so that comparisons can be made between the two 
sectors and the travel trade sector. As the travel trade is the prime subject of this thesis, a 
section of investigations on the internationalization approaches of TO and TA businesses is 
regarded as necessary, although there is a lack of relevant references in the area.  
 
3.6.3. Internationalization in Airlines 
In today’s global marketplace, transportation affects increasing numbers of people. The 
international market environment in the airline industry has been changing rapidly. The 
number of competitors has been reduced and firms are no longer competing with one another 
in the way they used to. Instead, competition in the industry is funneled into a scenario 
between low cost carriers (LCCs) and some ‘world-encircling alliances’ formed by major flag 
carriers (Papatheodorou and Lei, 2006; Alberts, Bowen and Cidell, 2009). Although there 
were FDI observed with the form of M&As in the airline industry, such as Air France taking 
over the Dutch KLM in 2004, non-equity forms like sub-contracting, franchising, 
code-sharing and formation of international alliances, have been well applied for over two 
decades, being a prominent feature especially in recent years (Morley, 2006). In 2003, only 
23% of airlines in the world were owned by foreign airlines or investors (UNCTAD, 2004). 
 
In general, North American carriers dominate the world's air traffic (WTO/OMT, 2002), but 
with British Airways, Air France, and Lufthansa being the largest in terms of 
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revenue-passenger-kilometres in international scheduled services. However, even for these 
largest carriers, 'FDI is usually directed to establish sales and reservation offices and 
ground-handling services in major destinations as well as aircraft maintenance and catering 
services at the airports in selected countries' (Endo, 2006, p604). But, it seems that major 
airlines neither have much passion to invest actively in developing countries, nor to own 
majority shares in rival airlines, with examples, such as British Airways owning 19% interest 
in Qantas and 9% in Iberia, KLM holding 26% equity in Kenya Airways, and Lufthansa with 
20% in British Midland.  
 
One reason for the limitation of FDI among airlines may be the huge capital investment FDI 
may involve. Moreover, another major reason for limited FDI results from the remains of 
traditional restraints at national level, such as foreign ownership limits of national airlines 
(WTO/OMT 2002; Chang, et al, 2004), even though the industry has witnessed constant 
liberalization and deregulation for decades. As Carney and Dostaler (2006, p 63) suggest, 
many countries, like Japan and China, still retain foreign ownership restrictions on the airline 
industry because of the belief ‘that domestic ownership promotes economic development, job 
preservation, trade and tourism, and capital retention’, as well as national security. Therefore, 
'the globalization of airlines takes the form of strategic alliances' (Endo, 2006, p605) as the 
prime mode. 
  
Thus, there is a need to explain some non-equity forms in the airline industry. Firstly, 
according to Dana L. P. & Dana, T. E. (1998), airline services have managed to increase their 
power though alliances and collaborations, and economies of scale among the emerging 
alliances have built essential barriers for new rivals to enter. Strategic alliances are generally 
characterized in one of two ways. Vertical relationships entail firms co-operating in 
complementary activities. For example, Canadian Pacific established its own integrated 
airline, hotel, railroad and passenger steamship network during the 1960s. Horizontal 
relationships involve co-operation within the same activity and since the 1980s, airlines have 
been increasingly involved in horizontal relationships for competitive reasons (Papatheodorou 
and Lei, 2006). Building alliances with former rivals can not only contribute to 
competitiveness, but also make a global presence possible without heavy capital expenditures. 
                                                          54
It is important to note that such alliances also helped the joint airlines overcome regulatory 
barriers among different countries.  
 
Other main forms of non-equity international expanding in the airline industry include 
sub-contracting, international franchising, and code-sharing (Hassin and Shy, 2004). 
Sub-contracting allows a major airline to focus on a specialism, by selling a specific segment 
of its business operations to another firm. International franchising is a recent innovation in 
the quest to expand airline services, as this mode may allow the franchisee to use the 
franchiser’s airline code and to operate carriers painted in the livery of the franchiser. 
However, it is code-sharing that has rapidly gained international popularity. A code-sharing 
agreement affects the reservation systems of airlines, as it allows each participating airline to 
sell tickets on flights operated by other contracting carriers under its own code. Thus, 
code-sharing facilitates the interconnections of international and domestic routes operated by 
different carriers.  
 
As Dimanche and Jolly (2006) stated, there have been major changes among airlines with 
worldwide consolidation, dynamic hub and spoke systems, low air fares and an increasingly 
competitive market environment. These changes mainly resulted from airline deregulation, 
commenced from the earliest Open Skies policy in the USA, followed by similar European 
schedules and Asian programmes (Forsyth, et al, 2006). The concomitant emergence of LCCs 
featured the most important developments of the airline industry since 1990s. LCCs became 
leaders in cost reduction by providing a basic quality service in a single class of seats, using 
secondary regional airports, and by other instruments, such as disintermediation by direct 
sales to customers over the Internet, and yield management techniques with one-way tickets 
and very restricted conditions (Papatheodorou and Lei, 2006). Thus, LCCs have gained a 
significant share of traffic within Europe (Alberts, et al, 2009)  
 
Globally (i.e. long haul), traditional flag carriers generally still retain their dominant status. 
But to perpetuate their advantage and to circumvent the continued regulatory barriers to their 
globalization in the ever-changing marketplace, major carriers have been heavily relying on 
the network of airline alliances (Dimanche and Jolly, 2006; Morley, 2006; Gudmundsson and 
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Lechner, 2006; Alberts, et al, 2009). The most important three ‘mega-networks’ are: Star 
Alliance (27 members), Oneworld (12 members), and Sky Team (14 members) (Dimanche 
and Jolly, 2006; Gudmundsson and Lechner, 2006; staralliance.com, 2010; oneworld.com, 
2010; skyteam.com, 2010). Moreover, the nature of the alliances in the industry has shifted 
from the original focus on distribution and reservation functions (endogamy nature), with an 
example of GDSs, to more complementary and comprehensive formulae (exogamy nature) 
‘enduring inter-firm cooperations that include governance structures’ (Gudmundsson and 
Lechner, 2006, p153). They are multilateral alliances encompassing great complexity and 
many possible governance forms and sub-dyadic alliances. They have become a ‘new 
all-encompassing brand that is superimposed over traditional flags’ (Dimanche and Jolly, 
2006, p195), such as United Airlines and Lufthansa under STAR, American Airlines and 
British Airways under Onewolrd, and, Air France Delta Air Lines under Sky Team. 
 
Though these alliances, the constituent airlines have been able to improve production and 
efficiency by widening the range of destinations, reinforcing the flight frequencies, and easier 
routing through various hubs. These agreements also allow economies on the code share 
flights, reduced costs by sharing member companies’ local facilities and services, and the 
common use of information networks and databases, as well as a reciprocity via reward 
programmes or joint consumer loyalty projects. Table 3.3 illuminates five types of joint 
activities that have been successfully applied in the airline sector. It is believed that through 
such alliances, without considerable capital investment, gains in market shares and cost 
savings, and in customer services have been achieved. However, the difficulties in 
maintaining such an alliance have also been documented. Gudmundsson and Lechner (2006, 
p155) suggested that ‘airlines in a dominant position with a multilateral alliance should 
continuously seek new partners and new opportunities’, which also explained as seeking for 
‘structural holes’ (Obstfeld, 2005). Thus the alliances are unstable and dynamic. Other 
difficulties include the increasing competition from both outside, such as LCCs, and from 
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In short, for the airlines, FDI made a small contribution in the industry's globalization process. 
The dominance of non-equity forms has been witnessed. However, in general, higher 
proportions of non-equity forms in the internationalization activities have been perceived in 
the airline industry than the hotel and travel trade sectors which are to be studied in the 
following sections. 
 
3.6.4. Internationalization in the Hotel Sector 
Hotels are characterized by certain distinctive features that differentiate them from other 
tourism industries. Obviously, the hotel industry is characterized by high capital investment 
and labour intensity. Moreover, the logistics and supply chain of hotels can be as complex and 
systematic as in manufacturing operations (Dimou, et al, 2003; Gannon, et al, 2010). However, 
despite the many world-known hotel brands frequently seen around the world, the majority of 
the industry remains in the hand of small or medium sized and independent hotels who may 
neither be passionate in investing overseas nor have necessary capacity. The figures from 
WTO/OMT (2002) show that nearly 70% of hotels are independently owned and operated in 
Europe, with the corresponding figure being even as high as 75% in Asia-Pacific. Endo 
(2006)'s study further confirmed the frailty of FDI application in the sector, by examining a 
number of the world’s largest hotel groups. In his study, among the 14 largest hotel groups of 
the world, no more than 25% of their subsidiary hotels were owned by the groups, while the 
overwhelming use of non-equity forms was obvious. Thus, it was concluded that 'there is little 
FDI made by large hotel TNCs (transnational corporations)' (Endo, 2006, p604). 
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In addition, Contractor and Kundu (1998) also documented that non-equity arrangements 
have accounted for about 2/3 of foreign hotel operations in the world as a whole. They refer to 
the term ‘non-equity arrangements’ to the contractual arrangements, mainly via the forms of 
franchising or licensing agreements, management contracts, or strategic alliances. The 
advantages of these strategies are considered mainly to allow the hotel companies to expand 
without equity participation in a new market, and hence to take little investment risks. 
However, as Dimou, et al (2003) indicate, the two most applied modes of expansion in the 
hotel industry are management contracts and franchising.  
 
As discussed in the early section 3.4, franchising is a contractual arrangement whereby one 
firm, the franchiser, sells the right to another firm, the franchisee, to operate under a particular 
trademark following a set of guidelines (Laforntaine and Masten, 1995). Additionally, the 
franchiser may agree to provide managerial assistance on issues such as advertising and 
promotion, personnel development and operation procedures. However, the franchisee runs 
the business in a way that has already been agreed, pays royalties, usually a percentage of 
sales, and sometimes is obliged to buy supplies from the franchiser or from approved 
suppliers (Rubin, 1978). However, ‘a management service contract is a long term agreement, 
of up to 10 years or even longer, whereby the legal owner of the property enters into a 
contract with another firm, in this case an international hotel company that agrees to run the 
hotel’s daily operations. Usually the property carries the name of the international hotel 
company and moreover, quality control, daily management and senior staffing rest with the 
hotel company, not with the owners’ (Dimou, et al, 2003, p148). In generally, if comparing the 
two modes, management contracts are considered as a more hierarchical form than the other.  
 
However, both franchising and management contracts are regarded as feasible and efficient 
approaches of internationalization in the hotel industry, as they reduce risks by avoiding the 
uncertainty of ownership rights, as well as large capital outflows. But being non-equity forms, 
both modes are not considered as FDI. Despite the dominance of non-equity forms in the 
industry, FDI is still seen on occasion where this is encouraged by special policy privileges, 
low land prices, or unique resort resources.  
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3.6.5. Internationalization in the Travel Trade Sector 
Although TOs and TAs are generally regarded as the travel trade or intermediaries of the 
tourism industry, the two businesses have very different business emphases pursuing diverse 
strategies in the industry, as discussed in chapter two. Therefore, in terms of international 
expansion, it is understandable that the performances of the two sectors may vary. However, 
few academic efforts have been made previously to research the internationalization process 
for the travel trade industry, especially TAs. Given this reality, it is rather difficult to 
generalize the features of foreign operations in the two sectors. Despite this, the following 
discussion will try to explain the major approaches of TOs and TAs, concerning their 
internationalization operations, including FDI. In general, the author believes that because 
TOs usually outsource services internationally, they are often financially more robust than 
TAs, and more FDI is generated in the TO sector. However, TAs are more likely to be the 
object being acquired.    
 
3.6.5.1. Internationalization in the Tour Operator Sector 
The majority of previous studies on the internationalization of TOs have been focused on the 
dominant position of companies situated in tourism generating countries, such as Europe and 
North America, despite the recognition of TOs located in emerging economies. Endo (2006, 
p.604) indicates that, the TO 'segment is dominated by a number of large operators in 
tourist-generating countries'. It is true that only mega-TOs who are concentrated in developed 
tourist-generating markets have both capacities and desires to develop foreign markets. 
 
TOs may be participating in a buyer-seller value alliance whereby transportation, 
accommodation, intermediary, and other travel related services are closely connected, in order 
to enhance production and service efficiency. Dissimilar to airlines, however, who usually 
face very high political and economical barriers in host countries, applying alliances is not the 
most important internationalization strategy for TOs. The TO sector is also largely different 
from the hotel sector, with fewer ‘ownership advantages’ (Dunning, 1981, 1988, 1989), such 
as brand loyalty and know-how value, and fewer service differences than hotels. Thus, 
franchising or management contracts afford few advantages to TOs when expanding overseas. 
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In fact, TOs are found to favor FDI, in terms of international developments either vertically or 
horizontally. 
 
Vertical integration allows TOs to control various links in the production chain with power to 
intervene over both suppliers, such as planes, cruises, or hotels, and the distribution channels 
like travel agencies (WTO/OMT, 2002). This strategy can help TOs reduce costs of 
procurement. However, there are differences between markets. For example, there were less 
vertically integrated groups created by FDI in the USA than in the European countries 
(Cavlek, 2006). The European market has witnessed a 'growing vertical and horizontal 
integration of activities', especially among German and UK operators (Williams, 1995, p172, 
Cavlek, 2006), such as TUI and Thomas Cook who are the biggest tour groups in Europe. A 
similar business structure of these giants was propounded by Cavlek (2006, p168) that ‘they 
consist of several tour operating companies on domestic markets and abroad, their own 
charter airlines, accommodation facilities in tourism resorts, chains of retail travel agencies 
and they provide very complex customer care.’  
 
In terms of horizontal expansion (between TOs), generally, the activity was either for the 
purpose of developing marketing and sales performance, or for increasing the control on the 
quality of ground services. As Endo (2006, p604) claimed 'mainstream, mass-tourism TOs 
have established sales offices in tourism generating countries (e.g., European operators' 
foreign affiliates in EU and North America) and ground agents in major destinations (e.g., 
Japanese TNCs' (transnational companies) foreign affiliates in Asia and the Pacific) to serve 
customers from home countries'. Therefore, the fact is clear that FDI in both M&As and 
green-field forms has been the most popular strategy in the international integration process 
of the TO sector. 
 
However, given the intermediate nature of TOs, FDI, especially vertical integration which 
involves huge capital risks, is not always a necessary strategy for TOs in foreign destinations. 
Being a trader or a wholesaler in the tourism industry, the ability of large TOs to direct a 
constant flow of tourists to a resort or a destination is considerable (Williams, 1995). This 
often places them in a powerful position when negotiating with local suppliers, for example a 
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local hotelier, especially with those in the developing countries or less popular destinations. 
As Williams (1995) stated, 'market advantages are reinforced by the increased flexibility that 
has been acquired by the tour companies; by virtue of their limited fixed investment in any 
particular location (p.171)', and non-ownership nature allows them to 'negotiate rock bottom 
prices (p.173)'. Therefore, only when the business volume or potential opportunity of a market 
reaches a significant level of importance with long lasting interest in the future, will a TO 
make substantial transnational investments (Buckley and Geyikdagi, 1996).  
 
3.6.5.2. Internationalization in the Travel Agency Sector 
Previous research about the internationalization of TAs is extremely rare. In the literature 
concerning FDI in tourism, the TA sector was often neglected. Most tourism activities 
occurred in the tourist-receiving country, which involves cross-border matters. However, TAs’ 
functions, including marketing and selling, are mainly executed in the tourist-generating 
country where TAs are located (Buckley and Geyikdagi, 1996). As Alexander (1997, p.3-4) 
reveals, being a retailer, TAs’ ‘operations have been traditionally perceived as localized 
operations’, and they ‘have merely acted as the conduits through which goods reached the 
market’ while principal suppliers dominated national and international marketing efforts for 
the distribution of products. Although the revenue of large retailers earned within the 
domestic market may also be invested in new markets when development opportunities are 
limited at home, the choices of the host country are confined within geographical and 
culturally proximate neighborhoods (Alexander and Doherty, 2009). Thus, most TAs shall be 
categorized as proximal businesses (see Figure 3.2). Even large TAs seemed to be rather 
lagging compared to other sectors, in terms of international expanding. 
  
Moreover, as M&As between TOs and TAs increasingly occur globally, especially in more 
developed markets like Europe, the border between TOs and TAs are getting more blurred 
than ever. Most mega-TOs, like American Express, TUI, Thomas Cook, JTB, or Kuoni, 
combine operations of both TO and TA businesses. It has become more and more difficult to 
define a case of international movement of a large TA, as the TA brand is often just a 
subsidiary of a giant travel aggregation. In terms of small or medium sized TAs, they usually 
lack the desire to invest abroad, or face financial constraints for international activities. 
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However, it is important to mention the market changes instigated by the increasing 
applications of advancing ICTs and the Internet in tourism, as it has been possible for small 
TAs to operate globally through the use of technology like web-based bookings (Page and 
Connell, 2009). It is true that technology development has largely facilitated the major 
business operations of TAs, including information comparison and consulting, making 
reservations and transactions, and other communications between TAs, customers and other 
stakeholders. As a result of this, TAs have been able to make dynamic packages with the 
availability of an online global stock of service ingredients, such as hotel rooms and air tickets. 
Moreover, there has been considerable success of online TAs, such as Expedia and 
Travelocity which sell international tour products to multinational customers purely via the 
Internet (Buhalis, 2003). These technology induced changes can be regarded as an alternative 
form of globlisation for TAs. 
 
In conclusion, while hotels are competing in the global tourism market by applying 
franchising and management contracts, the airline industry is experiencing expansion 
internationally via strategic alliances. However, the TO sector witnessed the growth of FDI as 
the major strategy for internationalization activities, given relatively lower entry barriers than 
those in the other two sectors. In terms of the TA sector, FDI is rarely documented. A possible 
reason for this neglect may be because historically internationalization has never been a 
prevalent phenomenon in the retail sector (Alexander and Doherty, 2009). However, 
facilitated by the development of Internet-based ICTs, online global networks have allowed 
TAs to operate internationally without heavy investment. In short, the different business 
dynamics of each sector caused the diverse preferences in their internationalization 
approaches. However, in general, the total scale of FDI in all these sub-industries was limited, 





                                                          62
3.7. Conclusion  
The chapter firstly looked at the definitions of FDI, emphasizing capital outflows to overseas 
and lasting interests in the destinations (IMF, 1993). With the recognition of 'control', 
foreign-controlled corporations, associates, and WOFEs were also introduced 
(Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts, 1993), followed by the study of FDI 
in both macro and micro views. Then there was an introduction of reasons for FDI, which 
were primarily concluded as being for monetary and marketing purposes.  
 
Moreover, conventional asset-exploiting FDI and unconventional asset-seeking FDI were also 
compared. After this discussion, the review of the determinants of FDI showed that the 
allocation of FDI favoured particular factors, such as large market size and good 
infrastructures, which encouraging ‘agglomeration’ (Lim, 2001). Moreover, the major forms 
of FDI, including green-field investment and M&As, were examined, with a study of six 
popular internationalization modes, including four non-equity forms: exporting, turnkey 
project, licensing, franchising, and two FDI methods: JVs and WOFEs. The choice of entry 
modes should not only adapt to the policies and regulations on the foreign ownerships of host 
countries, but also depend on some firm-specific facts, as well as other host country 
conditions. Furthermore, the chapter also briefly investigated two features of FDI, including 
the source country differences, and the challenges on HR and other management issues. 
Following the above discussions, the impacts of FDI were explored, focusing on positive 
spillovers for example technology transfer, and negative effects, such as competition.  
 
In addition, the chapter aimed to review previous studies concerning FDI in tourism. It was 
found that there was difficulty in measuring FDI in the industry. However, different types of 
multinational operations in the industry were studied, followed by the examination of diverse 
overseas entry modes in tourism. In general, FDI was not the most frequently applied strategy 
for foreign expansion process in the tourism industry. This was confirmed by the study of the 
three sub-industries, including hotels, airlines and travel trade business. The three sectors 
were studied respectively, with findings concerning distinctive preferences of each business 
on internationalization methods.  
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In general, franchising and management contracts were the preferred modes for hotels, with 
strategic alliances favoured by airlines, indicating that non-equity forms were the major 
globalization strategies in the two industries. The TO sector witnessed growing M&A 
activities, while the TA sector was neglected in internationalization studies. However, 
facilitated by the development of Internet-based ICTs, online global networks have allowed 
TAs to operate internationally without heavy investment. Thus, it is clear that different 
business dynamics of the each sector have caused the diverse preferences in their 
internationalization approaches. In conclusion, the total scale of FDI in tourism was limited, 
resulting from the lack of large market players. The flow of FDI in tourism was essentially 
limited within developed countries, although both developed and developing countries 
promoting FDI for tourism development.  
 
Through the discussion in this chapter, it seems clearly the case that the previous research has 
not developed a systematic framework neither about the ways of FDI in different tourism 
sectors, nor about the cooperation and collaboration between international and local tourism 
businesses. However, the review of previous literature was necessary, as it helped the author 
to develop an understanding about how FDI performs in general and in the world tourism 
industry. Similarly as chapter two, this chapter also provided some of the fundamental 
knowledge required for this study. Both chapter two and chapter three emphasized the view of 
international perspectives, offering a guide for designing the methodology of this research, 
(especially when designing the questionnaires). An understanding of these concepts was also 
useful when conducting the survey, especially during the interview processes, as these 
conceptual ideas had been frequently applied by the participating managers who were 
interviewed. Thus, the knowledge content of these two chapters is essential for the successful 








The Chinese Economy and the Roles of the State 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In chapters two and three, attention has been given to developing a fundamental 
understanding of the travel trade industry and the FDI phenomenon from an international 
point of view. The focus of this chapter will be placed on the circumstances of the investment 
environment in the marketplace of China. Emphasis will be given to the political, institutional 
and economic basis of China, which inevitably impact on the development approaches of the 
FITS sector in the country. The main purpose of this chapter is to facilitate the comprehension 
of the development approach of tourism in China (studied in Chapter five) and to assist in the 
further investigation of the FITS sector which is the subject of this research, by understanding 
the overall business environment of China. Therefore, emphasis will be given to two relevant 
issues: the extent of political intervention in China on the transition of the economy, and 
development features of FDI in China. 
 
This chapter firstly investigates the Chinese political system and introduces the six main state 
organs and their responsibilities. This is followed by a discussion on the system down to 
regional, provincial, and local levels. A discussion of regional differences is made in order to 
provide a clearer understanding of difficulties encountered in expanding and developing 
business in China. The chapter also reviews literature regarding the government’s role in the 
development of the tourism industry, and the reasons and forms of government intervention, 
as well as a conceptual perspective on four approaches to tourism planning. This is followed 
by an explanation of the improvement of the Chinese economy, and the major challenges it 
faces. These may result in obstacles to further developments in the opening and reform 
process. Additionally, a remarkable zoning method used by the government, the application of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), is examined. In the final part of the chapter, a general 
picture of FDI in China is presented, with an introduction to the development history, major 
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forms, and patterns of FDI activity in the country, followed by a summary of some key 
prospects about the Chinese policy directions and the future tendencies of FDI. 
 
Given the early explanation in the introduction chapter, it is important to consider that this 
chapter is focused on Mainland China. Although Hong Kong and Macao have been 
internationally recognized as Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of China, the two smaller 
and more advanced economies have very different economic and political bases from the 
mainland. Similarly, Taiwan being a special province under disputation is also different from 
mainland China. In practice, most statistics do not count the economies of Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan under the category of China. Thus, all the data used in this thesis follow this 
practice, except for the discussion of the geographical administrative divisions of China.  
 
 
4.2. Government Institutions in China 
As the Chinese government and its policies usually play a crucial role in the development of 
almost all industries (Chow, 2002; Huang, 2003; Haley, 2003; Yusuf, et al, 2006; Siqueira et 
al, 2009), including tourism and the FITS sector, it is necessary to discuss the nature of the 
Chinese administrative system, and the Chinese institutional structure for policy-making and 
implementation. Political and bureaucratic issues represent one of the most significant factors 
for entrepreneurs to consider in Chinese industries, as China is a socialist country where the 
government has strong power of control through substantial ownership in almost all of the 
most important economic elements within the country, from land to the supply of utilities. 
Although this chapter only provides limited political knowledge of China, the investigation is 
important in developing an understanding of the special activities and approaches of the FITS 
sector in China. 
 
China is known as an emerging market socialistic economy, dominated by its only reigning 
party, the Communist Party of China (CPC). As Saich (2001, p.212) states, most literature has 
concluded the nature of policy-making in communist systems as a 'monolithic and top-down 
process'. Some authors may argue that such a system lacks the mechanisms of democracy. 
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However, this system also brings to the country a sense of national cohesion and integrity, 
resulting in policies, such as China’s opening and economic reform, can be conducted for 
almost 30 years, accompanying a rapid and sustained economic increase. The present political 
regime of China results from not only the historical and cultural background of the country, 
but also the characteristics, such as its huge population. The Chinese government is maturing 
and aims to improve itself over time in response to both internal and external challenges, in 
order to be a competitive player in the increasingly interconnected world economy. However, 
there are still deeply-rooted institutional constraints existing in the country, and these should 
not be ignored when examining China’s economy. 
 
4.2.1. Chinese Political System at State Level 
The People's Republic of China (China) is known as an emerging socialist market economy, 
dominated by its only reigning party, the Communist Party of China (CPC). China is applying 
the people’s congress as its fundamental political system. At the state level, there are mainly 
six national administration organs, including National People’s Congress (NPC), State 
Council, President of China, Central Military Commission, Supreme People’s Court and 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Currently, the head of the state is President Hu Jintao, and 
the head of the government is Premier of the State Council, Wen Jiabao. The NPC represents 
the supreme power of China. The State Council of China, namely the Central People's 
Government, is the highest executive organ of state administration power. The premier of the 
State Council is nominated by the president, reviewed by the NPC, and appointed and 
removed by the president. In general, the State Council is responsible for carrying out the 
principles and policies of the CPC, as well as the regulations and laws adopted by the NPC. 
And all the six state organs are under the tight control of the CPC (Yang and Li, 2007). 
 
Table 4.1 shows the organizational structures under the supervision of the State Council of 
China. The administration organ of the tourism industry, China National Tourism 
Administration (CNTA) is one of the organizations which directly report to the State Council. 
The council is also concerned with two important organizations relevant to this research, the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
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(SOASAC), and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). SOASAC is in charge of all the 
state-owned assets and entities. MOFCOM is responsible for granting a commercial license 
which is necessary for every foreign invested enterprise, including FITSs who then need a 
license from CNTA. Thus, the State Council is the most influential organization regarding the 
economic development of China. However, as the CPC is the only party being ‘in the saddle’, 
the National Congress of CPC usually takes the function of indicating the future political and 
economical plans of the country, which are then executed by the State Council. 
 
Table 4.1. The administration offices under the Chinese State Council 
Special Organization directly under the State Council (1) 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council  (SOASAC) 
 
Ministries and Commissions under the State Council (27) 
-Ministry of Foreign Affairs   -Ministry of Environmental Protection 
-Ministry of National Defense -Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
-National Development and Reform Commission -Ministry of Transport 
-Ministry of Education -Ministry of Railway 
-Ministry of Science and Technology -Ministry of Water Resources 
-Ministry of Industry and Information Technology -Ministry of Agriculture 
-State Ethnic Affairs Commission   - Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
-Ministry of Public Security -Ministry of Culture 
-Ministry of State Security -Ministry of Health 
-Ministry of Supervision -National Population and Family Planning Commission 
-Ministry of Civil Affairs -People's Bank of China 
-Ministry of Justice -National Audit Office 
-Ministry of Finance - Ministry of Land and Resources 
-Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
 
 
Organizations directly under the State Council (16) 
-General Administration of Customs -State Administration of Work Safety 
-State Administration of Taxation -National Bureau of Statistics 
-State Administration for Industry and Commerce -State Forestry Administration 
-General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine 
-General Administration of Press and Publication 
(National Copyright Administration) 
-State Administration of Radio, Film and Television -General Administration of Sport 
-State Intellectual Property Office -National Tourism Administration (CNTA) 
-State Administration for Religious Affairs -Government Offices Administration of the State Council 
-Counsellors' Office of the State Council -National Bureau of Corruption Prevention 






Since the launch of China’s Reform and Opening Policy, the State has realized the importance 
of reform throughout the state-body itself. In fact, the country has improved the efficiency and 
transparency of its governmental organs, for example actions such as simplifying 
administrative procedures and transferring some rights of decision- making to the provincial 
level. It was thought that in China extensive bureaucracy would be applied to every single 
action of an enterprise. This was probably true some years ago, but today the situation has 
improved significantly in most Chinese cities, especially in a number of special economic 
zones, open coastal cities and areas, and economic and technology development zones. 
However, although the State has achieved considerable improvements, there have not been 
any fundamental changes regarding Chinese political property, whereby the state controls or 
influences almost all industries through the ownership arrangements of prevailing state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) throughout the country (Yusuf et al, 2006). It was also the advantage of 
being the rule-maker for all industries (Huang, 2003).   
  
4.2.2. Regional Economy and Policy Frameworks 
4.2.2.1. Geographical Introduction of China  
Located in the east of the Asian continent, on the western shore of the Pacific Ocean, China 
has a land area of about 9.6 million sq km. From north to south, the territory of China 
measures 5,500 km, stretching from latitude 530 30’ N to latitude 40 N. From west to east, the 
nation extends about 5,200 km from longitude 730 40’ E to longitude 1350 05’ E 
(www.china.com.cn , 2007). 
 
With a land boundary of some 22,800 km, China is bordered by Korea to the east; Mongolia 
to the north; Russia to the northeast; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (Kirghizstan) and Tajikistan to 
the northwest; Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan to the west and 
southwest; and Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam to the south. Across the seas to the east and 
southeast are the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
China also has a vast sea area, its domain extending into the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the 
East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Contiguous to each other, the four seas form a 
northeast southwest arc covering a total area of 4.78 million square kilometers 
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(www.china.com.cn , 2007). Based on this vast land supply, China is known as a tourist 
destination embodying ‘every natural phenomenon’ (Zhang, Pine and Lam, 2005, p. 3). 
 
4.2.2.2   The Administrative Division 
Currently, China administers 34 province-level divisions, including 23 provinces (Taiwan as a 
disputed province), 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities directly under the Central 
Government, and 2 special administrative regions which are local administrative areas 
directly under the Central Government (See Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1). Obviously, 
autonomous regions are the places where minorities are the main residents, and thus enjoy a 
higher level of autonomy than the provinces. Municipalities are usually as small as a city, but 
also very important or high-density areas like the capital city, Beijing. Administratively, the 
country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities on an equal level; 
A province or an autonomous region is then subdivided into autonomous prefectures, counties, 
autonomous counties, or cities; A prefecture or a county is subdivided into townships, national 
minority townships, or towns. In accordance with the existing administrative divisions of the 
country, the people’s congresses of the provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), 
counties (cities), and townships (towns) are established, with people’s congresses having 
standing committees at or above the county level and people’s government set up at all levels. 
(Yang and Li, 2007) 
 
Table 4.2. Name list of Chinese provinces, autonomous regions (AR), municipalities (Muni), and 
special administrative regions (SAR) 
Level Names  
Provinces (23) Hubei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, 
Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan, 
Sichuan, Guizhou,Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Taiwan (disputed) 
AR (5) Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, Xinjiang 
Municipalities (4)  Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing 
SAR (2) Hong Kong, Macao 




Figure 4.1.   The map of China: locations of provinces  
 
Sources: www.chinakontor.de  , (2006) (Approximate scale: 1:2,000,000) 
 
The local people’s governments are local administrative organs of the state. Working under 
the unified leadership of the State Council, they are responsible, and report on their work to 
the people’s congresses and their standing committees at the corresponding levels, to the 
government at the next-higher level, and to CPC’s corresponding agents. They have overall 
responsibility for the administrative work within their respective administrative areas. 
Normally, only supreme leaders of the provincial level, such as nomarches, are appointed by 
the State Council. According to Yang and Li (2007), Chinese local governments have 
experienced an increasing decision-making power released by the central government in 
recent years. However, such a system was originally designed for a planned economic system 
to facilitate and empower the central control of the top level governance of the regime upon 





Such a political system has resulted in some substantial constraints upon the development in 
economic terms. First, the government body is characterized by redundant and inefficient 
bureaucratism, as any post of the system has several different upper level monitors. Second, 
senior leaders of different levels often hold highly centralized power, which may result in 
corruption (Yang and Li, 2007). Lastly, the lack of transparency has increased the unfairness 
between SOEs (including town and village owned enterprises, hereafter TVEs) and other 
types of economic entities, including FDI and private firms (Huang, 2003). Therefore, the 
overall macro (political) environment (constructed by Kaufmann, et al, 1999) of China was 
scored as a lowest by international bodies (Haley, 2003). 
 
4.2.2.3.   Consideration of Four Regions 
China, in a sense, could be regarded as a large country built out of many regions, each with 
different local cultures, habits and even spoken languages. It is worthy of discussing that 
Grillet (2003) describes the diversity of China by presenting it as four regions. These are: the 
North with the capital city, Beijing; the East with the country’s business center Shanghai; the 
South with most activated cities, Guangzhou and Shenzhen; and the Western Regions which 
are being strongly encouraged by the state for the future economic and environmental growth. 
In this classification, the former three are the regions within the Chinese Eastern Coastal Area, 
while the rest vast areas often identified as the Middle and Western Regions (Wu, 2006).  
 
Grillet (2003, p.57) emphasizes the 'different business cultures' of the four regions. For 
example: Shanghai is the most business orientated; Beijing seems to be more bureaucratic, 
being the location of the central government; the province of Guangdong sees a unique 
collaboration network among the local entrepreneurs, and being the earliest location to 
experience the country's open policy. Moreover, the differences between Chinese regions also 
indicate diverse economic policies designed and executed by both central government and 
local authorities. In general, the west part is perceived as having a less mature business 
climate than the coastal regions. In terms of the level of accessibility for foreign investment, it 
can be summarized that: the more advanced economic environment is in coastal cities in the 
 72 
 
south and east of China rather than in the north and west regions. The opening level is higher 
in the south and east than in the north and west (Wu, 2006).  
 
Although the division of the four regions represents some common features or customs within 
the each region, there can be many differences between cities, counties, and towns, in terms of 
both industrial and administrative aspects. A company who has dealt with its business 
successfully in one city may see different rules in another location, for example, in terms of 
preferential industries, tax rates, or registration requirements. Grillet (2003, p.59) marks the 
situation as a remaining problem of the Chinese bureaucracy, and that ‘it is impossible to 
define a China-wide rule of which procedures have to be followed in setting up and running a 
business.’ However, the four region model is found to be meaningful in this thesis, as the 
development of the FITS sector shows a strategical concentration in the core cities of the 
former three regions, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou (and Shenzhen). In general, the 
awareness of regional differences is useful. As one of the most important political instruments 




4.3. The Roles of Government in Tourism Planning 
This chapter attempts to examine China's domestic political and economical phenomena, in 
order to understand the development of the Chinese tourism industry. We have studied the 
basic political system of the country, and now it is necessary to review literature regarding the 
government’s role in planning tourism development. This will help us to explain the 
motivations and actions of the Chinese authority and its series of tourism policies.  
 
Hall (2000, p.7) claims that ‘Planning is a kind of decision-making and policy making; 
however, it deals with a set of interdependent and systematically related decisions rather than 
individual decisions’. Therefore, in the tourism planning process, the decisions shall concern 
issues not only upon tourism business and tourists’ need, but also many wider elements, for 
example, the economic impacts, the host communities’ need, environmental sustainability. 
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Therefore, it is not inconceivable that the tourism planning approach in China should show its 
own characteristics.  
 
Moreover, planning is distinguished from a ‘plan’. It shall be a process that lasts for a certain 
length of period, covering the past, present, and the future. Various activities will be 
continuously carried out as the planning process going further, involving research, bargaining, 
negotiation, compromise, coercion, evaluation, monitoring, or sometimes modification. As 
Getz (1987, p.3) states, tourism planning must be ‘a process, based on research and evaluation, 
which seeks to optimize the potential contribution of tourism to human welfare and 
environmental quality.’ As the planning also implicates changes over time, a defined time 
span is often applied when it is studied. In this thesis, the study covers the decade from 1998. 
 
4.3.1. Reasons and Forms of Governance and State Intervention  
The importance of tourism in economic contribution is one most substantial reason for state 
interference in the sector, as governments have their inherent obligation and authority on 
administration and planning for development purpose. It has been noticed that tourist 
expenditure has a ‘cascading’ effect throughout the host economy, which includes incomes 
generated by tourist expenditure and job opportunities provided by tourism and tourism 
related industries (Cooper et al, 1998, p.130). According to Cooper et al (1998), these two 
impacts can occur and should be examined at three different visions –direct level, indirect 
level and induced level. Therefore, the development of tourism has impacts on a country’s 
economy in a wide and deep extent.  
 
In addition, as Shaw and Williams (2002) have indicated, there are a number of reasons for 
state intervention and these change over time in response to national and international 
economic developments, changes in the tourism industry itself and in government and 
governance. Shaw and Williams (2002, p.133) list six principal purposes for state 
interventionism in the tourism and its related industry, including: national economic goals, 
such as balancing the current account; political legitimation for the state justifying its 
existence through intervention; equity and social needs, such as ensuring minimum provision 
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of leisure and tourism access to citizens; a responsibility for externalities and social 
investment where the state has to intervene because there are insufficient returns to individual 
capital (for example, building a new road); regulation and negative controls, such as 
protection of the landscape and environment from the actions of private capital; and finally, 
the use of tourism and leisure as instruments of urban and regional development. 
  
Shaw and Williams (2002, p.132) also state that while tourism and leisure enterprises are 
mostly owned by private capital in capitalist societies, the state is usually involved in these 
sectors either through 'the forms of regulation or ownership'. In practice, the forms of state 
intervention are very diverse resulting from different political and economical contexts of 
countries. For example, planning is mostly at the local level in the US, often involving 
physical planning measures, such as zoning. In comparison, the UK witnesses an increasing 
involvement of local government using tourism as an instrument of economical policy. 
Helpfully, Hall (2000) suggests seven major methods of public sector involvement in the 
tourism industry: coordination; planning; legislation and regulation; entrepreneur; 
stimulation; encouraging social tourism; and public interest protection. However, Qiu, et al 
(1999) claims that there are six roles which the Chinese government has played in tourism, 
namely, operator, regulator, promoter, coordinator, investment stimulator and educator. As 
there is no one ‘perfect’ instrument or measure for tourism planning, multiple methods are 
often used by governments. It seemed that the forms of regulation and ownership are applied 
not only in capitalist societies but also in socialist countries like China.  
 
4.3.2. Four Approaches of Tourism Planning 
Getz (1987) provided one of the most useful outlines on the study of tourism planning, 
emphasized by Hall (2000). They identified four broad traditions of planning approaches: 
boosterism, economic/industry oriented approach, physical/spatial approach, and community 
oriented approach. According to Getz (1987, p.5) and Hall (2000):  
‘the four traditions are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily sequential. 
Nevertheless, this categorization is a convenient way in which to examine the 
different and sometimes overlapping ways in which tourism is planned, and the 




First, boosterism is ‘a simplistic attitude that tourism development is inherently good and of 
automatic benefit to the hosts’ (Hall, 2000, P.21). Under the boosterism tradition, cultural and 
natural resources are regarded, absolutely, as objects to be exploited for the sake of tourism 
development. The second tradition is namely under economic/ industry-oriented approach, 
whereby tourism is seen as an industry ‘which can be used as a tool by governments to 
achieve certain goals of economic growth and restructuring, employment generation, and 
regional development through the provision of financial incentives, research, marketing and 
promotional assistance’ (Hall, 2000, p.25). Both approaches stress the positive contributions 
of tourism to national and regional economies. Therefore, economic goals are given priority 
over social and ecological questions, with limited attention paid by governments to the 
negative impacts of the development relative to tourism activities.  
 
Third, the land use/physical/spatial approach has its origins in the work of geographers, 
urban and regional land-use planners and conservationists who advocate ‘a rational approach 
to the planning of natural resources’ (Hall 2000, p.26). This approach refers to planning with a 
spatial or geographical component, in which the general objective is to provide for a spatial 
structure of activities (or of land uses). Thus, tourism is planned based upon certain spatial 
patterns that would minimize the negative impacts of its development on physical 
environment. Related management issues comprise physical and social carrying capacity (e.g. 
Mathieson and Wall, 1982), environmental thresholds (e.g. Hill and Rosier, 1989), and limits 
to or acceptable/desirable rates of change (e.g. McCool, 1994).  
 
Finally, the community-oriented approach indicates that there has been increasing attention 
given to the negative and undesirable environmental and social impacts of the tourism 
development, by the governments of many tourist destinations. In response to this, alternative 
strategies of planning were espoused, including ecotourism, which highlighted the social and 
physical context of tourist destinations. According to Murphy (1985), the use of an ecological 
approach which emphasized the need for local control over the development process was 
introduced. In this sense, community tourism planning is a response to the need to develop 
more socially acceptable guidelines for tourism expansion based on local capacities and 
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community decision-making. It is, therefore, a ‘bottom up’ form of planning, where residents 
are regarded as the focus of the planning exercise, with the community as the basic planning 
unit.  
 
Although a sustainable approach was also introduced by Hall (2000), featuring a combination 
of industry, special and community-oriented approaches, the ideal western-styled sustainable 
approach for tourism planning was difficult to find in China (Ying and Zhou, 2007), resulting 
from the complicated issues around the ownership and control of various authorities and 
organizations. As examined, in terms of the political regime, the case in China is substantially 
different from western capitalism countries where the literature of tourism planning was 
devised. However, the basic functions of government and governance, and the reasons and 
forms of government intervention in tourism, studied in this section should be applicable for 
the study on China. Therefore, the review of the literature on tourism planning aims to 
provide a guide for identifying the characteristics and roles of the Chinese government in the 




4.4. The Opening of the Chinese Economy 
4.4.1 Dramatic Expansion of the Chinese Economy 
In December 1978, the Eleventh National Congress of the CPC decided that the focus of 
future work should be economic modernization and that all other work must be subordinated 
to this objective. This was followed immediately by the launch of China's open and reform 
policy. It is apparent that China has tried to introduce market influences into a 
centrally-planned economy, and has actually achieved dramatic improvements, especially in 
terms of its continuously growing gross domestic product (GDP) since early 1980's (see Table 
4.3). According to Saich (2001, p.219), the CPC’s legitimacy was 'shifting effectively to the 
capacity of the leadership to deliver the economic goods', which has significantly changed the 
relationships between the plan and the market, and between the CPC and the economy. 
Eventually, the economic changes have raised China to become one of the essential parts of 
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the global economy (Walters and Samiee, 2003; Gillboy, 2004; Gu et al, 2008), stimulating its 
tourism development synchronously.  
 
Table 4.3. Chinese annual GDP growth (US$ billion), 1978-2009 
Year GDP 
(US$ billion *) 





1978 215 11.7 362.4 379 
1979 258 7.6 403.8 417 
1980 301 7.8 451.8 460 
1981 286 5.2 486.2 489 
1982 280 9.1 529.5 525 
1983 299 10.9 593.5 580 
1984 309 15.2 717.1 692 
1985 304 13.5 896.4 853 
1986 295 8.8 1,020.2 956 
1987 321 11.6 1,196.3 1,104 
1988 401 11.3 1,492.8 1,355 
1989 448 4.1 1,690.9 1,512 
1990 388 3.8 1,854.8 1,634 
1991 406 9.2 2,161.8 1,879 
1992 483 14.2 2,663.8 2,287 
1993 601 13.5 3,463.4 2,939 
1994 542 12.6 4,675.9 3,923 
1995 700 10.5 5,847.8 4,854 
1996 816 9.6 6,788.5 5,576 
1997 898 8.8 7,446.3 6,054 
1998 946 7.8 7,834.5 6,038 
1999 991 7.1 8,206.8 7,159 
2000 1,080 8.0 8,946.8 7,858 
2001 1,324 8.3 10,965.5 8,622 
2002 1,453 9.1 12,033.3 9,398 
2003 1,640 10.0 13,582.3 10,542 
2004 1,930 10.1 15,987.8 12,336 
2005 2,228 9.9 18,386.8 14,040 
2006 2,635 11.1 21,087.1 16,084 
2007 3,253 11.4 25,730.6 19,524 
2008 4,342 9.0 30,067.0 22,698 
2009 4,909 8.7 33,535.3 24,743 
Sources: based on Chinability (2008), Datamonitor (2004), China National Bureau of Statistics (2009), and 
World Bank (2010). (*at each year's exchange rates) 
 
Since the launch of the reform and open policy, the Chinese GDP has increased dramatically 
and continuously, which attracts attentions from the rest of the world. The country has been 
regarded as one of the fastest growing countries with over 9% average increase rate since 
1979. Between 1979 and 2009, China’s GDP grew from US$ 215 billion to over US$ 4.9 
trillion with GDP per capita from US$ 183 dollars to US$ 3,622 (see Table 4.3), having 
 78 
 
become the third largest country of world since 2009, in terms of GDP (World Bank, 2010). 
Moreover, the regional financial crisis in the late1990s (Datamonitor, 2004) did not do much 
to dent the pace of growth in China. It seemed that the most recent global downturn has 
affected China much less in aggregate economic terms than many western countries, by the 
time of writing. 
 
Moreover, China has also become one of the largest trading countries in the world, with 
exports of goods to the value of US$ 1,218.0 billion in 2007— an increase of 25.7% over 
2006; and imports of US$ 955.8 billion— an increase of 20.8%, totaling US$2.17 trillion in 
2007. Table 4.4 shows the tremendous growth magnitudes of the Chinese trade performance 
since US$281 billion in 1995 to $2.17 trillion in 2007, with 2003 and 2004 seeing remarkable 
annual growth rates of over 35%. China has become a major import origin country and export 
destination in the world. In fact, the country had overtaken the US as the second largest 
exporter in the world in terms of export volume by 2006 (Hall, 2007), and dethroned 
Germany as top goods exporter in 2009 (Miller and Walker, 2010)  
 
Table 4.4. China’s exports and imports growth (US$ billion), 1995-2009. (US$ billion) 
Year Exports Imports 
 
Total Value %  
Growth 
Balance 
1995 148.78 132.08 280.86 18.7 +16.70 
1996 151.05 138.83 289.88 3.2 +12.22 
1997 182.79 142.37 325.16 12.2 +40.42 
1998 183.71 140.24 323.95 -0.4 +43.47 
1999 194.93 165.70 360.63 11.3 +29.23 
2000 249.20 225.09 474.29 31.5 +24.11 
2001 266.10 243.55 509.65 7.5 +22.55 
2002 325.60 295.17 620.77 21.8 +30.43 
2003 438.37 412.84 851.21 37.1 +25.53 
2004 593.36 561.38 1,154.74 35.7 +31.98 
2005 762.00 660.12 1,422.12 23.2 +101.88 
2006 969.08 791.61 1,760.69 23.8 +177.47 
2007 1,218.01 955.81 2,173.83 23.5 +262.20 
2008 1,428.54 1,133.09 2,561.63 17.8 +295.46 
2009 1,201.67 1,005.60 2,207.27 -13.6 +196.07 
Sources: based on Chinability (2010), and MOFCOM (2010) ('+' means surplus). 
 
China is regarded as one of the most successful socialist countries that have made a transition 
from a centrally planned to a market economy. It is true that the decision of reform has 
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resulted in considerable effects in a number of political-economic fields, such as the following 
aspects. First, a ‘modern enterprise system’ is being established, which includes reform of the 
organizational and managerial system in the public sector. Government organs have also been 
fitted or recombined, such as the new MOFCOM. Government interference has been reduced 
to enable the enterprises to function more independently and efficiently in the marketplace.  
 
Second, the Chinese economic reform implies the essential reform of its financial system, 
including taxation, banking and monetary organizations. New equal taxation policy was 
designed for a fair market environment (Zhang, et al, 2006), and has been applied since 
January 2008. The People’s Bank of China was allowed to function as central banks do in 
other countries in order to implement monetary policies in an independent manner. In addition, 
foreign banking organizations and stock markets, as well as a less rigidly-controlled foreign 
currency exchange market, have also been encouraged. Third, in order to encourage 
international competition and protect the right of private investment and property, the Chinese 
legal system has produced and constantly improved many new regulations and laws, for 
example ‘Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-funded Enterprises' in March 
2007 (see Appendix 4.1). This law gives clear instruments and guidelines for FDI’s operations 
in China, including issues such as setup and registration, mergers, and property rights. Along 
with this, some 20 new regulations on foreign mergers and acquisitions of domestic firms 
launched in 2007, and 'Anti-monopoly Law' enforced in 2008. 
 
4.4.2. The Challenges for Future Development   
However, beneath the benign statistics some imbalances are evident, such as the fiscal deficit 
resulting from high demands for social expenditure and infrastructure investment and 
constraints on the revenue side (Datamonitor, 2004). Unemployment is also a raising concern, 
with the official urban unemployment rate standing at over 4% in 2007. Moreover, 
inflationary pressures have also become more pronounced recently, as annul consumer price 
inflation rose to around 6% at the end of 2007, being the peak of the last decade (MOFCOM, 
2008). Last but not least, China’s economic development has proceeded unevenly between 
different regions, with southeast urban coastal areas experiencing more rapid economic 
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development than other rural areas of the middle and western regions of the country (Cui and 
Liu, 2000; Wu, 2006; Jackson 2006). 
 
Moreover, although currently China has a mixed economy, with a combination of state-owned 
and private firms (including both domestic and foreign), the majority, about 75% of the 
country's production power and assets, were in the hand of the State, leaving only 21% among 
the nation's private sector (Chen, 2007). Therefore, the key economic challenge faced by 
China’s further success of economic reform and development is how to restructure its ailing 
sector of SOEs, and the largely bankrupt remnants of the old command economy (Steinfeld, 
1998; Branstetter and Feenstra, 2002; Huang, 2003). 
 
A number of SOEs, although they are mostly small or medium sized, have undergone steady 
partial or full privatization since early 1990s (Yusuf et al, 2006). However, many of them, 
which offer substantial employment and social security benefits to millions of workers in 
depressed areas, have built up huge debts to state-owned banks. In a sense, China’s ‘biggest 
four’ state-commercial banks (SCBs), which together control almost three-fourths of all 
China's banking assets, are technically bankrupt because of the massive portfolios of 
non-performing loans (NPLs). Thus, the Chinese authority had to restructure the financial 
sector, by creating some asset management companies to take the NPLs off the balance sheets 
of the SCBs (Datamonitor, 2004, Hu, 2006). 
 
Not only are the Chinese SCBs under the pressure of reform. In fact, it is one of the biggest 
challenges for almost all industries throughout the country, with respects to the inefficient 
operations of most SOEs. Given the nature of the Communist Party, there was a period in 
China when all the industrial corporations were either state owned, or collectively owned 
(which usually meant being run or managed by various departments of local governments, 
institutions or state-owned enterprises) from 1957 to the 1970’s (Chow, 2002). Nowadays, 
SOEs (who are under the supervision of SOASAC) are still the second important production 
units, right after the ‘communes’ of farmers, in terms of numbers (Chow, 2002, p49), and the 
largest employer in terms of its shares in the urban workforce (China National Bureau of 
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Statistics, 2008). The importance of SOEs is apparent in tourism too (Su, et al, 2007). In the 
hotel sector, one of the earliest open areas in China, over half of the total hotels were 
state-owned or collectively owned in 2007, in terms of number (CNTA, 2008). 
 
Some have argued that China’s previous home-grown reform followed a gradualist fashion 
which puts off the necessary restructuring towards a real market economy, and hence, there 
may eventually be fierce pain in the future (Haley 2003). However, the country has gained 
some breathing space through the gradualist approach, which is needed by the public. Also, 
this approach has avoided the social dislocation of a shock reform, and prevented events that 
were damaging Russia’s transition to capitalism, the black market’s take-over of the 
legitimate sector.  
 
It is necessary to emphasize that the Chinese economy has its special characteristics. On one 
hand, the government’s intervention or control upon the market is still higher than most 
western countries. As cited by Haley (2003, p 244), the Chinese market is a highly protected 
one, and ‘China would never fully open up its market to multinationals after its WTO entry; 
and because of cultural barriers, local competitors would gradually control it (Sito, 2000)’. On 
the other hand, ‘China faces some serious economic challenges, particularly with respect to 
the inefficient SOEs’ (Datamonitor, 2004, p.23) and the reforms of these SOEs who are about 
to be the most considerable competitors of FDI projects (Huang 2003). 
 
4.4.3. Zoning Approaches 
During the 1980s, China experienced a series of zoned opening strategies, including the 
establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), opening coastal cities and areas, and 
designating open economic and technology development zones. In August 1980, the NPC 
passed ‘Regulations for The Special Economy Zone of Guangdong Province’ and officially 
designated a portion of Shenzhen as the Shenzhen Special Economy Zone, followed by 
another two Guangdong cities, Zhuhai and Shantou, and one city of Fujian Province, Xiamen. 
In addition, the entire province of Hainan was designated, totaling five SEZs of China (red 




In August 1984, the country opened 14 coastal cities to overseas investment, including Dalian, 
Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, 
Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Beihai (see the green marked cities in Figure 4.2) and Shanghai. 
Furthermore, in 1988, China extended its open policy to border areas along the Yangtze River 
and covering inland cities. Then, during the 7th NPC in 1988, Hainan Island was officially 
established as the mainland China’s largest SEZ, with the other four SEZs enlarged. Shortly 
afterwards, the State Council expanded the open coastal areas into an open coastal ‘belt’ with 
the open economic zones of the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, 
Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle in South Fujian, Shandong Peninsula, Liaodong 
Peninsula, Hebei and Guangxi. This was followed by the open of Pudong New Area in 
Shanghai as the ‘dragon head’ of other open zones along the Yangtze River valley in June 
1990. Since 1992, China has further opened a number of inland cities, including all the capital 
cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions, with other forms of SEZs established, 
such as free-trade zones, economic and technological development zones, and new and 
high-tech industrial development zones. (www.en.wikipedia.org , 2007) 
 
Primarily geared to export processed goods, the SEZs, as well as other specially designed 
open zones, were foreign-oriented areas which benefit from preferential policies. In general, 
all enterprises established in these zones enjoyed more preferential treatment, such as 
reduction or elimination in customs duties and income taxes, than other locations. In terms of 
tourism, these SEZs and open areas have also become the most significant tourism generating 
regions in the country, with the best service infrastructures and labour resources (Jackson, 
2006). Given the accession to the WTO in December 2001, China committed to a further 
opening-up procedure to foreign ownership and competition throughout the country. The 
prevalence of the open process throughout the country may depreciate the outstanding status 
of those SEZs and open areas from a long term view. However, the more advanced investment 
environments and infrastructures of these early opened areas still represent a sense of 





Figure 4.2.  SEZs and major open zones and cities of China 
 
Sources: http://maps.nationmaster.com  (2007) (Approximate scale: 1:2,000,000) 
 
With this gradual development pattern of SEZs and other open zones, it is not difficult to see 
that China’s opening process is well-planned and controlled by the central government. In fact, 
China is sophisticated in applying zoning instruments, and its opening process is featured with 
regional differences. The advantage of this approach is obvious, as negative effects of new 
policies can be confined within a relatively small scale by experimenting in designed zones. 
However, as Wu (2006) suggested, these is already a large gap between the economy of the 





4.5 Foreign Direct Investment in China 
4.5.1. A General Picture of Foreign Direct Investment in China 
FDI was excluded in China prior to1978. It was not until Deng Xiaoping came to power and 
announced the reform and open policy in 1978 that China opened its door again (Chow, 2002). 
But, after 30 years effort, the general environment of China for serving FDI has been 
significantly changed. It was apparent that FDI was vigorously promoted in China, and in 
return, FDI has sped up the prosperity of the country. 
 
In fact, China has been one of the top three destinations of FDI after the USA and UK (Hu, 
2000; Wu, 2008). Table 4.5 shows the dramatically increasing volumes of FDI inflows into 
the country from about US$ 1 billion contractual volume in 1979 to over US$ 200 billion in 
2006. In 2008, China actually applied US$ 92.4 billion FDI, increasing 11.7% over 2007, and 
ranking first among developing nations for the 16th year in a row (Xin Hua News China, 
2008, 2009), although the project number reduced. China is, thus, recognized as one of the 
most FDI-dependent economies (Huang, 2003). However, the majority of the investments was 
still concentrated in east China along the coastal line, especially 11 provinces and cities, 
including Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Tianjin, and Zhejiang, capturing 81.9% of China's overall FDI in 2006 (US-China 
Business Council, 2008). 
 
What then are main reasons for the investment of foreign capital into China? According to 
Grillet (2003, p. 52), three major issues may be used to answer the question. First, there are 
‘location-specific advantages’ over other destinations. In this respect, the location-specific 
advantages of China include: high investment incentives of the government; good commercial, 
transport and communications infrastructure; cheaper input prices than in western countries 
(labor and others); politically relatively stable compared to other developing countries; proved 
economically stable during the Asia crisis; stable currency exchange rates (as being tightly 
controlled by the government ) (see Table 4.6); reasonable education level of work-force; and 





Table 4.5.  FDI in China (1979 to 2008) 
The Year Number of  
New Projects 
Amount in Contract 
(US$ billion) 
Amount in Practice 
(US$ billion) 
1979-1982 920 4. 96 1. 8 
1983 638 1. 92 0. 9 
1984 2,166 2. 7 1. 3 
1985 3,073 5.9 1. 7 
1986 1,498 2.8 1.9 
1987 2,233 3. 7 2. 3 
1988 5,945 5. 3 3. 2 
1989 5,779 5. 6 3. 4 
1990 7,273 6. 6 3. 5 
1991 12,978 12.0 4. 4 
1992 48,764 58. 1 11. 0 
1993 83,437 111. 4 27. 5 
1994 47,549 82. 7 33. 8 
1995 37,011 91. 3 37. 5 
1996 24,556 73. 3 41. 7 
1997 21,001 51. 0 45. 3 
1998 19,799 52. 1 45. 5 
1999 16,918 41.2 40.4 
2000 22,347 64.2 42.1 
2001 26,139 71.1 48.8 
2002 34,171 84.8 55.0 
2003 41,081 115.1 53.5 
2004 43,664 153.5 60.6 
2005 44,019 189.0 60.3 
2006 41,485 200.2 69.5 
2007 37,888 NA 82.7 
2008 27,514 NA 92.4 
Sources: Based on statistics of MOFCOM (2009), and US-China Business Council (2008) 
 
The second reason for international enterprises to invest in China is to exploit the potential of 
the market, which is considerable. As mentioned in Chapter Three, large market size is an 
important determinant for FDI (Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Lim, 2001; Hong and Chin, 2007). 
We may also quote Nunnenkamp (2002, p. 35) to explain: ‘Traditional market-related 
determinants are still dominant factors shaping the distribution of FDI. If at all, the bias of 
foreign direct investors in favor of large host countries has become stronger, rather than 
weaker.’ For example, China had only two million annual outbound tourists in 1990, but the 
figure increased 20 times to 40 million in 2007 which still only represents 3% of its total 
population. Being one of the biggest emerging marketplaces, China is obviously attractive to 




Table 4.6. Changes in exchange rate from 1979 to 2009, (RMB to 1US$, annual average) 





















2009 6.83  
Sources: based on Chinability (2010), and Datamonitor (2004) 
 
Third, Huang’s (2003) study indicated a deeply rooted cause to explain the prevailing 
situation of FDIs, especially the dominance of small and medium sized ones in China, 
attributing it to the financial institutional constraints of China. Huang (2003, p.3) argues that 
the Chinese ‘political pecking order favors, legally and financially, inefficient state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) at the expense of efficient non state firms, especially truly private firms’. 
As a result of this, the non state firms faced difficulty in borrowing from SCBs, and 
eventually had to seek for a solution from overseas capital.  
 
Despite the continuous growth in FDI, there have been notable changes in the major factors 
which can affect the decision of foreign investors. For example, the changes in the exchange 
rate evaluation system (from fixed rate to a more floating pattern with less control played by 
the government since July 2005) in China, and the gentle but continuous appreciation of RMB 
against the US dollar may substantially raise overall investment cost and thus are a vital issue 
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for international investors. Moreover, recent inflation, accompanied by rigid regulations for 
labour protection, severely affected the profitability of foreign investors. Furthermore, the 
lack of transparency in the Chinese political system, especially the information ‘black hole’ 
(Haley, 2003, p.239), protectionist policies (Tan, 2002; Gilboy 2004; and Tao, 2005), and 
corruptions (Huang, 2003), was regarded as other considerable obstacles depressing FDI 
activities in China. Last but not least, according to Ali et al (2006), the economic components 
and regime in China is still considerably different from other free-trade countries. Thus, 
foreign investors may find difficult to apply international experiences to their businesses in 
China with problems the foreign firms may have not met before.  
 
4.5.2. Historical Development of Foreign Direct Investment in China 
Based on Hu (2000)’s investigation, the development of FDI in China can be divided into four 
stages: The first stage (1979 to 1985) was from the 11th National Congress of the CPC 
announcing the decision of economic reform on 18 December, 1978, followed by the first 
regulation for foreign investments approved at the Fifth NPC of China in 1979. Five special 
economic zones and 14 coastal cities were opened. The total actual utilization of foreign 
capital was about 6 billion US dollars, averaging 1 billion per year, with total FDI projects 
numbered less than 7,000. Then, the second stage (1986 to 1991) was featured with the 
government’s efforts to complete the legal system and improve the environments for foreign 
investors. From 10th July, 1986, China began negotiations with WTO for being a member of 
free trade markets, which substantially encouraged FDI inflows. Total actual utilization of 
FDI increased to US$ 19 billion. 
 
The third stage (1992 to 2000) saw a rapid development time, stimulated mainly by the 
confirmation of the reform and open policy since Mr. Deng Xiaoping’s southern patrol and 
inspection in 1992. So 1992 witnessed the amount of contractual FDI being more than the 
total of the previous 12 years. Manufacture was still the main field opened to foreign investors. 
However, some of the agriculture, infrastructure, high-tech industries, and some service 
industries were also exposed with limitations. As industrial catalogues opened to foreign 
investment were substantially enlarged, during this period, actually applied FDI totaled over 




The final stage commenced in 2001. China started structural coordination and upgrading for 
hosting FDI with a period of stable development of FDI inflows and overall improvements of 
investment environment. The Chinese government has realized the importance of ideal 
distribution of FDI between different industries, different regions and localities. Since China 
became a formal member of WTO in 2001, the country has accelerated its open and reform 
strategy in both geographical and industrial terms. Ecological and sustainable development 
has been emphasized with great attentions on high-tech industries, financial and other service 
sectors. Relative regulations, such as a decree on M&A of domestic firms by foreign investors, 
and categories for guiding FDI in encouraged, restricted or prohibited industries (see 
Appendix 4.2) were composed and upgraded constantly to match the needs of foreign funded 
enterprises in the Chinese markets. The utilized amount of FDI, by the end of 2007, exceeded 
US$ 430 billion.  
 
4.5.3. Major Forms of Foreign Investment 
The absorption of FDI is an important ingredient of China’s fundamental principle of opening 
up to the world. With the figures studied earlier, there is no doubt that China has had 
considerable success, in terms of both the scale of absorbed foreign capital and the improved 
infrastructure and business environment. However, it is also important to realize that there are 
constraints in the forms of FDI that can be applied by overseas capital while investing in 
China, compared with those in free markets. It was not unusual to see that the form of 
Sino-foreign JVs was often used as the only allowed strategy for FDI by the Chinese 
government in certain industries.  
 
The constraint on the forms of FDI in China was due to three factors: first, through this 
approach, the state could keep defense and obstacles in sensitive, young or weak sectors to 
protect domestic economy bodies. Second, sometimes the Chinese market itself might not be 
mature enough to encounter or accept the approaches of an entirely foreign oriented business 
(Moore, 2002). Last but not least, it was also to provide opportunities for domestic enterprises, 





Table 4.7. Five forms of FDI in China 
Sino-foreign joint ventures: (also known as share-holding corporations, or equity joint ventures ) They are 
formed in China with joint capitals by foreign companies, enterprises, other economic organizations and 
individuals with Chinese companies, enterprises, other economic organizations and individuals. The capital from 
different parties is translated into the ratios of capitals, with foreign side generally more than 25%. Joint parties 
invest together and operate together, taking corresponding risk and benefit from the project according to the ratio 
of their capitals.  
 
Sino-foreign cooperative joint ventures: (also called contractual cooperation business) They are established 
with capitals or terms of cooperation by foreign companies, enterprises, other economic organizations and 
individuals with Chinese companies, enterprises, other economic organizations and individuals. The rights and 
obligations of different joint parties are embedded in the contract. To establish a cooperative business, the foreign 
party, generally speaking, supplies all or most of the capital while Chinese party supplies land, factory buildings, 
and useful facilities, and also some supply a certain amount of capital, too. 
 
Exclusively foreign-owned enterprises: They are totally invested by foreign investors in China by foreign 
companies, enterprises, other economic organizations and individuals in accordance with laws of China. 
According to the law of foreign-funded enterprises, the establishment of foreign enterprises should benefit the 
development of China’s economy and agree with at least one of the following criteria: the enterprises must adopt 
international advanced technology and facility; all or most of the products must be export-oriented. The foreign 
funded enterprises often take the form of limited liability. But the WTO pledge will help to further reduce relative 
restrictions.  
 
Sino-foreign joint exploitation: Joint exploitation is the abbreviation of maritime and overland oil joint 
exploitation. It is a widely adopted measure of economic cooperation in the international natural resources field. 
The striking features are high risk, high investment and high reward. The joint development is often divided into 
three steps: exploitation, development and production. Compared with the other three means mentioned above, 
joint cooperation accounts for a small ratio in China. 
 
Foreign-funded share-holding companies: Foreign companies, enterprises, other economic organizations and 
individuals can form foreign funded share-holding companies in China with Chinese companies, enterprises and 
other economic organizations. The total capital of the share-holding company is formed by equal shares. 
Shareholders will take due responsibilities for the company according to shares purchased; company will take 
responsibilities for all its debts through all its assets. The Chinese and foreign shareholders will hold the shares of 
the company. Among them, the shares purchased and held by foreign investors account for more than 25% of the 
total registered capital of the company. Limited company can be established either by means of starting-up or 
raising, and the limited liability company invested by the foreigners can then apply to turn into share-holding 
companies. The qualified enterprises can also apply to issue A & B share in China or list abroad. 
Sources: www.invest-inchina.com , (2007) 
 
In general, FDI took five major investment modes in the Chinese marketplace. They were: 
Sino-foreign equity JVs; Sino-foreign contractual cooperation JVs; wholly owned foreign 
enterprises (WOFEs); joint exploitation; and foreign-funded share-holding companies (see 
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Table 4.7). However, during recent years, WFOEs are multiplying quicker than other types 
(Table 4.8), which reveals at least three facts that: first, there have been deregulations in the 
forms of foreign investment; second, international companies are getting better at investing 
alone in China and getting more familiar with the Chinese business circumstances; third, there 
is a serious lack of domestic capital in the hands of Chinese domestic investors (Hu, 2000). 
But there was also a belief that the lack of trust between Chinese and overseas partners was an 
essential reason for the popularity of WOFEs in China (Deng, 2001). 
 
Table 4.8.  Non-financial FDI by types in 2006 and 2007 
 
Number of Project Utilized FDI Value (US$ billion) 
2006 2007 2006 2007 
Total FDI 41,473 37,871 65.82 74.77 
EJVs 10,223 7,649 14.83 15.60 
CJVs 1,036 641 1.99 1.42 
WFOES 30,164 29,543 48.56 57.26 
FISVs 50 38 0.44 0.49 
Note: EJVs=equity joint ventures; CJVs=cooperative joint ventures; FISVs=foreign invested shareholding 
ventures.  Sources: US-China Business Council (2008) 
 
Moreover, as studied in Chapter Three, international mergers of Chinese companies and assets 
is still a recently opened field, and thus has not been a prevailing entry mode in the Chinese 
marketplace (Huang et al, 2006). However, since multinational M&As have become the major 
strategy of international investments, China has made efforts to improve relative policy and 
regulation environment for M&As activities of foreign firms, especially since 2007, such as 
anti-monopoly law in 2008, and decree on M&A of domestic firms by foreign investors in 
2008 and 2009, in order to facilitate further development of FDI. Rationally, the improvement 
of China’s legal condition should induce a peak era of FDI expansion in the economy in the 
foreseeable future.  
 
4.5.4. Key Issues in the Recognition of China for International Investments 
In November 2002, the 16th National Congress of the CPC amended some articles of the 
Constitution of CPC; elected the new leadership of the 16th Central Committee of the Party; 
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and emphasized the future work on the state’s economical and social development. The 
central principles and policies may be summarized as: to adapt to the new situation of world 
economic development; to stick to the principles of active and reasonable utilization of 
foreign capital; to combine foreign capital absorption with economic structure adjustment and 
industrial upgrading promotion; to improve the socialist market economy system; to reinforce 
enterprise competitiveness; to expand the development of an open economy; to vigorously 
exploit China’s western area; and to promote regional economies’ harmonious development.  
 
Important measures included: to further improve the soft environment for foreign investment; 
to explore new methods for absorbing foreign capital, to put emphasis on modern 
management and special talents, and to actively absorb foreign capital to invest in industries 
of new and advanced technologies; to encourage multinationals to set up district headquarters 
research and procurement offices; to speed up the development of supporting industries and 
push on the service trade field to open up gradually and further to foreign countries 
(http://english.people.com.cn , 2004). In short, the Chinese open and reform procedure in its 
political and economic system is recommended to continue, with FDI and service industries 
like tourism apparently in encouraged list.  
 
The 17th CPC National Congress was held on 21 October, 2007, which further emphasized the 
importance of on-going development and reform activities. However, the congress also 
revealed that China's leading officials and party cadres have placed 'building a harmonious 
society' at the top of their agenda. This ‘harmonious society’ principle, on one hand, implies 
China’s continued integration into the global economic system (Blanchard, 2008). However, it 
is also noteworthy that, in a sense, the primary consideration of the future development of the 
country has been given to poorer and less advanced regions or societies, especially the vast 
middle and west regions.   
 
As examined earlier, China faces some serious economic challenges, particularly with respect 
to the inefficient SOEs, such as the over-exposed SCBs (Datamonitor, 2004). In fact, the 
internal reform of the Chinese economical system, which is actually focusing on the 
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restructuring of SOEs, is an essential fact for international investors to consider. Given the 
nature of CPC, China experienced a time when all the industrial corporations were either state 
owned or collectively owned from 1957 to the 1970’s. By now, the prior importance of SOEs, 
its supervisory organ, SOASAC, and regional governments, are still throned within China's 
economic framework (Du and Xu, 2009). Therefore, SOEs, as well as its ramification, 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) owned by lowest level of government, are, in effect, 
the most considerable rivals of foreign invested enterprises in China (Huang, 2003). And the 
process and consequence of the reform of SOEs can significantly impact the future of the FDI 
sector. Many studies have been focusing on relative topics, including Chow (2002) who 
provides some insights about the implication of the process for FDI, as follows: 
 
1. Foreign investors ‘should treat China’s economy as a market economy’ (p85); 
2. ‘Further reform of China’s economic institutions will be a slow process’, as easy changes 
made in the first two decades, with the difficult ones left ahead (p85). Also, as the 
government fears for creating too much social instability, it ‘cannot and will not allow the 
competition to come in too rapidly.’ Thus, ‘there is red tape and other means to delay 
foreign competition --- exercised by central, provincial, and local government officials’ 
(p79);  
3. ‘One might call the Chinese economy a “bureaucratic market economy” (its official 
designation is “socialist market economy”)’, with two considerations. First, the 
state-owned institutions are controlled and run by bureaucrats. Second, the non-state 
enterprises, both domestic and foreign, have to deal with bureaucrats in the government 
and other state sectors to conduct their business (p85); 
4. Although the institutional characteristics, somehow, hamper the growth of the Chinese 
economy, they are unlikely to change dramatically in the near future. 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion  
This chapter begins with an examination of the structure of Chinese government institutions, 
from the central system at the state level with a focused introduction on the State Council, to 
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the administrative differences at regional and local level, and concluding with a general 
overview of regional differences of the country. The chapter also reviews some of the 
literature related to tourism planning, including the major reasons and forms of government 
intervention. This is followed by the study of Getz (1987) and Hall (2000)'s models on four 
tourism planning approaches, including ‘boosterism’, industry-oriented approach, spatial 
approach, and community-oriented approach. Then the study draws an understanding that 
despite of a unique political system, the Chinese government takes similar functions as most 
other countries for development. 
 
This chapter also addresses the background of economic development in China, especially 
concerning the impacts of the Chinese reform and open policy. It investigates the overall 
growth of the Chinese economic figures, such as the GDP and foreign trade performance 
during the last three decades. However, it should also be noted that China faces challenges in 
its future development, such as the appreciation of RMB, and the pressure of inflation and 
unemployment. However, the most significant problem is the restructure of the ailing SOE 
sector, especially the recapitalization of the SCBs. This discussion is followed by an 
introduction of SEZs and other open zones as an important economical instrument of the 
Chinese government  
 
The last section of this chapter focuses on the FDI phenomenon in China, by looking at the 
growing volumes, the reasons of the growth of inflows, the development history of FDI, 
major forms and the future trends. Finally, some key issues about the current policy directions 
were discussed, which indicated that the open and reform in both economic and political 
terms in China would continue to be the primary task of the Chinese government. However, it 
is vital to understand that the supreme objective of the future development in China will be 
the efforts to shorten the gaps between rich and poor regions, as well as between different 
societies. In other words, social stability is regarded as more important than the growth of 
economy for the country. In short, the message of this chapter is to realize that the Chinese 
economy is a bureaucratic market economy, and the reform process of the economy in the 




The contribution of this chapter is that it provides a necessary understanding of the Chinese 
political and economic systems, and their impacts on FDI in the country. These provide 
essential background knowledge for the further investigation of the Chinese tourism industry 
and the FITS sector. First, Chinese authority shows a combination of economic-oriented 
approach, spatial approach, as well as community oriented approach (in terms of local 
protection). Moreover, FDI in China is substantially guided and influenced by changes in 
government policies. Lastly, FDI in China should give great attention to the performances of 
Chinese SOEs.  
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Chapter 5 
FDI in the Major Sectors of Tourism in China 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China is the third largest country in the world in term of its land 
area of 9.6 million square kilometers, and the largest in terms of a population of more than 1.2 
billion. As discussed in Chapter Four, China has also become the largest exporter in the world 
since 2009, and one of the biggest FDI destinations since 1990s. The GDP of China reached 
US$ 4.9 trillion, ranking as the third in world terms in 2009 (World Bank, 2010). Supported 
by this economic growth, the tourism market of China has been developing rapidly. The 
official website of the Chinese government states in its brief introduction on tourism that: 
Since the initiation of the policies of reform and opening to the outside world in 1978, China’s 
tourism has entered a stage of rapid development. In 1999, the number of tourists entering China 
reached 72.8 million, of which 8.43 million were foreign tourists, 40 times the figure for 1978. 
Consequently, the foreign exchange income from this industry reached US$14.1 billion, 54 
times that of 1978. Currently, China has become an important tourism destination in Asia, and 
the fifth large tourism country in the world. Domestic tourism is also growing vigorously. With 
the improvement of the Chinese people’s living standards, Chinese citizens have an increasingly 
strong interest in traveling abroad. In recent years, Chinese citizens have traveled to Southeast 
Asia and Europe. Foreign travel agencies are now opening offices in China to attract Chinese to 
travel abroad. Now, China is fast on its way to becoming a country with developed tourism, and 
constantly improving tourism facilities and services. It is estimated that, by 2020, China will be 
the world’s No. 1 tourism destination and the fourth-largest nation of tourists 
(www.gov.cn/english , 2005). 
 
 
The development of the Chinese tourism industry has been regarded as significant in the last 
three decades. Nowadays, ‘tourism has become a strategic industry in China’s development 
toward a socialist market economy’ (Zhang, & Lew, 2003, p3). In 2007, the total inbound 
tourists (including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) numbered 131.87 million, including over 
26 million visitors from other countries, with a total revenue in excess of US$ 41.9 billion, 
increasing by 5.5%, 17.6% and 23.5% over the previous year respectively (CNTA, 2008). 
Given the effects of global recession, 2008 witnessed a light decrease with a total of 130 
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million inbound tourists, including 24.3 million foreigners, and US$ 40.8 billion total revenue 
(CNTA, 2009). In 2007, Chinese outbound tourists reached 40.95 million, with an annual 
increase of 18.6% achieved. According to CNTA1 (2001), it is estimated that by 2020, China 
will receive 210 to 300 million inbound tourist arrivals, including up to 45 million foreign 
tourists. Similarly, it was forecast by WTO1 (2001) in its 2020 Vision report that China would 
be the top tourism destination and fourth largest tourist-generating country in the world by 
2020, with 137 million international visitors and 100 million outbound tourists. It seems that 
China may reach these figures earlier than expected (Arlt, 2006). And clearly, the importance 
of the Chinese tourism industry has been recognized globally.  
 
In Chapter Four, the overall investment environment, including both political and economic 
phenomenon, was investigated, revealing relative stability in the growth of China’s economy, 
as well as in its political system, during the last three decades. The reform and open policy 
launched at the end of 1970s and China's accession to the world free trading network since 
2001 have constantly accelerated the prosperity of the country and the improvement of its 
industrial structure. In these circumstances, the potential development of the Chinese tourism 
industry is considerable. 
 
This chapter discusses, and presents ways in which the Chinese tourism industry is 
developing, and the general character of the development. It was noted that tourism 
development in China was accompanied by the increasing interconnection and 
communication with international expectations and capital investments (Shan and Wilson, 
2001; Tang, et al, 2007). This indicates a mutual causal relation between FDI and the Chinese 
tourism, especially from FDI to tourism (as advocated by Tang, et al, 2007), which is the 
focus of this chapter. Three major tourism sectors are also investigated in this chapter, with a 
particular emphasis on the Chinese travel trade sector. 
 
Firstly, this chapter provides a historical review of the development approach of the Chinese 
tourism industry in general. This is followed by a brief introduction on the governmental 
administration organ, CNTA, and its major functions in the industry. As CNTA's jurisdiction 
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is mainly confined to three tourism sectors, including hotels, travel trade, and tourist 
attractions, the three business sectors and their development, and the influence of FDI are 
summarized. However, more attention is given to the travel trade industry, as it is the target of 
this research. Both the characteristics of the indigenous travel services and the FITS sector are 
studied, based on previous studies. The changes of the Chinese policies upon the travel 
service industry, as well as the commitments about the industry made by the country when 
joining in the World Trade Organization (WTO) are also examined. The aim of this chapter, 
together with the previous three literature chapters, is to contextualise the more detailed 
empirical research presented in later chapters on the FITS sector. 
 
 
5.2. The Development History of the Chinese Tourism Industry  
There is no doubt that tourism industry has become one of the fastest growing businesses in 
China since the launch of its Reform and Open Policy. During the decades of its 
implementation, the travel and tourism industry was promoted at the forefront of China’s 
economic reform by actively importing FDI and international management knowledge (Guo 
and Turner, 2002). It was true that the opening of the tourism industry was also regarded as 
one of the most crucial topics during China’s access negotiation with the WTO. However, the 
level and extent of opening within the industry can’t be explained in a simple way. There has 
been unbalanced development among different tourism sectors and among different regions 
(Jackson, 2006). In order to understand these differences, there is a need to look through the 
history of the industry's development and the overall changes happening in the industry over 
time, influenced by both domestic and foreign forces.  
 
The tourism industry of the People’s Republic of China (China) which was established in 
1949, grew from a very low foundation, but experienced rapid development and growth 
within the following decades, with surges especially after the announcement of its reform and 
open policy, the southern tour of Mr. Deng, and China’s entry into the WTO. Similar to the 
development history of FDI in China, which was examined in the previous chapter, the 
development of the tourism industry also emphasizes the three vital years, 1978, 1992 and 
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2001. Based on Gao (2004) and Qian’s (2003) study, the development of tourism industry of 
China can be briefly divided into four periods: 1, the period before the reform and opening 
policy, 1978; 2, from 1979 to 1991; 3, 1992 to 2001; and 4, after 2001.  
 
 
5.2.1. The First Period before 1978 
Prior to 1978, tourism had not been developed as an industry in China yet, (Guo and Turner, 
2002; Qian, 2003). China’s limited travel services were considered as part of ‘People’s 
Diplomacy’ (Lew, 1987), and the ‘travel service was not a business, still less an industry’ 
(Qian, 2003, p146). The purpose of receiving foreign visitors was to break blockages and the 
hostility of most western countries, and to make the new China familiar to the rest of the 
world, which resulted in the dominance of inbound tourists. Generally, the most popular 
forms of travel were limited by some major factors, including government and business 
activity; and recuperation for sick or injured model workers; Spring Festival family reunion, 
school holidays; and visiting friends and relatives (VFR) (Guo and Turner, 2002). 
 
At this time, two state-owned organizations, China Travel Service (CTS) and China 
International Travel Service (CITS) together performed an administrative role, and served 
almost all inbound tourists. In the mid 1970s, the Bureau for Travel and Tourism (BTT) (the 
proscursor of CNTA) was created under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry, in order to 
take over the administrative power. The accommodation for serving international tourists 
were separated and titled as ‘exterior unit (“Shewaidanwei” in Chinese)’. All these hotels 
were state owned, and numbered 137, with 15,539 rooms or 30,740 beds in total in 1978 
(Chon, 2007). The number was very low, compared to 14,099 star-rated hotels in 2008 
(CNTA, 2009).  
 
Domestic leisure tourism hardly existed, as it was regarded as a capitalistic life style contrary 
to the communist ethics of the country, with outbound travel limited almost exclusively 
reserved for diplomats and government officials (Zhang, 2003). The numbers of foreign 
visitors during those years were very low, with 4,000 from 1956 to 1957, 12,877 in 1965, and 
                                                                                                           99 
 
 
dropping to 300 during China's ‘cultural revolution’ period (1966 to the early 1970’s). 
However, the volume of foreign tourists further increased to 0.23 million, with 1.8 million 
inbound tourists (including those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) in 1978.  
 
5.2.2. The Second Period from 1979 to 1991 
This encompassed approximately ten years of high-speed development, in terms of both 
China's reform process and the country’s tourism industry. During the period, the industry 
adopted some major opening strategies, including: 1) encouraging inbound traveling and 
improving the international image of China; 2) vigorously building hotels with foreign 
investment, but in selected locations; 3) starting the opening of outbound tourism for Chinese 
people, with domestic travel encouraged; 4) initially opening market access of ‘commercial 
presence’ and ‘presence of natural persons’ for foreigners’ hotels; 5) the opening of other 
fields of the industry, such as infrastructure of tourist attractions, restaurants and cruising 
business. Among these, utilization of foreign capital in building hotels for the Chinese tourism 
industry, and the increase in the Chinese outbound and domestic markets were milestones in 
the development of the industry. In addition, with the experience of open policy for thirty 
years, the higher standard of the facilities, services, and management technology of the hotel 
sector in China, compared to other tourism sectors, can be regarded as the best example of the 
contribution of FDI to the development of the industry,.  
 
For the hotel sector, two different stages were seen before and after 1986. During the former 
stage, the use of foreign investment to build hotels was encouraged. The state firstly examined 
and approved eight foreign invested hotels in the early 1980s. Then, local governments were 
authorized to grant FDI if the budget was under US$ 30 million dollars. By the end of 1985, 
the country's hotel industry had absorbed US$ 0.75 billion dollars foreign capital, involving 
94 hotel projects and 18,500 beds. However, foreign investment was again seriously 
controlled and restricted by the central government since 1986. The state government 
reclaimed all the rights of examining and approving foreign invested hotels and office 
building projects (Chon, 2007).  
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Despite these restrictions, during this period, the hotel industry utilized US$ 5 billion dollars 
of FDI and the number of foreign invested hotels increased to 370, with a capacity over 
75,000 rooms. The application of FDI substantially offset the lack of domestic capital in 
construction, and rapidly improved the overall standard of accommodation facilities in the 
country. The total number of hotels increased from 203 in 1978 to 2,130 in 1991 (Zhang, et al, 
2005), albeit the industry was still dominated by state-ownership. 
 
Moreover, this period saw not only the growth of inbound tourism, but also the start of the 
domestic and outbound travel activities of Chinese nationals. CTS and CITS still dominated 
the inbound travel industry, together with China Youth Travel Service (CYTS) known as the 
'three magnates' of the travel service industry in China (Zhang, 2003). The business was 
essentially a monopoly with demand over supply, which resulted in huge net profits at over 
67% on average (CNTA, 1998). This monopolistic situation came to an end, characterised by  
the growth in both demand and supply, as the number of travel agencies rapidly increased to 
1,561 in 1991 (Qian, 2003). Travellers from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan still accounted 
for around 90% of all inbound visitors to the country, totaling 33 million inbound tourists in 
1991 (Zhang, 2003). In order to control the outbound market, approved destination status 
(ADS) was launched in 1983 (Guo and Turner, 2002), with only Hong Kong and Macao two 
destinations at the beginning. Until 1990, Chinese nationals were officially allowed to take 
leisure tours organized by CTS to Hong Kong, Macao, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
(Arlt, 2006), followed by the addition of Russia, Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos and 
Myanmar later. The outbound tourist number increased to 2.1 million, accompanied by 300 
million domestic travelers in 1991 (Zhang et al, 2005).  
 
In general, the tourism industry acted as a precursor of the Chinese reform and open policy 
during the period (Gao, 2004). The utilization of foreign capital in the hotel sector provided a 
pilot model for other industries to further experience the policy (Zhang et al, 2005). The 
government had realized the significant role of tourism in the course of reform, as the CNTA 
was set up in 1981 under the direct supervision of the State Council to replace the former BTT. 
However, by 1991, the opening of the Chinese tourism industry was still at an infant stage, 
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and the market mechanism in the industry was small (Zhang, 2003), although there have been 
signs of the release of government control, especially in the hotel sector. The emphasis of 
development during this period was still concentrated in the inbound sector (Qian, 2003).  
 
5.2.3. The Third Period from 1992 to 2001 
From the early 1990s, China started access negotiation with WTO. Simultaneously, Mr. Deng 
Xiaoping's southern patrol in 1992 assured further economical reform and openness in China. 
In this circumstance, Chinese tourism welcomed its new era of prosperity impelled by both 
internal policy stimuli and external pushing powers of foreign interests. In a sense, this period 
can be recognized as China's vigorous self-transforming stage focusing on the coordination 
and regulation of its indigenous industry (Qian, 2003) with the introduction of market 
mechanism, before the access into WTO. There were some important changes and 
improvements achieved in the industry during the period, summarized by two aspects, 
administrative movements and industrial development. 
 
Considerable shifts occurred in the political and administrative system that impacted on the 
tourism industry. As the Chinese government gradually relaxed its control in many areas of 
the industry, it tended to withdraw from the role of operators and entrepreneurs, and switching 
to a regulator and promoter of the industry (Gao, 2004). One obvious point is the reduction of 
SOEs in the hotel industry, with the proportion of SOEs dropping to around 59 % in 2001 
(Qian, 2003), whilst the private and foreign ownership largely encouraged. As Qian (2003, 
p146) claims, given an urgent need to reform, this period is a ‘transition stage in the central 
government’s move from a planned to a socialist market economy’. The transition called for 
the improvement of its legal measures, such as the licensing regulation started in 1993 and a 
compelling substantial cash deposit in 1995 in the travel service sector (Gao, 2004). In 
addition, the first benchmark system for star-rated hotels was launched in 1995, followed by 
'Regulations of Travel Service Management' in 1997. Moreover, being a promoter of the 
industry, the government introduced three week-long holidays in 1995 to encourage domestic 
travel market, with the outbound market further officially legalized in1997 (Guo and Turner, 
2002). 




Synchronously, the tourism industry in this period witnessed dramatic growths in terms of 
size, and overall improvement in terms of structure. In 2001, the number of star-rated hotels 
further increased to 7,358, together with some 4,100 non-starred hotels and 0.26 million other 
tourist accommodations (Zhang et al, 2005). The same year saw 10,532 travel 
servicecompanies in the country and the total international tourism receipts climbed to 
US$ 17.8 billion, which made the country one of the largest tourism marketplaces in the 
world (CNTA2, 2001). Moreover, the application of FDI expanded from hotels to other sectors, 
such as travel services and transportation, as well as theme parks, with some limitations. It is 
important to note that, it is only since 1993 that Sino-foreign joint travel services have been 
allowed to operate in designated resort areas.  
 
Furthermore, it is in this period that China’s tourism industry successfully developed its full 
structure of three major markets, the inbound, outbound and domestic. The Chinese inbound 
market continuously grew and attracted over 89 million inbound tourists in 2001. In March 
1997, the state relaxed the limitation on the purpose of outbound travel from VFR only to all 
kinds, which was marked as that the Chinese people’s outbound travel was officially legalized 
(Guo and Turner, 2002). Since that time, the scale of the Chinese outbound market has 
substantially expanded, and developed to become an independent market of the industry, with 
a total of Chinese outbound tourists exceeding 12 million in 2001 (Zhang et al, 2005). 
Furthermore, the domestic travel market was also stimulated by the increase in the Chinese 
people's disposable income and the legitimacy of week-long holidays, with 784 million total 
domestic trips made in 2001 (Gao, 2004).  
  
5.2.4. Post 2001 
Since China formally became one of the member countries of the WTO in December 2001, 
the importance of examining, regulating and facilitating foreign business phenomenon in the 
context of local marketplace has become the focus of the government's programme (Gao, 
2004). Thus, this is the time for China to gradually adapt to the rules of global markets, after 
its domestic foundations strengthened during the previous years. Further aspects of the 
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government's role in enterprises were discarded. Policies and regulations have been made in 
order to improve the overall soft environment for international investments, and to establish a 
smooth communication and competition mechanism between the local and foreign operators 
(Qian, 2003). Examples include many new laws for foreign companies’ M&As of Chinese 
entities launched and an anti-monopoly law proposed since 2007.  
 
Within the tourism industry, in June 2003, there was the amended ‘Interim Provision on the 
Establishment of Foreign Holding and Wholly Foreign-Owned Travel Agencies’ (see 
Appendix 5.1), which was further deregulated in December 2005, and most recently in early 
2009. Other efforts, such as nine benchmark rules for tourist attractions, tour guide, 
transportations and tourist accommodation facilities announced since 2004, were made to 
standardize the local industry. The purpose of these actions was very simple: to create a 
clearer and healthier market environment, and to facilitate partnership opportunities between 
locals and foreigners (Gao, 2004). 
 
Early in the 21st century, the Chinese tourism industry witnessed a substantial growth, in 
terms of both size and capacity. 2007 saw 131.87 million inbound, 1.6 billion domestic and 
40.95 million outbound tourists with total tourist receipts increased to US$ 41.9 billion 
(CNTA, 2008). Moreover, many tourism-related businesses have been fostered, such as car 
rental companies and exchange shops. The FIST sector is also gradually picking up local 
knowledge in the marketplace, although their business scope is still restricted. However, being 
the earliest opened area, the Chinese hotel sector has witnessed various internationalization 
modes, for example, licensing, franchising, and mergers. 
 
This situation relates to similar findings in a United Nations’ (2007, p.96) study that ‘within 
tourism itself, hotels and restaurants were more open to FDI than travel agencies and tour 
operations’, as well as other sectors. The opening pace of hotels has been faster than other 
industries in China. Since 2005, the Chinese hotel industry has faced minimum regulatory 
barriers composed to foreign firms (Gao, 2004). In 2007, there were 13,583 star-rated hotels 
with 1.57 million rooms in China, with 5,806 or 42.7% state owned and 592 or about 4% 
                                                                                                           104 
 
 
foreign (including Hong Kong and Macao) owned entities. The number of travel services 
increased to 18,943 in the same year, however, with only 25 FITSs operating in the country. 
Thus, the future opening speed of the travel service sector has been the most crucial and 
hottest issue in the Chinese tourism industry (Gao, 2004). 
 
5.2.5. The General Picture 
Table 5.1 summarizes the major development indicators of the Chinese tourism industry with 
comparable figures in one year of each evolution stage. Apparently, the figures show a rather 
dramatic growth in the industry during the last three decades. In fact, some researchers like 
Chon (2007) even suggest that China may become the world's No.1 tourist destination by 
2012, which is eight years earlier than the forecast of World Tourism Organization (WTO1). 
Beyond these figures, changes are happening in every area of the industry in China, such as 
the shift from mass production to niche marketing, and the emerging trend of FDI outflow of 
Chinese travel and hotel groups. 
  
However, Zhang (2003) concluded the most essential transformations in the Chinese tourism 
industry relate to five key aspects. First, the industry experienced a shift 'from a diplomatic 
activity to an industry’ (p.24) that contributing considerably to the Chinese economy. Second, 
the tourism administration system in China has changed 'from micromanagement and control 
to macromanagement and service' (p. 25). Third, the priority of tourism policies in China is no 
longer given to inbound only, as what was at the earliest development stage, but to both its 
international and domestic market equally. Fourth, in terms of the business operation and 
competition environment of the industry, a switch from the monopoly of SOEs to a 
standardized and mixed ownership structure has occurred. Fifth, the management strategy of 
the industry has actively transferred 'from a product-oriented to a market-oriented mode' 
(p.28). It is also significant that FDI has played a significant role during the above changes. 
Especially at the micro level, the shifts of firms’ management and technology orientation were 
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Table 5.1. The comparison of four development stages of tourism in China 
 First Period  
Before 1978 
(Figures of 1978) 
Second Period  
1979-1991 
(Figures of 1991) 
Third Period 
1992-2001 
(Figures of 2001) 
Forth Period 
After 2001 





1.8 million 33.35 million 89.01 million 130 million 
Tourist Receipts 
Of the Inbound 
NA 2.8 billion US$  17.8 billion US$ 40.8 billion 
Domestic Tourists NA 300 million 784 million 1.7 billion 
Outbound Tourists NA 2.1 million 12 million 45.84 million 
Hotel Numbers 203 2,130 7,358 (star-rated) 14,099(star-rated) 
Travel Service 
Numbers 
CITS and CTS 
as monopolists 
1,561 10,532 20,110 
Sources: The figures are from CNTA statistics (until 2009) and Zhang (2003) 
 
In addition, in terms of the tourism planning approaches of China, it seems that China had no 
concept of tourism planning for development before 1978. Gradually, the country has 
developed a tradition of tourism planning, combining the features of both economic and 
zoned spatial approaches, with increasing attention given to a community-oriented approach. 
However, it is important to understand that, although the Chinese tourism industry has 
developed rapidly, there are still considerable gaps between some of the giant international 
operators and Chinese indigenous tourism enterprises, in terms of both economic scales and 
management technologies.  
 
 
5.3. The China National Tourism Administration 
It is obvious that tourism has become one of the most important industries in China’s 
economy with total revenue accounting for over 5% of the country’s GDP. The State tourism 
administration, named CNTA, functioning under the State Council, is the supreme 
administrative organ of the nation’s tourism industry. Figure 5.1 reveals the structure of 
CNTA, including one administration office and six departments: Marketing & 
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Communications Department (MCD), Industry Management Department (IMD), Policy and 
Legal Department, Planning and Finance Department, Human Resources Department, and 
Comprehensive Coordination Department. Apparently, under IMD, the hotel and travel 
agency divisions indicate the particular strength of the jurisdiction of CNTA upon these two 
sectors (CNTA1, 2007).  
  
Figure 5.1. The organizational structure of CNTA 
Sources: CNTA1 (2007).  
 
According to CNTA’s official website, its main responsibilities are: 1) to set out guidelines, 
policies, plans and supervisory regulations for tourism development; 2) to make strategy to 
promote international tourism, and publicize ‘proper’ images of national tourism; 3) to form 
domestic tourism strategy and direct regional tourism; 4) to organize tourism research and 
investigation; 5) to standardize the quality of services and facilities of hotels, monitor and 
license travel services, and supervise tourist attraction sites; 6) to set out out-bound tourism 
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policy, and being responsible for foreign, Hong Kong, Marco and Taiwan affairs; 7) to 
promote international co-operations with other countries in tourism; 8) to promote tourism 
educational and training institutions. 
 
In practice, CNTA exercises its administrative powers on three major tourism sectors, the 
travel trade/ travel services, hotels, and tourist attractions. Traditionally, the transportation 
sector is under the supervision of other ministries of the State Council in China. For example, 
the airlines and air ticketing system in China are in the control of Civil Aviation 
Administration of China (CAAC) which is a bureau under the Ministry of Transport of China, 
responsible for the State Council (see Figure 4.1 in Chapter Four).  
 
In fact, there are often cross-border fields in the CNTA’s supervision of tourist attractions, as 
most sites, like national parks, or historic houses are under the direct jurisdiction of other 
ministries, such as Ministry of Culture and the China State Forestry Administration. Therefore, 
CNTA is the most authoritative body in the Chinese hotel and travel service industry, where, 
as a result, statistical data is available, unlike other tourism sectors. However, with the 
introduction of a 5A-rating system for the nationwide standardization of tourist attractions, 
CNTA is trying to increase its influence upon the sector. Similarly as with the 5 star-rating 
system in the hotel sector, the 5A-rating system also gives relevant evaluations to the 
attractions according to a series of criteria, such as the uniqueness and the level of 
maintenance, with 5A representing the highest value of visiting. By using the standardisation 
mode, CNTA has established its relatively strong administrative domain in three major 




5.4. Foreign Influence in the Three Major Tourism Industries 
As discussed earlier, in practice, the responsibilities of CNTA are mainly concentrated on 
three tourism sectors, travel services (travel trade), hotels, and tourist attractions. Recently, 
the official publisher of CNTA started giving a series of annual reports on the three sectors, 
namely ‘General Survey of Travel Services in China’, ‘General Survey of Hotels in China’, as 
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well as ‘General Survey of Tourist Attractions in China’. Other tourism sectors, such as, 
airlines or other transportation services, restaurants, and even national parks, are supervised 
by other corresponding administrative systems respectively. Thus, CNTA have little authority 
upon those businesses, except for providing basic information for tourists and businesses. In 
these circumstances, only the three major tourism sectors where more research and statistic 
data are available are introduced and examined in the remainder of this chapter, concerning 
their prospects and capacity in accessing foreign investment.  
 
In general, the division and influences of FDI were considered unbalanced in the Chinese 
tourism industry. This is probably because the distribution of FDI was unbalanced between 
different regions in China from a geographical view, with eastern coastal areas being much 
more preferable than the middle and west regions (Jackson, 2006; Wu, 2006), as was briefly 
examined in Chapter Four. According to Jackson (2006), almost 86% of FDI inflows went to 
the east coastal regions of China in 2002, with the top eight provincial tourism destinations all 
located in the east. This may result from the unequal distribution of tourism resources and 
tourist facilities, such as hotels, among different provinces and cities in China (see Appendix 
5.2), and the diversity in accessibility between the east and the rest.  
 
Conversely a number of researchers have concluded that there were also large differences and 
gaps between diverse sectors of the industry, in terms of the absorption and application of FDI. 
For example, Qu, et al (2005, p1) analyzed national samples of hotels and travel agencies with 
the conclusion that ‘The hotel sector has been open to foreign investment for two decades and 
has a diversified ownership structure, whereas the travel services sector has been dominated 
by government owned firms and relatively closed to foreign investment’.  
 
5.4.1.   The Hotel Industry  
5.4.1.1. General Picture of the Hotel Industry   
The late 20th century saw a vigorous development of the Chinese hotel industry, starting from 
a total of 203 hotels in 1978 (Zhang, et al, 2005). According to Zhang, et al (2005), by 2000, 
China had had a total of 10,481 tourist hotels which owned a total of 948,200 guest rooms or 
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1.86 million beds. The total revenue of China's hotel industry in 2000 amounted to about 
US$ 10 billion dollars (Zhang, et al, 2005). The overall labour productivity reached about 
US$ 9,000 dollars per person, 10.2% higher than 1999. Therefore, since 2000, China 
introduced a star-rating scheme to standardize, classify and evaluate the quality of hotel 
facilities in the country. Under the rating system, the number of examined hotels has increased 
greatly and continuously. According to CNTA (2008), by the end of 2007, there were 13,583 
star-rated hotels in China, 832 more than that of 2006, with over 1.57 million guest rooms 
increasing by over 7.8% than the last year. The total revenue of the hotels in 2007 reached 
RMB 164.7 billion (approximately US$ 21.7 billion), rising by 11.1% than 2006. Overall, 
there were 369 five-star hotels, with an increase of 67 over the previous year. The 
corresponding figures for four-star, three-star, two-star, and one-star hotels were 1,595 and 
226, 5,307 and 528, 5,718 and 20, and, 594 and a reduction of 9 respectively. Moreover, 2008 
saw a further growth of 516 star-rated hotels, and the total reaching 14,099 (CNTA, 2009).  
 
 
Table 5.2. The ownership structure of the Chinese hotel industry in 2006 and 2007 










the Total (%) 
State Owned 5,832 45.7 5,806 42.7 
Collectively Owned 902 7.1 914 6.7 




329 2.6 353 2.6 
Other Ownership* 5,432 42.6 6,271 46.2 
Total 12,751 100 13,583 100 
Resources: Based on CNTA statistics (20072, 2008) 
(*: Other Ownership indicates all other types of domestic ownership, such as stock companies, alliance, 
and privately owned hotels.) 
 
 
Moreover, Table 5.2 shows the overall structure of ownership in the industry in 2006 and 
2007. The reduction in the proportion of SOEs and collectively owned properties and the 
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increase in private and other ownerships indicate the case that the reform of SOEs in the 
Chinese hotel industry was continuing in a slow and gradual fashion, while other types of 
domestic hoteliers have ‘woken up’ and were growing rapidly. However, it is clear that 
foreign (including HongKong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT)) ownership in the Chinese hotel 
industry was still a small portion at less than 5% of the total, compared with the Chinese 
domestic ownership of over 95%.  
 
Table 5.3. Comparison of different ownership and performance indicators in Chinese star-rated 



















State Owned 5, 806 42.7 666,093 42.3 60.42 8.18 37.7 
Collectively 
Owned  
914 6.7 88,684 5.6 58.24 0.97 4.5 
Other 
Domestic 
Owned   
6,271 46.2 683,156 43.4 (60.35) 8.82 40.6 
Foreign 
Invested 
239 1.8 54,323 3.5 65.87 1.53 7.0 
HMT  
Invested 
353 2.6 81,528 5.2 65.34 2.22 10.2 
Total 13,583 100% 1,573,784 100% 60.96 21.72 100% 
Sources: Based on CNTA2 , (2007)  (* Unit: US$ billion; exchanging at 1US$ =7.58CNY) 
 
In general, although the Chinese hotel industry was dominated by SOEs numerically, the 
small number of foreign and HMT invested hotels were leading the industry, in terms of their 
more advanced management and marketing techniques, and higher efficiency (Yu, 2003). 
According to Table 5.3, by the end of 2007, there were 592 foreign and HMT invested hotels, 
accounting for 4.4% of the total Chinese star-rated hotels and 8.7% of the national total guest 
rooms, but generating an annual revenue of RMB 28.48 billion (about US$ 3.75 billions) 
accounting for 17.2% of the national total. The average occupancy rates of the foreign 
invested and HMT invested hotels were higher than those of the domestically owned hotels by 
around 5%. In 2007, the average contribution of per-employee in domestic hotels was about 
RMB 90 thousand (US$ 11,870 dollars). However, it was approximately RMB 165 thousand 
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(US$ 21,767 dollar) in foreign and HMT owned hotels, which was almost the double of the 
domestic group (CNTA, 2008). Thus, the difference, in terms of efficiency and performance, 
between the Chinese indigenous hoteliers and the foreign invested and HMT invested hotels is 
still considerable.  
 
5.4.1.2. International Hotel Brands in China 
As noted the hotel industry was one of the earliest opened development area, and has become 
one of the most advanced industries in China. In fact, by 2005, the Chinese hotel industry has 
been entirely open to external operators and the world’s top ten hotel groups have all arrived 
in China (costa.com, 2007). However, the total number of foreign owned hotels did not see 
much growth from 370 in the early 1990s to 592 star-rated ones in 2007. This is mainly 
attributed to the prevailing application of management contracts by the international hotel 
groups when expanding in China, which helps them avoid risks of large capital investment 
whilst still maintaining a certain level of control on the managed properties (nddaily.com, 
2008). According to a research report of CNTA3 (2007), by the end of 2006, there had been 37 
foreign hotel management companies operating in China controlling 502 hotels in total by 
either management or franchising contracts. Five international hotel groups, namely, 
Wyndham, Intercontinental, Accor, Starwood, and Marriott, were most important, in terms of 
the number of hotels controlled by them in China. For example, Wyndham possessed 159 
hotels by contracting, with 110 'Super 8' in China by 2006.   
 
However, the 592 foreign invested hotels and 502 foreign managed or franchised properties 
certainly did not represent the entire current framework of foreign involvement in the Chinese 
hotel industry. This results from a deficit in CNTA's administration and statistical system. On 
one hand, CNTA does not provide statistics of foreign managed or franchised/licensed hotels. 
On the other hand, CNTA has been focusing on the supervision of star-rated hotels, leaving a 
large number of non-star hotels neglected. However, many foreign hotel groups are 
increasingly interested in investing in economic and budget hotels in China which are often 
non-star rated (Liu and He, 2007). For example, Accor's economic brand, Ibis, who found 
themselves not compatible in the current star-rating system, were all directly owned and 
managed by the parent company. Thus, it is difficult to examine and illuminate the actual 
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development situations of all foreign hotel groups in China (Shi, 2007). In this chapter, 
several major issues concerning the expanding approaches of foreign hoteliers in China will 
be summarized based on the data available.   
 
One of the most remarkable features of international hotel groups was their multi-brand 
expansion strategy, compared with the dominance of independent hotels in the Chinese 
indigenous market (Liu and He, 2007). An international hotel group usually contains a series 
of brands covering diverse target markets, such as 'Sofitel', 'Novotel' and 'Ibis' of Accor, 
'InterContinental', 'Crown Plaza', and 'Holiday Inn' of Intercontinental, and 'Westin', 'Sheraton' 
and 'Four Points' of Starwood. Generally, foreign hoteliers entered China with their 
upper-class brands at the earliest stage, which caused an oversupply in the late 1980s in this 
niche market (Zhang et al, 2005). 
 
However, since the 21 century, the focus of their expanding strategy has shifted onto a 
combination of both high-end and luxury hotel brands and the economic and budget 
properties. Given that more than 90% of the total Chinese local hotels belong to the category 
of middle and low budget market, the success of 'Super 8' and 'Ibis' has led to a vigorous local 
redevelopment in this niche market since 2004, and attracting more foreign hoteliers coming 
in, such as 'Green Tree' (Liu, et al, 2007). At the other end, the competition in high-end and 
luxury markets has become more and more intense. In 2007, there were 1,107 four or five-star 
hotels under construction or in registration in China (CNTA3, 2007). Among these new luxury 
hotels, foreign brands such as 'Ritz Carlton', 'St. Regis', 'Park Hyatt', 'Shangri-la', 'Marriott', 
'Mandarin Oriental', 'Four Season', made up more than 20% of the total, resulting in an annual 
growth of over 60 foreign luxury hotels in the country (nddaily.com, 2008). Taking Wyndham 
Hotel Group as a more recent example, the group announced the first Chinese hotel under its 
luxury brand ‘Wyndham Hotels and Resorts’ in Wuhan in March 2009. Within a year, the 
brand has contracted seven hotels in China and will increase the number to 50 hotels by 2015 
(Wyndham Worldwide, 2010). As Gao (2009) states, as the financial recession hurt the US 
and EU hotel markets badly, many deluxe hotel brands have moved their business emphasis 
from western countries to east, especially China.  




Secondly, the investment and development emphasis of foreign hotel groups has been moving 
from China's first-tier cities to smaller second-tier cities (Yu, 2003; Gao, 2009). At the initial 
opening time, most foreign invested and managed hotels were concentrated within the three 
most important metropolises, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. However, given that 
dramatic growth has occurred in more and more smaller cities throughout the country, foreign 
hotel groups have been actively infiltrating into these sub-prosperous areas, in order to gain 
early-entry advantages, especially in cities surrounding the three major hubs, such as 
Hangzhou, Suzhou, Tianjin and Shenzhen, and some newly rising cities like Chengdong and 
Sichuan in the middle region of the country (CNTA3, 2007). This tendency is more obvious in 
the economy and budget market than the upper-class market, stimulated by a tremendous 
increase in the business and leisure travel demands of China's middle-class people.   
  
Thirdly, it is important to note that the foreign invested and managed hotels have made a 
tremendous contribution to the development of the Chinese hotel sector since the launch of 
reform and open policy. Undoubtedly, they brought more advanced management technology 
and skills, as well as considerable capital investments with them into the Chinese hotel market, 
which eventually stimulated the Chinese local hoteliers to grow quickly from an infant into a 
giant in the last three decades (although the Chinese hotel groups are still fledglings compared 
with multinational hotel groups). Especially given the technology improvement based on the 
Internet, the most advanced hotel management knowledge and instructions have been rapidly 
transferred into the Chinese market (China Business Alliance, 2008). New IT technologies 
have already been involved in almost every procedure of the hotel operations, including 
e-marketing, e-procurement, e-transaction, as well as on-line reservation. However, there have 
also been negative impacts announced, mainly considering 'heavy reliance on foreign 
management', resulting in the leakage of tourism revenue and unequal competitive position 
(Zhang et al, 2005, p. 149).  
 
Despite some negative debates, the positive influences of foreign hoteliers on the dramatic 
growth of the Chinese local hotel industry, in terms of both hard facilities and soft 
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management capacities, have been confirmed (Yu, 2003). It is also noteworthy that there has 
been an increasing trend of establishing collaboration and consortia between the Chinese 
indigenous and foreign hotel groups, such as Beijing Tourism Group and Shanghai Jin Jiang 
with Accor. In general, foreign hoteliers are considered likely to continuously play a 
prominent role in China in future years (Wang, 2009). Especially, it is clear that they have 
potential to provide a model for Chinese indigenous hotel industry to develop, in term of the 
access to global distribution and reservation systems, technology solutions, and the ability to 
capture and process data (Zhang et al, 2005).  
  
5.4.2. Tourist Attractions 
5.4.2.1.   The Definition of Tourist Attractions  
Along with accommodation, tourist attractions are the other central component of the tourism 
industry, providing a vital link in terms of value in the visitors’ enjoyment and experience. 
Page (2003, p.220) suggests one key to identifying attractions is that ‘whilst they are 
patronized by tourists, more importantly, the scale and volume of visits are dominated by 
leisure and day trippers as well as local residents.’ Also, Pearce (1991, p46) presents another 
important attribute that ‘A tourist attraction is a named site with a specific human or natural 
feature which is the focus of visitor and management attention’. Moreover, the definition of 
tourist attractions should also include events and activities, such as shopping, with temporary 
duration (Holloway, 2002). Thus, in a broad sense, tourist attractions involve not only 
geographic sites, but also intangible events, culture, or any other particular local features, for 
example climate.      
 
This chapter focuses on sites that are ‘able to supply a holiday (or a day trip) which meets the 
varied needs of the tourist’ (Cracolici and Nijkamp, 2006, p.134) for pragmatic reasons. 
Although, there is no generally accepted definition applicable to such attractions (Swarbrooke, 
2002; Leask and Fyall, 2006), according to Weidenfeld (2008, p 31), a tourist attraction is ‘a 
single unit, an individual site or a clearly defined small-scale geographical area’ which has the 
ability to draw visitors into them and serve their recreational needs (Morrison and Mill, 1992). 
Generally, it is possible to break down tourist attraction sites into two main categories. One is 
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largely human-made objects, with either historic or modern themes. The other is from the 
natural world, such as land forms, flora and fauna (Lovelock, 2004). 
 
5.4.2.2. Tourist Attractions in China 
Within China, although the jurisdiction of CNTA in this sector is not as strong as in the hotel 
and travel service sectors, they have identified the diverse categories of tourist attractions of 
the country. In China, tourist attractions include nature scenery spots, museums and galleries, 
temples or other religion sites, tourist resorts, nature reservation areas, theme parks, national 
parks, geologic parks, amusement parks, zoos, gardens, workplaces, farms, and other sites 
featured with economy and trading, science and education, militaria, physics and sports, 
culture and arts, etc (CNTA, 2005). This broad definition served the administration office’s 
need to commence its benchmarking system with a wide range of subjects. 
 
In this context an ‘attraction’ is defined within a broad concept encompassing all geographical 
sites that appeal to the visits of tourists and local residents. In fact, we may use this term 
synonymously with ‘destination’ because of the growth of resort complexes, which ‘offer both 
the attractions that motivate people to travel to visit them, together with the services and 
facilities (such as accommodation and retailing) they require’ (Horner and Swarbrooke 1996, 
p.328). In China, for example, it is popular now to see a whole town being packaged as a 
tourist product with its ancient cultural or historical assets (Ying and Zhou, 2008).  
 
However, in this chapter all the Chinese attraction sites can be categorized as two segments, 
depending on the ownership of the major resources, in order to facilitate the understanding of 
foreign influence in the area. The first type is represented by theme parks, amusement or 
marine parks, or temporary recreation events, such as the Carnival. These attractions are 
human-made and usually isolated facilities, being less sensitive to the surroundings and less 
complicated in terms of land and resource ownership. The other category covers all China’s 
traditional nature, culture or history attractions, which usually are involved in a tangled 
ownership structure with various state or local government organizations.  
 




China has abundant tourism resources. In fact, it is a country that possesses a rich and unique 
resource to offer to tourists, in terms of both quantity and quality of tourist attractions. By the 
end of 2009, the country had 38 world heritage sites (see Appendix 5.3). After the 
introduction of a benchmarking system, namely ‘Standard of Rating for Quality of Tourist 
Attractions’, for all the tourist attraction sites of the country in 1999, there were 2449 
state-level A-rated tourist attractions with 872 four-A sites, 521 three-A, 926 two-A and 130 
one-A sites by the end of 2009 (CNTA, 2010). According to (CNTA4, 2007), there were 1,551 
nature reservation areas, 502 state-level forest parks, and 1,168 state-level historical and 
cultural relics under state protection. And in general, there were over 15,000 tourist attractions, 
waiting to be developed and evaluated within the country (CNTA4, 2004).  
 
However, amongst all the Chinese attractions, FDI is almost excluded from the traditional 
type of attractions. This situation is not only because many vital resources, for example the 
world heritage sites, are not for sale, but also results from the complicated and inefficient 
structure of ownership and management of these national attraction sites (Hong and Li, 2006; 
Ying and Zhou, 2008). The tangled property rights and the uncertainty in management process 
substantially encumbered the approaches of foreign involvement in the industry. Although 
there has been an announcement calling for a reform to separate the ownership and 
management rights of traditional tourist attractions in China (Hong and Li, 2006), the growth 
of FDI in this area will be limited for many years in the future, except for increasing 
opportunities in the related industries, such as management and design consulting businesses.  
 
Given the differences between the two categories explained earlier, FDI is more likely to 
happen in the first type, i.e. newly built attractions. The size of this category is not small and 
numbered about 6,000 by the end of 2005 (Yang, 2006). However, the successful cases of FDI 
were rare. In this chapter, we will only consider FDI in theme parks in China as a case study 
for the industry. 
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5.4.2.3. Theme Parks and FDI in China 
Theme parks, as manufactured tourism resources, are an important type of tourist attractions. 
Especially in China, this is the major approach for private capital and FDI to participate in the 
tourist attraction sector. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the theme park industry in 
China have multiplied from around 2,500 in 1998 (Ap, 2003) to some 6,000, although the 
average size of the industry was very small with an obvious feature of homogeneity (Yang, 
2006). However, a serious problem for the industry was that, according to Yang (2006), 
around 70% of the parks were losing money, with 20% breaking even and only 10% 
profitable. In Clave’s (2007) list of the top 50 theme parks in the world, in terms of visitor 
numbers, there was only one theme park from mainland China ranked at 43rd in 2005, named 
Happy Valley, located in Shenzhen, with about 2.6 million annual visitors,.  
 
In fact, there were only a few competitive local theme parks developed successfully in the 
marketplace, including Splendid China, China Folk Culture Villages, Windows of The World, 
and Happy Valley (the four are operated by the same company in Shenzhen), with Splendid 
China Miniature Scenic Spot receiving the return of US$ 12 million initial investment within 
one year and its opening in 1989 regarded as the starting of the boom of the Chinese theme 
parks (Ap, 2003; Clave, 2007). Some other theme parks, such as Hangzhou Song City, 
Suzhou Amusement Land, Beijing Park of the World, Hannan Nanshan Cultural and Tourism 
Area, Gueilin Merry-Land, have also been considered successes, in terms of their relatively 
sound management bases (Ap, 2003). However, the performance of foreign investors has not 
been as great as the local parks. Nationally, only a few foreign invested theme parks has 
managed to survive, namely Shandong Fuhua Amusement Park jointly invested by Intra-Asia 
Entertainment Corporation, Chengdu Floraland Theme Park by Landmark Entertainment 
Group, and Beijing Nine Dragon Amusement Park by Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd (which may be 
the earliest Sino-foreign theme park in China traced back to 1985) (Access Asia, 2004).  
 
Ap (2003) studied the spate of theme park failures in 1990s in China based on a case study of 
Shanghai. According to Ap, apart from an oldest local amusement park, there had been seven 
new theme parks under construction by 1996, including three foreign invested projects. 
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However, by 2000, 'all but one of these parks had closed and the closure of the last was 
imminent' (Ap, 2003, p. 203). He categorized the major reasons for the defeats as: namely 
irrelevant planning, lack of development resources, and poor management skills (see Table 
5.4).  
 
Table 5.4. Reasons for the failures of foreign theme parks in Shanghai 
Planning Development Management/Operations 
Inappropriate Location: 
public transport not ready to 
the outskirts  
Low Quality Development: 
cheap equipments &  lack 
of  maintenance 
Poor Management, such as  
unskilled staff & nepotism  
Repetition and Copying of 
'Themes' 
Lack of Interactivity and 
Dynamism 
Naivete of Investors: too much 
trust in the local officials  
Inadequate Feasibility 
Studies 
Lack of Capital Availability 
& Budget Control  
Political Interference: only 
pursuing the amount of FDI  
Ineffective Evaluation of 
Projects 
/ / 
Lack of Market Knowledge 
and Research  
/ / 
Poor Design and Planning / / 
Lack of Effective Control: at 
the macro level , causing 
oversupply of the parks 
/ / 





More recently in 2004, Shanghai discarded an American invested theme park project named 
Shanghai Universal Studios Theme Park, which commenced in 2002. Moreover, Walt Disney 
Parks & Resorts began to contact the Shanghai government seeking an opportunity of opening 
a new attraction since 1990s. After almost two decades, in November 2009, Disneyland 
Shanghai was finally approved by the local government and is planned to open in 2015. 
However, considering the struggle of Hong Kong Disney, opened in 2005, is no secret (Rein, 
2008), the future of Disneyland Shanghai is being questioned (Jaunted.com, 2009).  
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Rein (2008) provided some insights regarding the shortcomings of Hong Kong Disney, which 
could be referred to other parks in China. First, there has not been any emotional attachment 
of Chinese consumers to the culture of Western theme parks. Moreover, misunderstanding 
about the desires of Chinese customers also impacts on the decision making of park managers. 
Lastly, a lack of new and abundant rides and land size can detract from visitors' experience 
and evaluation of the park.  
 
In conclusion, as Christopher (2007, p.1), the founder, president and CEO of Landmark 
Entertainment Group, claimed 'China is one of the countries where the government really is 
your partner in everything. …which means typically that businesses are backed by the 
government in some way or fashion'. The success of Splendid China and its other three sister 
parks in Shenzhen who all having a state-owned ultimate parent may be a good example of 
the importance of state involvements in the business in China. However, the government’s 
administrative function, such as the provision of official statistics, has been absent in the 
theme park sector. No one government body has been uniquely appointed and obligated for 
supervising the development of theme parks in China, although CNTA handles some of the 
matters, such as advices and information (Ap, 2003). Therefore, for foreign investors, the 
Chinese theme park industry is a challenging marketplace. 
 
5.4.3  Travel Trade/Travel Service Sector  
5.4.3.1. The Development of Travel Services in China 
The Chinese travel services are, in fact, what are called ‘the travel trade’ in most advanced 
western countries (Guo and Turner, 2002; Song, 2005). However, China’s travel services are 
synonymous with travel agencies, as there has not been a clear border between the wholesaler, 
TOs, and the distribution system, TAs (Qian, 2003). In China, TAs do everything concerned in 
the travel trade business, including handling entry, exit and visa formalities for visitors, 
soliciting and receiving tourists by organizing food, lodging, transportation and other relevant 
services for them. According to CNTA (2008), by 2007, China had a total of 18,943 travel 
services. Among these, there were 1,797 international services and 17,146 domestic services, 
showing increases of 5.5%, 8.6%, and 5.2% over the previous year respectively. Among the 
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international services, only 915 international agents were licensed to engage in the Chinese 
outbound market in 2007. The same year saw US$ 6.8 billion of total assets and US$ 21.6 
billion of total revenue in the Chinese travel trade industry (CNTA, 2008).  
 
Table 5.5. The introduction of 'three magnates' of the Chinese travel service industry  
China International Travel Service (CITS): It is a state-owned enterprise with headquarters in Beijing 
and branches in all provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities. It originally established for serving 
foreign tourists. CITS is recognized as the country's largest comprehensive travel agency under the 
supervision of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SOASAC) of the State 
Council, with 600,000 tourists hosted and an approximately US$500 million turnover in 2002. It serves 
almost 10% of the totality of foreign visitors coming into China. In November 2001, CITS and American 
Express Travel (Hong Kong) together built a Sino-foreign joint company in Beijing. 
 
China Travel Service (CTS) (originally named as Overseas Chinese Travel Service of China): initially 
catered to overseas Chinese residents, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan compatriots, and foreign Chinese 
returning as tourists or visiting relatives. It headquartered in Beijing, and has a national network in most 
Chinese cities, as well as permanent offices in Hong Kong, Macao and other overseas locations. It is 
directly under the management of SOASAC. In December 2003, CTS jointed German tour group TUI and 
established the first foreign controlled Sino-foreign travel agency in Beijing.  
 
China Youth Travel Service (CYTS) Based in Beijing, it originally hosted mainly young foreign people, 
young overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. The first Chinese travel company who listed 
on the Chinese domestic stock market in 1997. The state is its main shareholder. In September 2004, it 
established a joint venture, named ‘CYTS Cendant International Travel Co., Ltd.’ with American Cendant 
group. 
Sources: based on CNTA3 (2004) and CTS, CITS, CYTS' websites (2004) 
 
All the Chinese travel services are divided into two large categories: international travel 
services and domestic travel services. The international travel services may organize inbound 
tours of overseas travelers and the domestic market within China, as well as the Chinese 
outbound tours if fully granted by CNTA. But the domestic category can only deal with the 
Chinese people's travel business within mainland China, or be the ground-handlers of some 
international services. In China, international travel services, although in a small proportion in 
terms of number (accounting for less than 10% of the industry’s total in 2007) have 
traditionally been contributing more than 60% of the industry’s total revenues (CNTA2 2004). 
Especially, the outbound sector can account for around half of the total revenue, and thus it is 
indeed the most beneficial and attractive section of the travel trade industry in China (Yao, 
2004). However, access to the Chinese outbound market was tightly controlled, as in 2007 
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only 915 international travel services were licensed in this privileged sector, with FITSs still 
entirely forbidden to deal with this productive market segment by the year.  
 
Table 5.6. The list of all foreign invested travel services in China by 2007 
No. Company Name Location  of 
Registration 
1 HRG JinJiang International Travel Service Shanghai 
2 Star Cruise International Travel Service Shanghai 
3 Nippon International Travel Agency  Shanghai 
4* Wuxi Wei Lin Holiday International Travel Service Wuxi   
5 JTB International Travel Service  Shanghai 
6 ShunTak International Tours  Shanghai 
7 NorthStar KwanKin International Beijing 
8* CYTS Cendant International Travel Beijing 
9 Morning Star New Ark International Beijing 
10 New Century JTB International Travel Beijing 
11 CITS American Express Business Travel Beijing 
12 Beijing BTG-Accor Travel Service Beijing 
13 CTS TUI travel Service Beijing 
14 Gulliver’s Travel Associates China Beijing 
15 Hankyu Express International  Beijing 
16 Kie China  Beijing 
17 American Grand Circle China Beijing 
18 Beijing FCM Travel Solutions Beijing 
19 JPIC International Travel  Beijing 
20 ANA Tours China Beijing 
21 Guangzhou Hongthai International Tours Guangdong 
22 Wing on International Travel Service Guangdong 
23 Guangdong Student Union Travel Service Guangdong 
24 Kuoni Destination Management (China) Guangdong 
25 Shenzhen Shunfeng Travel Agency Guangdong 
26 Yunnan Diethelm Travel Yunnan 
27 Tianjin SA tours Tianjin 
Sources: base on CNTA's statistics (20075) (* indicating the cases of closure) 
 
As we have examined the development history of the Chinese tourism industry earlier in this 
chapter, it is understandable that the Chinese travel service industry has experienced a 
dramatic development from diplomacy-dominated activities with the monopoly services of 
'three magnates' (see Table 5.5) to today's standardized industry with around 19 thousand 
businesses. However, although the Chinese government has allowed the establishment of 
Sino-foreign JVs of travel services in selected tourist resorts since 1993, the speed of opening 
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and deregulation in the FITS sector has been slow. Therefore, in 2007, there were only 27 
FITSs registered in the country with 25 still operating (see Table 5.6) Although the total 
number has further increased to 38 in early 2010 (CNTA, 2010), this thesis will keep the 
focus on the FITS sector in the decade from 1998 to 2007. The entry of these FITSs has not 
made considerable contributions or changes upon the traditions of the local travel service 
industry in China by 2007 (Lin, 2008).   
 
 
5.4.3.2. Problems and Trends in the Chinese Travel Service Industry 
Given the unique historical background and the specialties of the Chinese political and 
economic system, some rooted problems of the Chinese travel service industry have been 
examined by both foreign and domestic researchers. First, the dominance of SOEs in the 
Chinese travel trade sector is particularly strong. As Qian (2003, p156) indicated, ‘almost all 
the travel agencies in China are state-owned and protected’, as they usually have a parent 
organization ranging from a local tourism administration to a government-owned company, or 
a mass association like trade unions or Women’s Federations. They have been kept afloat in 
spite of ongoing losses. Moreover, government travel policies play an important role in 
driving the development of the Chinese tourism industry, especially the outbound market 
(Guo and Turner, 2002; Qu, et al, 2005). Thus, government intervention is an essential and 
sensitive issue in the marketplace, and the sector of private and foreign travel services are still 
relatively small in number.  
 
Second, ‘The ADS (approved destination) status, the authorization of the Chinese outbound 
and the foreign inbound operators and the continuous monitoring on tour operations inside 
and outside China demonstrate that the industry has a very high level of entry barriers’ (Guo 
and Turner, 2002, p58). Especially, the Chinese outbound travel market is a tightly regulated 
and highly concentrated industry with some major indigenous outbound operators in 
dominance. Third, a so-called ‘chengbao’ system was substantially damaging the industry, as 
it allowed individuals to subcontract with larger travel services and to operate outside the 
regulatory system while using the name of the larger and regulated services. In fact, the 
number of such ‘black agents’ has been two times more than the registered travel services in 
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China, as they totally numbered over 60,000 (Zhang, 2009). This phenomenon features 
intangible property and short-term interests, resulting in huge personal profits with any losses 
passed on to the agency (Qian, 2003).  
 
Fourth, a low price war with low profits, has become rampant in this industry, and has caused 
a chaotic market situation. However, ‘not even the most authoritative persons could play a 
decisive role in bringing about the radical reforms that are needed’ (Qian, 2003, p144). Thus, 
it is difficult for the Chinese local travel services that are mainly fragmented, small, 
financially weak and inefficient to develop themselves. Last but not least, as mentioned earlier, 
the distinction between wholesaling and retailing functions within the industry remains 
blurred, which is a sign that the Chinese travel service industry ‘is at its early stage of 
development, and dominated by a political power structure rather than business fundamentals’ 
(Guo and Turner, 2002, p59). 
 
Based on these circumstances of the industry, Song (2005) summarized some general 
development characteristics and trends of the industry. First, it is possible that the Chinese 
outbound tourism market may grow faster than the inbound and domestic segments, as the 
Chinese people’s outbound travel desire has been confined for a long time in the past. Second, 
there are many indigenous private and foreign investors interested in the Chinese travel trade 
business. However, the investments have been suspended by the current high entry barriers. 
Third, there have been increasing demands of Chinese tourists for more professional and 
specialized travel services of both domestic and outbound tours. 
 
Moreover, there will be co-existence and collaboration among on-line services based on the 
Internet and substantial operations of traditional travel services (Song, 2005). Furthermore, 
the integration and specialization of the Chinese travel services will together play an 
important role in directing the future development of the industry (CNTA, 2007). Finally, 
there will be increasing applications of M&As, as well as alignments and consortia in the 
Chinese travel trade industry, especially among foreign agents and local large state owned 
travel services (Song, 2005).  




5.4.3.3. The Opening of the Chinese Travel Service Industry 
 
Table 5.7. China’s WTO agreement and its practical achievement 
China’s WTO Agreement for Travel 
Agency and Tour Operator Business  
(CPC 7471) (September, 2001) 
China’s Achievement in Practice 
Foreign Travel services who meet the 
following conditions are permitted to provide 
services in the form of joint venture in the 
holiday resorts designated by the Chinese 
government and in the cities of Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xi’an upon 
accession:  
l A travel agency and tour operator 
mainly engaged in travel business;  
l Annual world-wide turnover exceeds 
US$ 40 million. 
The registered capital of joint venture travel 
agency/tour operator shall be no less than 
RMB 4 million.  
Joint ventures or wholly-owned travel 
services are not permitted to engage in the 
activities of Chinese traveling abroad and to 
Hong Kong, Macao and Chinese Taipei. 
In 1998, China had its first Sino-Foreign joint 
travel agency, called Yunnan Diethelm in the 
province and Yunnan.  
 
In December 2001, a cession about setting up 
foreign-invested travel service companies was 
added into the rules on the administration of 
Chinese travel services. 
 
In 12 June 2003, ‘Interim Provision on the 
Establishment of Foreign Holding and Wholly 
Foreign-owned Travel Agencies’ was launched 
by CNTA and the Ministry of Commerce.  
Within three years after China’s accession, 
the registered capital shall be no less than 
RMB 2.5 million; 
Within three years after China’s accession, 
foreign majority ownership will be permitted, 
In February 2005, the requirement on the 
registered capital was lowered to RMB 2.5 
million. 
In December 2003, TUI and CTS jointly set up 
a travel service with TUI holding the major 
shares and control of the JVl. 
Within six years after accession, wholly 
foreign –owned subsidiaries will be permitted 
and geographic restrictions will be removed.  
In December 2005, the geographic restrictions 
were removed. 
In December 2003, the first wholly foreign 
owned travel service, JALPAK International 
China was formed in Beijing. 
Within Six years after accession, there will be 
no restriction on the establishment of 
branches of the joint venture travel 
agency/tour operator and the requirement on 
registered capital of foreign–invested travel 
services will be as same as that for local 
services.  
In 2006, JTB Shanghai was set up as JTB’s 
second subsidiaries in China.  
However, by the end of 2007, no clear rules had 
been announced for the setup of branches, and 
many foreign agents felt still dazzled in this 
matter. (This obstacle was removed in the new 
regulation launched in 1st May 2009.) 
Sources: WTO (2001), and the author 
 
 




The opening of the Chinese travel service industry occurred later than the hotel industry 
which was being opened from 1978 and the theme parks since the middle 1980s. The first 
Sino-foreign travel agency, Yunnan Diethelm, was formed in 1998, although FDI had been 
permitted in the Chinese travel trade industry since 1993. Initially, the choices of registered 
location were tightly controlled and limited within assigned tourist resort areas. The officially 
opened areas later were extended to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xian in 2001, with 
Sino-foreign JVs seen in Beijing and Guangzhou since 1999. Since China entered the WTO, 
deregulation has happened constantly according to China's commitments to access. As Table 
5.7 indicates, the Chinese government has generally fulfilled its promises by the agreed time. 
However, over the first development decade by 2007, the total number of FITSs only grew to 
27, including two cases of closure. This relates to the original interests of this research 
project. 
 
There have been a few Chinese studies focusing on the FITS sector in China in recent years, 
including Gao (2004), Li (2005) and Lin (2008). However, they are mainly empirical studies 
focusing on a few events or the announcements of deregulation news in the FITS sector. Some 
of the articles attempted to discuss some development problems of FITSs according to a few 
interviews with managers from a couple of FITS companies. Although none has been able to 
draw an overall picture of the industry and the changes happened over time, resulting from no 
sufficient supporting data, the above three references provided a useful guide in this research.  
 
According to Gao (2004), Li (2005) and Lin (2008), five main features of the FITS sector 
have arisen as follows: First, as the Chinese outbound travel market has not opened to foreign 
operators yet, and the Chinese domestic market was too complicated to operate, FITSs were 
mostly focusing on the Chinese inbound section, with two major categories: group inbound 
tours and corporate travel management. Second, by 2005, only a few FITSs had been 
profitable, with several in semi-shut-down situations. Third, all foreign parent companies of 
FITSs were originally operating in the travel trade sector. Fourth, whatever the ownership 
structures are, foreign partners took the major positions and responsibilities in managing and 
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running the companies. In general, FITSs were seen as more efficient in operation with better 
skilled staff than those local services. The FITS sector was also commonly featured with more 
advanced corporate management system, compared to the Chinese indigenous services. 
Finally, in terms of the corporate travel segment, the meanings and benefits of using 
specialized outside services to manage overall travel expense have not been recognized and 
accepted by Chinese local clients. 
 
In conclusion, without the access to the Chinese outbound travel market, FITSs have not been 
able to fully show their advantages in the Chinese marketplace. However, it was estimated 
that they are about to dominate the high-end corporate travel market and deeply influence the 
Chinese indigenous businesses as the opening going further. Since the deregulation in 2009, 
although FITSs are still forbidden for the Chinese outbound market, all other constraints have 
been removed. The number of FITSs increased to 38 by March 2010. But this thesis will only 
investigate the FITS sector’s early development patterns during the first development decade 





This chapter attempts to provide a brief introduction to the development of the three main 
sectors of the Chinese tourism industry: hotels, tourist attractions, and travel services, 
especially the application of FDI in the each sector. The chapter starts with a historical review 
of the development of the Chinese tourism industry with a division of four periods, before 
1978, from 1979 to 1991, from 1992 to 2001, and post 2001. This is followed by a general 
summary demonstrating the four-period development, and indicating that the Chinese tourism 
industry has transformed from diplomatic activities to an important industry of the country. 
Subsequently, the supervision of CNTA is examined which leads to the focus of this chapter 
on foreign involvement in the three major tourism sectors in China, namely hotels, travel 
services and tourist attractions.  
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In accordance with the administrative scale of CNTA, foreign influence in the three main 
tourism sectors in China is examined one by one. First, the study of the hotel sector shows the 
industry's dramatic development in China, in terms of both number and management ability of 
hotels, as a result of being the earliest tourism sector to experiment the reform and open policy. 
However, the expanding of foreign hotel brands in the country was mainly through 
management contracts and franchising, and thus, the actual FDI in the hotel sector was still in 
a limited number. Moreover, it is found that foreign managed hotels generally had better 
performance in China than domestic hoteliers, featured with more advanced management 
technologies and higher efficiency. 
 
Second, the Chinese tourist attraction sector and its abundant resources are studied, as well as 
the reasons of many failed attempts of FDI in theme parks in China. A broad definition of 
tourist attractions is summarized, with two categories applied to facilitate the understanding 
of FDI in the sector. Most China's traditional tourist sites belong to one category where the 
structure of ownership and management is too complicated for FDI to intervene. Thus, the 
other category represented by theme parks, and featured as human-made facilities with low 
obstacles in property rights for overseas investors, becomes the focus of the section. However, 
most foreign invested theme parks in China were found to have failed, mainly due to the lack 
of local knowledge.  
 
Finally, the Chinese travel service industry is examined. Although this business sector was 
originally set up by the government for serving diplomatic purposes with the monopoly of 
several SOEs, it has transformed to an industry with almost 19 thousand enterprises in 2007. 
However, FDI was still rare in the sector after the opening in 1990s, with totally only 27 
FITSs registered in the country by 2007. In order to study the FITS sector, the problems and 
trends of the Chinese travel services in general are reviewed. This is followed by a summary 
of the FITS sector, including a comparison of the China's commitments for WTO access in 
2001 and China's practical achievements afterwards. This fundamental knowledge of the 
Chinese travel trade industry and FITS sector guides the data collection and analysis in this 
research.   




By comparing the sectors, it is clear that neither the hotel sector nor the theme parks has 
witnessed great prosperity and success of FDI in the opening decades. Relatively high risks of 
capital and property rights in owning hotels or theme parks in a socialistic country like China 
may be a major reason that impeding FDI inflows in the two business sectors of the country. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter Three, FDI has been the major internationalization mode 
applied in the travel trade sector, especially by TOs. Therefore, the development pattern of 
FITSs in China may be a very different picture from the other two sectors. By studying the 
hotel sector, ownership advantages (Dunning, 1977, 1981) are confirmed to be an effective 
resource in the Chinese tourism market. The examination of the theme park sector emphasizes 
the importance of local knowledge and resources.    
 
By investigating the three tourism sectors in China, this chapter has revealed that the opening 
and development approach of the tourism industry in China was heavily influenced by, or 
depended on the policies imposed by the government. On one hand, political stimulus was the 
essential engine of the growth of tourism, as well as many other industries in China. However, 
on the other hand, state intervention could also impose constraints to affect the speed of 
development. This has eventually led to the questions: How did the government policies 
impact the development of the FITS sector in China? How did the FITS sector cope with the 
policy obstacles? And, how did the FITS sector impact the Chinese local services and being 
affected by the local? These questions motivated the initiation of this research, and influenced 
the selection of research methods, which will be explained in the next chapter.  
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6.1. Research Objectives and Research Design 
As stated in Chapter One (with the research aims and objectives), this research focuses on the 
development approaches of FITSs in China during the opening decade from 1998 (when the 
first foreign invested JV, LiTian (Diethelm) Travel Co., Ltd, was officially set up in Yunnan 
province) to 2007. In this chapter, the methodology used in the research is explained, 
including a detailed explanation of the survey methods and the analysis of the data. The 
research programme is designed to address the aims and objectives with the limited 
availability of resources.  
 
There are three research aims: The First Aim is to analyse the features of development 
approaches and operational experiences of the FITS sector in China in the decade from 1998 
to 2007. The Second Aim is to investigate the relationship between the FITS sector and the 
Chinese indigenous travel trade sector from 1998 to 2007. The Third Aim is to research the 
general investment environment for the FITS sector in China from 1998 to 2007, as well as 
the opportunities and challenges for the sector in the future. Moreover, a series of objectives 
related to the aims are addressed in this thesis, including: 
 
Objectives, Aim One: 
Ø (1A) to research the reasons of FITSs’ selection of investment locations in China in the 
decade (1998-2007), and the major differences in their operational strategies related to 
the choices of registered locations;  
Ø (1B) to study the concerns and reactions of FITSs towards the business registration 
process in China, and special strategies applied in the sector for set-up; 
Ø (1C) to investigate the counties/regions of origin of FITSs, as well as particular 
operational patterns or characters related to their original background; 
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Ø (1D) to research the corporate strategies of FITSs, in terms of the formation of entities in 
China, including the ownership and management structures of the companies; 
Ø (1E) to understand the similarities and differences in the selection of target markets of 
FITSs, and the reasons and features of their marketing strategies (as well as the financial 
results/profitability of the companies if applicable); 
Ø (1F) to examine the major employment strategies of FITSs in China, and their desires or 
concerns relating to the local labour market. 
 
Objectives, Aim Two: 
Ø (2A) to research the competition and collaboration between the FITS sector and Chinese 
indigenous services, as well as the impacts of the entry of FITSs upon the local industry; 
Ø (2B) to investigate the attitudes and relative reactions of the Chinese local travel services 
towards the entry of FITSs. 
 
Objectives, Aim Three: 
Ø (3A) to analyse both the economic and political environment in China for the entry and 
expansion of international travel trade businesses;  
Ø (3B) to identify facilitative influences and key barriers existing in the Chinese travel trade 
industry for the further development of FITSs in China.  
 
 
In order to research the three aims and the related objectives under the each aim, both 
secondary data and primary data were needed. During the collection of primary data, both 
interviews and questionnaires were used, which will be explained in more detail later 
throughout this chapter. In general, the interview data were collected from FITSs and 
analysed manually, while the questionnaire survey was applied to Chinese indigenous travel 
services and examined using SPSS.  
 
Table 6.1 shows the connections between each individual objective and the corresponding 
data collection methods. Secondary data, such as statistics and previous studies, are widely 
used to support the results of every objective of this thesis. However, being primary data, 
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interviews and questionnaires have diverse emphases on different objectives. In general, Aim 
One and its objectives particularly rely on the interview data which clearly illuminate the 
operational strategies of FITSs. However, data collected from the questionnaire survey mainly 
relates to objective 2B, focussing on opinions of local services. Objectives 1A, 2A, 3A, and 
3B refer to both types of data, as the responses of both FITSs and local services are applicable 
to the analysis.  
 
Table 6.1. The aims and objectives and the correspondingly used research approaches  
Objective Number Secondary Data Primary Data 
1A Yes Yes. Both interviews and questionnaire 
1B Yes Yes. By interviews 
1C Yes Yes. By interviews 
1D Yes Yes. By interviews 
1E Yes Yes. By interviews 
1F Yes Yes. By interviews 
2A Yes Yes. By interviews, partly questionnaire 
2B Yes Yes. By questionnaire  
3A Yes Yes. Partly interviews and questionnaire 
3B Yes Yes. Partly interviews and questionnaire 




6.2. Literature Review of Research Methods 
There is a comprehensive discussion regarding research methods in the literature which has 
been widely applied in the study of leisure and tourism industry, especially in western 
advanced economies. According to different purposes and audiences, diverse research 
methods need to be used correspondingly and carefully. The importance of methodology 
choice and design is well documented and is regarded as the key to a successful research 
project (Ritchie, Burns and Palmer, 2005). Thus, it is worthwhile to discuss some principles 
regarding different research methods, especially questionnaires, in-depth and semi-structured 
interviews, as well as the case study, which will help develop an understanding of the 
selection and application of the research methods contained in this thesis, in relation to the 
purposes and features of this study.  
 
There are many different ways to categorize types of research methods. For example, 
according to the purposes of research, there are different categories, such as descriptive, 
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predictive, exploratory, and explanatory research. However, DeVaus (1986) simply classified 
all research as falling into two main categories: the descriptive survey or the analytical survey. 
This was cited widely by other researchers. Generally, descriptive surveys ‘are designed to 
identify the characteristics of a specified population either at a given moment in time, or over 
a period of time’ (Finn and Elliott-White and Walton, 2000, p.88), focusing on features or 
phenomena. An analytical survey ‘seeks explanations for observed variations in given 
phenomena’ (Finn et al, 2000, p.88), which emphasizes the causal relationship and attribution 
demands of the phenomena. As this research is endeavoring to study a relatively new business 
phenomenon about FDI in the travel trade sector in China from 1998 to 2007, the exploratory 
intention regarding the relationship between FDI and China is obvious. Thus, analytical and 
exploratory purposes are essential in this study. 
 
Another useful division of research types is provided by Yin (2003). He argues that there are 
five main ways of undertaking social science research: experiments, surveys, histories, the 
analysis of archival information, and case study. He also summarized the major features of the 
five methods, which is helpful in the identification of the differences of these strategies (see 
Table 6.2).  
 
Table 6.2.  Relevances for different research strategies 
Strategy Form of Research 
Question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioral Events 
Focuses on Contemporary 
Events 
Experiment How, Why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, What, Where, 





Who, What, Where, 
How many, How 
much?  
No Yes/No 
History How, Why? No No 
Case study How, Why? No Yes 
Sources: COSMOS Corporation; Yin (2003, P5) 
 
 
As Table 6.2 reveals, each strategy fits different research conditions, including: a) the type of 
research questions, b) the extent of control an investigator has over the studied events, and c) 
whether focusing on contemporary issues or on historical phenomena (Yin, 2003). In this 
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research, the aims and objectives are mainly set to answer ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. 
For example, what were FITSs’ major marketing strategies in China during the decade? How 
did FITSs feel about the local labour quality? And why were there less than 30 FITSs 
throughout mainland China during the first opening decade? Moreover, in this research, the 
author can only act as an interviewer and observer to the studied firms, having little influence 
to the actual performances of the companies. Furthermore, it is clear that this study focusses 
on contemporary phenomena. With reference to Table 6.2, this thesis regards the methods of 
case study and survey as the most suitable choices. 
 
Considering that by the time the research was conducted, there had been only 27 FITSs 
registered in mainland China, they comprised a relatively small number. One popular survey 
method, semi-structured in-depth interviews was chosen, in order to obtain detailed, deep and 
up to date information from the FITS sector. As different interviewees gave their attentions to 
diverse topics, the data collected from the interviewees on different firms was not entirely 
comparable. Thus, the strategy of an exploratory case study was also applied when analyzing 
and presenting the research findings on the FITS sector. In addition, a questionnaire survey 
distributed to the Chinese local travel service sector was incorporated in the mixed 
methodology of this study, in order to increase the scale and quality of data, as well as extend 
findings.  
 
A case study is defined as 'a strategy of research that aims to understand social phenomena 
within a single or small number of naturally occurring settings', which 'is often associated 
with practical problem solving' (Bloor and Wood, 2006, p.27). Moreover, as Gerring (2007) 
states, case study method enjoys ‘a natural advantage in research of an exploratory nature’ 
(p.39), and the ‘product of a good case study is insight’ (p.7). Therefore, the case study 
method was eventually chosen to form part of this research.  
 
However, the method should be used carefully, as many researchers consider a case study 
strategy as a less desirable form of inquiry than either experiments or survey. It is true that 
much less systematic investigation has been done about how to use case studies, compared to 
other strategies (Pitchie et al, 2005). However, an awareness of some negative concerns of the 
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case study method can provide a precaution for its utility in this research. In general, the 
prejudice about the case study results from many reasons, such as: the lack of rigor, confusing 
case study teaching with case study research, little basis for analyzing and scientific 
generalization, and often with lots of unreadable or incomparable documents (Yin, 2003). 
Especially, the little generalizability of case study method is the most considerable issue of 
critics (Bell, 2005; Bloor and Wood, 2006).   
 
Responding to the above debate, Bell (2005, p.12) cites the division of two kinds of 
generalization applied in the social sciences, which are 'statistical generalizations and fuzzy 
generalizations', with the later referring to what ‘arises from studies of singularities and 
typical claims that it is possible, or likely, or unlikely that what was found in the singularity 
will be found in similar situations elsewhere: it is a qualitative measure (Bassey, 1999, p.12)'. 
Thus, as Yin (2003, p10) claims, very like the experiment, the case study does not represent a 
“sample”, and in doing a case study, the goal will be to expand and 'generalize theories' 
(analytic generalization), but not to 'enumerate frequencies' (statistical generalization). In 
other words, the case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions rather than to 
populations or universes (Bloor and Wood, 2006). Therefore, the selection of case studies 
should not follow the same rationale of 'sampling' of survey strategies, such as questionnaire. 
 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews and questionnaires are two popularly applied survey 
methods in the tourism industry (Pitchie et al, 2005). However, the essential difference 
between the two methods is: the former is associated with the tenets of a qualitative approach, 
while the later with a quantitative orientation (Yin, 2003). Pitchie et al (2005, p.101) define 
the interview as face-to-face or voice-to-voice ‘interaction following a question-answer 
format (stimulus-response) or an interaction more akin to a conversation’. The questionnaire 
survey is another question-answer format based on the application of a well-structured 
questionnaire where most questions should be simple with some answers pre-provided for 
respondents to choose from (although open-questions may also appear). Essentially, a 
questionnaire survey is related to ‘interactions mediated via written text transfers’ (Pitchie et 
al, 2005, p.101). Therefore, semi-structured interviews usually can offer deeper explanations 
than a questionnaire survey, while the later provides more generalizable characters from a 
                                                                                                    135
population. Given the above understanding, this study applied the interview method to the 27 
FITSs, with an additional questionnaire survey section to the local services. 
 
 
6.3. The Collection of Data 
The collection of data in this research programme was generally based on two approaches: the 
precedence of secondary data, and the focus on primary data. As Table 6.1 reveals, both 
secondary data and primary data were required in order to address the set objectives. The 
using of secondary data helped the researcher to find the direction of the survey, and 
developed an understanding of the background of China, the industry and the targeted firms. 
However, FITSs were a relatively new phenomenon in the Chinese tourism market, and there 
was a lack of previous research data available to refer to. Thus, how to collect sufficient and 
effective primary data became very crucial, in terms of research design and implementation. 
Here, a brief introduction regarding the approaches to secondary data is given in the following 
paragraphs, followed by a more detailed explanation on the collection of primary data.  
 
6.3.1. Secondary Data 
6.3.1.1. Major Resources 
As discussed, secondary data are a vital information resource which can provide the 
researcher with basic references and instructions to construct and process the whole research 
programme. Five major foci were identified when seeking the secondary data, including: a) 
literature on the background of the tourism industry, especially the travel trade sector; b) 
literature on the theories of FDI; c) information about the Chinese investment environment; d) 
references about the Chinese tourism market and the major businesses sectors of the industry; 
and e) data or previous study about the performance and situation of the targeted FITSs. The 
major resources utilized include books, journals, government statistics, organizational internal 
documents, research reports, news or other independent information from the Internet, 
especially the university's on-line data resource and some data bases, such as questia.com. 
Some of these materials are reflected in the literature review (chapters 2 to 5) of this thesis, 
with some helping the collection and analysis of primary data.   
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This research requires the comprehension of both the Chinese political and economic 
background, such as the structure of the Chinese government, the foundation of the Chinese 
tourism markets, and the changes of tourism policies. This kind of data may be represented in 
the form of statistics, research reports, announcements, or news items. However, it is 
noteworthy that in China the statistics used in the academic study or for public purposes 
usually originated from same source, the Chinese government and its ministry offices. Thus, 
government documents and data were heavily applied in this research, such as Chinese 
Statistical Yearbooks and the government’s websites (Table 6.3). However, there are very few 
sources available to cross check these data against. 
 
Table 6.3.  Main data resources about China and its tourism industry  
Name Publish Years  Provider or Publisher 
The Yearbook of China Tourism Statistics 2003 to 2009 China National Tourism 
Administration  (CNTA) 
General Survey of Travel Services in 
China 
2004, 2007 CNTA 
General Survey of Hotels in China 2004, 2007 CNTA 
General Survey of Tourist Attractions in 
China 
2004, 2007 CNTA 
The Green Book of The Chinese Tourism 2005 China National Academy of 
Social Science (CASS) 
Chinese Tourism Research Website: 
http://www.cotsa.com/ 
Until 2009 CNTA 
Chinese Tourism Administration Website: 
http://www.cnta.com/ 
Until 2009 CNTA 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn 
Until 2009 Ministry of Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China 
Sources: the author 
 
Moreover, a few recently published books about the Chinese tourism market in English also 
provided a useful reference on the subject, such as Lew, et al (2003) and Zhang, et al (2005). 
In general, there is very limited previous research data available focusing on the performance 
and situation of the FITS sector in China. Thus, some partial pieces of information about 
FITSs collected from the Internet, especially from the industry’s training and research 
websites like cotsa.com, and from those foreign companies’ websites (Table 6.4) seemed 
significant in this research. It is of course acknowledged that these FITSs’ web sites are very 
selective in the way that they present the firms.  
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Table 6.4. The targeted companies’ websites  
Company Name Website Address 
HRG JinJiang International Travel Service www.hrgworldwide.com  
Star Cruise International (Shanghai) Travel Service www.starcruise.com  
Nippon International Travel Agency (Shanghai) www.nihonryoko.com.cn  
Wuxi Wei Lin Holiday International Travel Service www.wlhits.com   
JTB China (Shanghai ) www.jtbcorp.jp 
ShunTak International Tours  www.shuntakgroup.com 
Beijing North Star Kwan Kin International www.nskk.com.cn 
CYTS Cendant International Travel www.aoyou.com 
Beijing Morning Star New Ark International www.btgtravel.com.cn 
New Century JTB International Travel www.ncit.com.cn 
CITS American Express Business Travel www.citsamex.com 
Beijing BTG-Accor Travel Service http://bjslyglxs.pinsou.com 
CTS TUI travel Service www.tui.cn 
Gullivers Travel Associates China www.gta-travel.com 
Hankyu Express International  www.hankyu-travel.com 
Kie China  www.knt.co.jp  
American Grand Circle China www.gct.com  
Beijing FCM Travel Solutions www.fcmtravel.com.cn 
JPIC www.jpic.com.cn 
ANA Tours China www.anas.co.jp 
Guangzhou Hongthai International Tours www.gz-hongthai.com 
Wing on International Travel Service www.wingontravel.com 
Guangdong Student Union Travel Service www.hkst.com 
Kuoni Travel (China) www.skytravelchina.com 
Shenzhen Shunfeng Travel Agency (Not found) 
Yunnan Diethelm Travel www.diethelmtravel.com 
Tianjin SA tours www.satours.com 
Hong Kong China Travel International  www.ctiol.com 
Sources: the author 
 
6.3.1.2. The Limitation of Secondary Data 
The major limitation in the collection of secondary data concerns the reliability of the 
information and statistics from the databank of the Chinese government. Doubt about the 
authenticity of these statistics mainly results from the lack of comparable data provided by 
independent research organizations. Hardly any data resource can be used to compare or test 
the actuality of the government’s publications. Moreover, the methodology of data collection 
is traditionally not reported in the Chinese government statistical reports.  
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The fundamental reasons for this imperfect situation are first related to the ownership 
character of China where most essential economic resources are owned by the government. 
Thus, no one else has the access to the knowledge and content of these resources. Second, 
almost all of industrial associations, as well as major research institutions like China Academy 
of Social Science (CASS), which function for researching or analyzing statistics 
independently in western economies, are usually responsible to the government in China. 
Thus, they advocate the official statistics. The third reason is that traditionally Chinese people 
and companies tend to be very conservative, in terms of knowledge exchanging and 
communication, which makes an independent research more difficult to exert than in 
developed economies. Therefore, the authenticity of Chinese statistics can be criticized. 
However, this limitation should not cause a serious denigration on the reliability of the whole 
thesis which is not merely based on the Chinese statistics. In fact, the findings of this thesis 
are essentially elicited from primary data collected via both in-depth interviews and a 
questionnaire survey.    
 
6.3.2 Primary Data 
As we have already pointed out, the collection of primary data was the core and essential 
section of this survey, as it, being the first-hand data, directly determines or affects the quality 
of findings and results of this research project. The total targeted FITS companies in this 
research only numbered 28, including all the 27 FITSs who had registered in mainland China 
by 2007, and a special case of a Hong Kong invested firm who licensed as a Chinese local 
service in practice. With the limited number of total FITSs by 2007, the strategy of case study 
with face-to-face interviews was chosen as the main methods. Final results and findings were 
generated from both individual case study and cross-case comparisons. In addition, a 
questionnaire survey directed towards Chinese indigenous travel services was also used, in 
order to examine relevant views from the local industry, and thus to help address the 
corresponding research aims and objectives, as mentioned in Table 6.1. In total, 150 
questionnaires were collected in the three target locations, with 50 conducted in each, albeit 
the sampling numbers were confined by the budget of research schedule and funds. 
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It is apposite to emphasize the choice of the three locations, Beijing (with Tianjin), Shanghai 
(with Wuxi) and Guangdong (with two cities, Guangzhou and Shenzhen). From a 
geographical view, the three locations are all located along the east coastline of China (see 
Figure 6.1), where economy has been booming dramatically for the last three decades. Beijing, 
as the capital city, is located in the north while Guangzhou and Shenzhen in the southern 
border to more developed regions, including HMT. However, Shanghai is in between the two 
areas along the coastal line. 
 



















Sources: modified on the may from http://www.britannica.com (2005)  
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The first reason for conducting the research within these cities is because almost all FITSs 
were registered in these cities at the time of the research. Second, these cities represent the 
most advanced investment environment and facilities, as well as the most prosperous 
economy and industry bases in mainland China. Thus, the study on the development of FITSs 
in these locations arguably may in some respects indicate likely emergent future issues for 
other Chinese provinces and cities. Third, these cities also represent the most popular 
locations for general FDI in China. As FDI promotes tourism development in China (Tang et 
al, 2007) through not only increased inbound and outbound travel movements, but also 
improved infrastructures and services, these locations shall remain being the most attractive 
locations for incoming FITSs in the foreseeable future.  
 
Moreover, as there is a need to find out some reasons about FITSs’ concentration in the three 
locations, the adopted research approach is to study the three markets individually. 
Interestingly, the three locations were also the core locations of three eastern regions 
emphasized by Grillet (2003) whose 'China's four regions' theory was briefly studied in 
Chapter four. Based on the belief that the difference between the three locations is important; 
an overall research strategy to represent research findings following the division of locations 
was decided. In other words, the three location clusters become a major theme of this thesis. 
According to this principle, the next three chapters, Chapter Seven, Eight and Nine, will 
illuminate the research results of the each single location, followed by a comparison and 
synthesis Chapter Ten, to review the three locations collectively.  
 
6.3.2.1. The Structure of Interview Survey  
The interview survey was designed to collect primary data directly from the only 27 FITSs 
throughout China until 2007. This survey section, in fact, provided the most significant 
contents of the primary data in this study, and made the most considerable contribution to the 
findings of this thesis. However, it is noteworthy that the interview data of individual firms 
were analyzed with the use of some secondary data about the same firm, in order to maximize 
the comprehension of the company. Moreover, for obtaining deep insights of the FITS sector, 
some of the interviewed firms were selected and presented as case studies in this thesis. Thus, 
the methodology shows a mixture of interview survey and case study approach. 
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Table 6.5. The summary of interview questions 
Number Brief of Questions Group 
1 About parent firms: origin, major business, etc? Background 
Information 2 About setup: when, where, why there, how many branches, etc? 
3 About register capital: initial investment, investment structure? 
4 About the investment: why China, why JV, why this partner? or 
why WOFE?  
5 About Staffing: staff numbers at beginning and now, how many 
from parent companies, etc? 
Operation 
Experiences 
6 About HR: enrollment and positions of foreigners and Chinese? 
7 About competition with local services: how they feel, what 
advantages and disadvantages they have? 
8 About communication and reporting: relations between kin 
companies, reporting rules, decision powers? 
9 About business areas: target markets, turnover, profitability? 
10 About cooperation: where to cooperate, experiences or lessons? 
11 About external determinants: what matters the most?   
12 About obstacles: what are they, which the most considerable? Difficulties/ 
Challenges 13 About government intervention: how strong, any examples? 
14 About licensing: how difficult, how long it takes? 
15 About personal relationship: how important, why and examples? 
16 About consortium or association: joining in who, how ? 
17 About knowledge: where to get information, how difficult? 
18 About different strategies in its origin market and in China? Development 
Strategies 19 About its market location: wholesale or distribution, future 
development objectives? 
20 About expansion plan: whether or not to outside of tourism? 
21 About their achievement: where improved where not? 
22 About expansion in the middle and western China: any plan, 
when, where, any difficulties or suggestions?  
Sources: the author 
 
The interview section was generally divided into three stages: first-round interview stage, 
deeper interview stage, and final stage. The first-round of interviews used a group of 
constructed questions (see Appendix 6.1 and Table 6.5), in order to get comparable data from 
each questioned company, and to improve the effectiveness of the interviews. The questions 
were designed according to the aims and objectives, especially aim one and its related 
objectives. In total, there are 22 questions to be answered in the first-round, grouped into four 
                                                                                                    142
sections: background information, operational experiences, difficulties /challenges, and 
development strategies, as summarized in Table 6.5.     
 
A voice recorder was used during the each interview, and then transcribed into written form. 
In order to have all the questions fully answered, the interviewees were required to be the 
persons who take senior management jobs, such as general managers (GM), department 
managers, or the assistants of general managers of the companies. All the 28 targeted foreign 
services were initially contacted by a letter and invited to take part in the research, with 15 
firms formally interviewed. The remaining 13 firms could not accept the interviews and gave 
various reasons. However, the negotiated interviews were all with the GMs of the companies, 
who have also kindly given permission for the author to directly quote their names and 
opinions in this thesis. The initial plan for the first-round interview stage was to get as many 
interviews as possible, with at least two cases as the bottom line to achieve in each location, 
in order to allow further study in the second-round stage. Generally, this target was achieved, 
although just two firms accepted the interview requirement in Guangdong. 
 
After the first-round, a more focused but deeper interview stage was conducted with the 
selected respondents who were to be the major case studies of the each location. The selection 
was based on the results of the first interview stage, as well as the willingness of the 
interviewees to participate further in the research. There were questions not clearly answered, 
or arising from the answers in the first interviews, which makes the second-round interviews 
very valuable. Also, the second stage increased the understanding of some common 
phenomena of the FITS sector that discovered in the first-round survey. Generally, the 
questions for second-round interviews were still confined by the research objectives. However, 
they were designed to address diverse questions regarding different firms, according to their 
performance in the first-round.  
 
In the second-round interview stage, seven FITSs (who are marked in bold type on the top of 
the each location in Table 6.6) were willing to participate via either formal interviews or 
e-mails, showing their high willingness to collaborate, and providing more sufficient data than 
other FITSs. Therefore, they were selected as case studies of each location. Eventually, two 
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main case studies, HRG Jin Jiang and NTA China are applied in Shanghai, with Kuoni and 
GZ Hong Thai examined in Guangdong. However, three cases, CYTS Cendant, New Century 
JTB, and CITS American Express are studied in Beijing, where over half of the total FITSs 
are located.  
 
Table 6.6.  The research process upon all the target companies 
Location* Name  Process 
SH1 HRG Jin Jiang 2 interviews 
SH2 Nippon Travel Agency 
(NTA) China 
1 interview, and further questions by e-mail  
SH3 JTB 1 interview 
SH4 ShunTak telephone interviews with basic questions (BQ) 
SH5 Star Cruise telephone interviews with BQ 
BJ1  CYTS Cendant 2 interviews 
BJ2 New Century JTB 2 interviews 
BJ3 CITS American Express 1 interview, further questions by e-mail 
BJ4 BJ North Star 1 interview 
BJ5 BJ Morning Star 1 interview 
BJ6 BJ JPIC  1 interview 
BJ7 BJ BTG Accor telephone interviews with BQ 
BJ8 BJ CTS TUI  telephone interviews with BQ 
BJ9 BJ FCM  telephone interviews with BQ 
BJ10 ANA Tours telephone interviews with BQ 
BJ11 GTA 1 interview by phone 
BJ12 Hankyu telephone interviews with BQ 
BJ13 Kie telephone interviews with BQ 
BJ14 American Grand 0 interview, not available 
BJ15 HK CITC 1 interview 
GD1 GZ Hong Thai 1 interview, and further questions by e-mail  
GD2 Kuoni 1 interview, and further questions by e-mail  
GD3  Student Union telephone interviews with BQ 
GD4  GZ wing on telephone interviews with BQ 
GD5 SZ shunfeng 0 interview, not available 
YN1 Yunnan Diethelm Travel telephone interviews with BQ 
WX1 Wuxi Weilin 1 interview 
TJ1 Tianjin SA tour 1 interview 
Sources: the author（*: SH referring to Shanghai; BJ to Beijing; GD to Guangdong; YN to Yunnan; WX to 
Wuxi; and TJ to Tianjin. And the figures indicating numbers.） 
 
The third stage was designed to try again to contact FITSs who did not join the research 
programme. These companies refused to accept the formal interview request in the first stage 
for their reasons, such as being too busy to arrange a time. Therefore, telephone interviews 
were applied in the third stage with some questions that can be quickly answered by the firms 
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(Table 6.6 shows some are marked as ‘telephone interviews with basic questions (BQ)’). In 
total, eight questions (see Table 6.7 and Appendix 6.2) were carefully chosen from the 
interview questions used in the first -round survey. They were reorganized, in order to get the 
most useful information from a relatively short telephone conversation. Basically, the purpose 
of conducting the third stage was to obtain as much data as possible from all FITSs, and thus, 
to be able to compare them and find some commonalities or differences among them. 
However, little information about two companies (marked as ‘BJ14’ and ‘GD5’ in Table 6.6) 
was found by the researcher, as BJ14 had not started operating and GD5 had been shut down 
by 2007. Despite this, the third stage helped to build a holistic view about the FITS sector. 
 
Table 6.7. The summary of questions used in telephone interviews in the third stage 
Number Basic Questions 
1 How much Register Capital, what investment structure? 
2 How much actual initial investment from parent companies? 
3 When set up, how many staff at the beginning and at present? 
4 Profitable or not, when and how much? 
5 What target markets? 
6 What are the characteristics of their major customers, such as countries of origin? 
7 Where to register, why there, other offices, any expansion plan? 
8 About their information like English names and websites. 
Sources: the author 
 
 
6.3.2.2. The Conduct of the Interview Survey  
On a practical note, the survey started from the use of information about all the registered 
FITSs’ addresses or contact numbers in China, obtained from the China National Tourism 
Administration (CNTA). Then, the total 27 FITSs were divided into three groups according to 
their located cities. As illuminated earlier by Figure 6.1, three main locations were identified, 
Shanghai (with a nearby city, Wuxi), Beijing (with a nearby city, Tianjin), and Guangdong 
(covering Guangzhou and Shenzhen, two most significant cities in South China). However, it 
is important to note that one company, named ‘Diethelm’ in Yunnan, had to be ignored with 
this approach, as it is isolated in the middle west of China. The budget of the research was too 
tight to cover this one remote case. The research was eventually carried out in the three 
locations with three periods: 
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l Period One (since July to September 2006): for Shanghai with first round interviews (as 
well as a questionnaire survey in Shanghai);  
l Period Two (since November 2006 to January 2007): for Beijing with first round 
interviews, meanwhile as the second round interviews in Shanghai (as well as a 
questionnaire survey in Beijing);  
l And, Period Three (since May to September 2007): for Guangdong with first round 
interviews, meanwhile as the second round interviews in Beijing (as well as a 
questionnaire survey in Guangdong). 
 
In Guangdong, only two companies agreed to take part in the research, and they preferred to 
be further questioned by e-mails for the second stage. Thus, it was not necessary to travel to 
the location to conduct the second-round interviews on-sites, which would have been difficult 
anyway given the researcher’s small financial and time budget. The whole research 
programme was completed after the Period Three, which was shown in a timetable later in 
this chapter (see Table 6.9). 
 
During each period, a similar research schedule was used in the different locations. The first 
step of the survey was to get as much information as possible about the market and the 
companies, by methods like the Internet and library searches, or visiting the local tourism 
authorities. The background study and data collection process provided a general picture of 
the local market, and thus improved the efficiency of the interview. Moreover, the pre-study 
of the researcher upon the market or a particular company sometimes could change the 
attitudes of the key persons of the targeted firms who initially did not accept the interview. 
For example, the HRG JinJiang (Shanghai) initially did not show any interest of being 
interviewed. However, after two letters and one email which expressed the specific market 
position of their company, and thus the importance of their participation, its GM eventually 
arranged a meeting. Thus, a pre-study before the interviews was essential and necessary. 
 
A formal letter (See Appendix 6.3) introducing the researcher and the survey was sent to all 
FITSs. It is vital that before sending the letter, all the companies’ addresses and contact 
numbers should have been confirmed by making a call in advance. One week after the letter 
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posted, the researcher started to contact each of the companies by telephone, asking about the 
letter, and asking to speak to the companies’ senior managers. If fortunate, an appointment for 
the interview could be made on the phone, or after several calls. However, not all the 
companies said “yes” to the interview request, in which case more letters or phone calls were 
made as further efforts. Once a company refused the interview request more than three times, 
then they were filtered to be the targets for the third research stage with telephone interviews 
and alternative questions applied. Although the researcher would have liked to interview as 
many companies as possible, the minimum number of interviews in each research location 
was set to be two, which was achieved. In general, 15 firms were formally interviewed, with 
11 FITSs telephone-interviewed, and two non-response cases (See Table 6.6).  
 
Almost all first-round interviews were conducted at the respondent’s office sites. However, 
after getting to know the interviewees, the second-round interviews or meetings could be 
made by telephones or e-mails. In order to increase the interest in responding, the researcher 
agreed to provide a copy of the research report after the basic findings succeeded, which was 
also explained on the introduction letter. A gift with an appreciation card was also used after 
the interviews. After the major case studies were written up, an e-copy of the draft was sent to 
the interviewees for their review. Written permission for the application of the data or 
opinions they provided in this thesis was then posted or faxed back to the author.   
 
 
6.3.2.3. The Questionnaire Survey to Chinese Indigenous Services 
In order to investigate the impacts and influences of FITSs upon the whole travel service 
sector in China, and the opinions and attitudes of the Chinese indigenous travel services 
towards the foreign rivals, a questionnaire (See Appendix 6.4) survey was also adopted and 
distributed among the Chinese local travel services simultaneously when  the interviews 
were conducted with FITSs. The questionnaire survey was supposed to help the researcher 
collect more comparable data, in order to strengthen the findings of the research. The 
questionnaire was designed to address five main questions in general: who are they (through 
the pre-question section and questions 1 to 3), what are their main business fields (questions 4 
to 5), how was their relationship with foreign agents (questions 6 to 14), what was their 
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attitude toward these foreign new entrants (questions 15 to 17), and how do they think about 
the issues related to the Chinese authorities (questions 18 to 22)? The questions are 
summarized in Table 6.8. 
 
Table 6.8. The summary of questions in the questionnaire 
Number Brief of Questions Themes 
Pre sec. Company’s name; respondents’ name, job title, contact methods; Who are they? 
1 How many years in existence? 
2 How many full time staff in China? 
3 How many branches in China?  
4 What business field? What is their 
main business 
field? 
5 What major source of income? 




7 If yes, parent firms involved with foreign investments or not? 
8 If yes, what forms of investments? 
9 Which countries involved? 
10 They are licensed as international services or not? 
11 If yes, permitted for outbound market or not?   
12 If yes, how to expand overseas, partnership or green-field? 
13 Any co-operation with foreign agencies? 
14 If yes, how is the relationship? 




16 If yes, their attitude? 
17 What their opinions about FITSs ? 
18 They belong to any Chinese tourism associations or not? How do they 
think about the 
Chinese 
governments 
19 If yes, the association organized by the government or not? 
20 If yes, what their satisfaction level with the associations? 
21 How they regarding a good relation with government agents? 
22 What their satisfaction level with local tourism administration 
office’s services of research, arbitration, aids, communication?  
Sources: the author 
 
The original plan was to use the mail service, posting 600 questionnaires to Chinese 
indigenous travel services selected randomly according to the “Yellow Page of Chinese 
Tourism Industry” within the mainland of China. However, the mail survey method resulted 
in a very low response rate, which was a ‘Zero’ reply during the twice piloted survey. In July, 
2006, the first pilot survey was targeted: 20 Chinese indigenous services by a random 
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selection. These 20 agencies were located in ten cities of China, and six of them were in the 
three major cities, including Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou. A letter introducing the 
survey and instructing how to answer and reply was sent together with the four-page 
questionnaire (see Appendix 6.4), as well as a stamped and addressed envelope for reply. An 
assistant was hired to tackle the work of printing, packing, and posting in Shanghai. The jobs 
were conducted at an advertisement company in Shanghai. And its address was used as the 
reply-to place which is printed on the reply envelope. However, no reply was received for a 
month after the post.  
 
In order to ensure the result of the first pilot, another 10 Chinese travel services were again 
selected randomly as the second pilot, but this time within the focused cities where interviews 
were about to be conducted. The assistant and a secretary of the advertisement company did 
the posting job together. However, there were again no replies. Therefore, the mail survey had 
to be replaced by an alternative way. 
 
The mail survey was changed into a face to face questionnaire survey with the use of same 
four-page questionnaire (see Appendix 6.4), which means that the questionnaire was carried 
to the respondents’ office sites by researchers or assistants, and a question -answer process 
applied at the sites. The survey was conducted within the three locations where interviews 
were conducted, including Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangdong, simultaneously as the 
interview survey was ongoing. 50 valid questionnaires per location were achieved during the 
each period. In total, 150 questionnaires were collected (as the origin mail survey designed 
with 600 questionnaires and 25% response rate). The respondent companies were chosen 
according to the most recent ‘Yellow Page of Chinese Tourism Industry’ at then time. This 
book lists the names and addresses of all the registered Chinese travel services, which helped 
the researcher make plans of visiting routes following a spatially stratified principle on the 
basis of geographical concentration levels of the local travel services.  
 
In every research location, two assistants were employed locally to help conduct the survey. 
University students who had had some experiences of doing questionnaire research were 
preferred. Training was given about the contents of the questions, the purposes of the research, 
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and the major features of the ideal respondents. A recommendation letter from the tourism 
center of the Exeter University, as well as an introduction letter (see Appendix 6.5) by the 
researcher was provided. In order to control the quality of the answers and the eventual results 
of the questionnaire survey, a valid questionnaire should have full information including the 
companies’ name, respondent’s name or position, and contact number.  
 
The research assistants worked together to make the plan of visiting routes, according to the 
list of local travel services, and their addresses and telephone numbers on ‘Yellow Page of 
Chinese Tourism Industry’. Streets with numerous travel services were considered to be 
important choices, and the visits started from the streets gathering the largest number of travel 
services. For example, if a road is inhabited by more than 20 travel agencies, and another two 
roads with 15 agencies and 10 respectively. The first road will be chosen as a primary route, 
and all the agencies on this road will be clearly listed with their names, addresses and 
telephone numbers. After finishing the visit of this road, the road with 15 agencies will 
become the next route to visit. However, the agencies on the second road should be carefully 
scrutinised to avoid visiting the branches of a same company visited before. Then, the road 
with the least number of agencies will be visited until 50 questionnaires completed. This 
‘spatially stratified’ selection principle may be criticized as a source of bias. However, it is 
regarded as the most efficient way of undertaking the survey, given the difficulty in finding 
and accessing these firms in very large urban areas.    
 
The two assistants visited the respondents either together or separately, depending on their 
confidence and convenience. Sometimes they had to provide their ID, student card, and the 
recommendation letter together to be able to access to the key persons. In order to increase the 
respondents’ interest of supporting the research, as same as the interview survey section, a 
copy of final research report was promised to the respondents if required. In total, 312 agents 
were visited with 150 questionnaires fully completed in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong, 
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6.4. The Research Time Table  
The whole research programme was divided into three periods. They are: Period One for 
Shanghai, Period Two for Beijing, and Period Three for Guangdong. The interval was applied 
with the idea that if there was any unexpected problem happening during each research period, 
the researcher should have time to modify the research methods or questions. Also, the 
researcher may need some interval time to make notes or to conclude some experiences for a 
better continuum in the next research period. Thus, the total period of the practical survey  
lasted over a year. The timetable below provides a clear research schedule (see Table 6.9).  
 
 
Table 6.9 Timetable of the research programme  
Preparation May and June 
2006 
Finishing questionnaire design and all the required 
documents, like letters; making contacts with the 
foreign agents in Shanghai for the interviews; 
conducting a pilot survey of questionnaires. 




Conducting 40 in-door questionnaire surveys; 
getting contact with the foreign agents in Shanghai 
and succeeding first-round interviews with three 
agents. 




Dealing with all the completed questionnaires; 
coding the answers with SPSS; reviewing the past 
of research to do necessary modification on the 
methods or the questions; contacting the foreign 
agents in Beijing; designing the deeper interview 
questions for the second-round interviews.  
 
 
Period 2 11th November 
2006 until  
15th January 
2007 
Conducting the interviews with the foreign agencies 
in Beijing and succeeding at least three first-round 
interviews with the agents; processing 40 
questionnaire surveys among Beijing local agents. 
Interval 2 16th January 
until 9th May 
2007 
Selecting the interviewed agents for the second 
-round interviews and making contact with them; 
dealing with the answered questionnaires and coding 
the answers into SPSS; doing basic analysis; 
designing questions for the deeper interviews; 
starting to write single case-study.  
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Period 3 10th May  until  
10th September  
2007 
Conducting interviews with the foreign agents in 
Guangzhou and succeeding at least three first-round 
interviews with the agents; doing 40 questionnaire 
surveys among Guangzhou local agents.  
Conducting the second-round interviews with the 
selected 6 foreign agents; ideally these could be two 
of each category: foreign controlled joint ventures, 
Chinese controlled joint ventures, and wholly foreign 
owned ventures.  
 Sources: the author  
 
 
6.5. Summary and Conclusion 
With an exploratory and inductive nature, this thesis aimed to investigate the development 
approaches and operational experiences of FITSs in mainland China in the first development 
decade since 1998 to 2007. The overall business background for them to develop and expand, 
as well as the impacts of them upon the local marketplace, was also examined. The data 
collection was initially based on the secondary data, and essentially concentrated on the 
process of face-to-face interview survey with totally 28 FITSs in mainland China. This part of 
data was then analyzed and presented as case studies. In order to collect comparable data from 
the Chinese local travel services in the three research locations, a questionnaire survey for the 
Chinese indigenous travel agencies was combined into the methodology. In the next chapter, 
the three locations are investigated one by one, each with discussions on the data from 
interviews, questionnaires, and secondary materials.  
 
There were limitations and difficulties during the whole research programme, which are 
discussed in the final conclusion chapter. It is acknowledged that this methodology design has 
its bias and shortcomings. For example, the results of this research only represent some 
relevant phenomena within the certain companies and during a certain time. However, there is 
no one perfect survey method existing. What can be done is to study problems and difficulties 
in advance, and try to prepare as sufficient as possible before the practical research is 
conducted. Given the resources available, the author was trying her best to overcome 
difficulties and succeed tasks throughout. 
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Moreover, it is important to explain one problem when presenting some data, in respect to 
different exchange rates applied throughout the thesis. During this research, many figures 
needed to be transformed from Chinese Currency RMB into American US$ which was more 
internationally applicable. However, it is not always good to apply a fixed exchange rate 
throughout, for example, when using figures representing a period over decades. Thus, most 
individual figures will be exchanged at corresponding rates of the years (according to Table 
4.5 in Chapter Four), with some tables using a fixed exchange rate of US$ 1 = RMB 7.8, 
which should also be marked accordingly under the tables. However, this strategy may 
implicate some differences in figures that are featured elsewhere, such as other documents or 
research works. 
 
In general, this project has aimed to make a contribution to the academic field on the topic of 
FITSs in China. In a sense, this thesis probably is the first work attempting to draw an overall 
picture of the development features of the business in its earliest stage, from 1998 to 2007. To 
record the facts and phenomenon of FITSs, it is unavoidable that this thesis may be criticized 
as too empirical or descriptive. However, it is considered that this work is important and 
needed for the development of both theory, and the industry. Hopefully, the findings can 
positively influence future research.  
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Chapter 7 
  The Tourism Industry and FITSs in Shanghai 
 
7. 1. Introduction  
As the methodology chapter explained, this research focuses on the development of FITSs 
who registered as a foreign owned travel service in mainland China. According to CNTA's 
statistical data of the registered FITS firms, almost all of these foreign services were located 
in three major cities or regions of China, Beijing (with Tianjin), Shanghai (with Wuxi) and 
Guangdong (a province covering Guangzhou and Shenzhen). With data collected, an 
assumption was confirmed that there are differences existing among the three research 
locations. Therefore, the three locations are adopted as the cluster for data presentation. This 
chapter examines the situation in Shanghai whilst the following two chapters discuss Beijing 
and Guangdong respectively, with at least two major case studies in the each location. 
 
As the purpose of this chapter is to study the FITS sector in Shanghai, at the beginning, 
Shanghai’s investment environment is briefly examined, in terms of the geographical features, 
historical and cultural development background, industrial and economic foundations. There 
are other issues, such as educational institutes, office costs, and transportation facilities also 
included. Then, a summary of the tourism industry in the city is provided. In total, there were 
six FITS cases in the research location of Shanghai, including one failure case in Wuxi. They 
are studied individually, followed by cross-case analysis focusing on the topics of their market 
features and profitability. Moreover, the analysis of questionnaire data is made to enable study 
of attitudes of local services towards the FITS sector. After this, two major case studies, HRG 
Jin Jiang and Nippon Travel Agency, are explored to reach an in-depth understanding of the 
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7.2. The Summary of the City, Shanghai 
7.2.1 Geographical view of Shanghai 
Shanghai, with the shorter names of “Hu” or “Shen”, is situated at 31”14’ north latitude and 
121”29’ east longitude, on the estuary of Yangtze River, covering an area of 6,341 square 
kilometers (of which Pudong New Area occupies 523 sq. km.). Shanghai is a gate to the 
Yangtze River delta. With a northern subtropical maritime monsoon climate, it has four 
distinct seasons with generous sunshine and plenty of rainfall. Recent figures shows that the 
statistical population of Shanghai is around 18.7 million, including 2 million floating residents. 
Dotted with many rivers and lakes, the Shanghai area is known for its rich water resources, 
which makes the city an important sea and river port, giving an easy access to the vast 
hinterland (see Figure 7.1). (Shanghai Municipal Tourism Administrative Commission (refer 
to SMTAC), 2003) 
 
Figure 7.1. The map of Shanghai area  
 
Sources: www.chinahighlights.com/shanghai/map.htm , (2008) (Approximate scale: 1:300,000) 
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7.2.2. Historical and Cultural Development of Shanghai 
Shanghai was originally a fishing town. The name “Shanghai” actually came into being 
during the Song Dynasty (960–1279), when Shanghai was becoming a new rising trading port. 
By the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Shanghai had already become China’s largest textile 
center and business was developing rapidly. By the reign of Qing Emperor Jiaqing 
(1760-1820), Shanghai gradually became a major trading port and water transportation center 
for grains of the country. It was then known as “A place accessible by sea and rivers; a capital 
in the southeast” (SMTAC, 2003).  
 
It was after the Opium War that Shanghai was forced to be an open port by the colonialists, 
and concessions were set up by Britain, the United States, France and so on. In the 100 years 
since 1843, Shanghai had become an important port for the foreign colonialists to offload 
goods, raw materials and money, which made the city widely known as “A paradise of the 
adventurers” (SMTAC, 2003). However, it is because of this aspect of its history that 
Shanghai has a reputation for generosity, in terms of its capacity of accepting novel things or 
foreign conceptions. From the late 1920s it had become the most open and modernized city in 
the country.  
 
On May 27, 1949, Shanghai was liberated, and specially set as a municipality under the direct 
jurisdiction of the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China. Especially since the 
1978’ reform and open policy of the country, Shanghai, as one earliest experimental areas for 
the policy, has experienced a long period of rapid growth, and become the centre of China’s 
economy, science, technology, culture, and education, and one of the most important and 
largest international metropolis in the country. Therefore, with its long history of business 
orientation, the reputation of the easiest accessibility for foreign investors and the highest 
market acceptability of imported goods, the city is popularly regarded as one of the best and 
most attractive Chinese cities by international investors in China.  
 
7.2.3. Industrial and Economic Bases of Shanghai 
Shanghai’s administrative status is a municipality, governed directly under the Chinese 
Central Government. It is notable that, the Yangtze River Delta with Shanghai as its head, 
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approximately occupying 2% of the country’s land with 11% of the country’s total population, 
garnered 25% of China’s GDP, 35% of total value of imports and exports, and 40% of FDI 
(Shanghai Securities News, 2009). According to Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation and 
Trade Commission (SFERTC) 2005’s report, being an economic leader of China, Shanghai 
has already developed a comprehensive industrial structure based on eight industries, 
including IT, Finance, Trade, Automobiles, Equipment Lines, Real Estate, Petrochemicals, 
and Steel. In addition, other booming industries, such as Optical-electronics, Software, 
Modern Bioscience, Advanced Materials, Urban Manufacturing, Tourism, and Agriculture 
(SFERTC, 2005) can’t be ignored. 
 
In 2007, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) value of Shanghai was approximately RMB 1.2 
trillion (US$ 158.3 billion), rising by over 13% more than that of 2006 which was just about 
RMB 1.0 trillion. The port of Shanghai witnessed US$ 521.23 billion on gross value of 
imports and exports in 2007, increasing by 21.6% than 2006, and the figures of gross value of 
imports and exports for the city of Shanghai totaled US$ 282.98 billion in 2007with a growth 
of 24.4 % upon the previous year. In 2007, the total amount of retail sales of consumer goods 
reached around US$ 50.76 billion, 14.56% more than the year 2006. The corresponding 
growth rates of 2006 over 2005 was 13.1%, 22.3%, 22.1% and 13%. (SFERTC, 2008). These 
figures show that Shanghai has indeed become one of the most important business ports of the 
world economy, accompanied by rapid and continuous growth. 
 
The performance of FDI in Shanghai was also very strong, with all figures showing double 
digital annual growth rates. By the end of 2007, Shanghai had approved the establishment of 
nearly 48,753 foreign investment projects from more than 116 countries, and attracted 
US$ 129.40 billion in contracted foreign capital, with US$ 74.68 billion actually used 
(MOFCOM, 2008). The FDI projects in Shanghai numbered 4,206 in 2007 with US$ 14.88 
billion in contract and US$ 7.92 billion actually used. In the year of 2007, foreign-funded 
companies in Shanghai garnered approximately US$ 215 billion in sales revenue, with profits 
amounted US$ 13 billion. They employed over 1.5 million people, involving US$ 8.23 billion 
in payroll, and US$ 6.09 billion in taxes (MOFCOM, 2008). In addition, there have been over 
750 headquarters of foreign corporations settled in the city, as well as more than 200 foreign 
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R & D (research and development) centers by the end of 2009 (MOFCOM, 2009). Moreover, 
Shanghai is expected to be the country’s international finance center with over 3,000 Chinese 
local banking organizations, and over 140 foreign banks and finance enterprises in 2007 
which only numbered 100 in 2005 (SFERTC, 2008). 
 
7.2.4. Issues Concerning the Investment Environment of Shanghai 
The first issue is concerned with the educational conditions and human resources of the city. 
Shanghai possesses a full range of universities, colleges, middle schools, primary schools and 
adult education institutions, for both domestic learners and the children of overseas staff with 
over 25 international schools and kindergartens. These educational resources give Shanghai a 
leading position in China. In 2007, 60 universities and colleges were located in the city, with 
students exceeding 0.48 million. In addition, there were 1108 scientific & technological 
research institutions located in Shanghai, engaging about 0.23 million research personnel in 
the same year (SSB, 2008). The average annual remuneration of employers was about 
US$ 3,983 in Shanghai in 2007, an increase of approximately 10 % over the previous year 
(SSB, 2008), which is higher than other Chinese provinces or cities. 
 
Secondly, Shanghai has established a comprehensive transportation system within the city, on 
inter-province level, and on international level, through its “Three Ports and Two Networks” 
(SFERTC, 2005). The three ports are Yangshan Deep Water Port and two international 
airports, with two networks, including its light rail transportation network and highway 
network. The Yangshan Deep Water Port, being Northeast Asia’s international shipping center, 
has been completed in 2005, featured with 50 deep-water berths and an annual capacity of 22 
million containers, as well as a 32 km long Luyang Oceanic Bridge. However before the 
building of this new part, Shanghai’s Port had already been ranked the third in the world in 
terms of container volume, and the second in the world in terms of tonnage of cargo. 
Shanghai was the first city in China equipped with two large international airports, and the 
two offering flights to more than 30 countries and regions, with an annual passenger transport 
volume of more than 30 million, making the city an international air transportation hub 
(SFERTC, 2008).   
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In addition, according to the local government’s goal labeled “153060”, all major industrial 
zones, major towns, transportation hubs, and passenger (or freight) distribution centers will be 
reachable with at most 15 minutes from the highway network; with at most 30 minutes travel 
time between the city center and provincial boundaries; and 60 minutes between any two 
points on the highway network within the city boundary. In total, seven highways, over 485 
km, connected Shanghai with surrounding provinces like Zhejiang and Jiangsu, and further to 
the hinterland (SFERTC, 2005). In addition, the convenience of the various transporting 
methods in the city, including ferries, overhead roads, subways, cross-river tunnels, light 
trains, advanced magnetic buoyant trains also, and super-speed trains, made contributions to 
the accessibility, prosperity and growth of the economy of Shanghai (SFERTC, 2010).    
 
Furthermore, Shanghai has the most advanced business facilities within the country. The city 
was also China’s fastest growing information and communication hub with over 58.1% 
families of the city's total having the access to the Internet in 2007, which was 52.7% in 2006 
(SSB, 2008). Since 2005, Shanghai’s IT hardware infrastructure has been equivalent to that of 
a major city in a developed country. In addition, there have been more than 250 international 
exhibitions held in Shanghai annually since 2001, among which over 100 shows organized by 
foreign enterprises. In 2007, Shanghai hosted 309 international exhibitions which occupying 
over 4.75 million square meters exhibition space (SSB, 2008). In 2010, Shanghai is estimated 
to receive some 400 to 500 international exhibitions although the recent global recession 
caused encumbrance to economic growth internationally. However, as a result of the rising 
demand for offices, the average rental fees for Class A office buildings in Shanghai is 
predicted to rise by 15% every year. A recent survey shows that the average rental fee in 
Shanghai in 2007 was 1.2 USD/sq.m./day, with the highest price in the business areas along 
the Huangpu River (SFERTC, 2008).  
 
A recent survey is worthy of mentioning, as it examines the perspectives of the 
Shanghai-based foreign-invested enterprises on Shanghai’s investment environment, and 
generally showing a high level of satisfaction upon the relative issues. It was sponsored by 
Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission in 2006. Appendix 7.1 and 7.2 represents the 
findings of the survey, which may be summarized as follows: 
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l Foreign-invested enterprises who were examined expressed general satisfaction with 
Shanghai’s investment environment and deemed Shanghai the most investor-friendly city 
in China; 
l Respondents also expressed great satisfaction with Shanghai’s implementation of China’s 
WTO commitments; 
l Showed positive comments on Shanghai’s comprehensive environment and optimistic 
attitudes about the improvement of the city’s investment environment; 
l Attributed Shanghai’s international competitiveness as a land for investment to its sound 
urban infrastructure and qualified labor; 
l Believed in the importance of the development of the city’s modern service industry and 
the Shanghai’s hosting of the 2010 World Expo; 
l Believed that relative policies regarding Pudong’s being a pilot base of overall 
concomitant reform on foreign investment in Shanghai and the construction of Yangshan 
Deepwater Port would greatly promote the city’s FDI; 
l Emphasized the city’s preferential policies, business opportunities, including extensive 
links with the international market, as well as free competition; 
l Energy and power, and transportation were deemed as the top two factors that would 
severely constrain Shanghai’s development in the future; 
l Continued to be complaints about the city’s ‘government efficiency, policy transparency 
and government administrative system’;  
l General positive comments were given on the protection of intellectual property rights in 
Shanghai. (SFERTC, 2006) 
 
In general, Shanghai has been one of the most important cities of China for hundreds of years, 
especially in terms of its tremendous economic strength, with contributions from both 
domestic and overseas businesses. It is also an important feature that the city is a place that 
any culture can be accommodated and thus the marketplace is the easiest for foreign 
companies to enter, in comparison to other Chinese markets. Thus, there had been over 30 
thousand overseas enterprises from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, or from other foreign 
countries registered in Shanghai by 2007, and the figure increased to over 55,000 in 2009 
(Xinhuanet.com, 2010). Over 0.13 million permitted foreign residences were also a valuable 
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market opportunity (SSB, 2008). The overall good investment environment is certainly 
beneficial for the development of tourism of the city. Especially, the inbound and outbound 
travel market in Shanghai was stimulated by the increasing foreign trade performance and 
FDI activities. As the No. 1 business centre of China, it is understandable that Shanghai is 
concerned as a main location for FITSs to enter, and plays a unique role in the development of 
corporate travel market. 
 
 
7.3. The Tourism Industry and Resources in Shanghai 
As mentioned previously the tourism industry has been regarded as one of the most important 
industries in Shanghai. In 2005, the city received over 5.36 million over-night foreign tourists, 
ranked the third among all the Chinese provinces and cities, and generating over US$ 4.7 
billion of international tourism receipts, ranked the second within the country. Both figures 
showed an increase by more than 10% over the previous year (SMTAC, 2008). Table 7.1 
indicates the increasing numbers of tourists received by tour agencies in Shanghai since 2001 
to 2007. The table also revealed a dramatic growth in the numbers of local citizens going 
abroad, as well as the raising total revenues and profitability of the travel service industry in 
Shanghai.  
 
Table 7.1. The growth of tourist numbers served by travel agencies in Shanghai (2001-2007) 
Indicators  
(Unit:10,000 person-times) 
2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Overseas and Domestic Tourists 400.14 537.76 633.47 750.89 880.24 904.73 
Overseas Tourists 97.42 128.37 78.40 95.01 107.34 111.50 
1 Foreigners  86.88 117.80 74.92 90.01 101.67 108.51 
2 Tourists from Hong Kong, China 6.36 6.29 1.83 1.48 2.28 1.29 
3 Tourists from Macao, China 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
4 Tourists from Taiwan, China 4.10 4.26 1.64 3.51 3.36 1.69 
Domestic Tourists 302.72 409.39 555.07 655.88 772.90 793.23 
Tourists Going Abroad 14.82 18.91 49.86 51.71 58.54 68.91 
Operation and Financial Status (Unit:1 million U.S. dollars)(1US dollar = 7.8 Chinese Yuan) 
1 Operational Revenues 749.62 951.54 1387.4 1697.82 2172.95 2933.85 
2 Total Profits 11.03 14.49 23.21 20.64 21.92 24.49 
Sources: SSB & SMTAC (2008)  
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By the year of 2007, there were 776 domestic travel services and 53 international travel 
services registered in Shanghai. Among the 53, 40 travel services were fully granted with 
outbound license, with the other 13, including six FITSs, only allowed to deal with the 
domestic and inbound markets. By 2007, Shanghai had 32 five-star hotels, including the 
Grand Hyatt, Four Seasons, Marriott, and some other top international hotel brands. Together 
with 47 four -star hotels, 128 three-star hotels, 105 two star-hotels, and 8 one-star hotels, 
Shanghai has in excess of 320 star-rated hotels. This provides approximately 99,000 beds 
qualified to serve both international and domestic visitors. Along with these, there are some 
3,461 low budget holiday properties, operating out of the star-rating system, with over 
170,000 beds, which have been witnessing a time of frenzied promoting, reforming and 
regrouping. These social hotels are to be the competitors in the segment market of 
“economical hotels”. The average occupancy rate of Shanghai’s hotels in 2007 was about 
61.5%, with 2.5% lower than the years 2006. (SMTAC, 2008)  
 
Moreover, Shanghai also has abundant tourism attraction resources. As introduced in Chapter 
Five, China launched the ‘Standard of Rating for Quality of Tourist Attractions’ with an 
A-rating system for all the tourist attraction sites in the country in 1999. In 2007, the Shanghai 
tourism administration office inspected and re-approved 17 four-A and one three-A 
state-standard tourist attractions in the local market, which are listed in the Appendix 7.3. In 
addition, Shanghai also contains many officially recommended attractions, including some 
130 cityscapes and cultural sightseeing spots, 29 historical residences and sites, 22 religious 
sites, 21 parks and gardens, and one nature reservation area. (SMTAC. 2008) Moreover, 
Shanghai has started a project aimed to find and protect old buildings which embody 
historical events or celebrities’ commemoration, and subsequently to convert such buildings 
into tourist sites. By 2006, the number of such buildings in Shanghai had exceeded 632 
(People's Daily Online, 2006). Additionally, shopping tourism, educational tourism, and food 
tourism offer many choices for visitors to the city. In short, Shanghai is one of the most 
advanced cities in China, in terms of tourist services provided.    
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7.4. The Sector of FITSs in Shanghai 
7.4.1. FITSs in Shanghai (and Wuxi) 
According to CNTA‘s official statistics, by November 2006, there had been 27 FITSs 
registered throughout China. Among the 27, there have been six FITSs in the Shanghai area, 
including two JVs and four wholly-owned ventures (See Table 7.2) (the bold letters indicate 
two major case studies in the location). Wuxi Weilin Holiday International (numbered 6 in the 
table 7.2) was dissolved in 2005, which makes the company worth studying, especially on the 
reasons of the failure. The company was located in a nearby city called Wuxi, with two-hour 
driving distance to Shanghai. Also as the company had a subsidiary in Shanghai, it will be 
investigated within the category of the Shanghai area.   
 
In general, the entry of foreign travel trade businesses into Shanghai seemed a little later than 
the other two case study locations. Except for the Weilin Holiday in Wuxi, there had not been a 
FITS in Shanghai until 2004, which was six years later than the first FITS in Yunnan (a 
famous destination in western part of China) and five years later than Beijing and Guangdong. 
The relatively more conservative attitude of foreign travel services’ investment decision in 
Shanghai might result from the limited number of suitable partners available in the local 
market. Obviously, local government owned Jin Jing Group had much sounder business 
structure than other local services, and was the most ideal one to corporate with. This situation 
could have caused unfavorable status for the foreign side in the negotiation process, and thus 
might have delayed the investment decision of them.  
 
Moreover, according to the Table 7.2, the foreign travel agencies in Shanghai were relatively 
small to medium sized, with the registered capitals (RC) amounted from half a million up to 
3.4 million US dollars. The majority of the foreign investors in Shanghai were from Asian 
countries or regions, including three Japanese, one Malaysian, and one from Hong Kong. And 
only Shanghai HRG Jin Jiang International was founded by a British tour operator. 
 
In total, four FITSs were interviewed, with interviewees listed in Table 7.3. Shanghai HRG 
Jin Jiang International and Nippon Travel Agency China were selected as two major case 
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studies of this chapter, resulting from the higher participating interest of and relatively more 
sufficient data provided by the two firms. However, in order to provide a holistic and 
comprehensive view about the FITS sector in the Shanghai area, this section summarizes the 
major features of all the six FITSs.  
 
Table 7.2.   The FITS sector in the Shanghai area 
No. Name Sino- Investors Foreign Investors Registration 












Robinson Group  
51% 
3.4 million  8 Jul 2004 
2 Star Cruises 
(SH) Travel 
None Malaysian Star 
Cruises  100% 




None Japanese NTA 
100% 
0.51 million 8 Oct 2004 
4 Shun Tak 
International 
Tours  
None Hong Kong Shun 
Tak International 
Tours 100% 
0.51 million May 2006 
5 JTB Shanghai 
International 
Tours 
None Japanese JTB 
International Travel 
Group  100% 
0.73 milliom Nov 2006 














Sources: based on the information provided by CNTA (2007) 
 
 
Table 7.3.  The list of interviewees in the Shanghai area 
No. Company 
Names 
Interviewees Positions of the 
interviewees 
Year of the 
Interviews 
1 Shanghai HRG 
JinJiang 
International 
Mr. J. Stevenson 
 







2 Nippon Travel 
Agency China 
Mr. C. Ota GM Aug 2006 
3 JTB Shanghai 
International 
Tours 








Mr. H.L. Sun GM 2006 
Source: the author  
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In short, Shanghai HRG Jin Jiang International was a JV of British Hogg Robinson Group 
(HRG) and Shanghai Jin Jiang International. HRG was specialized in corporate travel market 
which was also the major target market of the JV in Shanghai. Nippon Travel Agency (NTA) 
China is a wholly owned Japanese company. The major income of the NTA in Japan was from 
both Japanese domestic travel market and the outbound travels. In China, NTA's Japanese 
outbound tourists visiting China have become NTA China’s main business and income 
resource. In other words, serving the inbound market from Japan into China was originally the 
focus of NTA China. However, the company has been eager for further opportunities in the 
Chinese corporate travel business, and hopes to see a complete expansion in the Chinese 
outbound travel market. These two case studies are examined in more details later in the 
chapter.   
 
Star Cruise Shanghai (refer to as SCS below), was the first foreign wholly owned travel 
service in Shanghai, established in July 2004, by Star Cruises Limited (refer to SCL) who was 
listed in Hong Kong and Singapore. SCL has headquarters in Hong Kong, and an operations 
and marketing headquarters in Port Klang, Malaysia. SCL’s major holder was Genting Berhad, 
a Malaysia multinational corporation with 40,000 employees globally and a combined total 
market capitalization of over US$ 11 billion by October 2006 (www.genting.com , 2005). 
Figure 7.2 shows the relationship of SCL and Genting group. SCL was formed in September 
1993, with an initiative to tap Asia-Pacific’s potential as an international cruise destination. 
Following the acquisition of a public company called NCL holdings in 2000, SCL has been 
the third largest cruise line in the world, operating a combined fleet of 21 ships with about 
32,300 berths in service, with 3 ships and 10,800 berths to be delivered by 2010. SCL had 
offices and representatives in 17 countries and regions worldwide, with approximately 1,058 
full time employees for shore offices and over 4,500 full-time on-ship officers and crew. 
SCL’s turnover in 2005 totaled about US$ 1.95 billion (www.starcruises.com, 2006).  
 
According to an employee of SCS (who preferred to be anonymous), the company also had 
representative offices in Guangzhou and Beijing, along with its Shanghai site by the end of 
2007. Being a wholesaler, SCS used local travel services who having outbound licenses and 
being able to sell SCS’s overseas, mainly Asian, cruising destinations. SCS’s target market 
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was the high end of the Chinese outbound tourists. To provide ground supports for the ships 
of the parent company, SCl, was another vital objective. Although SCS was not profitable, its 
importance and great potential has been fully recognized by SCL. The setup of this wholly 
owned venture in Shanghai indicated an initial growth of luxury cruising business in China.  
 
Figure 7.2.  The relationship of Star Cruise Limited and Genting Berhad 
 
Sources: www.genting.com/groupprofile/index.htm ,(2006) 
 
JTB Shanghai International Tours (hereafter JTBS), approved at the end of 2006, was wholly 
owned by Japanese JTB Corp (hereafter JTBC). However, before JTBS, the JTB group had 
already formed a JV in Beijing almost seven years earlier, with a RC of US$ 0.67 million. 
JTBC was formed in November 12, 1963, with its head office in Tokyo, Japan. The registered 
capital of JTBC was 3.2 billion Japanese Yen (about US$ 26.9 million). With broad interests 
in the tourism and tourism-related industries, JTBC had already established more than 150 
companies worldwide with more than 25,300 employees by the end of 2005. In Japan, the 
group has won almost half share of the country’s total travel market. In fact, JTBC has formed 
11 companies throughout China, including JTBS, covering a wide business fields like 
exhibitions, conferences, consultant, investment, and tourism. JTBS, as the wholly owned 
travel agency of JTBC, was targeting the up-scale outbound market and the sector of 
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corporate travel in the market of China East. There will be a further study of the JTB group in 
the next chapter of Beijing (www.jtbcorp.jp , 2006).  
 
Shun Tak International Tours (China) (refer to STIT China) was wholly owned by a Hong 
Kong listed company, Shun Tak Holdings Limited (refer to STHL) whose core businesses are 
in the transportation, hospitality, property and investment sectors, with over 2,200 employees 
in total. STHL was established in 1972 and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1973. 
Shipping was STHL’s original business, dating back to 1961 when a ferry service was 
inaugurated between Hong Kong and Macao, following the Macao government’s grant of an 
exclusive casino franchise to a company abbreviated as STDM. Later the STHL group started 
to operate a cross-border coach service, and in January 2006, it also reached an agreement 
with strategic partners to form a new Macao-based airline that is serving new destinations in 
mainland China and Asia. The group’s long-term program of diversification was firstly into 
tourism related industries, such as hotels and restaurants and then into real estate (STHL, 
2007). STHL was a pioneer in top-tier hotel services in Macao through the investments in the 
Mandarin Oriental Macao and Westin Resort Macao. Currently, it owns one of the largest land 
banks in Macao among all the listed companies in Hong Kong. In addition, STHL also holds 
some interests in STDM and another casino company, SJM, which is one of the three gaming 
concessionaires licensed to operate casinos in Macao. The turnover of STHL was over 
HK$ 2.4 billion (about US$ 320 million) in 2005. Although STIT China was licensed in May 
2006, it did not commence practical operation until 2007. In 2007, the subsidiary in China 
was only dealing with reservation requirements for hotels and air tickets for journeys to or 
from Macao. However, the establishment of STIT China was a symbol of STHL’s expanding 
decision in the tourism industry of mainland China. (www.shuntakgroup.com , 2007) 
 
It is worth looking at the only failed case of the FITS sector in the Shanghai area. Wuxi 
Weilin Holiday International Travel Agency (WWHITA) was established in the beginning of 
2002 with RC of 1 million U.S. dollars. The two parent companies were Chinese Wuxi 
Holiday International Travel Service (WHITS) with 51% of total shares, and Japanese Weilin 
Corporation with the remaining 49%. Before setting up the JV, the two parent companies had 
had a long-term business relationship for the travel market between Japan and China. WHITS 
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looked at the Japanese partner’s ability of soliciting Japanese tourists into China, in order to 
increase its inbound reception capacity. While, one of the major reasons for the Japanese firm 
to choose WHITS as a JV partner in China was that WHITS had a very good relationship with 
Wuxi local government. In fact, the Board Director of WHITS was the previous Vice Direct 
General of Wuxi’s tourism administration office. According to Mr. Hailiang Sun who is the 
General Manager (GM) of WWHITA, when the JV was set up, it did not match the 
requirements of the Chinese government on the scale and qualification of foreign partners, in 
terms of turnover. But because WWHITA chose its register location at Mashan Mountain, one 
of the earliest total twelve National Tourist Resort Zones of China, the JV was then allowed to 
develop as a privilege. 
 
However, the Japanese partner was not running well in its home town. The Japanese Weilin 
Corporation belonged to a Japanese airline, named Western Airline, which was shut down in 
2004. According to Mr. Sun, the main reasons for the JV’s closure were attributed to two 
points. The first reason was, ‘obviously, the relevantly bad news of the JV’s Japanese partner 
in 2004 (originally in Chinese)’. Secondly, there were two severe crises impacting the JV’s 
viability, the SARS in 2003 and the later Bird Flu. Thus, the first two years after setup were 
seen as the best time of the JV, with a turnover of RMB 50 million (about US$ 6.4 million) 
per year. After the withdrawing of the Japanese partner, WHITS is still operating in Wuxi and 
other Eastern cities, including Shanghai, with a full license to deal with the Chinese domestic, 
outbound and inbound travel market. However, without the Japanese JV partner, WHITS has 
changed its business focus onto the Chinese domestic and outbound market.   
 
7.4.2. The Target Markets and Profitability of FITSs in Shanghai   
Table 7.4 shows the major business targets of the six FITSs in the Shanghai area, and how 
their profitability status was by the time of this research. It is not difficult to see that the 
business performance of FITSs in the research location seemed to strongly depend on the 
capacity of their overseas partner companies in its original countries or regions. For example, 
the three Japanese companies were mainly serving Japanese tourists or companies traveling 
between Japan and China. This mainly resulted from policy restrictions to FITSs upon the 
Chinese outbound travel market. Thus, the foreign services had to focus on the market on 
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which their original foreign business was based. The dependence upon its foreign original 
business base was one obvious feature of the FITS sector in Shanghai. It should be noted that 
their development strategy tended to emphasize the function of providing a better product and 
service for existing foreign customers, but not their expansion in China. 
 
Table 7.4.  The target markets and profitability of FITSs in the Shanghai area (by 2007) 
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Sources: the author 
 
Since there had not been a FITS in Shanghai until July 2004, (except for the one in Wuxi), the 
history of these services operating in the local market was no more than four years by 2007. 
Only two Japanese invested travel services, NTA China and JTB Shanghai had become 
profitable by the end of 2007, and they had very positive attitudes about their future 
development in China. However, HRG JinJiang seemed also to be very optimistic about its 
future and expecting their breakeven time by 2008, although it was still in a lose position 
when interviewed. In the case of STIT China, it did not start its actual business operation until 
2007. The company's original focus was limited within the reservation service of hotels and 
flights to Macao and Hong Kong, operating as both a wholesaler and retailer. In addition, SCS 
had not been able to create enough Chinese business to cover all its costs. Thus, only two 
FITSs, one third of the all, were making profits at then time. In general, without the access to 
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the Chinese outbound market, FITSs in Shanghai were developing slowly by 2007.  
 
7.4.3 Local Travel Services and Their Attitudes towards FITSs  
As FITSs were new entrants of the local marketplace, it is worth examining the impacts of the 
FITS sector upon the local agents, and the attitudes of the local industry towards the coming 
of foreign services (see Aim Two in Chapter Six). Therefore, a questionnaire survey was also 
carried out among the local services as subsidiary data to help understand the relationship 
between the FITS sector and the locals. As examined, by 2007, there were 776 Chinese travel 
services licensed to conduct domestic travel business in Shanghai, along with 53 licensed to 
handle international travels. Among the 53, 40 local services were fully approved to operate 
the Chinese domestic, inbound and outbound travel business. However, the other 13 services, 
including the five FITSs, were qualified for domestic and inbound travel only. In total, 50 
questionnaires were collected from the local travel services in Shanghai. The respondents 
were selected by addresses from the ‘Yellow Page of Travel Industry’, as explained in the 
methodology. All the collected questionnaires were with the names of the companies and 
respondents, and the addresses and telephone numbers, so that the author was able to call 
back to the respondents to make sure of the validity. In general, the results were represented in 
this thesis with five groups of questions on: 1) their scale; 2) business fields; 3) relation with 
FITSs; 4) attitude toward FITSs; and 5) attitude to local government offices. 
 
From the results of the survey (see Appendix 7.4 and Table 7.5), 25 respondents who were 
qualified for international travel business, including 20 agencies who were fully granted for 
the three travel markets (inbound, outbound and domestic), accounting for 50% and 40% of 
the total respectively, were questioned in this survey. Thus the respondents in this survey were 
those relatively bigger agencies. However, 33 agents, about 66% of the total respondents, 
were up to 10-year old. 29 agents (58% of the total) had less than 50 staff, while only six 
(12%) had over 400 employees. In addition, 76% of the total, 38 agents, had less than 10 
branches or sales points in the city, including 26% with a single branch. There were only three 
agents, 6%, claiming that they had over 100 branches. Thus, the general scale and size of the 
local travel services in Shanghai was relatively small, and the industry was still young.  
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Table 7.5.  Summary of characteristics of the respondents in Shanghai 
Item Frequency Percentage of the Total Valid Percent* 
Qualified for International 
Travel Service 
25 50% / 
Among the above, 
Qualified for Outbound  
20 40% 80% 
Only for Domestic Service 25 50% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
<= 10 years old 33 66% / 
 >10 years old 17 34% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
1 to 49 Staff 29 58% / 
50 to 99 Staff  4 8% / 
100 to 399 Staff 11 22% / 
400 to 1000 Staff 3 6% / 
More than 1000 Staff 3 6% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
1 Branch 13 26% / 
2 to 9 Branches 25 50% / 
10 to 49 Branches 5 10% / 
50 to 99 Branches 4 8% / 
>=100 Branches 3 6%  
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author 
(*: Valid Percent means the corresponding figures account for percentages of the above group’s total. For 
example, in this table, 20 respondents qualified for outbound, account for 80% of the above 25 respondents 
who are international travel services. The same application is in following tables.) 
 
 
According to the collected data (see Table 7.6), there were 39 agencies choosing domestic 
travel as their major business field, with seven services going for overseas package, and only 
one agency claiming the handling of inbound visitors. Figure 7.3 shows similar information 
about the importance of outbound, inbound, and domestic travel markets for the local travel 
agencies respectively, in terms of the contribution for income. It is obvious that inbound 
market was the weakness of local travel services in Shanghai. This was very different from 
those foreign services who in most cases were developing their Chinese career based on the 
inbound travel market of the country. This may be a short-term phenomenon only before the 
entire opening of the Chinese travel market. However, it is still noteworthy that focusing on 
the Chinese inbound market could be a good development strategy for the FITS sector at the 
time when the local travel service sector being still weak in the inbound travel business.   
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Table 7.6.  Major business focuses and income sources of the respondents in Shanghai 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total  
Domestic tour groups and individuals 
tours as the major business 
39 78% 
Overseas tour groups and individuals 
tours as the major business 
7 14% 
Bookings of hotels and flights as the major 
business 
3 6% 
Incoming tourists as the major business 1 2% 
Total Respondents 50 100% 
 
Domestic services as the major income 38 76% 
Inbound services as the major income 2 4% 
Outbound services as the major income 10 20% 
Total Respondents  50 100% 
Sources: the author  
 
Figure 7.3 The importance of outbound, inbound, and domestic travel markets for the local travel 
agencies in Shanghai. 
Question 5: Which of the following three is your 














Sources: the author  
 
A section of questions were designed to see whether there were any local travel services who 
were invested by indirect foreign ownership. As shown in Table 7.7, only one respondent 
claimed that their mother company obtained foreign investment from Hong Kong. As the 
involved company was not an officially registered FITS, it meant that it was possible for 
foreign capital to enter the Chinese travel trade market by methods rather than green field 
investments, although the form of the investment was not clearly identified. Additionally, in 
total, 20 respondents had the permission for the outbound market. Among the 20, when they 
approaching to overseas business, 65% used foreign partners, but 15% set up their own 
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branches, with another 15% using both two methods. This may indicate a strong preference of 
the Chinese travel services to apply partnerships as their major strategy upon overseas 
markets. Moreover, among all the respondents, 19 agencies had cooperative working 
experiences with foreign agencies. However, among the 19, 17 agents, almost 90%, claimed 
that the relationship between them and their foreign partners as “very good” or “good”. This 
again suggested that Shanghai local services inclined to maintain good relationships with 
foreign business partners. 
 
Table 7.7.  Communications and relationships between the local travel trade businesses and 
international capital investments in Shanghai 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Having parent companies 15 30% / 
           Mother company being 
involved in foreign investments 
4 8% 26.7% 
   Wholly owning a venture in overseas 2 4% 50% 
 A foreign Invested mother company 1 2% 25% 
Having joint investments in overseas 1 2% 25% 
Involved in European countries 1 2% 25% 
Involved in HongKong, Macao or Taiwan 3 6% 75% 
Having no parent companies 35 70% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
Permitted for outbound (see Table 7.5) 20 40% / 
    Building foreign partnerships  13 26% 65% 
    Setting up own branches 3 6% 15% 
    Using the above both ways  3 6% 15% 
    Only solicit tourists in China  1 2% 5% 
 
Having cooperated with foreign agencies 19 38% / 
    The relationship being ‘Very Good’ 7 14% 36.8% 
    The relationship being ‘Good’ 10 20% 52.6% 
    The relationship being ‘Neutral’ 2 4% 10.5% 
Having not cooperated with foreigners  31 62% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author 
 
When asked about whether they had knowledge about the entering of FITSs in the Chinese 
travel market, there were still 44% of the total saying “No”. This may indicate that the FITS 
sector has not brought much competition into the indigenous market yet. Table 7.8 shows the 
results of the local attitude towards the FITS sector, that among the 28 respondents who knew 
about foreign entrants, half of them showed welcome with a hope to improve the overall 
performances of the local businesses, but one disliking it and all others holding neutral 
opinions. In addition, Figure 7.4 shows what the same 28 respondents thought about the roles 
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of incoming FITSs. Most of them, over 64%, regarded the foreign services as both a rival and 
a potential business partner to ally with. About half of the rest held a negative attitude 
considering FITSs as rivals, with the other half eager to learn international business 
experiences from the foreign companies. In general, competition between FITSs and the 
locals seemed not intense.   
 
Table 7.8.  Local knowledge of and attitudes towards the FITS sector in Shanghai 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Having the knowledge of foreign entrants 28 56% / 
    Do not like foreign agencies 1 2% 3.6% 
    Neutral 13 26% 46.4% 
    Appreciate foreign agencies 14 28% 50% 
Concerning as a considerable rival 
 with advanced skills 
4 8% 14.3% 
Concerning as a new rival 
with different background 
1 2% 3.6% 
Concerning as both a potential 
competitor and partner 
18 36% 64.3% 
Concerning as a valuable model 
to learn from 
5 10% 17.9% 
Having no knowledge on foreign entrants 22 44% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author  
 
Figure 7.4.  The respondents’ thoughts about the role of FITSs in Shanghai 
 
Sources: the author 
 
The remaining part of the questionnaire was designed to investigate the local travel agencies' 
attitudes towards the Chinese governments and administrative organizations. Table 7.9 shows 
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a finding that more than half, 54% of all respondents, believed the importance of maintaining 
a good relationship with government organizations or administration offices, with the 
remaining companies holding a neutral opinion. When the respondents were questioned about 
their attitudes towards the local government’s four functions, including providing market 
researches, arbitration service, consultant and aids, promoting communications and 
networking of the industry, the answers showed almost identical patterns (see Table 7.10). 
Only around 10% of the total respondents confessed that they were not satisfied with the 
public services, but about 50% to 60% were “Very Satisfied” or “Satisfied”, and 
approximately 30% to 40% were “Neutral”. However, there is a critique that if most of them 
want to maintain a good relationship with the government bodies, will they express their 
dissatisfaction with the government directly? The high percentages of neutral answers may 
indicate that these are sensitive issues. In addition, the high level of satisfaction probably 
reflects that the local travel services doesn’t require much from the administration bodies.  
 
Table 7.9.  Local attitudes towards governmental organizations in Shanghai 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Being a member of the Chinese 
associations in the tourism industry 
39 78% / 
  In the associations directly under 
the supervision of the government 
24 48% 61.5% 
    Being ‘Very Satisfied’ with the 
associations 
2 4% 8.3% 
Being ‘Satisfied’  6 12% 25% 
Being ‘Neutral’ 14 28% 58.3% 
Being ‘Unsatisfied’ 2 4% 8.3% 
Not Being a member of any Chinese 
associations in the tourism industry  
11 22% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
To have a good relationship with the 
government is ‘Important’ 
27 54% / 
To have a good relationship with the 
government is ‘Neutral’ 
23 46% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author  
 
Table 7.10.  Local satisfaction level with the major functions of Shanghai tourism board 
Item Very 
Satisfied 
Satisfied Neutral Unsatisfied Very 
Unsatisfied 
Marketing Research  12 13 19 6 0 
Arbitration 11 13 22 3 1 
Consultant and Aids 16 13 15 6 0 
Networking/Communication 14 11 20 4 1 
Sources: the author  
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To address Objective 2B (see chapter six) about the attitudes of local travel services towards 
FITSs, the questionnaire survey provides some direct information from the local businesses, 
as well as a better understanding about the characters of the local travel service sector. 
However, most importantly, as discussed earlier, the local industry has not perceived much 
competition from the FITS sector yet by the time of the research, and most of the respondents 
who were aware of the change welcomed the foreign entrants, recognizing not only 
competition but also collaboration opportunities. Sufficient willingness of the local agencies 
to cooperate with foreign partners was also seen. But in general, the local travel service sector 
was young and small, especially weak in the inbound market. Moreover, the local government 
and administration offices gained high respect and important status in the market. 
 
 
7.5. Case Study of HRG Jin Jiang China (hereafter HRG JJ) 
As introduced in the methodology chapter, given the relatively high willingness of 
participation and more sufficient data compared to other FITSs, HRG JJ was selected as one 
case study of Shanghai. HRG JJ is the JV of British Hogg Robinson Group (HRG) and 
Shanghai Jin Jiang International (SJJ), set up in July 2004. The JV was interviewed twice. The 
first time was with Mr. James Stevenson, the ex-GM of the company, in August 2006 when 
the JV was called BTI Jin Jiang China. But the second time was with Mr. Harald Weber-Liel, 
the current GM, in June 2007. Both of the two GMs were appointed by the foreign partner, 
HRG, and they were both formally interviewed in their office in Shanghai, followed by some 
emails. Between the two interviews, there had been some changes on the foreign investor side, 
and the name of the JV was changed to HRG JJ. The reasons of choosing HRG JJ as a main 
case study was that: first, the company provided very much information to this study, with 
two interviews achieved and more contacts afterwards; and second, the JV was the only 
European invested travel service company in Shanghai by 2007.   
 
7.5.1. The Ownership of the Joint Venture 
It was HRG JJ that was the first FITS approved in Shanghai on 28 July 2004. At that time, the 
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Chinese government had further released its restraints on the FITS sector, which allowed the 
foreign investors to hold the majority of the JVs’ control. Thus, HRG JJ was also the first 
foreign controlled JV in the sector in Shanghai, whereas HRG hold 51% of the whole shares, 
and SJJ having the remaining 49%. 
 
As mentioned before, the name of the JV was changed from BTI Jin Jiang to HRG JJ in 2006, 
resulting from the changes within the British mother company. BTI stands for Business Travel 
International, which was a brand formed by a joint venture of HRG and a company, called 
BCD holdings, on 5 March 1990 in Netherlands, headquartered in Britain. BTI had been one 
of the leading corporate travel management brands, which was recorded as the third in the 
business travel market worldwide in 2005, with a turnover of about US$ 18 billion of clients’ 
spend going through BTI in around 100 countries across five continents. At the beginning of 
2006, BTI announced an agreement that “it is in each of their [the two parent companies] best 
interests to pursue independent strategies” (BTI news, 03/01/2006). According to Stevenson 
(10/08/2006), the argument was that HRG’s vision was “to provide cooperate travel services 
with high quality, lots of extra-value”, while BCD believing in lots of volume primarily.  
 
As the JV in China at that time was initially contracted between HRG and its Shanghai partner, 
the only change was made upon the name becoming HRG JJ. The JV gave its positive attitude 
towards the change. As Stevenson (10/08/2006) stated that ‘the HRG in its own line was No.1 
corporate travel agency in the UK by a long time. … In the medium and long term, it [the 
change] is much better for us. It puts us in a far stronger position' [as they can stick to their 
own belief and development strategy. The continuous growth of the JV’s annual turnover 
supports the above statement with the start from zero in 2004, £18 million in 2005, £40 
million in 2006, and approximately £70 million in 2007 (Weber-Liel, 17/06/2007).  
 
Shanghai Jin Jiang International (Group) Company Limited (SJJ) is the JV’s Chinese-side 
investor. Being one of the biggest integrated tourism groups in mainland China, as well as the 
largest in Shanghai, SJJ achieved its development through six major industries, hotels, travel 
trade, transportation, real estate, manufacture, and finance, with six subsidiaries. And among 
the six subsidiaries, four are public listed, including Jin Jiang International Hotel Group (JJ 
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Hotel), Jin Jiang Travel (JJ Travel), Jin Jiang Holding, and Jin Jiang Investment. JJ Travel 
owns the licenses of two international travel agencies and one domestic travel agency with 51 
branches, having been ranked as the first travel agent in Shanghai, in terms of the total tourist 
number it receives every year.  
 
In addition, it is also noteworthy that being one of China’s biggest hotel operators, JJ Hotel is 
principally engaged in star-rated hotel operation and management, budget hotel operation and 
franchising, restaurants and related businesses. The Group’s portfolio covers 4 municipalities 
and 73 cities in 24 provinces and autonomous regions throughout the country. In aggregate, JJ 
Hotel has over 260 hotels and over 51,000 rooms. In 2005, it was ranked the 22nd in the 
world and the first in Asia in terms of room numbers, according to HOTELS Magazine (30th 
June, 2005). In fact, the content of numerous hotel rooms of the SJJ was one of the major 
concerns of HRG, when making decision upon the partnership (Stevenson, 10/08/2006). In 
short, SJJ is an internationally renowned brand and an industry leader in China, especially in 
the marketplace of Shanghai. Along with the JV of HRG JJ, the group has also been involved 
in another tourism related JV, Jin Jiang JTB Exhibition, with Japanese JTB who is studied in 
the next chapter. 
 
According to the interview data from Stevenson (10/08/2006), before the JV’s actual 
registration, HRG had been trading through SJJ before 2004, because a couple of HRG's 
clients wanted to use its services in China. When asked about the reasons why HRG finally 
decided to co-operate with SJJ, the answer from Stevenson (10/08/2006) was that: first, at the 
time, HRG needed a JV partner in order to overcome the restriction in the licenses; second, 
SJJ being Shanghai local government owned, brought not only a lot of local expertise, but 
also valuable government connections into the JV. Also, as mentioned before, SJJ brought the 
JV another unique benefit as it had been the largest hotel company in China, which provides 
an advantage in serving the accommodation demands of their clients traveling within the 
country. Last but not least, for HRG, SJJ was also very financially secure based on the trust 
built between the two firms through many years collaboration. 
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Although there were definite benefits for HRG to work with SJJ, according to Stevenson 
(10/08/2006), it still took HRG about a year to make the final selection of partners. In order to 
make the best decision on the partnership, HRG applied outside consultants who were experts 
in China. It is clear that HRG understood that most Chinese companies who wanted to deal 
with HRG were looking at their specialized knowledge on cooperate travel market, and the 
multinational customer base of HRG brand. It was the case that the both sides of the JV had 
carefully examined the each other, and had definitely set the purposes of the partnership 
before the JV’s setup. One key issue for both partners is how to be aligned together happily, 
and reach a win-win position in a long term perspectives.  
 
7.5.2 The Initial Establishment of the JV 
HRG JJ licensed on 28 July 2004 in Shanghai, with a RC of US$ 3.4 million. According to 
Stevenson (10/08/2006), they had done their research before choosing Shanghai as the 
head-office of the company. He found that many multinationals were moving their regional or 
even global headquarters to Shanghai from the rest of the world. Stevenson (10/08/2006) said: 
 
‘Shanghai is the business capital, whilst Beijing is the political capital. Although 
most companies still have a presence in Beijing for corporate government reasons, 
but more and more companies are setting up their headquarters to Shanghai. So we 
thought that Shanghai would be a better choice for us’. 
 
The cost of setting up for HRG JJ was not large. ‘Set up costs are relatively cheap because we 
start very, very small’ Stevenson (10/08/2006) remarked. The company started with 11 people, 
and the major part of cost at the time was for the office they purchased, as well as the cost of 
refurbishment. The office was located around one of Shanghai’s best office areas, Nanjing 
Road Commercial Area, with a total area of 800 square meters. The office, according to then 
time market price, valued about US$ 4 million approximately.  
 
There were 11 people who became the company’s earliest employees. It was also these 11 
people who actually made the efforts in setting up and establishing HRG JJ in its infancy. 
Among the 11, the majority of eight were from SJJ, and the rest three were sent by HRG. 
According to the JV agreement of HRG JJ, the GM personnel are flexible, but it should be a 
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HRG appointment. Thus, after Mr. Stevenson accredited a higher position in Singapore at the 
end of 2006, Mr. Weder Liel, who was also sent by HRG, took over the GM position. HRG 
also held the position of Financial Controller and Sales Director of the JV. However, the 
Deputy General Manager, Sale Manager and Financial Manager were all SJJ’s appointments. 
In general, HRG took all the key positions, under which the vice positions belonged to SJJ.  
 
The structure of the Board was designed with five board members, with three for HRG and 
two for SJJ. The GM may take the position of Managing Director of the Board. SJJ occupied 
the seat of Chairman, but with same voting rights as other directors. Thus, HRG had essential 
control by having three voting rights while SJJ having two. 
 
7.5.3. The Expansion of Branches and Partnership Network 
HRG JJ, since starting the business in Shanghai in 2004, has built a big network of business 
presence throughout China. Referring to the original words of Stevenson (10/08/2006), 'it [the 
network] is growing incredibly quickly.’ The expanding strategy of the company during the 
period 2004-2006 may be concluded as: three offices in major cities leading the growth of 
partnership network. Initially, the Chinese government restricted the numbers of branches or 
subsidiaries that a FITS could have throughout the country, with normally only one allowed. 
Thus, building up partnerships and using partners’ offices and stores was the initial expanding 
strategy for the JV. HRG JJ had another two major offices in Beijing and Guangzhou working 
through partnerships with local agents, such as with BTG in Beijing, and CITS in Hangzhou. 
 
With a presence in the most important cities of mainland China, HRG JJ has also successfully 
built up a partnership network in more than forty locations throughout the country. A 
partnership agreement was applied between HRG JJ and its local partners who would provide 
services to the customers of HRG JJ. Using this tactic, the JV aimed to achieve the goal of 
providing their customers with a one-stop service within China, without significant 
investment to start with. In addition, a network manager was designed to play an essential role 
in the programme. Their job was to sign up new partners and to make sure a contract was 
actually in place with the delivering of an agreed service level matching HRG’s standard.  
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By the end of 2007, the Chinese government has further released policy restrictions upon the 
FITS sector. Foreign agents have been allowed to set up more branches in different cities if 
they match the required certifications. According to Weber-Liel (17/06/2007), HRG JJ has 
been planning to establish its own branch offices in Beijing and maybe in more cities as their 
next step towards the development in China.  
 
7.5.4. The Importance of On-Sites 
On-sites, in the world's corporate travel industry, are also called in-plants, which is about a 
corporate travel agency sending skilled staff to work in clients’ offices. “In China, there is a 
big trend to have on-sites,” said Stevenson (10/08/2006) with his surprise, because in Europe 
and North America, people have moved away from using on-sites over the years with the 
replacement of cheaper and more effective call centers or service centers. According to him, 
the main benefits of having an on-site, traditionally, are to be able to produce tickets in 
clients’ own office. However, in China this benefit was taken away resulting from the 
ticketing and licensing restrictions put by the government. But, HRG JJ still witnessed a fast 
increase of providing on-sites in the Chinese marketplace, which probably means that a 
professional and face-to-face contact is more desirable in the Chinese market. Moreover, what 
the JV would like to provide to their customers was at least two people on-sites, in order to 
keep stable operating procedures and service quality. However, this initiation sometimes had 
to be justified by the clients’ willingness of keeping contracts as cheap as possible, which 
reflects a big challenge for the JV between standard of quality and financial benefit.  
 
7.5.5. Local Employees and Local Culture 
The growth of the number of employees of HRG JJ was very rapid, from 11 at the beginning 
to 186 in June 2007. Among the 186, only six staff initially came from SJJ, together with 
three from HRG remaining in the JV. The rest were later recruited locally. Stevenson 
(10/08/2006) explained that the reasons why they did not have more HRG experts from 
overseas coming into China was to save the massive cost of doing so, and to be financially 
efficient. Stevenson (10/08/2006) clarified that: 
‘At the moment we have the balance in that we do not need more than three experts 
or HRG people to actually run the company. We have been very successful. So what 
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we do is if we need expertise, we bring it in on a short-term project basis, so that 
there is no a permanent fixed cost for these people to the JV’.  
HRG JJ believed that the cost of the experts occurred in the JV, so it should be paid for by the 
JV itself, not by the overseas head offices (although head offices pay for this in many other 
international JVs).  
 
How to recruit the right employees locally is always one of the biggest challenges for all 
foreign-invested enterprises. Mr. Stevenson felt the same, but he claimed that the JV had 
enjoyed the good quality of local human resource (Stevenson, 10/08/2006). In addition, when 
choosing recruits, the most important and the most wanted characters of personnel was 
concerned as the candidates’ good “attitude”. As Stevenson (10/08/2006) stated: ‘you can 
train for technical skills, but it is very difficult to train attitude, very difficult’. In addition, 
good language skills, being bright and being able to learn quickly were also important 
features appreciated by the JV. However, the challenge was not only about recruiting people, 
but also about the provision of subsequent appropriate training progammes for its staff.  
 
Since 2006, HRG JJ has started a structured training programme, lasting 6 months, whereby 
trainees would be working in all the different departments, whereby they could get a flavour 
of all the different areas of the company and understand how everything is operated. The aim 
of the programme was to bring more people on board to be travel consultants of the JV. As 
Stevenson (10/08/2006) said, “these people will become the future of our company”. In his 
interview, Weber-Liel (17/06/2007) further emphasized the strategy of local recruitment of the 
JV in China, and as he indicated, both experienced people from the industry and new 
graduated students were hired and trained in the JV. However, as the industry was growing 
rapidly, it was very difficult for the JV to keep the trained employees who might easily find 
higher salary offer from other foreign or local rival companies, and thus leave. 
 
Although the JV relied on hiring local employees, the maintenance of HRG’s own culture was 
also considered. “The culture we create is going to be a real mixture of values of the overall 
HRG’s culture and hopefully the good bits of the local culture,” said Stevenson (10/08/2006). 
As both Stevenson (10/08/2006) and Weber-Liel (17/06/2007) claimed, the most important 
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thing was to find and keep the right personnel who can be trusted in maintaining service 
quality that is primarily valued by the JV. Consequently, the good attitudes of learning, caring 
about the clients’ needs, and a willingness to provide services as efficiently as possible were 
the most important characteristics that the JV was looking for from the local recruitment.  
 
7.5.6. Target Markets and Production 
Given the traditional business focus and advantage of HRG, the primary target market for 
HRG JJ was the travel demand of MNCs (Multi-National Companies) operating in China. 
Contracts of the JV were secured either through local sales activity or, in fact mainly, were 
awarded from HRG's regional or global contacts. Since 2006, the JV had been giving focus 
onto the travel demand of China central and local governments (where the JV valued the most 
for the future) and Chinese private enterprises. Apart from the corporate travel market, the JV 
has started a new division targeting expatriates (known colloquially as ‘expats’) in Shanghai 
by answering their personal travel requirements, which was called ‘HRG Concierge’ (See 
Appendix 7.5). The important experience of this is that the JV employed expats, who were 
from different countries, to provide the service to the expats living in China. Stevenson 
(10/08/2006) remarked that: ‘this was not in the original business plan and operating scope, 
but has proved to be a rapidly expanding and high margin part of our business.’  
 
In general, the service offered by HRG JJ mainly included booking air tickets, rail tickets and 
hotel rooms, passport and visa service, car hire, and other services related to corporate travel. 
They had an account management division that negotiates all the contracts for the clients, 
such as airline deals and hotel rates. There was also a 24 hour service, HRG traveler Assist 
Service, to help customers change their travel plans easily and quickly in anywhere for any 
urgent requirements through a communication system with the Assist Centres in Chicago, 
Dubai and London. In addition, HRG Corporate card was another specialized and intelligent 
service, which enables the clients to track, monitor, and refine their total card-based travel and 
entertainment expenditure. The card had been widely accepted at over 14 million locations 
worldwide and providing clients with management information of already collated, tabulated 
and analyzed data across a broad range of categories. Moreover, there were other valuable 
techniques such as HRG Global Calling Card lowering the customers’ costs of making 
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international calls; and HRG Consulting as a service of business solutions aiming to control 
and reduce travel costs. However, due to the immaturity of the Chinese market, some of the 
HRG’s specialized, international and professional services could not be fully applied in the 
Chinese marketplace (at the time of this research), which was regarded as one of the most 
considerable challenges of the JV.  
 
However, HRG JJ has started the business of expat travel, MICE and group inbound travel 
market in China from late 2006. This expansion helped the company to increase incomes, and 
thus to mitigate the pressure of survival in the constrained local marketplace. It is suggested 
that the corporate travel market in China is neither mature nor fertile enough to support an 
international specialized company to purely rely on the business sector. Therefore, creativity 
and adaptability are two essential capacities a FITS should develop, if it aims to survive in the 
Chinese business environment. HRG JJ provided us a good model of coping with the local 
differences. According to Weber-Liel (17/06/2007), about 80% of the JV’s turnover came 
from the business of corporate travel, with some 15% from inbound group travel and 5% from 
expat business. However the margin on business travel is only between 2.4% to 3.6%, while it 
can count for 30-35% on other ingredients, especially the expatriates’ travel. 
 
 
7.5.7. Competition and Rivals 
According to Stevenson (10/08/2006), HRG JJ has realized that there is strong competition in 
the Chinese corporate travel market, and the rivals could be classified into three major 
categories. First, there were many foreign rivals, who were also targeting the Chinese 
corporate travel business, entering the market earlier or later than HRG JJ. Second, many 
Chinese local travel agencies, who were originally dealing with local traditional travel 
business, had recognized the huge potential of business travel sector and started striving for 
this market in recent years, becoming more and more professional and successful. The third 
category was those new local market entrants who might originally only deal with the Internet 
travel business, or telephone booking center for hotels or flight tickets. The last category was 
considered as the strongest rivals because most Chinese local enterprises chose their services. 
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Moreover, Weber-Liel (17/06/2007) pointed out a fierce competition environment in the 
corporate travel market in China. He listed four most considerable foreign rivals in the market, 
which are American Express, CWT (Carlson Wagonlit Travel), BCD holdings, and FCm 
(Flight Centre-Comfort). But he considered the local rivals as quick learners, and thus 
stronger competitors who were able to provide lower prices on similar services with good 
local relationships and connections. The strongest local agent in the corporate travel sector 
was concerned to C-trip, a leading consolidator of hotel accommodations and airline tickets in 
China, who set up in 1999, and based on the Internet and call-center services.  
 
In addition, Stevenson (10/08/2006) emphasized the disadvantages of being a foreign agent at 
the beginning of its operation in a new marketplace, as it often had a relatively weak 
bargaining power. This was the experience of the JV who found difficulty in negotiating low 
prices from local principal service providers. However, as Weber-Liel (17/06/2007) claimed, 
their competition strategy in China was not via prices, but by creating more additional and 
unique services for the clients, and they have been working hard in this direction. 
 
7.5.8. The Relationship between JV Parents and the JV  
HRG JJ was well established. The GM was fully responsible for the operation of the JV, and 
according to the JV agreement, should report to both partners on a monthly basis. Both parent 
companies would receive the JV’s financial reports monthly. However, according to 
Stevenson (10/08/2006), he had meetings with SJJ at least once a week, to update them with 
what the JV was doing and also to ask for necessary supports. But obviously, he reported to 
the British parent company more frequently, on an almost daily basis, in order to maintain 
good communications with the ‘far away’ parent company, to let HRG understand what’s 
going on and why things were. In short, as Stevenson (10/08/2006) concluded, a JV ‘is like a 
marriage, and there are ups and downs with a Chinese partner. But the key to a successful 
marriage is communication, and it is the same with a JV.’ 
 
7.5.9. Three Major Aspects That Affect the JV’s Performance  
There were three elements that the JV considered as the most essential aspects in terms of the 
company’s overall achievements. The first was the deals the JV was signing with the clients, 
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which eventually would have a massive impact on their bottom-line profitability. As 
Weber-Liel (17/06/2007) remarked, he had to constantly convince their clients that their 
services were worthwhile so that they would stick to the contract. But, he found that in China, 
‘when clients sign a contract, it is only a draft’ (Weber-Liel, 17/06/2007) which means very 
little commitment. Controlling the cost base was considered as the second impacting element. 
The experience of HRG JJ was trying to solve problems by technology but not by putting 
extra resources, because the later meaning increasing costs. Another considerable issue for the 
JV was the relationship with their suppliers, especially airlines, getting the right income deals 
from them, which also had a massive impact on the JV’s profitability. Therefore, to increase 
income and control costs were generally the most important focus of the JV.   
 
7.5.10. Three Major Obstacles Experienced by the JV  
HRG JJ had encountered some challenges since they started operating in Shanghai. According 
to Stevenson (10/08/2006), the main obstacles for the JV were threefold: First, licensing was a 
biggest problem; as FITSs had not been allowed to operate the business of Chinese people’s 
outbound travel at that time. Second, there was one computer booking system, called 
TravelSky, which was owned and controlled by the government. Every single travel service in 
China used this system to make airline reservations. It was a government monopoly and had 
not been deregulated by 2007. However, for a foreign agent like HRG, the challenge was that 
not all of their technology could work well on TravelSky, which means that the technical 
systems they used elsewhere in the world could not all fit easily into China. Third, the single 
largest challenge for HRG JJ was considered as recruiting and retaining the right quality of 
staff. It takes the company a long time to find and educate a suitable employee. It is even 
harder to retain skilled staff in the company from being drawn away, especially by local 
rivals. 
 
7.5.11. Government Intervention  
In general, HRG JJ had experienced little intervention from the Chinese Government since 
their setup. There were standard operating practices and audits, such as taxation, public 
insurances and human resources from various bureaus, and HRG JJ reported to them on a 
monthly basis. HRG did not feel there were particular difficulties when applying for licenses 
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and registering. However, as a FITS, they did think the licensing process in China was more 
difficult than that in their original country. This emphasizes the importance of local expertise 
from their local partner, SJJ, to help solve problems related to government issues.  
 
However, HRG found it is often very difficult to get the right information about policy 
changing trends in China. As Stevenson (10/08/2006) said, ‘we would always use a lawyer or 
someone to get the information for us, but often you are told one thing by someone and then 
something different by someone else. And sometimes it is very contradictory and very 
confusing.’ Therefore, he further emphasized that, ‘obviously good relationships in China are 
very important’ (Stevenson, 10/08/2006). HRG believed their partner, SJJ, as ‘they have good 
relationships with the right and senior people from the various administrations that effect 
travel. So yes, those relationships are important definitely,’ said Stevenson (10/08/2006).  
 
7.5.12. The Use of Local Financial Services 
According to Weber-Liel (17/06/2007), HRG JJ was using both Chinese local banking 
services and some overseas facilities for their business in China. They have had contracts with 
CCB (China Construction Bank), BOCOM (Bank of Communications) and BOC (Bank of 
China), and have obtained some loans from these banks. But in terms of some services that 
were not yet available in the country, they would then have to use overseas financial facilities, 
such as Hong Kong HSBC. For example, a service called Factoring Facility which can help 
secure the supplier’s capital withdrawal has not been available on mainland China by 2007.  
 
7.5.13. Future Objectives 
According to Stevenson (10/08/2006) and Weber-Liel (17/06/2007), the JV’s future objectives 
were that: long-term (10 year) objective was to make profit from the Chinese travel market; 
medium-term (five year) objective was to make profit, and to be the No 1 foreign travel 
service upon the corporate travel sector in China; and short-term (two year) objective for the 
JV was about to make profit and to grow, as well as to carry on sustainable training 
programmes. It is obvious that the company has been investing in China with their clear plan 
for at least the next 10 years. Besides the pursuit of profits, HR (Human Resource) 
management is a crucial challenge for the future. In conclusion, through the survey on the 
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HRG Jin Jiang China, one can see that they are ambitious, and they are becoming more and 
more confident in operating in China. 
 
7.5.14. Conclusion 
HRG JJ, being the only Sino-foreign JV focusing on corporate travel market in Shanghai, was 
studied for its unique position in the research area. Valuable experiences of the JV mainly 
include: a well established management and ownership structure; emphasis put on local 
recruiting, training and retention; frequent communications with parent companies; being 
creative and adaptable to local markets, efficient establishment and application of national 
partnership network, etc. Also it is noteworthy that SJJ and HRG had been working 
cooperatively for years before the setup of HRG JJ, which proved to be a crucial base for the 
birth of the JV and the trust between the two partners. However, policy restrictions, such as 
the bar on the outbound market, were considered as a substantial obstacle to its development 
in China.     
 
7.6. Case Study of Nippon Travel Agency China (NTA China) 
The second case study was chosen from the three Japanese agents in the Shanghai area. 
Similar as the other case HRG JJ, the managers of NTA China showed their great patience and 
co-operation by providing sufficient responding data through not only interview but also 
emails. Thus, as explained in Chapter Six, NTA China was applied as a case study in 
Shanghai. Moreover, as Japanese entrepreneurs made up half of the total number of FITSs in 
the Shanghai area, it is vital to examine them with particular attention. Although JTB 
Shanghai is also a good case, it will be investigated with JTB’s JV in Beijing in the next 
chapter. The GM of NTA China, Mr. Chiaki Ota, was formally interviewed once, with the 
interpretation of his assistant, Mr., Jian Feng, in August 2006. And Mr. Feng replied to further 
questions by e-mails afterwards. However, as the original answers were in Japanese, 
translated into Chinese, but analyzed and explained in English, there may be unintentional 
bias in the understanding of Mr. Ota’s original expressions. And the quotes of his answers in 
this study are inevitably from those translated sentences. Despite this language barrier, the 
company provided valuable information. 
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7.6.1. The Establishment of NTA China 
NTA China was the second foreign wholly owned travel service registered in Shanghai, on the 
date 22 October 2004. The mother company, Nippon Travel Agency CO., LTD (NTA below) 
is a Japanese enterprise, originally founded in 1905, and re-incorporated in January 1949, 
with RC of 4 billion Japanese yen, about USD 34.7 million (1 USD = 115 JPY). NTA’s 
headquarter is located in Tokyo, and it has had 286 domestic branches throughout Japan, and 
37 overseas branches in other ten countries. Total global Employee number of NTA reached 
3,322, according to the figure of 1st April 2006. Its total sales capacity in 2005 was 473.9 
billion Japanese yen (around 4.11 billion US dollars), among which 65% was from Japanese 
domestic business, 33% from the outbound market, and 11% from the inbound, approximately. 
With this sound business base, NTA started its exploitation in the Chinese market. 
 
NTA China is 100 % owned by NTA, with a RC of 4 million Chinese Yuan (about US$ 0.51 
million dollars). Before the company was officially set up, NTA had had a presence in China 
since the 1990s, in the form of representative offices in Beijing and Shanghai dealing with 
inquiries or communications, apart from an earlier operation in Hong Kong. When 
interviewed, NTA still had these three offices in the country. 
 
According to Ota (01/08/2006), the actual setting up costs was not high. Except for the RC, 
the most considerable fee was the amount of 0.6 million Chinese Yuan (about US$ 85.7 
thousand) as a deposit to the Shanghai local tourism administrative office, according to 
relative Chinese tourism regulations1. Other costs were mainly related to the expenditure of 
renting and furnishing the new office. At the start of operations, NTA China began with 8 
Japanese staff, three of whom were appointed by the mother company NTA, with other five 
recruited locally. So the employment cost at the initial time was not large. 
 
                                                        
1 According to the administrative rules upon the travel agency sector in China (11 December 2001, 
Numbered 2005), to be approved, a travel agency should pay a deposit to its local administration office, 
with 0.1 million Chinese Yuan for doing domestic travel business, 0.6 million Chinese Yuan for an 
international inbound license, or 1 million for a full license including outbound business. But the deposit 
amounts have been reduced by a new rule since 1st May2009. 
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The board of NTA China was responsible for the board of NTA in Japan. But, NTA China 
enjoyed its 100% independence in concrete business operations in China. According to 
Japanese Business Laws, a Japanese subsidiary should submit a financial report to its parent 
companies every quarter of a year, and then the group company should announce its financial 
books to all the shareholders at least once a year. NTA China was attempting to execute 
legally in accordance with the Japanese laws, under the pre-condition of not contradicting the 
Chinese local regulations. Along with this, NTA China also gave a monthly report to NTA, in 
order to keep a good communication and understanding between the two companies.  
  
7.6.2. The Initial Purposes of Investing in China 
Mr. Ota (01/08/2006) explained that their first purpose of setting up the venture in China was 
to improve the overall quality of tour services in China for the Japanese tourists organized by 
NTA. Second, to get a better deal with Chinese local hotels, resorts, and transportation 
companies, and therefore to be able to provide NTA attractive product proposals for soliciting 
more Japanese tourists was another objective. Additionally, being a representative office in 
the past, they were absolutely constricted and could not carry out any practical sales or 
contracts in China. However, after incorporating, they have been able to promote their 
performance in China, with much more flexibility and business opportunities. For example, 
the number of Japanese expatriates living in Shanghai was considerably 31,025 in 2007 
(Shanghai Statistic Bureau, 2008), and their travel demand to the Chinese resorts was huge. In 
fact, this group of people has become a vital target market of NTA China. 
 
Although they had realized the relative advantages of having a JV with local agents, NTA 
China preferred keeping independence and efficiency in the decision-making process. 
Therefore, they did not set up the company until foreign wholly-owned travel agencies were 
allowed to operate by the Chinese government. They also emphasized the convenience of 
being a WOFE, in terms of establishing multi-partnerships. When they needed to find partners 
in different locations, they felt very free to collaborate or contract with any strong and large 
local agents, without worrying about the priority of a JV partner. Last but not least, a 
wholly-owned venture would definitely be a reasonable choice, if one of NTA China’s initial 
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purposes was to provide better services to the Japanese mother company’s tour groups from 
Japan.  
 
7.6.3. Local Employment  
As mentioned, NTA China employed only eight Japanese staff at the beginning, with three of 
them sent from the mother company. The three were appointed with the top management 
positions, which were Chairman of NTA China, concurring with the post of GM, Vice GM 
who also taking the responsibility of Sales Minister, as well as a Minister specially being in 
charge of marketing and sales events upon the Japanese expatriates’ travels in China. Besides 
the eight Japanese staff, NTA China had also recruited other 26 Chinese local employees by 
the end of 2006. Almost all the Chinese employees could speak Japanese, with 16 people 
holding a certification of Japanese language skill, and 8 having past the Level Two test of the 
language. By then, the highest post a Chinese staff could hold in NTA China had been a 
Department Manager. According to Ota (01/08/2006), whether there would be a promotion of 
both the number and posts of local employees depends on the development situations of their 
business in China in practice. If the importance of the Japanese outbound travel into China 
increases, the need for Chinese staff will increase accordingly. However, if the company 
decides to give more attention on corporate travel of Japanese companies that located in 
China, the focus will be given to both Japanese and Chinese staff.  
 
Generally, NTA China felt satisfied with the quality and skills of their Chinese employees. 
They found that Chinese employees could easily understand, and thus, better match NTA’s 
service standard, compared to their local staff in European or American countries. Probably, 
this is because China and Japan share a closer background, in terms of not only geographical 
proximity but also culture, customs and etiquettes, than Japan with western countries. 
 
7.6.4. Target Markets and Sales Promotion  
NTA China setting up in October 2004, their turnover of 2005 was around 2 billion Japanese 
yen (about US$ 17.3 million), with about US$ 16.5 million in 2006 and US$ 18.2 million in 
2007 (Feng, 15/01/2008). Their income was mainly based on two streams. The most 
important one of the company’s then business was the Chinese inbound tourists from Japan, 
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sent by NTA itself, making up 95% of the total turnover of NTA China. There was an 
agreement between NTA in Japan and NTA China, that all the Japanese outbound tourists 
served by NTA, visiting within China, should be handed over to NTA China. The other major 
target market was Japanese expatriates living in China, and the Japanese companies located in 
China, which totally accounting for 5% of the company’s turnover. NTA China has been 
profitable since the first operation year. However, the performance was regarded as not steady, 
resulting from the sensitive diplomatic relation between China and Japan.  
 
Given China having been the first choice of overseas destinations for Japanese tourists, NTA 
China was taking essential responsibility for making product plans and contracts with 
destination service providers, including accommodation and transportation. In addition, NTA 
China was also responsible for controlling the service quality provided by local ground 
handling services in the destinations in China. For the market of Japanese expatriates and 
Japanese companies in China, however, NTA China needed to make much more efforts, from 
marketing and advertising to sales and quality control. Newspaper and magazine 
advertisements, which were in Japanese and published in China, were frequently designed and 
applied to help access prospective Japanese customers. This method was very economic and 
effective, according to Ota (01/08/2006).  
 
In terms of the future marketing plans, NTA China emphasized that they were not very 
interested in Chinese people’s outbound market that was characterized by a low-price war. 
'Even when the Chinese outbound market is entirely opened, we will only focus on the 
Chinese high-end segment, the most expensive travel products', clarified Feng (15/01/2008). 
But it was looking forward to the opportunity to share the Chinese corporate travel and the 
Chinese MICE markets. To achieve this objective in the future, they have already commenced 
making efforts on getting contacts with some large Chinese enterprises, providing them with 
travel information concerning Japan.  
 
7.6.5. Competition 
In general, NTA China considered that the relationship between local agencies and themselves 
had been a combination of competition and cooperation, but tending to be more of ally than 
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rivals. As they had a certain and stable annual receiving amount of Japanese tourists from 
NTA, they did not feel much competition from local travel agencies for customers. Instead of 
this, they have built up a standardized relationship with local partners who undertaking the 
position of local handlers of NTA China. Moreover, NTA China emphasized their desire for 
the improvement of services provided by Chinese local partners, and so that the both sides 
could achieve higher benefits and more development opportunities together. 
 
In terms of the competition resulting from other FITSs in China, they indicated that they had 
not seen any competition from them, neither from other Japanese travel service companies in 
China. Generally, NTA China showed an excessive confidence in their competence in the 
marketplace. It was true that the mother company NTA supplied NTA China all its Japanese 
customers. However, too much dependence itself can be a potential threat, especially when 
planning a long-term investment in China. Moreover, the second Japanese wholly-owned 
travel agency, JTB Shanghai, have already opened its new company in Shanghai since 
November 2006, after JTB’s first JV in Beijing. This is a caution that the market situation is 
ever changing.  
 
7.6.6. Collaboration with Local Agents in China 
NTA China used their own staff to serve the Japanese tourists only occasionally, such as at 
airports of Beijing or Shanghai. In most Chinese destinations, however, the company utilized 
local partners to provide services, including Japanese guides, arranging accommodations and 
transportations, etc. As mentioned early, NTA China was mainly responsible for controlling a 
standardized service quality, in order to achieve a high satisfaction level of their Japanese 
customers. Many requirements from NTA China to the local partners' services were described 
with detailed rites, such as the style of uniforms of the guides, guiding panels used during the 
tours (See Appendix 7.6), and the solutions for various emergencies or complaints. Along 
with this, NTA China also frequently assembled the important peoples of all the partner 
agencies to meet together, for a training or problem solving session. Additionally, all guides or 
local representatives were trained periodically, and should pass the standard requirements of 
NTA to be qualified for the jobs. Besides, NTA China also arranged regular inspections on the 
partners’ performances using its Japanese staff. Paying tremendous attention on standardized 
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services with a series of detailed criteria was one strong feature of NTA China, and maybe, of 
most Japanese entities.  
 
7.6.7. Expectancies and Difficulties 
First, NTA China was eager to see a stable and improving bilateral diplomatic relationship 
between China and Japan in the future. As Ota (01/08/2006) stated: ‘the development of the 
tourism industry was a product based on the soil of a peaceful time. Any increase of hostility 
between the two countries would have some impacts upon the both tourist markets, and on the 
performances of us’ (originally in Japanese). For example, in April 2006, when there was a 
Chinese campaign against Japanese, NTA China saw a big drop of Japanese arrivals in the 
following months of the year. Second, NTA China wished for an improvement in the Chinese 
tourism institutions to foster more highly-skilled tourism talents, in order to meet the demands 
of industry. They also expressed a possibility to set up a subsidiary focusing on HR and 
training programmes for supporting NTA's business in China, like what NTA did in Japan. 
Third, in some remote Chinese resorts, better infrastructures, including hotel facilities, the 
hygiene of restaurants, and the convenience of accessibility, were desired. These changes in 
marketplace were what NTA China expected the most.  
 
In addition, according to Ota (01/08/2006), NTA China have not met any huge difficulties 
since the setting up, except for the policy constraints of the Chinese government upon the 
Chinese outbound market, and on the setup of branches of a FITS in China. However, there 
were some small difficulties or misunderstandings when dealing with the local tourism 
industry. One aspect identified was that it could take Chinese companies a very long time to 
sign up a single contract. And even through the contract was signed, the Chinese side might 
not be able to realize or complete it. Ota (01/08/2006) also pointed out that although it was 
usual to see delayed flights in all countries, Chinese airports would check-in customers and 
keep them waiting at the hall, which caused many troubles and complaints to the company. 
 
7.6.8. Government Intervention 
Although NTA China has had business contacts with China for almost 20 years, they still 
experienced difficulties with changing Chinese regulations when applying for licenses in 
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China. It took the company about seven months to obtain the certification and license, which 
might have been longer without the assistance of law consultants. It seemed that the Japanese 
entrepreneur was very conservative when being asked about their opinions related to 
government issues, as they preferred not to make comments on the efficiencies of the local 
government organizations, such as tourism administration office and the major tourism 
associations in Shanghai. Mr. Ota did not directly answer whether, or not, it is difficult to get 
information about Chinese policies from the local government. Instead, he said that he had 
had opportunities to attend some public associations or conferences, organized by Shanghai’s 
tourism administrative office, and thus he could get communication with the government 
leaders. However, as a foreign investor in the city, Mr. Ota thought it was not necessary to 
build up personal or private relationships with the local leaders.  
 
7.6.9. The Future Plans 
NTA China realized its responsibilities with three main focuses: to further improve overall 
service quality, to secure the customers’ satisfaction, and to establish an efficient and smooth 
operating system in China. These were also regarded as the main objectives for the company 
in the future. In order to achieve their investment purposes, Mr. Ota (01/08/2006) said that 
they would consider to set up more ventures in China, or to apply the international expanding 
methods like mergers or acquisitions upon the local market. He further enforced their interests 
in the outbound demands of Chinese corporate travel market if the access allowed. However, 
before this, they would focus on the task to assure a better service platform in China, and to 
increase the influences of their brand image (See Appendix 7.6), in both Japan and China. In 
addition, Ota (01/08/2006) also revealed their ambition to expand the business into other 
tourism sectors, such as hotels or tourist attractions, especially in the Chinese middle and west 
regions and cities, where many most popular destinations for Japanese were located. 
 
7.6.10. Conclusion 
NTA China was selected as the second case study from the three Japanese companies in the 
research area of Shanghai, because of very sufficient data provided by the company, and 
because of its success in terms of being profitable since the second year after setup. It took the 
form of WOFE (whole owned foreign enterprise), in order to keep an absolute right regarding 
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the decision making process. New market opportunities were applied according to local 
business conditions, such as the development of the Japanese expats business. Being regarded 
as a purpose of the entity, standardized service quality was achieved by establishing detailed 
criteria, such as tight controls and frequent monitoring of the contracted ground services 
providers. The emphasis on local recruitment and HR management was also found in NTA 
China. However, the company has been very dependent on the NTA's original customer base, 
and little attention has been paid on the competition issues, neither on other FITSs nor on 




7.7. Conclusion of the Chapter  
In this chapter, we briefly investigated the investment environment of Shanghai for FITSs, 
including the geographical, historical and cultural, industrial and economical aspects of the 
city. Some facilities in Shanghai that are closely related to foreign investments were also 
covered summarily, such as the human resource bases, transportations, and office costs. In 
addition, a public survey about the investment environment in Shanghai was also applied as a 
useful reference material. Following the above discussion, the chapter also examined the 
general scales and resources of the tourism industry in Shanghai. 
 
As the main objective of this chapter is to study the FITS sector in Shanghai, the six foreign 
travel agencies were investigated, and generally, we found that:  
l The licensing ban for the Chinese outbound market and other policy constraints have 
substantially obstructed the development of the FITS sector; 
l They were relatively small and medium sized, even through their mother company might 
be one of the biggest travel companies in the world; 
l They were mostly from Asia countries or regions, which may indicate that Shanghai 
specially has an important status among the Asian countries; 
l The choice of Shanghai to register indicates the companies’ interests in the Chinese 
upper-class markets, such as cruising, corporate travel and MICE, and foreign expatriates’ 
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travel demand has also become an increasingly important target market in the FITS 
sector; 
l Most of FITSs had not been able to be profitable by the time of this research. However, 
they were generally very positive about the future; 
l Their then time business tended to essentially depend on the original customer bases of 
their foreign mother companies, as the Chinese inbound travel market; 
l The changes in the mother companies can cause serious impacts in FITSs, especially the 
JVs, sometimes resulting in the shutdown of the subsidiaries 
l The foreign invested travel service sector in Shanghai (excluding Wuxi) started late in 
2004. This may be because that few large tourism groups are available in the local market 
for FITSs to cooperate with. After HRG’s JV with Shanghai SJJ, the biggest travel service 
in Shanghai, all the foreign travel service companies set in Shanghai were WOFE, at the 
time of the research. 
   
In order to help understand the local market in Shanghai, the local travel agencies were also 
investigated through the questionnaire survey. The results can be summarized as the below 
five points: 
l The local travel agents were relatively small and young; 
l They were especially not strong in the Chinese inbound travel sector; 
l They were generally willing to having good relationships with foreign agents; 
l They overall did not resist the coming of foreign agents, as competition was not fiercely 
perceived while cooperation expected; 
l The local agents expressed a relatively high satisfaction level towards the government 
administration offices and associations. 
 
Through the two case studies, HRG JJ and NTA China, although the former is a JV and the 
later being a WOFE, we found some common features noteworthy that:  
l Both of them were very optimistic and ambitious about business development in China in 
the future, with HRG JJ expecting a breakeven soon and NTA China being already 
profitable since the first year operation. 
l The costs of setting up the corporations in their initial time were low. 
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l Before their actual setup in the location, they had already spent years of time studying the 
economy and marketplace of China. 
l For both companies, good communication with parent companies was considered, with at 
least monthly reports and more informal communications.  
l Both started with the support of custom base of the foreign mother companies, while 
expanding the business by adding more highly profitable services upon local-based new 
markets, such as expatriates. 
l Building partnerships with the best agents of the different locations was chosen as the 
most efficient way to establish a service network through all over the country.  
l Both overseas mother companies only sent three of their managers, taking the highest 
positions of the company in China, to overlook the local business. In terms of the 
recruitment, they also both largely relied on local employees, and expressed a high 
satisfaction level with the local labour market. 
l Both of them thought the restraint of the policy upon the Chinese outbound travel market 
was the biggest challenges for their further development in China. 
 
However, the two companies chose different strategies of investment forms, as HRG JJ 
preferring a good local knowledge of the JV partner, while NTA China enjoyed the flexibility 
of being whole-owned. As we studied in the earlier literature Chapter Three, both JV and 
WOFE are two popularly applied FDI methods, and the each having respective advantages 
and disadvantages. For example, as a JV, HRG had less control, and thus, trust over its 
subsidiary than NTA. Therefore, very frequent, like weekly and daily, communication 
between the JV and the parent companies was an essential task for the JV’s manager. 
However, the two cases showed their reasons for choosing the different investment forms. For 
HRG, being a British corporate travel service, local knowledge and resources, such as hotels, 
of the JV partner helped reduce the risks of their new operation in an unfamiliar market 
environment. But, in the WOFE, the kin between NTA and NTA China was extremely tight, as 
the two companies shared the same goal, together to provide NTA’s customers better service 
support and brand images, which would be problematic in a JV operation. 
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Moreover, three special issues should be emphasized here. First, as we discussed in chapter 
two, the travel trade industry in western countries sees a division between TAs and TOs, but it 
is simplified as TAs or travel services in China. Through the study of Shanghai, we found that 
most of FITSs, except for SCS, had not defined themselves with a clear role of being TOs or 
TAs. Second, we studied FDI forms and FDI performances in the tourism industry and in 
China in the chapters three and five. Given an immature local market, the foreign investments 
in the travel trade sector in Shanghai were all in forms of FDI. Clearly, the FITS sector was 
less developed than the local hotel sector, but drawing much more attentions from the 
administration offices than the attraction sector. In terms of the ownership forms, only green 
field investments in JVs and WOFEs were seen in the sector, which reflects different 
preferences of diverse international investors. When they are permitted for the choices, the 
British enterprise used JVs, while other Asian companies preferred WOFEs. Third, we knew 
from chapters four and five, the Chinese government plays a significant role in industries with 
the strength of SOEs. In Shanghai, the importance of the only local government owned travel 
service, SJJ, was seen in the FITS sector. The impacts of government policy implements have 













The Tourism Industry and FITSs in Beijing 
 
8.1. Introduction 
In Chapter Seven, the FITS sector in Shanghai was examined, in addition to the results of the 
questionnaire survey which aimed to address relations between FITSs and local travel 
services. In the practical research process, Shanghai was the first research location to be 
studied, followed by Beijing and Guangzhou. As expected, the research collected from 
Shanghai provided a guide for the research process in Beijing where over half the total FITS 
firms were located. Based on the understanding of development approaches of the FITS sector 
in Shanghai, this chapter will investigate the FITS sector's features, performance and 
problems in the research area of Beijing, as well as the relationship between the foreign and 
indigenous services within the location.  
 
Beijing, being the capital of the People’s Republic of China, has a unique status in the country, 
especially in terms of its political and cultural importance. Among the three research locations, 
the Shanghai area and Guangdong province are both regarded as being economy-oriented. 
However, Beijing showed its different character with stronger political influences upon the 
travel trade market, as all the central government organizations, including CNTA, were based 
in the city. As noted, more than half of FITSs chose to register in Beijing. According to their 
answers, the main purpose of having a presence in Beijing was to gain an easier access to 
proactive information on the changes of industrial policies made by the central government in 
the city, as these policies can substantially impact the business performance and development 
plans of the firms. This indicates the strong political constraints upon the FITS sector during 
the focused decade (up to2007).  Hence, in this chapter it is particularly important to address 
the third research aim (see chapter six), in terms of the understanding of policy obstacles. 
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The structure of this chapter uses a similar format to that of the previous chapter on Shanghai. 
Firstly, the investment environment of Beijing is investigated, including the geographic, 
historic, cultural and economic characteristics of the city. Other issues such as accessibility, 
the labour market, and office facilities are briefly covered too. Then, a summary of the 
tourism industry in Beijing is provided, in order to draw a picture on the size and resources of 
the local tourism industry. This enables a comparison to be made regarding the three research 
locations in Chapter Ten, and helps to develop a better understanding of the location 
difference and its importance for the development of the FITS sector in China.  
 
In total, there are 16 FITS companies studied in this chapter, including one ‘failure’ case, one 
case in the nearby city Tianjin, and one special local agency invested by a Hong Kong travel 
service. They are studied individually, followed by a cross-case analysis focusing on the topic 
of target markets and profitability of the sector. Subsequently, a section of analyses of the 
questionnaire data is made to study the local services' attitudes towards the FITS sector in 
Beijing. After this, three major case studies, JTB New Century, CITS American Express, and 
CYTS Travelport, are explored to reach an in-depth understanding of the businesses, with 
both successful experiences, and lessons of failure examined. Finally, important issues 
concerning the common features of FITSs, the relationships between foreign and local 
services, and the results from key cases in the Beijing area are presented.  
 
 
8.2. The Introduction of the City, Beijing 
This chapter will give some introduction about the city of Beijing, concerning its geographical 
features, historical and cultural development, economic strength, and some other important 
characteristics of the city. With these references, we will be able to overlook the three research 
locations in a more comparable and distinct manner in the later chapter ten, and thus to help 
address the objective 1F (see chapter one or six) about the differences between the three 
locations and the reasons why they were chosen by FITSs. Moreover, by reviewing details of 
the locations, a basic picture of the investment environments of the three marketplaces will be 
                                                                                                                              201 
 
provided. This will assist in providing answers to the Aim Three of this thesis which is related 
to China’s general investment environment to the foreign travel trade business, especially in 
the economical aspects.  
 
8.2.1. Geographical view of Beijing 
Beijing, Jing for short, or called Peking, lies at 39.6 north latitude and 116.2 east longitude, 
covering a total area of more than 16,410 square kilometers (6336 square miles) with 62% of 
the landmass being mountains and hills (see Figure 8.1). The city also enjoys sufficient water 
resource with the connection of three rivers, the Yongding River, the Chaobai River and the 
North Canal. The center of the city is 43.71 meters above sea level (Beijing Municipal 
Government (BMG), www.beijing.gov.cn , 2007). With continental monsoon climate and four 
definite seasons, Beijing is one of the four municipalities directly under the central 
government. It is divided into 16 urban districts and 2 rural counties. The total population of 
the city was 15.81 million by the end of 2006, 0.43 million more than that of 2005 (BMG, 
www.beijing.gov.cn , 2006). Moreover, the city is located in northern China, partially 
surrounded by Hebei Province, and closely connected to Tianjin Municipality, with 
approximately one hours driving distance in between. With this geographical proximity, the 
only case study location in Tianjin was grouped in the location of Beijing. 
 
8.2.2. Historical and Cultural Development of Beijing 
According to the Beijing Tourism Administration, Beijing’s development can date back to 
1000 BC, as a trading town mainly for Mongols and people from Shandong Province and 
central China. Beijing has been a capital city for more than 800 years since the Yuan Dynasty 
(1271-1368), to the Ming (1368-1644), Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, and until now. 
Thirty-four emperors have lived in this city while ruling the nation. The aspiration of politics 
and power has been deeply rooted in the soul of the city, as well as in the minds of people 
living in the place. Beijing is not only the capital city for politicians; it is also the country’s 
center of culture, information, and trading. The economic reform since 1980s has brought 
Beijing dramatic changes and prosperity in its economic system. An international metropolis 
is the perhaps the correct way in which to refer to the city. 
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Figure 8.1. The map of greater Beijing  
 
Source: http://www.muztagh.com/map-of-china/large-map-beijing.htm (2008)  
(Approximate scale: 1:600,000) 
 
8.2.3. Industrial and Economic Bases of Beijing 
According to the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (BMBS, www.bjstats.gov.cn , 2008), 
the gross domestic product (GDP) of Beijing was 900.62 billion Yuan (about US$ 118.81 
billion) by 12.3% over the previous year, and the per-capital GDP of the city reached 56,044 
Yuan (US$ 7,370) in 2007. However, Beijing’s GDP in 2000 was only 247.9 billion Yuan 
(about US$ 29.95 billion), with per capital GDP at 22,460 Yuan (US$ 2,713). The ratio of the 
primary industry, secondary industry and the tertiary industry changed from 2.5: 32.7: 64.8 in 
2000 to 1.1: 27.5: 71.4 in 2007, showing an increase in the service industry since the 21 
century. In terms of the total retail sales of consumer goods of Beijing in 2007, it stood at 
380.02 billion Yuan (about US$ 48.72 billion), increasing by 16% than 2006, and more than 
the double of 144.3 billion Yuan (about US$ 17.43 billion) in 2000. The total value of exports 
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and imports through customs of Beijing was US$ 192.95 billion in 2007, up by 22.1% over 
the year of 2006, and almost three times of US$ 68.46 billion in 2003. Of the total value of 
2007, the value of exports was US$ 48.92 billion, up by 28.9% over 2006, with US$ 144.03 
billion of imports and up by 19.9% than the previous year. 
 
In 2003, 1360 projects for foreign fund utilization were signed in Beijing with contractual 
value totaled US$ 3.27 billion, and actually utilized value at US$ 2.14 billion. In 2007, the 
actual utilized value of FDI climbed to US$ 5.07 billion, more than the double of 2003, and 
up by 11.3% over 2006, with total projects numbered 2177. Moreover, the total turnover of 
foreign-funded enterprises was 1,156.72 billion Yuan (about US$ 152.6 billion) in 2007, with 
an increase by 29.7% over 2006. In the same year, the foreign funded enterprises made total 
profits of 101.8 billion Yuan (about US$ 13.43 billion) and contributing tax of 38.77 billion 
Yuan (about US$ 5.11 billion). By 2005, Beijing had had totally 2,673 banking institutions 
hiring over 80,000 staff, along with 282 insurance organizations and over 39,000 employees 
(BMBS, 2008). 
 
8.2.4. Other Issues Concerning the Investment Environment of Beijing 
As the cultural center of the country, Beijing has most educational facilities. At the end of 
2007, there were in total 83 general colleges and universities in Beijing, with approximately 
0.16 million new entrants, 0.57 million enrolled undergraduate students, and 0.14 million 
graduates. In the same year in Beijing, there were 52 general colleges and universities and 118 
research institutions trained postgraduates, with over 0.25 million studying postgraduates. In 
addition, 2007’s statistics showed that there were 328 high schools and 361 middle schools in 
the city, with totally 0.84 million enrolled students. Moreover, Beijing also had 1235 
elementary schools with 0.67 million enrolled students, and 1306 kindergartens with 0.2 
million kids. The outlays expended for R&D were 48 billion Yuan (about US$ 6.3 billion) in 
Beijing in 2007. In total, there were 14,859 institutions engaged in scientific activities in 
Beijing, with approximately 0.45 million scientific workers. In short, the educational quality 
in Beijing is regarded as top in the country, fostering a sufficient and high-quality labour 
market. The average remuneration of its citizens in 2007 stood at 46,507 Yuan (about 
US$ 6,135), ranking the second in China after Shanghai. (BMBS, 2008) 
                                                                                                                              204 
 
Beijing, as one of the most developed cities in China, enjoys a comprehensive transportation 
system. In order to meet the demands of hosting the 2008 Olympic Games, intensive 
construction upon the city’s transportation connection both within the city and cross cities has 
been progressing. Beijing has one international airport, Beijing Capital International Airport. 
According to the Beijing Municipal Government, since 2008, this airport annually receives a 
passenger volume of 48 million, a freight and postal volume of 1.3 million tons, a taking-off 
and landing-on volume of 0.4 million planes, becoming a multi-functional large pivotal 
airport in Northeast Asia. The passenger and freight transport capability by railway of the city 
was also adapted to the requirement of Beijing's economic and social development, with a 
reasonable layout of railway facilities and more advanced equipments. By 2008, Beijing's 
urban railway operation system was extended to over 200 km in total, with around 1.5 billion 
annual passengers (BMG, 2008).  
 
The construction of a national highway, city highway and rural highway network was 
accelerated in order to form main radial routes consisting of 12 national highways, and 
subordinate radial routes consisting of 11 city highways, 9 connection highways and 2 ring 
roads. By 2008, the suburban counties/districts in Beijing had all been well connected to the 
downtown area by either expressway or first-grade highway, as well as connected to the each 
other. With the good connection, the traveling time between suburban counties/districts to the 
downtown area was also reduced to be within one hour's driving. The density of highway 
network reached 91.6km/100km2. Moreover, in 2008, the annual capacity of Beijing's buses 
and trolley buses transport reached over four billion passengers with more than 18000 
operational vehicles. (BMG, 2002). 
 
According to the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (BMBS, 2006), in 2005, there were 
totally 0.62 million square meters area equipped for conference in the city, along with places 
equipped for expositions totaled over 0.2 million square meters. In 2005, the average 
achievable office rent in Beijing recorded a slight increase of 1.6 percent to US$ 26.80 per 
month per square metre (sq.m) (based on net floor area). With a limited new supply, it was 
estimated that rapid local economic growth would continue to increase the demands of 
Beijing's Grade-A office (Beijing This Month, 2005). 
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Essentially, the city of Beijing has witnessed a rapid growth in economic terms and fast 
development in hard infrastructures. The most significant character of the location is its nature 
of being the country’s political center. The large scale of its educational facilities, and the high 
quality of its labour market are also considerable features of the city. Moreover, similar as 
Shanghai, a well established transportation system increased the accessibility and 
convenience for the inflow of investments, which can probably be highlighted as one of the 




8.3. The Tourism Industry and Resources in Beijing 
Since the reform and open policy in 1978, Beijing’s tourism industry has experienced a 
continuous and rapid growth in both demand and supply sides. Table 8.1 reveals the 
increasing numbers of both overseas and domestic tourists travelling through Beijing since 
1978 to 2007. Clearly, in 2002, the number of annual international tourists exceeded the total 
five-year’s number of the early 1980s. The domestic tourist numbers to Beijing also increased 
dramatically, as 2007 twice that of 1994 when records started (see Table 8.1).   
 
The demand of Beijing citizens going abroad was also growing dramatically. Chinese citizens 
only had permission of self-fund overseas travel to nine destination countries before 2000. 
However, by the end of 2007, the practically permitted access of foreign destination countries 
had reached 86 (BMBT, 2008). Moreover, Table 8.2 indicates the growing numbers of Beijing 
residents going abroad in the most recent years. In 2007, Beijing witnessed over one million 
outbound tourists who living in the city and traveling overseas for private reasons, with an 
increase of 26.5% more than the year of 2006. The majority of outbound trips were towards 
foreign countries, beyond the reach of Hong Kong and Macao. It is clear that the potential of 




                                                                                                                              206 
 
















(USD 1 million) 
1978 190 100 / / 
1880 290 120 / / 
1981-85 2,950 940 / / 
1986-90 4,920 2,809.01 / / 
1991-95 9,200 7,355.19 / / 
1994 2,030 2,009.04 67,100 4,014.28 
1995 2,070 2,182 63,200 4,749.92 
1996-2000 12,030 12,148 440,810 32,173.91 
1996 2,190 2,252 76,830 4,844.35 
1997 2,300 2,248 82,210 5,271.23 
1998 2,200 2,384 87,310 5,718.33 
1999 2,520 2,496 92,600 7,139.49 
2000 2,820 2,768 101,860 9,200.51 
2001-05 14,600 14,750 556,570 66,932.04 
2001 2,860 2,950 110,070 11,957.97 
2002 3,100 3,110 115,000 12,527.78 
2003 1,850 1,900 87,000 9,510.34 
2004 3,160 3,170 119,500 15,423.99 
2005 3,630 3,620 125,000 17,511.96 
2006 3,903 4,026 132,000 19,973.06 
2007 4,355 4,580 142,800 23,622.28 
Sources: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Tourism (BMBT) (2008) 
(Note: The exchange rate of domestic earning is based on 1 USD = 7.42350 CNY )  
 
By the end of 2007, star-rated hotels in Beijing numbered 638, an increase of 6.8% over the 
previous year, offering totally over 3 million guest rooms, and generating around 23.7 billion 
Yuan (US$ 3.13 billion) total revenue with 2.2 billion Yuan (US$ 290 million) total profits. 
Among the total 638 hotels, there were 42 five-star hotels and 93 four-star hotels, totaled 128 
with a growth by 18.4% over the year 2006. The corresponding figures of three, two and one 
star hotels in 2007 were 221, 244, and 38 respectively. In addition, some another 100 
star-rated hotels were built and opened before the 2008 Olympic Games in the city, according 
to the local tourism authority (as the Olympic impacts fall outside of this survey period, from 
1998 to 2007, the thesis will not expand the discussion of the impacts after 2007.). The 
average occupancy rate was 60% in 2007 (3% lower than that of Shanghai). Moreover, in 
total, there were 816 travel agencies operating in Beijing in 2007, an increase by 3.3% over 
2006, including 189 international travel agencies. Among the 189, 98 services were qualified 
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for dealing with the outbound travel market. FITSs in Beijing numbered 14 by the end of 
2007, and they were qualified for Chinese domestic and inbound travel markets only. Totally, 
the 189 international travel agencies generated business revenue of about 21.0 billion Yuan 
(US$ 2.77 billion) with total profits of 284 million Yuan (US$ 37.47 million) in 2007. 
(Beijing Municipal Bureau of Tourism (BMBT), 2008) 
 
Table 8.2. The growth of outbound tourists in Beijing (2004 to 2007) 
Tourist Numbers            (person) 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Total Outbound Tourists 1,002,000 792,000 517,144 513,766 
Tourists to foreign Countries 813,000 611,000 383,431 407,172 
Tourists to Hongkong and Macao, China 189,000 181,000 133,713 106,594 
Sources: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Tourism (BMBT) (2008) 
 
In addition, according to BMBT’s statistics of 2007, there were more than 400 tourist sites in 
Beijing, including 171 A-rated sightseeing spots and 56 key historical and cultural attraction 
sites, such as the Forbidden City of Beijing. The 171 A-rated sightseeing spots received 
122.71 million visitors in 2007, making total revenue of 3.69 billion Yuan (US$ 486.8 
million). The sightseeing resource in Beijing is rich, including some of the most famous 
heritage sites in the world. For example, among the 35 World Heritage Sites in China by the 
end of 2007 (see Appendix 5.3), six were located in Beijing, including the Great Wall which 
was voted as one of the New Seven Wonders of the World (www.new7wonders.com, 2009).  
 
 
8.4. The Sector of FITS in Beijing 
8.4.1. FITSs in Beijing and Nearby Cities 
FITSs registered in Beijing by the end of 2006 numbered 14, making up more than half of the 
total number in China. The business sector commenced from 2000, and witnessed a 
comprehensive development with three major forms of investment, including Sino-controlled 
JV, foreign controlled JV, and WOFEs. Table 8.3 shows all the companies studied in this 
research location, including the 14 officially registered FITSs in Beijing (numbered 1 to 14), 
and one FITS in Tianjin (numbered 15), as well as a special case of CITC in Beijing 
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(numbered 16). As noted Tianjin is a city close to Beijing, therefore the sole case in Tianjin 
was studied inclusively in the Beijing area. CITC was commonly recognized as a Hong Kong 
listed company. However, it was operating in China as a Chinese corporation and enjoying its 
full licence in all the three travel markets, resulting from its original Chinese background. 
Moreover, in the table, the bold letter indicates three case studies of this chapter, numbered 
one, four, and ten. 
 
According to the collected primary data (shown in Table 8.3), among the 14 FITSs in Beijing 
(numbered 1 to 14), there were four Chinese-controlled joint ventures established before the 
end of 2001. Then, in 2004, Beijing Flight Centre-Comfort (FCm) Business Travel was 
formed with equal shares between its Chinese and foreign partners. Later in 2005 the 
company was re-established by transferring 45% of the Chinese-holding shares to the foreign 
side, to rejuvenate from a financial crisis it encountered in 2005. Therefore, including FCm, 
Beijing also had 4 foreign-controlled JVs, setup after 2003. However, it was also since 2003 
that 100% foreign owned travel service companies were allowed to set up in Beijing. By the 
end of 2007, there were six WOFEs in Beijing. 
 
Based on the primary data collected from this research programme, it is interesting to see that 
the development of the FITS sector in Beijing showed instant reactions towards the 
deregulations of the Chinese policies upon the ownership forms of the sector. For example, at 
the end of 2001, the government allowed to set up JVs with any share holding proportions. In 
2002, FCm's former two partners set up the company with equal investment, followed by 
more foreign controlled JVs afterwards. In June 2003, the government allowed the setting up 
of WOFEs, followed instantly by the setup of Beijing JPI. Moreover, it seemed that FITSs in 
China preferred to have the control upon their investments by either holding the majority 
shares of the JVs, or owning 100% of the entities. Once it became possible for the foreign 
services to keep the majority of control, there has never been any growth of 
Chinese-controlled JVs from 2002. This preference reflected the fact that the foreign 
stakeholders were generally more confident with their management skills and held more 
advanced technologies. Thus, it is reasonable for them to apply majority equity investments 
with greater controls over the operations in the Chinese market. 
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Table 8.3.  The FITS sector in the Beijing area   















0.67 million 24 Jan 
2000 







0.67 million 18 Apr 
2000 
3 BTG Accor BTG (51%) French Accor Group 
(49%) 
0.81 million 24 Aug 
2000 
4 CITS American 
Express 
CITS (51%) American Express 
(49%) 
2.5 million 22 Nov 
2001 




(50% down to 
5%) 
Australian FCm 
(50% up to 95%) 




6 JPI (China)  None Japanese JPI (100%) 0.6 million 17 Oct 
2003 
7 CTS TUI  CTS (25%) German TUI (51%);  
MB (24%) 
6.1 million 18 Nov 
2003 
8 ANA Tours None Japanese ANA 
(100%) 
0.6 million 9 Jun 
2004 
9 Gullivers Travel 
Associates(GTA) 
None Hongkong GTA  
(100%) 




CYTS (40%) American Cendant 
(60%) 
20 million 12 Oct 
2004  






0.54 million 30 Mar 
2005 
12 Hankyu Express 
(China)  
None Japanese Hankyu 
Express (100%) 
0.6 million 25 Jul 
2005 
13 KIE China None Japanese KNT 
(100%) 
0.53 million 25 Jul 
2005 
14 Grand Circle 
 (China) 
None American Grand 
Circle (100%) 
0.33 million 10 Nov 
2005 
15 Tianjin SA tours Tianjin Tourism 
(Holding)(51%) 
Singapore SA tours 
(49%) 
1 million 29 Dec 
2000 
16 CTI China None Hongkong CTSHK 
(100%) 
23 million 30 Aug 
2001 
Sources: Based on the information provided by CNTA in 2006 
(Note: the RCs are approximated values after using exchange rate: 1 USD = 7.47 CNY) 
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Among the 16 foreign invested services in the Beijing area, the majority were from Asian 
countries or regions, including five from Japan, four from Hong Kong and one from 
Singapore. Others included three American companies, two European and one Australian 
company. It is noteworthy that among the all Japanese investors, 80% of them chose to have 
wholly owned enterprises. The only Japanese JV was the earliest case in Beijing, New 
Century JTB. But the Japanese JTB also established its own wholly owned company in 
Shanghai later in 2006, which forms a major case study in this Chapter.  
  
In order to provide a holistic and overall study on the FITS sector, all FITSs in Beijing were 
formally requested to be interviewed. However, as described in the Table 6.5 in methodology 
chapter, the result in Beijing area came with nine FITSs formally interviewed, six with simple 
telephone questions, and one inaccessible. Combining the collected data from the interviews 
and some secondary data mainly from their websites, more details about the each FITS 
companies in Beijing are presented in the following section before further analyses. By doing 
this, an overall picture of the whole sector can be draw, which is necessary in answering the 
aims and objectives of the thesis.  
 
8.4.2. The General Characteristics of FITSs in the Beijing Area 
In order to investigate the development approaches of the FITSs sector (during 1998 to 2007) 
with holistic and overall data, this research tried to invite all FITSs to take part in the 
interview survey. However, the reactions of FITSs were very different. In the Beijing area, 
there were 15 FITSs registered, including one in Tianjin. Together with a special case of a 
state-owned travel service from Hong Kong, totally 16 firms were targeted and studied in this 
chapter. Among the 16 firms, nine companies were formally interviewed, with interviewees 
introduced in the Table 8.4. With more sufficient data, three FITSs were selected as case 
studies (marked with bold letters in the Table 8.4). Concerning the differences between the 
three case studies and other FITSs in data analysis and presentation, this section will 
summarize the performances and characteristics of the other 13 firms before presenting a 
more detailed study of the three major case studies. By reviewing every FITS in the area, the 
chapter will be able to conclude with some common features and differences on development 
approaches of the FITS sector in Beijing. 
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Table 8.4. The list of interviewees in the Beijing area 
No. Company Names Interviewees Positions of the interviewees Year of the 
Interviews 
1 JTB 
New Century  
Mr. J. Zhao 
(Mr. H.B. Liu) 
Vice GM 
(Manager of Business  
Development and Strategy of 




2 Morning Star 
New Ark 
Mr. C. Shi Sales Manager 2006 
3 CITS American 
Express 
Mr. G. Lochtie 





4 JPI (China)  Mrs. S.S. Zhang  The Manager of General 
Affaire Group 
2007 
5 Gullivers Travel 
Associates(GTA) 
Mr. B. Shen GM  2007 
6 CYTS 
Travelport 
Mr. X. D. Guo GM December
2006, May 
2007 
7 North Star 
KwanKin  
Mr. Xian GM 2006 
8 Tianjin SA tours Mr. J. Zuo Board Member 2007 
9 CTI China Mr. M. Guo Assistant GM 2007 
Source: the author  
 
JPI China (hereafter JPIC) was invested by Jalpak International (JPI), who is the oversea 
travel agency group of one of the biggest airline companies in Asia, named Japan Airlines 
Corporation (JAL). JAL was originally formed in 1951, and was listed in Japan’s stock market 
in 2002, with total Paid-in Capital of 174.25 billion yen (about US$ 1.61 billion). JAL also 
has a global hotel chain, JAL Hotels, and JAL Travel specialized for Japan domestic travel 
market (www.jpic.com.cn/en , 2007). JPIC started its operation in China in December 2003, as 
the first foreign whole owned travel service in China, with about US$ 0.6 million Registered 
Capital, which just matched the minimum requirement of the government for setup. 
According to Mrs. Shanshan Zhang (10/05/2007), the manager of General Affairs Group of 
JPIC, JPIC started from 14 employees, and reached 27 by 2007. The General Manager and 
Vice GM, as well as some other senior positions, were taken by 7 Japanese staff, with only 
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five at the beginning time. The number of local Chinese doubled to 18 in 2007, from nine in 
2003. Their main business fields were based on two categories, Japanese tourists into China 
including business trips, making up 95% of the total revenue, and travel and air ticket services 
for Japanese expatriated in China as 5% of the total. Mrs. Zhang (10/05/2007) confirmed that 
for the first few years, their business in China did not perform well affected by problems such 
as the the crisis of SARS and chicken flu. However, JPIC has made profits since 2006, with 
two offices in Beijing and Shanghai. 
 
ANA Tours China (hereafter ANATC) was owned by ANA Sales Co., Ltd (ANAS), born in 
June 2004 with a RC of about US$ 0.6 million. ANAS are also an airline company in Japan, 
but younger and smaller than JAL, established in 2002, with 1 billion Yen (US$ 9.2 million) 
RC (www.anas.co.jp , 2007). According to a senior manager of ANATC (who does not want 
to be named), the company had 14 employees by the time of the research, including 3 to 4 
staff from Japan taking the vital positions of the company. Similar as JPIC, the main business 
was confined to two categories, including inbound tourists from Japan, and Japanese 
Expatriates’ travel in China. And, according to them, ANATC has also become profitable by 
2007. 
 
Hankyu Express China (HEC) was formed by its sole Japanese mother, Hankyu Express 
International (HEI) in July 2005, with around US$ 0.6 million of RC. HEI in Japan was 
founded in 1948, originally as a railway company. Now, the business of HEI Group covers 
railways, hotel chains, travel agencies, buses and taxis, parcel services, department stores and 
so on. Its Paid-up Capital was 530 million Japanese Yen (US$ 4.88 million) 
(www.hankyu-travel.com/english , 2007). According to an in-nominate staff of the HEC, the 
number of staff of the company increased to 20 in 2007 from 7 at the beginning. The main 
business was upon the Chinese inbound tourists from Japan, mostly for leisure purposes. And 
it was confirmed that the HEC had also been profitable by 2007.  
 
KIE China (KIE stand for Kintetsu International Express) was wholly invested by Kinki 
Nippon Tourist Co., Ltd (KNT), in July 2005, with around US$ 0.53 million RC. KNT was 
established in September 1955 with 7.5 billion Japanese Yen (US$ 69 million) of RC and 477 
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billion Japanese Yen (US$ 4.39 billion) of total revenue in 2005 mainly depending on the 
Japanese domestic and inbound travel markets. KNT has its Railway Services, named 
Kintetsu Rail Pass (www.knt.co.jp , 2007). According to an in-nominate staff in KIE China, the 
company started with 10 employees and slightly developed to 11 in 2007. With its Japanese 
domestic customer base, KIE China mainly focused its business on the Chinese inbound 
travel from Japan. With only one office in Beijing, the respondent revealed that KIE China 
had not been profitable yet (the staff, 2007).  
 
Gullivers Travel Associates China (GTAC) was formed and fully owned by Gullivers Travel 
Associates (GTA)’s Hong Kong subsidiary with a RC of about US$ 0.61 million in 2004. 
GTA was a British leading wholesaler and online provider of hotels, destination service and 
other travel products, started in 1975. Nowadays, GTA has become a business to business 
service, sourcing, distributing and transferring travel products in the industry, with a network 
of over 35000 ground product suppliers and 21000 hotels, and handling more than 27,000 
group tours across the world every year. However, in April 2005, GTA became a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Travelport, which was called Cendant Travel Distribution Service at that 
time. Travelport is one of the largest and most geographically dispersed travel companies with 
presences in more than 130 countries, and operating over 20 leading brands, including online 
travel agency, Orbitz and Octopus, and a global distribution system (GDS), Galileo. On 
August 23, 2006, Travelport was purchased by an affiliate of The Blackstone Group, a global 
private investment and advisory firm with around US$ 59 billion for investing. 
(www.gta-travel.com & www.travelport.com , 2007)  
 
As presented in the literature chapters, the global online travel market was developing rapidly, 
which was often accompanied with shifts in shareholdings, especially in more advanced 
western economies. Although the changes of ownership in the mother companies in recent 
years has brought the GTAC relevant changes too, but mainly in the structure of the Board. 
The business of GTA in China was going well and smoothly, with its breakeven in 2006. 
According to Billy Shen (20/06/2007), the GM of GTAC, the company was started with 50 
people, with less than 6 foreigners and a majority of local employees. By August 2007, GTAC 
has had 100 employees in Beijing and 40 in Shanghai, with its GM being locally recruited. 
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The Chinese inbound travel market from Europe, America and Middle East was the major 
focus of its then business, covering FIT, group tours, leisure holidays, and corporate travels. 
Surely, they have also been eager to share the Chinese outbound and domestic travel markets.  
 
One American invested company in Beijing (numbered 14 in the Table 8.3), Grand Circle 
China (GCC) was wholly owned by Grand Circle Travel (GCT) who was formed in 1958 
together with the Association of Retired Persons (AARP). Since 2000, GCT has become a 
widely recognized name across the US as an industry leader in tours marketed at elder, as well 
as all mature Americans. A substantial percentage of GCT’s business related to river cruises in 
Europe, with a growing percentage consisting of ocean cruises, with 45 offices and 2000 
associates around the world. (www.gct.com , 2007) GCC was granted by CNTA in November 
2005, with a RC of US$ 0.33 million. However, by the end of 2007, the company has not 
been put into practical operation, as no contact methods could be found through the Chinese 
public checking and searching system. 
 
CTS TUI China was the first foreign controlled Sino-foreign joint venture in China, set up in 
November 2003, with a RC of US$ 6.1 million which was ten times over what requested by 
the then time Chinese regulation. The shareholders of the JV include German Touristik Union 
International (TUI) Group with 51% of the total shares, MB Investment (a subsidiary of the 
TUI Group) with 24%, and China Travel Service (CTS) with the rest of 25%. In other words, 
TUI Group had the majority of 75% of the JV, and hence controlling it by taking the JV’s both 
CEO and CFO positions. TUI Group was one of the biggest tour operators among the 
European tourism companies and the number five in the world of container shipping. The 
Group had its total turnover of €20.9 billion (US$ 30.99 billion) with the tourism business 
contributing €14.1 billion (US$ 20.9 billion), about 2/3 of the total. In 2007, the formation of 
TUI Travel PLC in the UK together with the British travel group First Choice emphasized its 
leading position in the EU. The TUI group of tourism comprised approximately 3300 travel 
agencies, 100 aircraft, and 300 hotels with 165,000 beds in 30 countries, as well as 35 
incoming agencies and more than 5000 representatives in 70 countries globally. In addition, 
there were about 80 tour operators active in the Group, including TUI, Robinson, Airtours, 
and Thomson. In addition, the group also had a Cruises fleet, called Hapag-Lloyd Cruises 
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with 4 liners, turning over more than €160 million in 2006.  (www.tui.cn , 2007) CTS was one 
of the earliest and biggest travel companies in China, formed by the Chinese government in 
1949, with an annual income of hundreds million Yuan and a profit about tens million Yuan. 
(www.ctsho.com , 2006)  
 
CTS TUI China’s business included the Chinese inbound travel mainly from Europe, foreign 
expatriates’ outbound travel, and the Chinese domestic travel. Both packaged tours and FIT 
were marketed. Since 2006, the JV commenced its ‘MICE & More’ Department to target the 
specialist market. The cruise travel has been another increasing business area for the JV. The 
company’s enrollment started from 10 and grew to over 100 in 2007. With only one office in 
Beijing, the JV has already been profitable by 2007 (anonymous staff, 2007).  
 
FCm Comfort China (FCm CC) was a foreign controlled JV of Australian FCm Travel 
Solutions (FCm TS) and China Comfort Travel Co. Limited (CCT), with a RC of about 
US$ 0.76 million. CCT was ranked as the third largest travel agency according to its turnover 
in China in 2005, with more than 100 branches and 10000 employees (www.cct.cn , 2007). 
CCT is one of the four travel agency brands under the flag of BTG Group which will be 
further studied in later two Sino-controlled cases (www.btg.com.cn , 2007). FCm TS was one 
of the biggest Asia Pacific based global corporate travel management companies with over 
1500 offices in nine countries, employing more than 8,000 staff globally, and with an 
extensive hotel networks of over 18000 properties in the FCm Global programme. 
(www.fcmtravel.com.cn , 2007) However, originally, CCT set up a JV with Rosenbluth 
International (RI) in 2002, not with FCm TS. After American Express acquiring the RI in July 
2003, CCT purchased RI’s initial shares of the JV for US$ 1 dollar, and then sold the 50% of 
the total stakes to FCm TS in May 2004. In December 2005, FCm TS increased their shares to 
95% of the new JV’s total. FCm CC has been involved with the Corporate Travel and MICE 
market since the re-corporation, with office in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, employing over 
90 staff, the JV met its breakeven point by 2007 (an anonymous manager, 2007). 
 
Beijing North Star Kwan Kin International Travel Service Ltd (NSKK) was established by 
Hong Kong Kwan Kin Travel Service Ltd (HKKK) with a majority of 80% of the NSKK’s 
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total shares, and Beijing North Star International Tourism Ltd (BNS) with the other 20% 
shares. HKKK was formed in 1982 in Hong Kong, and it has always been one of the top five 
travel service companies in its original marketplace, with an annual turnover of over US$ 50 
million. BNS is a member of Beijing North Star Group with more than 20 years experience in 
the Chinese travel trade business. (www.nskk.com.cn , 2006) Although BNS has been as one 
of the top 100 travel agencies in China for over eight years, its reputation was concentrated in 
the Beijing local market. The RC of NSKK was 4 million Chinese Yuan (about US$ 0.54 
million), just matching the government’s minimum requirement. The JV did not start its 
business operation until January 2006. The number of staff grew from 7 at the beginning to 
more than 70 in the first year. As the two parent companies have built their business 
partnership for over ten years with adequate trust between the each other, the GM of NSKK, 
Mr. Xian, was from the China, BNS. According to Xian (2006), this also saved over a million 
Yuan in annual wages, which is the market price to hire a Hong Kong GM who might not 
even be familiar with mainland China market. NSKK’s major business covered both the 
Chinese inbound travel from Hong Kong and regions such as American and EU, and the 
Chinese domestic packaged tours, with the corresponding ratio of the two as 70% and 30%, in 
terms of tourist numbers. The turnover of NSKK was about 40 million Chinese Yuan in 2006, 
and it was expected to reach 100 million Yuan with a breakeven in 2007 (Xian, 01/12/2006).  
 
Two Chinese controlled JVs having a same Chinese investor, BTG International Travel & 
Tours (BTGITT), one of four travel agency groups of Beijing Tourism Group (BTG), and the 
two JVs were registered and started in the same year, 2000. The first JV, Beijing Morning 
Star-New Ark International Travel Service (MSNAITS), was invested by Beijing New Ark 
International Tourism Company Limited and Hong Kong Morning Star Travel Service 
Limited, with 5 million Chinese Yuan of RC (US$ 0.67 million). Beijing New Ark 
International Tourism Company Limited is under the ownership of BTGITT who is one of the 
China’s largest and strongest travel group and was originally owned by the China Central 
Government. In addition another parent company, Hong Kong Morning Star, was owned by 
MUI Group which was the first tourism company listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges 
(www.btgtravel.com.cn , 2007). The Beijing MSNAITS started with 25 people and increased to 
55 by the end of 2006, with only one office in Beijing. 
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The second JV is the Beijing BTG-Accor Travel Co., Ltd (BTG-Accor), registered four 
months later than Beijing MSNAITS with a RC of US$ 0.81 million. BTG-Accor was 
established directly by BTGITT and its French partner, Accor Group which is one of the 
leading hotel and tour companies in the world (www.chinatours.cc , 2007). By the end of 
2007, the total staff number of BTG-Accor was about 15, with one only presence in Beijing, 
revealed by a manager of the JV. 
 
Beijing MSNAITS and BTG-Accor had many similar features, although obviously 
BTG-Accor has a stronger foreign mother company and greater overseas resources. First, they 
had a similar structure of share-holdings, with 51% in the Chinese side and 49% in the foreign 
side. Second, both companies were featured as specialists in the Chinese inbound travel 
market in the BTGITT’s inventory. Both companies’ business plan covered a wide range of 
travel services, including ticketing, leisure and holidays, corporate travel, and MICE. Third, 
the GMs of the both companies were from the China. Finally, both companies had claimed 
that they have been profitable since 2002. However, the difference is BTG-Accor’s products 
were mainly focused on the EU markets. MSNAITS had made significant efforts to develop 
the Chinese domestic market. According to Mr. Cheng Shi (11/12/2006), the Sales Manager of 
MSNAITS, the Chinese domestic travel had made up a considerable proportion in the 
company’s turnover. And in the close future, Beijing MSNAITS would probably open another 
three offices in Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou, said Mr. Shi (11/12/2006).  
 
The one JV located in Tianjin was named Tianjin SA Tours (TSAT), set up in late 2000, with 
US$ 1 million RC. The JV was formed by a Singapore tour operator, Sino-America 
Corporation (SAC) with 49% of the total shares and Tianjin Tourism (Holding) Corporation 
LTD (TTC) with the other 51%. TTC was a state-owned tourism group, reformed in June 
2000, owning or managing the local government’s tourism related assets, including travel 
agencies like Tianjin CITS , hotels, car renting services, real estates, educational institutions, 
restaurants, and so on, with more than 2800 employees in total (www.jtg.cn , 2007). SAC has 
been one of the largest travel companies in Singapore, with more than ten years of business 
experience and over 200 staff. The annual tourists that SAC handling exceeded 50000, 
                                                                                                                              218 
 
covering a wide range of markets including both leisure, corporate travel, and MICE. 
(www.satours.com , 2007)  
 
According to Mr. Jian Zuo (10/05/2007), one of the Board Members of TSAT, the JV was 
established in 2000, after more than 20 years cooperation between the two parent companies 
in the hotels and other travel related business fields. The original idea was to make the JV as 
the biggest wholesaler in Tianjin and its surrounding area. The JV had 19 staff at the 
beginning with 4 from Singapore, including one GM and three technical operators. The scale 
of TSAT grew slightly to some 20 staff, and the structure remained the same as it had been 
from the start, except for the replacement of the GM by the Chinese side in 2002, said Mr. 
Zuo (2007). In 2002, the company had met its breakeven point, and it has been profitable 
since 2004 with about 40 million Yuan (US$ 5.4 million) annual turnover, around 0.2 million 
Yuan (US$ 27,000) profit, and approximately 40,000 inbound tourists per year. In order to 
minimize the costs, the JV only had one office in Tianjin. However it was longing for the 
opening of the Chinese outbound travel market, and the development opportunities afterwards, 
according to Zuo (10/05/2007).  
 
A special case is also worthy of study for its special background of being both state-owned 
and from Hong Kong. China Travel International (CTI) Ltd in China (CTIC) was granted in 
August 2001, and started in January 2002. It is fully owned by China Travel Service (Holding) 
Hong Kong Ltd (CTSHK). Being originally from Hong Kong, however, CTIC was registered 
as a Chinese travel agency, and thus not constrained by the relative Chinese business sector 
regulations. The reason was that CTSHK has been owned by the Chinese government since 
1949. CTSHK was formed in 1928 in Hong Kong, being the eldest travel company in China. 
After 1949, CTSHK has been one of the strongest Chinese invested corporations in Hong 
Kong, under the supervision of the Chinese Central Government, especially after 1985’s 
aggregation. In 1992, the group was listed successfully in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
with its partial business and assets. By the end of 2006, CTSHK’s total assets reached 28.7 
billion Hong Kong dollars (US$ 3.68 billion) with over 35000 employees. (www.hkcts.com , 
2007) CTI was the travel agency brand owned by CTSHK, being one of the biggest travel 
agencies in Hong Kong, with over 20 overseas branches in 12 countries, and 43 branch offices 
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in Hong Kong and Macao (www.ctiol.com, 2007). Before the setup of CTIC, CTSHK had had 
investments in the theme park and tourist attraction industry in mainland China. 
 
According to the Assistant General Manager of CTIC, Mr. Ming Guo (2007), the development 
of CTIC in mainland China was dramatic. The RC was 170 million Yuan (around US$ 23 
million) in 2001, and further increased to US$ 222.16 million in 2005 after purchasing two 
Chinese international travel groups. And CTIC has had 28 fully owned or majority controlled 
travel companies all over the country by July 2007, said Mr. Guo (01/06/2007). With its full 
business inventory regarding the Chinese domestic, inbound and outbound travel market, 
covering leisure, holidays, corporate or MICE, as well as online travel markets 
(www.mangocity.com ), CTIC has made profit since the first year of its operation in China in 
2002 to over US$ 670 million of 2006. The turnover was growing from 2 billion Yuan (about 
US$ 266 million) in 2002 to over US$ 670 million of 2006, with an annual growth rate over 
10% in profits. He also revealed a message that CTIC has started a plan to absorb another 
Chinese biggest and earliest travel company, China Travel Service (CTS), which was also a 
state-owned enterprise formed in 1949. This could be regarded as a sign that the Chinese 
government has started to build up its own multinationals in the tourism industry in order to 
compete with other foreign services. 
 
Except for the three major case studies which will be examined in more details later, we have 
investigated 13 FITSs in the research location of Beijing, including four Japanese WOFEs and 
two western WOFEs, three foreign controlled JVs, two Sino-controlled JVs, one case in 
Tianjin and one special FITS from Hong Kong. The above study suggested that the foreign 
investors preferred to hold majority or absolute control over their subsidiaries in the Chinese 
markets. However, they tended to keep their investment and risks as low as possible, by 
applying minimum costs on RC and organizational scale. Moreover, some other features of 
the FITS sector in the area can be found in their marketing and financial situations, as 
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8.4.3.  The Target Markets and Profitability of FITSs in Beijing 
 
Table 8.5 The target markets and profitability of FITSs in the Beijing area  (by 2007) 
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Sources: the author 
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This section examines the major features of the market strategies of the FITS sector in the 
Beijing area, as well as their profitability up to 2007. The information in this section will be 
useful, especially in order to address the Objective 1E (see chapter six). Table 8.5 shows the 
market targets and the then time profitability of the 16 studied companies in the Beijing area. 
It is obvious that they have mainly relied on the Chinese inbound market, corporate travel 
management market and MICE market, as well as the foreign expatriate market in China. 
Only five of them, (numbered 2, 7, 10, 11, and 16), have started operating in the Chinese 
domestic market. They are MSNAITA, CTS TUI China, CYTS Travelport, NSKK and CTIC. 
Three of them were from Hong Kong and thus would know the market of mainland China 
better than others. CTS TUI China seemed to be more ambitious than other foreign services, 
as they had intervened in the Chinese domestic market from its initial stages in the market. As 
CTS TUI China has been profitable, its success highly credits their strategy of acknowledging 
local markets and local experts. Also, TUI’s backdrop with tremendous sales and buying 
power was another considerable support. However, focusing on the online travel market in 
China, CYTS Travelport was unsuccessful. The reason of their shutdown will be investigated 
later in the case study sector. 
 
In addition, as the inbound market was the major business area of all FITSs in the Beijing area, 
a substantial dependence upon their foreign mother companies’ original business base was 
detected. Moreover, it appeared that in the research area of Beijing, 12 (80%) of the total 15 
FITSs have been profitable or been breakeven by 2007.  
 
8.4.4.  Local Travel Agencies and Their Attitudes towards Foreign Rivals 
In order to examine the impacts of the FITS sector upon the local services, and the attitudes of 
the local industry towards the incoming foreign services (See the Aim Two in chapter one or 
chapter six), a questionnaire survey was also conducted in Beijing as a form of subsidiary data 
to compare with the answers from interviewed FITSs. This certainly helped to develop an 
understanding or the relationship between the FITS sector and the locals. As mentioned before, 
by 2006, there were 790 travel agencies in Beijing in total, with 212 qualified as international 
travel agencies. Using the same process as that employed in Shanghai, 50 questionnaires were 
completed by the Beijing indigenous travel services. At least half of the collected 
                                                                                                                              222 
 
questionnaires were checked by phoning back to the respondents, according to the contact 
methods recorded to control the quality and validity of the data. In the same structure as that 
in Shanghai, the results were represented in five groups, on 1) their scale; 2) business fields; 3) 
relation with FITSs; 4) attitude toward FITSs; and 5) attitude to the local government offices 
(see Table 6.8 in chapter six).  
 
From the results of the survey in Beijing, (see the general frequencies reported in Appendix 
8.1 and Table 8.6), the respondents in this survey were relatively big companies of the local 
travel trade marketplace. While traditionally, international travel services are usually bigger 
and financially stronger than domestic ones in China, there were 42 respondents in this survey, 
over 84% qualified as international travel agencies, including 38 who were fully granted for 
the Chinese outbound markets. However, 60% of the total was no more than 10-year old. 36% 
of the all responding services had less than 50 staff, with totally 48% of the all respondents 
hiring less than 100 employees. Moreover, 48% of them had less than 10 branches or sales 
points, including nine respondents, 18% of the total, having only one branch. However, at the 
other end, 40% of the all was over 10-year old, 36% having more than 400 staff, and only 7 
respondents, 14%, having over 100 branch offices. Thus, the local services generally were 
small and young businesses, although Beijing seemed to have more large services than 
Shanghai. 
 
In terms of the major business field and target markets of the local travel agencies in Beijing, 
the result of the questionnaire survey told a very similar story about the lack of attention of 
the local services upon the Chinese inbound travel market. According to the collected data, 
there were 32 respondents claiming that the domestic tours were the major content of their 
business inventory, with 11 services choosing overseas tour groups. There were only five of 
them concerned with the business of handling with inbound tours as their major business 
constituents (See Table 8.7).  
 
Figure 8.2 shows the result of the questions about the importance of the three travel market, in 
terms of the contribution to the respondents' income. More than half, 58%,  of the all 
respondents chose the ‘Domestic Travel Service’ as their major origin of turnover, with 26% 
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relying on the ‘Outbound’ and only 16% on the ‘Inbound’. This result suggested that 
compared to outbound and domestic markets, inbound business was a relatively weak, and 
often despised business area for most Chinese indigenous travel services, which was revealed 
in this survey in Beijing, as well as in Shanghai.  
 
Table 8.6.  Summary of characteristics of the respondents in Beijing 
Item Frequency Percentage of the Total Valid Percent 
Qualified for International 
Travel Service 
42 84% / 
Among the above, 
Qualified for Outbound  
38 76% 90.5% 
Only for Domestic Service 8 16% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
<= 10 years old 30 60% / 
 >10 years old 20 40% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
1 to 49 Staff 18 36% / 
50 to 99 Staff  6 12% / 
100 to 399 Staff 8 16% / 
400 to 1000 Staff 11 22% / 
More than 1000 Staff 7 14% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
1 Branch 9 18% / 
2 to 9 Branches 15 30% / 
10 to 49 Branches 14 28% / 
50 to 99 Branches 5 10% / 
>=100 Branches 7 14%  
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author  
 
Table 8.7.  Major business focuses and income sources of the respondents in Beijing 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total  
Domestic tour groups and individuals 
tours as the major business 
32 64% 
Overseas tour groups and individuals 
tours as the major business 
11 22% 
Bookings of hotels and flights as the major 
business 
1 2% 
Incoming tourists as the major business 5 10% 
Other Sidelines 1 2% 
Total Respondents 50 100% 
 
Domestic services as the major income 29 58% 
Inbound services as the major income 8 16% 
Outbound services as the major income 13 26% 
Total Respondents 50 100% 
Sources: the author  
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Figure 8.2.  The importance of outbound, inbound, and domestic travel markets for the local travel 
agencies in Beijing.  
 
Question 5: Which of the following three is your

















Sources: the author 
 
Table 8.8 shows that there were seven local respondents having a parent company who were 
involved in some forms of foreign investment. However, none of the parent companies had 
investments of foreign capital, but that it was mainly in the forms of having a joint project in 
overseas or owning overseas loans. Thus, none of indirect FDI was detected in Beijing. In 
addition, among the 38 respondents who had permission for the Chinese outbound travel 
market, 50% of them chose to build partnerships with foreign services, with another 39.5%, 
using both foreign partnerships and their own overseas branches. It was apparent that almost 
90% of the full-licensed international travel services in Beijing preferred the approach of 
building partnership to expand their outbound business. Moreover, among all the respondents, 
33 services had experiences of cooperation with foreign travel companies, making up 66% of 
the total. Among the 33, 32 accounting for 97%, stated that their relationship with foreign 
partners were ‘Very Good’ or ‘Good’, with one being neutral. Thus, it is clear that establishing 
partnership with foreign travel companies in the both Chinese marketplace and overseas 
markets has proved popular with the respondents in Beijing. Additionally, very similar as 
Shanghai, the majority of the Beijing respondents who have worked closely with foreign 
services have enjoyed a good relationship with their foreign partners. 
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Table 8.8.  Communications and relationships between the local travel trade businesses and 
international capital investments in Beijing 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Having parent companies 13 26% / 
        Mother company being involved 
in foreign investments 
7 14% 53.8% 
   Owning loans from overseas 1 2% 14.3% 
 A foreign Invested mother company 0 0% 0% 
Having joint investments in overseas 6 12% 85.7% 
Involved in North American countries 3 6% 42.9% 
Involved in European Countries 3 6% 42.9% 
Involved in Asian Countries 1 2% 14.3% 
Having no parent companies 37 74% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
Permitted for outbound (see Table 8.6) 38 76% / 
    Building foreign partnerships  19 38% 50% 
    Setting up own branches 0 0% 0% 
    Using the above both ways  15 30% 39.5% 
    Only solicit tourists in China  4 8% 10.5% 
 
Having cooperated  with foreign agencies 33 66% / 
    The relationship being ‘Very Good’ 16 32% 48.5% 
    The relationship being ‘Good’ 16 32% 48.5% 
    The relationship being ‘Neutral’ 1 2% 3.0% 
Having not cooperated with foreigners  17 34% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author 
 
The answers directed towards local knowledge about the incoming FITSs showed that 26% of 
the total respondents did not know the changes related to the opening of the Chinese travel 
service industry for foreign entrants (see Table 8.9). However, among the 37 respondents who 
have recognized the foreign services’ entering into the local market, 54.1% of them 
appreciated the new situation, with another 43.2% being neutral, and only one disliking the 
trend. Thus, the result was similar to that of Shanghai, showing a dominance of welcome 
rather than resistance to the emerging foreign influences in the local market. In addition, 
Figure 8.3 clearly illuminates the opinions that these 37 respondents perceived about the roles 
of foreign new market entrants. The majority of them, 56.8%, represented a neutral view, 
seeing the foreign entrants as both competitor and possible partner, with 16.2% holding a 
positive view seeing them as a good case to learn from, but 27% being relatively conservative 
viewing them as rivals. Thus, Beijing saw slightly higher concerns on competitions in relation 
to foreign travel services in the local market than the result showed in Shanghai. It seemed 
that the knowledge about the incoming foreign services was still limited, as more than a 
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quarter of the total respondents knowing little about the opening trend. This suggests that at 
least by the time of this survey, there had not been considerable influences of FITSs upon the 
Beijing travel service market.   
 
Table 8.9.  Local knowledge of and attitudes towards the FITS sector in Beijing 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Having the knowledge of foreign entrants 37 74% / 
    Do not like foreign agencies 1 2% 2.7% 
    Neutral 16 32% 43.2% 
    Appreciate foreign agencies 20 40% 54.1% 
Concerning  as a considerable rival 
 with advanced skills 
7 14% 18.9% 
Concerning  as a new rival 
with different background 
3 6% 8.1% 
Concerning as both a potential 
competitor and partner 
21 42% 56.8% 
Concerning as a valuable model 
to learn from 
6 12% 16.2% 
Having No knowledge on foreign entrants 13 26% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author  
 
Figure 8.3.  The respondents’ thoughts about the role of FITSs in Beijing 
Question 17: Which is the one best indicating the role of
foreign agents in the Chinese marketplace?
Role of foreign agents
















Sources: the author 
 
Questions were also asked in order to examine the satisfaction level of the local travel 
services towards the government administration offices and organizations, with Table 8.10 
showing the summary of the answers. There were 33 respondents being a member of Chinese 
tourism associations, including 28 clearly indicating the background of the associations being 
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government controlled. Among the 28, 19 were 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied' with the functions 
of the government agencies, with seven cases being 'neutral', and only two saying 'unsatisfied' 
or 'very unsatisfied'. However, similar to the result from Shanghai, the importance of 
maintaining a good relationship with government administration offices was a prevailing 
concern of most respondents, with 56% of the total advocating importance, and the rest 
remaining neutral. 
 
Table 8.10.  Local attitudes towards governmental organizations in Beijing 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Being a member of the Chinese 
associations in the tourism industry 
33 66% / 
In the associations directly under 
the supervision of the government 
28 56% 84.8% 
    Being ‘Very Satisfied’ with the 
associations 
6 12% 21.4% 
Being ‘Satisfied’  13 26% 46.4% 
Being ‘Neutral’ 7 14% 25% 
Being ‘Unsatisfied’ 1 2% 3.6% 
Being ‘Unsatisfied’ 1 2% 3.6% 
Not Being a member of any Chinese 
associations in the tourism industry  
17 34% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 
To have a good relationship with the 
government is ‘Important’ 
28 56% / 
To have a good relationship with the 
government is ‘Neutral’ 
22 44% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author  
 
Table 8.11.  Local satisfaction level with the major functions of Beijing tourism board 
Item Very 
Satisfied 
Satisfied Neutral Unsatisfied Very 
Unsatisfied 
Marketing Research  11 20 16 3 0 
Arbitration 14 18 15 2 1 
Consultant and Aids 22 12 10 6 0 
Networking/Communication 20 14 13 3 0 
Sources: the author  
 
Moreover, the respondents’ attitude towards the functions of local tourism board was also 
tested through this survey. Table 8.11 shows the result, revealing a relatively high level of 
satisfaction. 31 respondents, 62% of the total was ‘Very Satisfied’ or ‘Satisfied’ with the 
market research services provided by the government organization, with 32% holding a 
neutral view on the issue, and with the rest 6% being ‘Unsatisfied’ or ‘Very Unsatisfied’. 
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Similar proportions of satisfaction and dissatisfaction levels happened on other three 
concerned services that provided by the organization, including arbitration, consultant and 
helps for business operation, and promotion of peer communications for the industry. In 
general, over 60% appeared to be ‘Very Satisfied’ or ‘Satisfied’, and 20-30% stood at a 
neutral position, with around 10% being ‘Unsatisfied’ or ‘Very Unsatisfied’. 
 
The questionnaire survey in Beijing was conducted as a part of efforts to address Aim Two, 
especially the Objective 2B (see chapter six) of the whole research programme, which 
concerns the attitudes of local travel services towards the FITS sector. Through this part of 
survey, we were enabled to see several insights about the local travel trade sector and its 
connections with FITSs in Beijing. The results shows that although Beijing witnessed a higher 
level of perception concerning the competition brought by the FITS sector, most respondents 
still welcomed the change and the entry of FITSs. Moreover, in general, the local travel 
service industry in Beijing was young and small, although larger companies are seen in the 
city than in Shanghai. Last but not least, the weakness of the local services in the inbound 
markets was emphasized in Beijing, and was similar to that in Shanghai. However, in order to 
offer comparable reference to investigate the relationship between FITSs and local services, 
the thesis gives further analyses pertaining to the questionnaire data in Chapter Ten.  
 
 
8.5. Case Study of JTB New Century 
JTB New Century International Tours Co., Ltd (hereafter JTBNC) was formed jointed by 
CITIC Travel Co.,Ltd (CITICT) and Japanese JTB Group (JTBG) in Beijing in 2000. In 2006, 
however, JTB’s wholly owned travel service, JTB Shanghai, was born in Shanghai. Since then, 
JTBNC in Beijing and JTB Shanghai, being two sister companies, cooperated with respective 
regional emphasis. The JV, JTBNC, was interviewed twice with its Vice GM, Mr. Jie Zhao, in 
January 2007 and May 2007, as well as some further questions via e-mails. The Manager of 
Business Development & Strategy Department of JTB Shanghai, Mr. Houbin Liu, was 
interviewed once in June 2007. But during the interview of JTB Shanghai, no recorder was 
allowed. And as the Shanghai company had been operating for less than a year when 
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interviewed, there was insufficient information available, compared with JTBNC. Therefore, 
the information about JTBNC made up the major data base in this case study, with JTB 
Shanghai being complementary source to study together. In addition, it is noteworthy that as 
both Mr. Zhao and Mr. Liu are Chinese local managers, they were interviewed in Chinese and 
their answers were then transcribed into English. Therefore, there will be no direct quotes in 
this case study. 
 
8.5.1.  The Ownership of JTBNC 
JTBNC is the JV of CITICT and JTBG, it was registered in January 2000 and was 
incorporated on 1st May 2000, with RMB 5 million Yuan RC (US$ 0.67 million). CITICT had 
the majority 51% of the stake, while, JTBG hold the other 49%. (www.ncit.com.cn) Both parent 
companies actually invested the corresponding amount of money, which was vital for the 
initial operating time. The structure of ownership and the amount of the RC followed the 
government’s regulations the time (the minimum RC was requested to be 5 million Yuan, and 
only Chinese controlled JVs were allowed).   
   
Although forming a JV was the only choice for JTBG to enter into China at that time, it was 
the group’s own choice to incorporate with CITICT, based on the trusts between the each 
other after many years collaborative experience. Prior the setup of JTBNC, JTBG had had its 
Beijing representative office since 1982. The CITICT was established in Beijing in 1987, 
being the earliest one specialized in corporate travel in China. As Mr. Zhao’s (15/01/2007) 
comment, ‘the JV was a spontaneity [originally in Chinese]’, as both companies appreciated 
each other after over 15 years of practical cooperation in the travel business in China.  
 
It is important to examine the background of both the parent companies. JTBG was originally 
founded as Japan Travel Bureau in 1912, and established a public listed company, JTB Corp 
in November 12, 1963, with Authorized Capital of 3.2 billion Yen (about US$ 28.99 million). 
Nowadays, as an originally state-owned enterprise, JTBG was constituted by more than 150 
companies all over the world, with about 276 domestic branch offices in Japan and 71 
subsidiaries in some 27 overseas countries, with a total of over 25 thousand employees. The 
group’s business integrated a wide range of services in the tourism and tourism related 
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industries, such as hotels and restaurants, ticketing, tourist attractions, telecommunications, 
credit and currency exchanging facilities, real estate, insurance service, publicity, and cargo 
agency, etc. It was popularly recognized as the biggest tour operator in Japan, and one of the 
biggest in the world (www.jtbcorp.jp , 2007).  
 
CITICT was formed by CITIC Group in 1987, with the intention to be professional in the 
corporate travel market, and licensed fully in order to cope with the Chinese domestic, 
inbound and outbound travel business. Since 2001, CITICT has been continuously ranked in 
the top five travel services in China. Moreover, the CITIC Group is a Chinese state-owned 
transnational conglomerate, with a core business of fields ranging from financial industry 
(making up 47% of the group’s total revenue, and 77.9% of its total net profit), industrial 
investment, and land development, to service industries. In 2006, CITIC Group owned 44 
subsidiary banks overseas, including Hong Kong, USA, Australia, and Canada. The total 
assets of the group reached RMB 929.2 billion Yuan (US$ 125.5 billion) with an after-tax 
profit of RMB 6.09 billion (US$ 0.82 billion) (www.citic.com , 2007). The travel agency 
business is obviously not the major contributor of CITIC Group. However, as an advantage of 
being a state-owned agency, its application of setting up a Sino-foreign JV in 1999 was 
granted in less than two months by CNTA, along with another three months for all the 
licensing process. In addition, as the two parent companies of JTBNC both having interests in 
a wide range of industries, one reason for them to choose each other as JV partners may be 
looking for further opportunities to corporate together in tourism related industries in China.  
 
8.5.2.  The Initial Establishment and Expansion 
The JV contract built up a system under the supervision of the Board, which was made up of 
three members from JTBG and three members from CITICT, with the Chairman taken by the 
Chinese side. Normally, the Board meeting took place twice a year, which gave the JV an 
overall plan for its development and operational strategies. The GM was responsible for the 
Board and its decisions and plans, and the position was designed as a Japanese post, together 
with the Manager of Administration. The Vice GM and the Financial Director were appointed 
to the Chinese positions. The Vice GM at that time was Mr. Zhao, mainly being in charge of 
local issues, such as finding local handling agencies.  
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Figure 8.4 shows the structure of the JV. According to Zhao (08/05/2007), the JV, in fact, had 
five major functional departments. Two sales departments included one for the brand ‘LOOK 
JTB’ and the other for all other group tours, which were both under the leadership of Vice GM, 
Mr. Zhao. As Figure 8.4 demonstrates, Administration, Accounting, Hotel Purchasing, and 
Corporate Sales departments were under the direct supervision of the GM of JTBNC, as they 
were very much Japan-oriented. Especially the later two departments were related to managed 
or owned hotels under the JTB flag, and the travel demands of other Japanese invested 
companies in China. However, Mr. Zhao (08/05/2007) further emphasized that one of the 
successful experience of the JTBNC was the Board was holding the essential power of 
decision and plan making. Thus in practical operation, every senior managers knew what 
exactly to follow, which meant there was less possibility of conflicts between the GM 
(representing the Japanese side) and Vice GM (representing the Chinese side). 
 
Figure 8.4  The organizational structure of JTBNC by 2007.  
 
Sources:  Administration Office, JTB New Century (2007) 
 
The total staff number was 38 in 2000, including two major managers from the Japanese 
partners and two from the Chinese side. It had increased to over 180 by the time of the 
interview. It was clear that JTBNC believed in the advantages of recruiting employees locally. 
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However, the JV only had one office in Beijing by 2007, and had no plans to open more 
branches in a short future. Probably it is because JTB Shanghai (and JTB Guangzhou formed 
in 2008) has shared the business sent by JTBG into the Eastern and Southern China. Thus, ‘it 
is unlikely for JTBNC to expand to the southern region in the recent future [originally in 
Chinese]’ (Zhao, 15/01/2007).  
 
8.5.3.  Recruitment, Training and Stimulating Mechanism 
According to Zhao (15/01/2007), HR has always been one of the most considerable 
challenges for JTBNC. In order to minimize the overall cost of the JV, the company advocated 
a local recruitment policy, including local Chinese and Japanese living in China. The most 
needed personae for the JV at then time were firstly local representatives who have good 
appearance, attitude, and language skills, and secondly people who are good at outsourcing 
and can bring business to the company. Degrees were required when enrolling the candidates, 
but JTBNC concerned more on practical skills and attitudes of the candidates.  
 
Three months of pilot period was applied to every new employee with intervening training 
programmes and inspections during the period. For the full time employees of the JV, the staff 
usually has constant training opportunities, either in the company or being sent to the JTBG 
Japan offices. The training content included language skills, management philosophy, 
marketing strategies, etc. In order to maximize the synergies within JTBG, providing its staff 
with constant and comprehensive training opportunities was regarded as a vital tradition of 
JTBG. And thus the group had its JTB University in Japan, and may establish one in China 
too (Liu, 18/06/2007). 
 
Like other FITSs, JTBNC also saw challenges resulting from the difficulty of finding right 
persons and training them, as well as keeping the trained staff. Responding to this, JTBNC 
applied a high salary policy, in order to maintain most of the staff, and to help reduce the 
staff’s intention for gray incomes. In addition, the JV has been trying to active a ‘Stimulating 
Mechanism’ which follows the principle of ‘More able more pay, More pay more gain’ (Zhao, 
08/05/2007). However, he remarked that, the above strategies had not been very successful 
yet, because of many difficulties encountered. For example, if an employee brings significant 
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business into the company, with the highest incentives offered by JTBG as 10%, the person 
may leave with the business as they can easily find another Chinese company offering higher 
rates of incentives. Thus, it was often the case that Japanese philosophies and traditions could 
not be easily assimilated into the Chinese marketplace. For example, Chinese staff had much 
lower loyalty to their employers than that of Japanese, and the attitude is difficult to change. 
 
As the tourism industry is booming rapidly, there has been a sense of competition between 
employees among travel service companies in China. JTBNC had to be aware of the 
competitiveness of employees with other foreign travel services and with Chinese local 
services, and to be prepared for the fluidity of its well-trained staff (Zhao, 08/05/2007). 
However, he also noted a solution to the movement of staff that the JV had to place two or 
three people in one job, so that any one's change would not affect the stability of the whole 
system, although this brought considerable extra costs.  
 
8.5.4.  Target Markets, Profitability, and Production System 
JTBNC’s business was contented in two major aspects: the Chinese inbound tours sent by 
JTBG from Japan, and the services for foreign companies and expatriates (mainly Japanese) 
in China to travel within China or go abroad (mainly to Japan). JTBG has two main brands 
‘LOOK JTB’ targeting high-class Japanese tourists' travel overseas, and ‘MEDIA’ focusing on 
group tour market. About 50% of the JTBNC’s total revenue came from the brand ‘LOOK 
JTB’, covering the corporate and MICE clients. Therefore, JTBNC has set up a department to 
serve and develop this brand in China. Additionally, the tour business provided for Japanese 
expatriates in China made up another 20% of JTBNC’s total income. Besides these, other 
Japanese group tours and JTB’s hotel projects together contributed to 30% of JTBNC’s total 
turnover.  
 
According to Zhao (08/05/2007), the company’s turnover has reached 300 million Yuan 
(US$ 40.54 million) per year. Table 8.12 shows the performances of JTBNC since its setup 
until 2006. Generally, the JV started being profitable from the first year after its setup, which 
shows the advantage of sourcing from a strong overseas parent company.  
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Profitable Or Not 
2000 since May 5.40 20,000 Yes. 
2001 24.32 100,000 Yes. 
2002 Around 40 180,000 Yes. 
2003 (No Statistics) (No Statistics) No. (because of 
SARS) 
2004 Around 40 140,000 Yes. 
2005 About 31 100,000 No. (because of 
Chinese protestations 
against Japan) 
2006 40.54 120,000 Yes 
Sources: Zhao (08/05/2007), Vice General Manager of JTB New Century 
(Note: The numbers showing in the Table 8.5 are approximate figures.)  
 
However, the table also reveals a big problem of JTBNC that being dependent upon the only 
source of customers has gave the JV an unsound business base. Such as in 2005, there were a 
big group of Chinese people protesting against the Japanese government for issues related to 
the Second World War. This resulted in a big drop on JTBNC’s books and its profits of that 
year, with a dramatically reduced number of Japanese tourists. Again in 2006, after JTB 
Shanghai’s setup, a big proportion of tourists from JTBG were shared, which impacted the 
JV’s total revenue as well. In order to mitigate the effects of this shortage, the JV have made 
efforts to extend its business to more markets, such as American tourists or European tourists. 
Also, according to Zhao (08/05/2007), JTBNC hoped that the access to the Chinese outbound 
travel market in the future could bring them more opportunities, and help appease the 
contradictions regarding sourcing.  
 
In addition, the both sides of the JV have seen an advantage when collaborating in marketing 
and production. In order to keep the production inventory attractive and suitable to the major 
target markets, the destination side (JTBNC) and the tourist provider side (JTBG) needed to 
work closely and efficiently, and thus a smooth and regulated procedure has been established. 
Any original idea of product will be firstly examined in the destinations, which is the 
responsibility of JTBNC. JTBNC’s local representatives shall bring the feedbacks to the 
relevant department of JTBNC about the best choices of facilities, routes, and so on. The JV 
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will then send a report to the JTBG about whether or not the idea should be continued. If a 
production idea is about to be promoted, the Japanese side will need to work out the feasible 
price of the product, according to the selling market, and reply within 24 hours. Good 
cooperation between the destination and the origin countries increased the feasibility and 
profitability of their products. And thus, such communication will be encouraged and 
enhanced, especially after the Chinese outbound travel market opened (Zhao, 08/05/2007) 
 
8.5.5.  Competition and Cooperation 
JTBNC did not feel the pressure of competition in the Chinese travel market. This mainly 
resulted from their stable resource of customers. As the JV’s major business was sent by JTBG, 
they did not need to compete with other services. In terms of other business which JTBNC 
need to achieve by its own efforts, such as the expatriate market and the Chinese outbound 
travel market in the future, they were very confident with the reputation of ‘JTB’ and the 
brand ‘LOOK JTB’. Zhao (08/05/2007) emphasized that the key to win competitions was 
about how to improve the JV itself to surpass other rivals, and about how to provide unique 
products and good quality services. 
 
In terms of the cooperation with local handling services, JTBNC has established a reliable 
partnership network with more than 10 Chinese international agencies all over the country. 
These partners included some biggest services in China, such as CITS, and CYTS. Zhao 
(08/05/2007) claimed that as the local ground services getting more familiar with the JTB’s 
standard, their service capacity and competence was increasing continuously. And this should 
eventually raise the overall service standard of the Chinese local travel industry, said Zhao 
(08/05/2007).  
 
8.5.6.  The Relationship between the JV parents and the JV 
According to Zhao (15/01/2007), the both parent companies had their influences upon JTBNC 
through Board meetings, which took place twice a year. In addition the two companies receive 
a financial report on a monthly base. Apart from these, JTBNC had its independence based 
upon concrete business operations. However, it was clear that the JTBG had a considerable 
role being the JV’s major business provider, while the Chinese parent company made more 
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contribution during the registration and licensing process, as well as in other events 
concerning the local government issues, such as providing information about the changing of 
relative policies. 
 
8.5.7.  The Establishment of JTB Shanghai 
JTB Shanghai was wholly owned by JTBG, and was formed in Shanghai at the end of 2006, 
with a RC of US$ 0.73 million. The business content of JTB Shanghai was almost the same as 
JTBNC, mainly focusing on serving the Japanese outbound tourists coming into China, send 
by JTBG, and on the travel market of Japanese expatriates and companies in China. JTB 
Shanghai has also been working on expanding its business to serve more tourists from other 
nationalities, including the ‘high-end’ class of Chinese domestic tours. According to Liu 
(18/06/2007), however, by 2007, still more than 95 % of the company’s total revenue came 
from the inbound business from JTBG in Japan. In addition, JTB Shanghai’s growth during 
the year 2007 was dramatic, in term of the number of staff, from less than ten at the beginning 
to more than 80 in June 2007, but with only four Japanese staff sent by JTBG. The reason of 
setting up JTB Shanghai, as Liu (18/06/2007) explained, was because of the un-ignorable 
economical importance of Shanghai and its surrounding areas. He confirmed later in 2008 that 
JTB Shanghai has been profitable since the year of 2007.  
 
In terms of the relationship with JTBNC, Liu (18/06/2007) explained that there was mainly a 
connection of collaboration with different geographical specialization between the two sister 
companies. In other words, the two companies were in charge of two different business areas 
geographically, with JTB Shanghai covering southern part of China with Shanghai as the core 
to some south popular destinations, including Guangdong, Fujian, and Yunnan. But, this 
portion of market was further shared by JTB’s second WOFE in Guangzhou since 2008 (Liu, 
18/06/2007). 
 
However, the set-up of JTB Shanghai has certainly impacted the business performance of 
JTBNC, with a big fall in its 2007 turnover. As Zhao (08/05/2007) was worried, the negative 
effects were happening inevitably, and this might just be the beginning. If more subsidiaries 
of JTBG opening in different regions around China and taking their geographical 
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responsibilities respectively, JTBNC will have to lose more shares of the JTBG’s total custom 
base. In fact, this was happening already as Liu (18/06/2007) revealed that it was a part of the 
expanding plan of JTBG to build its own network in China, with a plan to open more wholly 
owned travel services in locations like Guangdong, and Sichuang in a near future. Moreover, 
JTBG has founded totally five tourism related subsidiaries and representative offices in 
Beijing, including JTBNC and other specialized companies for consultant and for MICE 
management services, along with five in Shanghai, two in Guangzhou, and one in Qingdao (a 
city in the North of China). With the plan to expand further to the middle part of China, the 
ambition of JTBG is already clearly. 
 
8.5.8.  Three Major Aspects and Three Major Obstacles 
The constraint of policies upon the Chinese outbound travel market, the management of HR, 
and the customs and traditions of the Chinese local tourism industry were considered as three 
major matters which may influence the business performance upon JTBNC. In terms of the 
main obstacles for the JV’s future development, the answer was very similar. They are policy 
constriction and the HR management again, along with the cost control (Zhao, 15/01/2007).  
 
Without being able to access the Chinese outbound market, the most lucrative part of travel 
trade business, the business expansion of JTBNC in China was essentially confined. Although 
JTBNC was backed with a sound international network of travel products and services, the 
company had not been able to show its advantages on the Chinese marketplace. Moreover, in 
some niche market, such as MICE market, it is difficult to find skilled local employees who 
can also speak Japanese. Training and staff retention were two other challenges in HR 
management. Furthermore, the inflation in the Chinese economy in recent years, especially on 
housing and wages, has imposed pressure on the task of cost control. Generally, Liu held the 
similar opinions in this issue as Zhao’s. However, He further emphasized the difficulty in 
fully understanding and communications between the Japanese mother company and the 
Chinese local employees such as himself, resulting from different levels of experience, 
knowledge, and operational traditions regarding the Chinese market.   
 
 
                                                                                                                              238 
 
8.5.9.  The Use of Financial Service 
JTBNC had its functional local banking services in China, and the accounting management 
system following a Chinese way according to the local law. However, once the JV 
experienced a shortage in cash, the company chose to apply loan service from a Japanese 
bank, named UFG. According to Zhao (15/01/2007), financial service in Japan was more 
convenient and comprehensive than that in China. It was clear that being able to use overseas 
financial services was definitely another considerable advantage for JTBNC who having a 
strong foreign parent company. 
 
8.5.10.  Government Intervention 
According to Zhao (15/01/2007), there was little government intervention in their business 
operations, except for the policy constrictions, and some yearly inspections from the 
government agencies. However, he mentioned that JTBNC was sometimes required to help 
promote some tourism campaigns organized by the local tourism authority. JTBNC was 
making large efforts to respond the campaign proposals, and very often to be the best sales 
agency in the projects (Zhao, 15/01/2007). But the efforts on such promotional events were 
not compelling, and thus, may not be defined as 'government interventions'. Therefore, from 
JTBNC’s point of view, Chinese government policies, such as the ones for business setup and 
for the access to the Chinese outbound travel market, were the main form of government 
interventions in the marketplace,    
 
8.5.11.  Future Plans 
Both JTBNC and JTB Shanghai revealed their short term and mid-term plans, which seemed 
a little different. For JTBNC, the recent objective was to fully exploit the opportunity of 2008 
Olympic Games, with a longer-term plan to break the current solely dependent situation upon 
JTBG's custom base and to increase the proportion of other sources of incomes. JTB Shanghai 
was established much later than JTBNC. Its short-term objective was to increase and solid its 
primary inbound business. However, its mid-term objective was to establish the ‘JTB’ 
reputation in the Chinese marketplace, and to explore the corporate travel market, and the 
opportunities in the Chinese high-end travel market. Thus, it seemed that the two sister 
companies were making their own plans independently. 
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After the studying of JTBNC and JTB Shanghai, three most considerable issues were worthy 
of emphasizing here again. First, both companies, especially the JV, JTBNC, demonstrates a 
well designed organizational structure and the great attentions on modern corporation 
management issues, such as the relationships between HR management and trainings, 
planning and execution, and marketing and production. Second, they both have attempted to 
expand the business inventory from JTBG's original Japanese tourists to a wider range of 
market segments, like the expatriates' market in China. Last but not least, they indicate a 
possible problem about the relationships between different subsidiaries who are owned by the 




8.6. Case Study of CITS American Express  
The Chinese biggest travel company, China International Travel Service Head Office (CITS) 
and one of the world biggest travel service companies, American Express (AMEX), together 
registered a JV, CITS American Express Travel Services Limited (hereafter CITS AMEX), 
with its first JV office set up in Beijing in November 2001, fully operated since January 2002. 
Then the two partners announced two more travel related companies, CITS AMEX Air 
Services in Shanghai (CITS AMEX/ ASSH) in December 2002, and CITS AMEX Southern 
Air Services Ltd in Guangzhou (CITS AMEX/ ASGZ) in February 2003. By applying air 
service licences for the later two subsidiaries, CITS AMEX legally established its triple hubs 
in the three most important cities of mainland China by 2003, before the government's 
deregulation upon the establishment of branches of FITSs in late 2007. With the leading status 
of the both parent companies in the industry, CITS AMEX was selected to be another case 
study of this chapter. Its GM, Mr. Gregor Lochtie who representing AMEX, and Deputy GM,  
Mr. Hongfei Li who appointed by CITS, were interviewed together in its Shanghai office in 
January 2007. Further questions were addressed via e-mails to Mr. Lochtie’s secretary, Mrs. 
Hu afterwards.  
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8.6.1.  The Parent Companies of CITS AMEX 
CITS AMEX was registered in November 2001 in Beijing with CITS having a majority of 
51% of the total shares and AMEX holding the rest 49%. The RC was RMB 20.7 million 
(US$ 2.8 million), according to CNTA's recorder. As Lochtie (12/01/2007) explained, the RC 
of CITS AMEX in Beijing was higher than the other two branches in Shanghai and 
Guangzhou, but the ownership structures of the three JVs were all the same. In fact, the JV’s 
RC was much higher than the government required minimum amount at then time, and being 
the highest among all FITSs until the end of 2003 when CTS TUI was formed in Beijing.  
 
CITS was P.R.China's first travel agency catering to overseas tourists, founded in 1954 by the 
Chinese government. Originally, CITS was also taking the administration function on travel 
events before the present CNTA was formed. It was until 1990s that the administration 
function was not entirely withdrawn from CITS who then became a pure enterprise under the 
direct ownership of SOASAC. Nowadays, the group has more than 20 wholly-owned stock 
holding subsidiaries and 122 CITS board member agencies nationwide, as well as 14 overseas 
enterprises in over 10 countries. In addition, CITS was regarded as the only tourism enterprise 
among the list of the Chinese top 500 enterprises by China's Statistical Bureau. (www.cits.net , 
2007)  
 
AMEX was formed in 1850, and over 150 years, the company has evolved from one of freight 
and valuables into a global best known payments entity selling financial products  like  
money orders and travelers cheques. AMEX’s involvement in China dated back to 1918, 
when the first branch of the American Express Bank opened in Shanghai. After the formation 
of the People’s Republic of China, the first AMEX representative office was established in 
Beijing in 1979, followed by additional offices in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xiamen. Earlier 
than its travel business in China, AMEX Bank opened its first representative office in Beijing 
in 1986 and second in Shanghai in 1992, focusing on the cards and payments business. This 
card business has been successful, as the AMEX card has been widely accepted by thousands 
of firms in over 400 cities in China, with its Travelers Cheques sold through 28 banks 
nationwide. By the end of 2004, AMEX and Commercial Bank of China together launched an 
ICBC AMEX credit card, which can be used throughout China, as well as at AMEX merchant 
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locations in more than 200 countries all over the world. AMEX has also funded and sponsored 
a number of industry, charity and community-related projects, showing its commitment to a 
long-term development plan in the country. (www.americanexpress.com , 2007) 
 
Before CITS AMEX was set up, the two parent companies had had a relationship for over 20 
years, as CITS was the ground service provider of AMEX’s inbound tours in China. After the 
setup of CITS AMEX, CITS, as the majority holder, occupied five seats in the Board, 
including the Chairman’s position, with four directors from AMEX. However, at the 
operational level, the majority of senior managers were from AMEX, including the CEO and 
CFO, Head of technologies, and Project Manager, totaled four posts. And these four senior 
managers, along with one Deputy GM from CITS, made up a five-people setup group at the 
infant stage of the JV. Moreover, besides the Board meetings four times a year, the CEO and 
the Deputy GM was responsible for keeping frequent and smooth communications between 
the JV and the each parent company respectively. Mr. Li would report to CITS on a weekly 
base with a formal monthly report, same did Mr. Lochtie to AMEX (Lochtie, 12/01/2007). 
 
8.6.2.  The Major Business Fields 
AMEX’s business in the world scope includes corporate travel, retail travel, traveler’s 
cheques and credit cards. However, in China, CITS AMEX’s travel business was focused in 
corporate travel only. Besides of this main stream, the JV has increasingly given attention to 
the Chinese MICE market, as well as some kind of VIP personal services for the key leaders 
of their corporate customers. By 2007, the majority of the company’s clients were 
multinationals, but ‘from a long term view, we wish to see the majority of our clients being 
local Chinese’, said Mr. Lochtie (12/01/2007).  
 
One of the main reasons for AMEX to set up subsidiaries in China was for the growing 
demands of their global corporate customers who had entered into China. These 
multinationals desired to keep a global uniform service in China as same as what AMEX 
providing in other countries (Lochtie, 12/01/2007). With this large existing client base and the 
resources brought by AMEX’s successful card business in China, CITS AMEX started its 
travel business in China with the focus on the corporate travel market only.  
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8.6.3. The Enrollment of Employees 
CITS AMEX, started with a group of five people, sent by the both parent companies, as 
mentioned before, with four from AMEX and one from CITS. It increased to about 100 by the 
end of the first year in 2002. By the end of 2007, the three JV’s total number of staff reached 
over 800, including only five foreigners. In addition, according to Lochtie (12/01/2007), the 
company was planning to further increase the number of local employees and reduce that of 
foreigners as the local people getting more experienced with the jobs. The aim of CITS 
AMEX was that eventually the JVs in China should be entirely run by the local staff. This 
target is a hallmark of AMEX’s localization strategy, and it reveals the long-term plan of 
AMEX to develop in China. And basically, this strategy helped the JV reduce the cost of 
importing experts.  
 
Moreover, as one of the biggest international travel companies, AMEX brought the JV 
advanced internal training programmes. The training will be different according to the various 
job responsibilities. For example, for the travel counselors, they will need technical skills and 
customer service skills. While for managers, leadership training will be provided. Lochtie 
(12/01/2007) further emphasized that it was essential for the JV to train and develop the skills 
of its employees in their incumbency, as there was a short supply of competent staff in the 
market in China.  
 
Additionally, the HR department in CITS AMEX was, in fact, regarded as one of the most 
crucial department (Lochtie, 12/01/2007). The importance of the HR department was further 
strengthened after an experience of sudden resignation of an entire team moving to rivals’ 
company. In this labour-intensive company, the HR management was regarded as crucial. The 
success shall ‘depend on a stable and efficient platform built by people’ (Lochtie, 12/01/2007). 
Thus, the major responsibilities of the HR department in the JV included not only recruiting 
and training, but also to create a friendly working environment and ideal career development 
opportunities for all employees, so that good staff and high retention rates can be maintained.  
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8.6.4. The Growing Business and Profitability 
By looking at a client’s overall travel expense, helping them negotiate better travel deals, 
controlling the volume of traveling, putting policies in place, reducing policy complaints, and 
making sure that their travelers comply with the deals, CITS AMEX helped its corporate 
customers to control the overall travel expenditures. Many multinational companies have 
realized that the travel expenditures is typically second or third largest controllable expense of 
their operations, so they are willing to pay for external experts to manage this cost. However, 
most Chinese companies have not accepted the idea, and thus, the JV had only a few Chinese 
local customers, said Lochtie. In spite of this, the JVs’ growth in turnover was dramatic. Table 
8.13 shows the increase of the three JVs total since 2002 to 2007. The business started from 
zero, climbing up to US$ 390 million in 2007. However, although the scale of the JV was 
expanding rapidly, CITS AMEX only had a small profit in 2007 (Lochtie, May 2008).  
 
Table 8.13.  Approximate annual turnovers of CITS AMEX (2002 – 2007). 







Sources: Mr. Lochtie (12/01/2007), the CEO of CITS AMEX 
(Note: The numbers showing in the Table 8.6 are approximate figures.)  
 
 
8.6.5. The Main Influences and Obstacles 
Both Mr. Lochtie (12/01/2007) and Mr. Li (12/01/2007) claimed that the most considerable 
influences on the company’s performance in China could come from three aspects: the growth 
potential of the Chinese economy, the good quality and capacity of the local labour market, 
and the Chinese government’s incentive policies related to the tourism industry, such as the 
opening and tourism development calls for the middle and west regions of China. However, 
towards the question about the most important obstacles, the answer was first about the 
regulatory and policy obstacles, especially the limited access to the Chinese outbound market, 
followed by the human resource problems, concerning the difficulty in recruiting skilled staff 
in some specific business areas and the lack of loyalty of local employees. Third, there was a 
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concern about the rapid growth of the business environment and the lack of its own internal 
capacity. It was emphasized by Lochtie (12/01/2007) that CITS AMEX felt that it was 
difficult to grow as quickly as their clients demanded, resulting from the problems of people, 
technology, and very different service system of the Chinese local industry. For instance, there 
was a difficulty in applying credit card payment methods among the clients.  
 
Therefore, from the AMEX experience, some adaptations had to be made when doing 
business in China. For example, AMEX’s subsidiary in other countries wholly owned, 
however, in China, the company worked with its partner, CITS. Also, the air-ticketing system 
in China, travel sky, limited the company’s capacity of applying some more advanced 
technology and services in the country. Thus, alternative products were designed in the China 
market.  Moreover the JV has also realized a different competition environment, where 
pressure coming from both fast learning local travel services, such as C-trip, and foreign 
rivals like HRG Jin Jiang. Generally, the development of the JV’s business in China was not 
smooth, but there is a great potential for the future development (Lochtie, 12/01/2007).  
 
8.6.6.  The Governmental Intervention 
The Vice GM of CIST AMEX, Mr. Li who was from CITS, was specially entitled with  job 
concerning to the governmental issues and regulatory problems. According to Li (12/01/2007), 
mainly the government influence was in the form of policies upon the registration and 
licensing. After the company’s setup, there should not be much intervention from the 
government. It was true that China was in the process of opening and reforming, and business 
operation in the country was getting easier and more efficient than before, said Li 
(12/01/2007). He further revealed that, there was hardly any difficulty for the JV in the 
registration process which lasting about 2 months. However, both Li (12/01/2007) and 
Lochtie (12/01/2007) admitted a case that the maintenance of a good relationship with the 
Chinese government and its administration offices was an important issue for the company.  
 
8.6.7. Future Objectives of CITS AMEX and Conclusions 
The company’s short-term plan was to increase the profitability of the JV, and to strengthen 
the business platform, as well as to improve the models of services. The medium and long 
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term goal of CITS AMEX was to continue its rapid growing in the corporate travel and the 
MICE market segments in China, to be the number one agency in the sector, and to further 
expand into retail travel business. Moreover, in long-term, the company was about to extend 
the client base from multinationals only at then time, to the objective of having Chinese local 
clients who contributing to half of the JV’s total turnover (Lochtie, 12/01/2007). In addition, 
he claimed that the long-term objective would be achieved in 10 years in China, shorter than 
AMEX would expect elsewhere. Generally, the two investing partners were satisfied with the 
achievements that CITS AMEX has made, and the future comprehensive development was 
expected in the Chinese travel market by the both investors.  
 
In conclusion, three development approaches of CITS AMEX are noteworthy. First, like most 
other FITSs, HR management was highly regarded, with the advocacy of local labour and 
professional trainings on going. Second, unlike the case of JTB who applied both JV and 
WFOE strategies, AMEX preferred to expand through close collaborations with its partner, 
CITS. Thus, they jointly formed three entities in China. Moreover, by using air service licence, 
they successfully hedged over the policy constraints on forming branches three years earlier 
than the deregulation.   
 
 
8.7. Case Study of CYTS Travelport  
CYTS Travelport International Travel Co., Ltd (hereafter CYTS Travelport) was formed as a 
JV of China CYTS Tours Holding Co., Ltd. (CYTS) and American Travelport Inc (Travelport) 
in November 2004, and fully started its operation in May 2005. At the beginning time, the 
foreign partner was still called Cendant TDS, the travel distribution system of the Cendant 
Corporation, and thus the JV was named CYTS Cendant. However, since the end of 2005, 
Cendant TDS was changed into ‘Travelport’, which subsequently alternated the JV’s name to 
CYTS Travelport. Both CYTS and Travelport were big names and having a strong position in 
the travel marketplace. Their corporation was raised with sufficient confidence and a high RC 
of RMB 145 million (about US$ 20 million), being the highest among all the registered FITSs 
by 2007. The actual initial investment was about RMB 100 million (US$ 13.55 million). 
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However, the story ended in April 2007, with a short history of only two year operation, and a 
general loss in the books. Therefore, this case study was selected, and probably the reasons of 
their failure may be a lesson for other FITSs. The JV’s GM, Mr. Xiaodong Guo, was 
interviewed twice in December 2006 and May 2007.  
 
8.7.1. The Introduction of Two Parent Companies 
CYTS, being one of the biggest in China, was found by the Chinese Government in 1978. In 
1993, the stock market was born in China, and CYTS was assigned to be the first travel 
companies being public listed in 1997. Since then, the ownership of the company was 
changed, from 100 % state owned to be some 20% owned by the state with about half owned 
by the public. Because of this, CYTS commenced to adapt to a market-oriented mechanism 
earlier than most of other state-owned travel service enterprises. By 30 June, 2007, the total 
assets of CYTS have reached over RMB  four billion (around US$ 542 million), including 
RMB 1.78 billion (US$ 241 million) net assets, with annual reception of travelers exceeding 1 
million, and annual turnover of RMB 3 billion (US$ 406.45 million). Under the direct 
ownership of CYTS, there were 11 travel service companies, dealing with Chinese domestic, 
inbound, and outbound tours; five travel related subsidiaries in the fields of tourist attractions 
or hotels or transportation; and, six high-tech or real estate development enterprises. In 2000, 
CYTS established an online travel company, with RMB 100 million (US$ 13.55 million) as 
its RC and initial investment (www.aoyou.com , 2007). However, it was not developing well. 
Thus, since 2004, CYTS has been looking for a foreign partner who can help it to strengthen 
the capacity of online travel business. 
 
The name of ‘Travelport’ has been mentioned earlier when studying the case of GTA. 
Travelport has three major leading brands, including the global distribution system ‘Galileo’; 
and a leading wholesaler and online provider ‘GTA’; as well as a worldwide electronic 
distribution of travel information ‘Worldspan’. However, originally, the foreign partner of 
CYTS was the former owner of Travelport, Cendant Corporation (CC), who sold Travelport 
to the Blackstone Group for US$ 4.3 billion in August 23, 2006, which was the result of a 
series of essential reform programme happened in CC. On October 23, 2005, CC announced a 
decision to separate the corporation into four companies for each of the company’s businesses, 
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including: Real Estate Service, Hospitality Services, Travel Distribution Services (Cendant 
TDS), and Vehicle Rental Business. It was since then that Cendant TDS has changed its name 
to Travelport. This was followed by the sales agreement of CC’s real estate business and 
hospitality business in July 2006, and of Travelport in August 2006. After these actions, CC 
changed its name to Avis Budget Group, comprising principally of its vehicle rental operation, 
Avis Budget Car Rental. Essentially, for the JV in China, the foreign investor was changed 
from CC to the name of ‘Travelport’ in October 2005, followed by a shift in ownership to 
Blackstone Group in August 2006. (www.cendant.com  & www.travelport.com , 2007) 
 
8.7.2.  The Initial Investment of the Two Parent Companies  
According to Guo (16/05/2007), CYTS was originally convinced by the capacity of the 
former partner, CC, with numerous travel companies that CC had purchased worldwide, 
especially with the online distribution skills and experiences CC having. Thus CYTS devoted 
its online subsidiary with about RMB 80 million (US$ 10.8 million) assets remaining on the 
balance sheet into the JV. However, on the other side, CC’s initial idea was to make the JV 
listed on the stock market as soon as possible. (At that time, the first Chinese online travel 
company, Ctrip.com, was just successfully stock-listed in American NASDAQ in 2003, which 
was considered as a good model to follow by the industry.) Therefore, the CC invested RMB 
10 million (about US$ 1.35 million) in cash and the assets of its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Four Oceans Investment. This was made up of the JV’s actual initial capital, as well as the 
JV’s initial ownership structure, with 60% of the total stake belonging to CYTS, and 40% to 
CC under the name of Cendant TDS. With regards to the high potential of the China’s online 
travel market, CYTS Travelport was formed with its online shop called 'Aoyou' 
(www.aoyou.com , 2007). 
 
8.7.3.  The Changing in the Ownership and Control  
The JV’s Board had six members, with three from CYTS, including the Chairman, and three 
from Travelport. The GM of the JV was a Travelport position at the beginning time, however, 
taken over by Mr. Guo who was a director of CYTS, after one-year loss performance. This 
was not the only change happening to the JV. Also in 2006, there was a transformation in the 
JV’s ownership, because, according to the JV contract, Travelport must purchase another 20% 
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of the JV’s shares (about RMB 30 million, or US$ 4.07 million) in 18 months, whatever the 
performance of JV would be at the time. This agreement was a CYTS proposal, in order to 
mitigate the pressure in CYTS’s accounting books, said Mr. Guo (16/05/2007). Since then, 
although Travelport holding the major 60% shares, the JV was actually run by CYTS.  
 
It is noteworthy that, almost at the same time, CC decided to sell Travelport to the Blackstone 
Group. Thus, changes happened in both the JV in China and the insides of the foreign parent 
company in 2006. However, CYTS Travelport continued its business, and growing from 110 
staff at its infant time to more than 180 before the breakup in 2007. The communications 
between the JV and the Travelport was mainly through monthly financial reports, according to 
Guo (16/05/2007). However, at the end of 2006, Travelport proposed to stop the partnership 
and wanted to sell its shares to CYTS, with an estimated price of US$ 10 million. But, it was 
not accepted by CYTS. Until April 2007, Travelport sold its 60% ownership to CYTS at 
US$ 2.5 million, which was lower than the amount they paid for the 20% shares in 2006. 
Thus, aoyou.com became wholly owned by CYTS, and the JV was aborted after its two year 
operation.  
 
8.7.4. The Market Segment and Its Business Performance 
As originally the two parent companies had the same interest in the business of online travel 
distribution, CYTS Travelport was to stick with this specialization until the breakup, with a 
focus on hotels and air tickets for FIT tourists. Being a FITS, its business was also confined 
with no access to the Chinese outbound travel market. However, not like most of other FITSs, 
CYTS Travelport did not enjoy a steady stream of inbound customers sent by the foreign 
partner, but with almost 100% of total revenue coming from the Chinese domestic market. 
According to Guo (16/05/2007), the annual turnovers for the two years were almost the same, 
at about RMB 100 million (US$ 13.56 million) per year. But the both years were in loss 
position, with RMB 32 million (US$ 4.3 million) in the first year, and RMB 28 million 
(US$ 3.8 million) in the second. In general, however, CYTS had no big loss, compared to 
their original investment. The major loss, about RMB 50 million (US$ 6.78 million) occurred 
on the overseas side of the venture. 
 
                                                                                                                              249 
 
 
8.7.5. The Major Reasons of Breakup and Conclusion 
Guo (16/05/2007) claimed that the major reasons for the breakup resulted from three aspects. 
First, there were increasing difference and gaps in the operation principles about the JV’s 
business between the two parent companies. For the foreign partner, their focus was upon a 
short return through public listing and financial operation. However, they did not make much 
effort in the development of JV’s core business, with no contribution of customer base or 
technologies. Moreover, although Travelport had many travel companies, each of the 
companies was handling its own business individually with most transactions made on-line by 
independent tourists. Thus, none of them was able to provide customers to CYTS Travelport. 
In term of this situation, CYTS did not want to invest anymore into the JV either, which 
eventually leads to a lack of resources for the JV. Second, as the JV was continuously 
loss-making in the two year operation, this made the plan of listing impossible. The foreign 
partner, therefore, has lost its patience to wait. Third, as the dramatic changes in the 
ownership of Travelport altered the actual foreign partner of the JV, the original cooperation 
interests connecting the both investors were damaged.  
 
Although the JV was a failed case, the two investors have learnt something from the 
experience of the joint operation. As Guo (16/05/2007) acknowledged, there was knowledge 
transfer, such as marketing strategies and production approaches associated with online travel 
provision, from the foreign partner to CYTS, especially during the first year from the GM 
sent by Travelport. However, as the two partners has lost the common confidence and sights 
about the future development of the JV, it was regarded as better for the both partners to be 
released from the commitment sooner than later. The reasons of the breakup for CYTS 
Travelport in fact were popularly seen in many failure cases. Most likely, the separation of 
ideas and insufficient communications between the stakeholders were the essential cause, 
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8.8. Conclusion of the Chapter 
Using a similar structure to the previous chapter about Shanghai, this chapter aims to 
investigate the FITS sector in Beijing, with 14 such entities in total. However, two more 
companies are also studied in this chapter, including one company located in Tianjin, and a 
Hong Kong company officially registered as a local service in Beijing. The chapter examines 
the issues related to the general investment environment in Beijing, including the 
geographical features, historical and cultural development, and, industrial and economical 
bases of the city at the beginning. Other topics, such as, the educational facilities, local labour 
market, transportation system, conference and exhibition facilities are also briefly covered at 
the early part of this chapter. Moreover, the chapter also investigates the tourism industry and 
its development in the city. The dramatic growth in the local travel market in both supply and 
demand sides provides responsive market circumstance for the foreign sector to develop.  
 
16 services are studied in this chapter, including three major case studies and 13 summarized 
cases. Important aspects are identified including: 
l The FITS sector in Beijing started at the beginning of 2000, and its development clearly 
reflects the movement of government deregulations, in terms of both the ownership 
structure and the RCs. As explained in Chapter Five (see Table 5.6), by 2002, investment 
structure in the sector had to be Sino-controlled JVs, with a minimum of 5 million Yuan 
(US$ 0.67 million) as RC. And after June 2003, foreign services were allowed to hold the 
majority shares of a Sino-foreign JV or wholly own an enterprise. Since that time, these 
two forms were popularly applied by the sector. The required amount of RC was 
dropping down to 4 million Yuan (US$ 0.60 million) in 2003, and reduced to 2.5 million 
Yuan (US$ 0.33 million) in 2005. There were some companies, such as CYTS Travelport, 
CTS TUI, and CITS AMEX, showed their sound financial power and confidence by 
applying higher RC than others;  
l By 2007, all the top five local travel agencies who are state-owned had found their 
foreign JV partners. These five were among the biggest services in the Chinese market, 
and the number of large Chinese travel services with such quality is limited. This may 
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result in a more difficult situation for foreign travel companies in the future when looking 
for a large and creditable JV partner in the local market. 
l The majority of them have been profitable, except for five FITSs. Among the five, two 
were breakeven in 2007; 
l The reason to register in Beijing was mainly for the purpose to access some key 
information resources, mainly seeking for early knowledge of government policy changes 
upon the industry. However, as the capital city, Beijing has also established the most 
mature travel industry within China, this was another major concern of FITSs.   
 
Moreover, through the study in this chapter, it is found that although Beijing was regarded as 
the most important location for the setup of business by most FITSs, for those FITSs who are 
focusing on the corporate travel business, their virtual headquarter of Chinese business was in 
fact located in Shanghai. However, there were also some characters of the FITS sector in 
Beijing similar as those in the Shanghai area, such as:  
l Beijing also saw the licensing ban on the Chinese outbound travel market as a substantial 
obstacle to the development of the FITS sector; 
l The majority of them were from Asian countries and regions, including five Japanese, 
four from Hong Kong, and one from Singapore, together with three American, two 
European and one Australian companies; 
l In general, these FITSs very much relied on the foreign customers inherited from the 
foreign parent companies. However, although inbound group tours into China seemed to 
be the most essential target market in the sector, FITSs have extended their attention to 
the Chinese domestic market gradually, especially the Chinese corporate and MICE, and 
expatriate market in China. As FITSs are becoming familiar with the Chinese local travel 
market, they will eventually infiltrate into the Chinese outbound market, causing deeper 
and wider influences on the marketplace. 
 
With a questionnaire survey, the local travel agency sector in Beijing is also examined, with 
some findings summarized below: 
l The travel trade businesses in Beijing were relatively small and young; 
l The inbound travel was the weakest part of the local agencies, with the domestic being 
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the strongest. And, Beijing witnessed a more mature industry structure with more 
attention to the inbound and outbound travel market than that in Shanghai; 
l The majority of the local respondents were willing to cooperate with foreign services; 
l The local respondents generally welcomed foreign services, although both competition 
and cooperation were perceived; 
l In Beijing, the local services expressed a generally high level of satisfaction with the 
local tourism authority and associations.  
 
JTB New Century, CITS AMEX, and CYTS Travelport were selected as the major case 
studies of this chapter. Originally, they were all set up as Chinese controlled JVs, and 
commonly with a state owned Chinese partner and a world famous foreign partner. Moreover, 
fully appreciating and utilizing local knowledge and resources was another most remarkable 
character of the three JVs, with only a small number of foreign managers employed. In 
addition, the restraint of the Chinese policies upon the Chinese outbound travel market was 
also commonly considered as the biggest encumbrance on their way towards the expansion in 
China. 
     
However, in terms of differences, JTBNC has been able to profit from the investment after 
one year of operation, resulting from good communications and efficient management 
principles between the partners. JTBNC has established an efficient decision making and 
execution platform by emphasizing the function of the Board, whereupon the both partners’ 
interest and power can drive the JV harmoniously. But JTB’s development strategy in China 
was independent from its Chinese partner, as its wholly owned service has been set up in 
Shanghai (as well as in Guangdong). 
 
CITS AMEX had made a small profit after five years of stable collaboration. Its business 
focus was mainly on the corporate and MICE market in China, with both multinational and 
Chinese clients. In terms of expansion methods, AMEX showed a different approach from 
JTBNC, as the American investor was applying close collaboration with CITS, together 
establishing three joint entities already in China. 
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CYTS Travelport was dissolved after two years, mainly caused by different expectancies 
about the JV’ future and a lack of communications between the two parent companies. 
Travelport’s former owner, CC, being an investment company looking for values created by 
trading entities, essentially wasn’t a tour operator. Its investment to CYTS Travelport was 
basically following the nature of adventure capital. The insufficient communication and 
understanding between the two partners also limited possibility of further investments of the 
foreign partner, and eventually resulted in a breakup within the two years. Moreover, the 
essential ownership changes occurred in ‘Travelport’ in overseas markets were damaging to 
the foundation of the corporation.   
 
Finally, there are three important issues noteworthy based on the understanding of early 
literature chapters. First, similar to Shanghai, the FITS sector in Beijing saw no clear 
boundary between the TO business and TA business. Second, in terms of investment forms, 
green field FDI, including Sino-controlled JVs, foreign controlled JVs and WOFEs, was the 
dominant approach in the sector in Beijing. However, in the case of FCm CC, foreign direct 
acquisition was witnessed, which signals multi-forms of FDI could increase in the future. 
Third, more obviously than in Shanghai, FITSs in Beijing showed very high levels of respect 
to the significance of the Chinese government and relative policies. The important role of 
SOEs in the Chinese travel trade market was also evident in the FITS sector in Beijing. In 
addition, Beijing experienced the initial action of foreign on-line travel operators via the 
establishment of CYTS Travelport and GTAC. Although the former case ended with loss and 
dissolution, the wholly owned GTAC recognized itself as a wholesaler with a backup of an 
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Chapter 9 
 The Tourism Industry and FITSs in Guangdong  
 
9.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters examine two significant locations, Shanghai and Beijing. Same as the 
surveys conducted in these two locations, the province of Guangdong is also researched using 
both interviews and a questionnaire survey. Essentially, if Beijing is featured as the most 
politically important city of mainland China, with Shanghai recognized as the most important 
business center of the country, Guangdong is often regarded as another economically 
important hub. It has close connections with more advanced economies, including Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan. In this chapter, the province of Guangdong and its two most important 
cities, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, will be examined through the use of a study regarding the 
development approaches of FITSs registered in the location. However, Guangzhou, being the 
capital city of the province, hosts the majority of the FITS sector, and receives more attention 
than Shenzhen. 
 
The structure of this chapter is similar to that of the previous two. The general investment 
environment of Guangdong, such as geographical, historical and cultural characteristics, 
economic and industrial bases, accessibility, and local labour market, is examined, followed 
by a summary of the tourism facilities and resources in the province and the two cities. Then, 
five FITS case studies are introduced, with an analysis of local attitudes towards the FITS 
sector in the marketplace. Following this discussion, two in depth case studies, Kuoni and 
Hong Thai, are investigated in detail in order to gain a better understanding of their concerns 
and strategies when expanding in China. In conclusion, after summarizing the above 
investigations, some aspects of the literature review chapters and FITSs characteristics found 
in the location are discussed. Based on the comprehension of the local markets in Guangdong 
and in the other two locations, Shanghai and Beijing, the next chapter can provide 
comparisons of major survey results found in the three locations.       
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9.2. The Summary of the Province and Its Two Major Cities 
9.2.1. Geographical View of the Location 
Located in the southern end of China, Guangdong province covers a total land area of 
179,756.5 square kilometers. Adjoining the Wuling Mountains to the north, the province faces 
the South China Sea to the south, with a landscape sloping from north to south. The deltas of 
the Pearl River and Han River are its chief plains. The Pearl River Delta is the convergent 
point of three upstream rivers, the East River, the North River, and the West River (See Figure 
9.1). These three rivers, as well as Han River, are Guangdong’s main water-ways. With a few 
inactive volcanoes, there are also numerous spots having underground hot water in 
Guangdong. There were two provincial level cities, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, as well as 
other 42 cities under the administration of the province. By the end of 2007, Guangdong’s 
population reached 94.49 million. (Guangdong Bureau of Statistics, GBS, 2008) 
 
Guangdong is often studied as four geographical divisions. These are: The Delta of Pearl 
River, the north mountain area, the Eastern area, and the Western area. Among the four areas, 
the Delta of Pearl River is the most economically advanced, occupying 23% of the province’s 
total land area, but contributing more than 80% of its whole GDP. (Guangdong Bureau of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, GDBOFTEC, 2007) The Delta of Pearl River 
includes Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and other seven cities. However, especially Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen have both been considered two of the most prosperous cities of China.  
 
Guangzhou is the capital city of Guangdong, located in the middle south of the province, 
covering a total area of 7434.4 square kilometers. The north and east of the city are 
mountainous areas with water, the south having the alluvial plain of the Pearl River Delta. 
The population was over 10 million in 2007, including 52 minority ethnic groups and about 
18,000 foreigners who had lived in the city for more than one year (Guangzhou Bureau of 
Statistics, GZBS, 2008). Additionally, as Figure 9.2 shows, Shenzhen lies 160 km to the south 
of Guangzhou, and 35 km to Hong Kong. Reaching Pearl River mouth to the west and 
bordering Hong Kong on the south, Shenzhen covers a total area of 1953 square kilometers. 
Its total population exceeded 8.61 million in 2007. (GBS, 2008) 
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Figure 9.1.  The map of Guangdong and the Delta of Pearl River 
 
Sources: based on http://www.maps-of-china.com , 2009 (Approximate scale: 1: 800,000) 
 
Figure 9.2.  The map of major cities in Guangdong 
Sources: 
http://www.johomaps.com , 2007  (Approximate scale: 1: 800,000) 
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9.2.2. Historical and Cultural Development of the Location 
Guangdong, with a short name of Yue, is the home of Lingnan Culture which is compatible 
for the 53 ethnic groups who are living on this land. The province also has a long history of 
foreign trading, being the original spot of the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ connecting ancient China 
with many Asian countries, such as India and Japan, and some countries in the Middle East 
and Africa since Han (206 BC to 220 AD) Dynasties. (People’s Government of Guangdong 
Province, PGGP, www.gd.gov.cn , 2007) Moreover, Guangdong shares almost the same culture 
with the nearby economy which was then a prosperous British colony, Hong Kong, in terms 
of language, customs, and business culture. Thus, the province became the frontline of the 
reform and open programme of P.R.China in 1980. Facilitated by the geographical and social 
proximity between the two markets, more advanced technology, management skills and 
capital mainly from Hong Kong, and low costs of resources and manpower in Guangdong 
were functioning well together, leading to continuous development in the province, especially 
in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, for almost three decades.    
 
Guangzhou, being the capital city of the province, has the longest and most representative 
history within the whole region. Dating back to 214 BC, Guangzhou was known as Panyu. 
Being a major sea port along China’s south boundary, Guangzhou suffered many foreign 
invasions in its history, such as the sack of the Persians in 786 and the ‘Treaty of Nanjing’ in 
1842 forcing Guangzhou to be one of the five open ports for foreign business transactions. 
However, the city has also become a main entry point of foreign culture for many centuries, 
which has brought local firms the experience of international business. Given the opportunity 
during the implementation of China’s reform and open policy, Guangzhou’s overall economic 
strength has risen to rank as the third within the country, with foreign trade sector making 
considerable contribution to the city’s gross economical performance. (Guangzhou 
Government, www.gz.gov.cn , 2007) However, Shenzhen was just a fishing village until the late 
1970s, when the then Chinese leader, Mr. Deng Xiaoping, singled out the city as the first SEZ 
in China due to its proximity to the more advanced economy, Hong Kong. Since 1990s, 
Shenzhen has become one of the economic powerhouses of China, as well as one of the 
largest manufacturing bases in the world. (Shenzhen Government, www.sz.gov.cn , 2007) 
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9.2.3. Industrial and Economic Bases of the Location 
Guangdong has a comprehensive and sound industrial system, especially an advanced 
manufacturing sector. Other powerful industries include textile and clothes, food and drinks, 
construction and materials, electronics and information, paper making, mechanical equipment, 
petrochemical, automobile, and bio-pharmaceutical industry. Also, high and new tech industry 
and the tertiary industry, including commerce and trade, logistics, and exhibitions, have been 
fiercely encouraged in recent years. (PGGP, 2007) Resulting from this, the average annual 
growth rates of the GDP in Guangdong was always over 10% for the last three decades, 
ranking the first among all the provinces in China, and occupying almost 1/8 of the country’s 
total GDP. The GDP of Guangdong in 2007 was around RMB 3,108.44 billion (about 
US$ 410.08 billion), increasing by 18.8% over 2006. The value of exports and imports totaled 
US$ 634 billion approximately in 2007, increasing by 20.3% over 2006. And the 
corresponding 2007’s figures in retail sales of consumer goods reached RMB 1,059.81 billion 
(about US$ 153 billion), rising by 16.2%. (GBS, 2008)  
 
Moreover, Guangdong has a sound economical platform with an obvious character of being 
foreign-oriented, which has made Guangdong always rank the first within the country, in 
terms of the total value of imports and exports, for more than 20 years. In 2007, the province 
had the total amount of actual utilized foreign direct investment (FDI) of US$ 17.13 billion, 
with a growth of 18.1% than the year of 2006. Since then, Guangdong has accumulatively 
attracted a quarter of the total amount of FDI in the entire country, totaled over US$ 300 
billion by the end of 2007. (GBS, 2008) Moreover, by 2007, there have been totally 181 
multinationals that were ranked among the top 500 strongest companies in the world setting 
up subsidiaries in Guangdong, with 696 entities established in total. 310 foreign R & D 
centers have also been formed by FDI located in the province in 2007 (GDBOFTEC, 2007). 
 
Guangzhou, through its more than 2000 years history, has always been one of China’s most 
important commercial and trading ports. In the time of the P. R. China, due to its proximity to 
Hong Kong and Macao, the city enjoyed China’s open policy at the earliest stage, which 
promoted the local economical strength and made the city the third strongest within the 
country, in terms of GDP, with an average annual growth rate of more than 14% in the past 
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two decades. In 2007, the GDP of the city reached RMB 705.07 billion (about US$ 100 
billion) increasing by 14.5% over 2006, with the per-capita GDP of around US$ 9302, 
ranking the first among all mainland China cities. Moreover, being the capital of the province, 
Guangzhou has an advanced industrial base with a strong secondary industry, such as 
automobile manufacturing and electronic communications, and a developed tertiary industry 
such as tourism, commerce and trade, and financial and insurance. In 2007, the proportion of 
the three industries to the GDP in Guangzhou was: 2.29:39.95:57.76. (Guangzhou Bureau of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, GZBOFTEC, 2008) 
 
In addition, statistics of Guangzhou showed that the approved contractual value of FDI in 
2007 totaled US$ 7.04 billion, up by over 60% over the previous year. The actual FDI inflow 
amounted to US$ 3.29 billion in 2007, up by 12.4% over 2006. The foreign trade also attained 
a new height that the total export and import volume in 2007 reached US$ 73.49 billion with 
an increase of 15.2%.The city has become one of the few import-export major trading cities in 
China that can basically maintain a balance between exports and imports, with 2007 
witnessing a total export value of US$ 37.90 billion, up by 17% over the previous year, as 
well as a total import value of US$ 35.59 billion, up by 13.4% over 2006. (GZBOFTEC, 2008) 
Furthermore, the total industrial production value of foreign enterprises in the City reached 
520.72 billion Yuan (US$ 66.76 billion), more than 64% of the city’s total in 2006. The 
taxable income related to foreign taxes exceeded 50 billion Yuan (US$ 6.41 billion), or 33% 
of the city’s total taxation income. And the actual foreign investment in the city makes up 
about 14% of the city’s fixed asset investment in the same year. It is clearly the case that the 
foreign trade has played an important role in driving the city’s economic and social 
development. (GZBS, 2007) 
 
Sharing an intimate trade and social linkage with Hong Kong, Shenzhen was selected to be 
the first SEZ of China, in 1980. Being a major manufacturing center of the country, the city 
has both strong secondary and tertiary sectors, with the proportion of the three industries to 
the aggregate of the GDP being 0.1: 50.1: 49.8 in 2007. Shenzhen’s GDP totaled 680.1 billion 
Yuan (US$ 98 billion) in 2007 (slightly lower than Guangzhou), up by 19% over the previous 
year. Its economy grew by 16% annually from 2001 to 2007 on average. At the end of 2007, 
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further integration and co-operation plans about Hong Kong and Shenzhen were launched by 
the both governments. It was estimated that Shenzhen-Hong Kong could be the third largest 
metropolis in GDP terms by 2020, which indicates a large potential for the city’s future, with 
electronics and telecom equipment manufacturing being its largest industry. (Shenzhen 
Bureau of Trade and Industry, SZBTI, 2008) 
 
In general, Guangzhou has a more comprehensive industrial base than Shenzhen, being the 
economical and cultural center of the whole region of the Southern China. The total retail 
sales of consumer goods in 2007 amounted to 259.5 billion Yuan (US$ 37.6 billion) in 
Guangzhou, and 191.5 billion Yuan (US$ 27.7 billion) in Shenzhen. However, the foreign 
trade and investment in Shenzhen was more vigorous than Guangzhou, with over 2000 new 
projects of FDI, and US$ 3.66 billion of FDI in Shenzhen in 2007. The corresponding figures 
of Guangzhou were 959 projects and US$ 3.29 billion. Moreover, Guangzhou witnessed a 
total value of exports and imports of US$ 73.49 billion in 2007, while Shenzhen had a value 
of US$ 168.54 billion in exports, US$ 119.06 billion in imports, and a total of US$ 287.6 
billion in the year, mainly benefiting from Shenzhen’s proximity to the port of Hong Kong. 
(GBS, 2008) 
 
9.2.4. Other Issues on the Investment Environment of the Location 
Guangdong province had 109 regular institutions of higher education, 5128 secondary schools 
and some 19,900 primary schools, as well as 10,594 kindergartens, enrolling over 1.1 million 
students in higher education institutions, 7.92 million in secondary schools and over 11 
million in primary schools in 2007. In the same year, there were approximately half million 
people engaged in science and technology projects, with 3678 various scientific and 
technological research institutions. The average annual wage in the local urban areas was 
29658 Yuan (about US$ 4298) in 2007, an increase of 12% from 2006. The total employed 
numbered 54 million in 2007, including over 10 million in urban areas. Therefore, the human 
resource in Guangdong was abundant, in terms of absolute numbers. (GBS, 2008) Moreover, 
it is noteworthy that Guangzhou, being the cultural center of the Southern China, embodied 
the most intensive network of educational facilities in the province, as 63 higher educational 
institutions located in the city, more than half of the province's total. (GZBS, 2008)   
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Guangdong also enjoyed a comprehensive and convenient transportation system. The total 
length of roads reached 178390 kilometers by the end of 2006, including 3340 km highway 
system which was planned to exceed 5000 km by 2010. From 2006 to 2010, Guangdong is 
planning to put huge investment and efforts on its railway system between major cities. The 
total length of railways will reach 2900 km, and that of the subways shall surpass 300 km by 
the year of 2010. Facing the South China Sea, there were 1265 rivers used as waterways for 
shipping in Guangdong, with 1194 berths in the ports along the sea, and 1481 berths in the 
freshwater ports in 2006. (GBS, 2007)  
 
In terms of Guangzhou, it is true that as the capital city, the city has the best infrastructure 
conditions within the province. Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport, being one of the 
seven airports in the Guangdong province, was among the top three airports in China (PGGP, 
2007). Guangzhou Port ranked the 3rd in China and the 5th in the world, with an annual cargo 
handling capacity of over 300 million tons in 2006. The Guangzhou Railway Station was one 
of the four largest railway transportation centers in China, in terms of both space and 
passenger numbers. By the end of 2006, the length of its metro lines in operation had reached 
116 km, surpassing Beijing and close to that of Shanghai. Before 2010, as many as 9 metro 
lines will be completed covering all districts in the city and the major cities around the Pearl 
River Delta, with the total length stretching to 255 km. Moreover, as a regional financial 
center, Guangzhou had more than 2800 various financial outlets, with over 60 branches of 
foreign financial institutions distributed in the city. (GZBOFTEC, 2007)  
 
Additionally, the development of the Guangzhou’s information service has been among the 
fastest in China, boasting over its top-ranking communication hub, the Internet exchange 
center and the Internet access facilities in China. The index of Guangzhou’s informatization 
has taken the lead in the country with its comprehensive level very closer to that of a 
metropolitan city in developed countries. Moreover, Guangzhou also has the best exhibition 
facilities in the country. Ranking the first in Asia and the second in the world, Pazhou 
International Convention and Exhibition Center covers a floor area of 0.7 million square 
meters and a site area of 0.92 million square meters. Also, the China Import and Export Fair 
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was held biannually in the city for 101 sessions, known as the No.1 Fair in China. 
(GZBOFTEC, 2007)  
 
Furthermore, being the capital city the housing price in the city of Guangzhou is higher than 
that of Shenzhen. In 2007, the average rental of prime office space in Guangzhou stood at 
around US$ 15.4 per square meter per month. However, the average rental of prime office 
buildings in Shenzhen was about US$ 11.6 per square meter per month in the same year. 
(www.echinacities.com , 2008) 
 
 
9.3. The Tourism Industry and Resources in the Location 
As the southern entrance of China Mainland, the tourism industry in Guangdong has 
experienced a stable and rapid development after China’s reform and open policy was 
implemented in the province. Table 9.1 shows that the total international tourists number 
reached over 206 million in 2007, with foreign tourist number more than doubled from 2000 
to 2007 (GBS, 2008). However, the majority of the international tourists were those from 
Hong Kong and Macao, resulting from the geographical and economic proximity between the 
three markets. The total number of local residents’ outbound trips through travel agencies 
numbered 3.82 million, double that of 2000. In addition, the total earnings from the tourism 
industry in Guangdong grew to more than US$ 31 billion in 2007, again, double that of 2000.  
 
In 2005, there were 884 travel agencies in total in Guangdong province, including 194 
international travel agencies and 690 domestic travel agencies. Among those 194 international, 
99 agencies were qualified and licensed to operate in the outbound travel market. The total 
number of travel agencies further increased to 933 in 2006, and reached 964 in 2007 with 196 
international agencies and 768 domestic ones. In 2007, there were 6985 hotels in the province, 
including 5814 un-stared hotels. Among other 1171 star-ranked hotels, there were 58 
Five-Star hotels, 168 Four-Star, 575 Three-Star, 344 Two-Star, and 26 One-Star hotels. The 
total room numbers reached 418613, with more than 0.77 million beds in 2007. The average 
room occupancy rate of Guangdong in 2007 was 61%. (GBS, 2008)  
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Table 9.1.  The growth of tourist numbers in Guangdong province (2000 to 2007) 




Tourists (1 million 
person-time) 
134.31 157.32 191.55 199.68 206.57 
Foreigners 5.74 7.43 10.79 11.88 13.48 
From Hong Kong 124.80 119.99 127.09 134.46 142.68 
From Macao  26.55 49.33 48.88 45.80 
From Taiwan 3.77 3.34 4.33 4.47 4.61 





1.16 1.72 1.96 2.56 3.82 
To Hong Kong and 
Macao 
0.86 1.11 1.37 1.81 2.82 
To Other 
Destinations 




14.74 21.33 24.14 27.18 31.48 
Foreign Exchange 
Earnings 
4.36 5.70 6.78 7.70 8.50 
Domestic Tourism 
Earnings 
10.38 15.63 17.35 19.48 22.97 
Sources: Guangdong Bureau of Statistics (GBS) (2008) 
(Note: The exchange rate of earnings is based on 1 USD = 7.8 CNY)  
 
 
In general, Guangzhou and Shenzhen have the most advanced and mature marketplaces in the 
tourism industry within the province. Especially, Guangzhou, as the capital of the province, 
had the best and most abundant tourism service facilities than other cities of the province. 
(Guangdong Provincial Tourism Administration, GPTA, 2007) Table 9.2 provides a brief 
comparison between the two cities with figures of 2007. Although the general size of the 
tourism market in Guangzhou is larger than that of Shenzhen, the table also shows that 
Shenzhen had more Five-Star hotels than Guangzhou, as well as higher room occupancy rate. 
Given the advantage of instant access into Hong Kong, the higher demands for hotels in 
Shenzhen, especially the luxury ones, are understandable. 
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Table 9.2. Comparison of tourism facilities between Guangzhou and Shenzhen in 2007 
Item Guangzhou Shenzhen 
Total Number of Travel Agencies  185 162 
   International Travel Agencies 62 38 
   Domestic Travel Agencies 123 124 
Total Number of Hotels  2102 522 
   Five Star Hotels 8 10 
   Four Star Hotels 31 27 
   Three Star Hotels 101 67 
   Two Star Hotels 66 46 
   One Star Hotels 3 1 
Room Occupancy Rates  61.6% 62.7% 
Numbers of Overnight Tourists  33.38 million 25.60 million 
Numbers of Outbound Tourists 1.98 million 0.95 million 
Total Tourism Receipts (US$ billion)  10.23 6.55 
   International Tourism Receipts 3.12 2.56 
   Domestic Tourism Receipts 7.11 3.99 
Sources: GPTA, and GBS, 2008 
(Note: The exchange rate of tourism receipts is based on 1 USD = 7.8 CNY)  
 
Furthermore, with good temperatures all year around, Guangdong province is an ideal tourism 
destination for both international and domestic visitors, with abundant natural scenic 
resources, such as mountains, rivers and lakes, gorges, beaches, hot springs, and islands. 
Additionally, the province also has plenty of cultural and heritage sites as tourist attractions to 
offer. By the end of 2006, there were two world-level, three national level and 34 provincial 
level scenic and heritage reservation areas in the province. In total, the province embodied 
more than 2000 tourist attractions, including 33 forest parks, 60 nature reservation areas and 
24 provincial qualified resorts, as well as seven national geological parks in 2006. (GPTA, 
2007)  
 
Therefore, Guangdong, being one of the most advanced markets in mainland China, had 
abundant resources in tourism service supplies, tourist attractions, transportations, as well as 
travel demands. In general, Guangzhou was still leading the development of tourism within 
the province. However, Shenzhen, being an immediate extension of Hong Kong, was also a 
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9.4. The Sector of FITSs in Guangdong 
9.4.1. FITSs in Guangzhou and Shenzhen 
According to CNTA (2007)’s statistics, there were five foreign invested travel agencies 
registered in Guangdong province by 2007. As can be see from Table 9.3, among the five, 
four were located in Guangzhou, with one in Shenzhen. In addition, it was at the earliest stage 
of the development of FITSs in China, in 1999, that two Sino-controlled JVs were founded in 
Guangzhou, followed by two Hong Kong controlled JVs in 2004, and a foreign wholly owned 
company in 2006. It is important to note that all five firms received direct investment from a 
company in Hong Kong, although the fifth company, Kuoni, was originally from Switzerland.  
 
Table 9.3. The FITS sector in Guangdong province   














Hong Kong Hong 
Thai (49%) 
0.64 million 26 Nov 
1999 
2 Guangdong 
Wingon Travel  
Guangdong 
CITS (51%) 
Hong Kong Wingon 
Travel (49%) 







Shunfeng  (70%) 








Hong Kong Student 
Union (60%) 
0.51 million 12 Oct 
2004 
(Note 1) 
5 Kuoni Travel 
(China) 
None Hong Kong (Swiss) 
Kuoni (100%) 
0.51 million May 
2006  
Sources: Based on the information provided by CNTA in 2006 
(Note 1: the RCs are approximate values after being exchanged: 1USD = 7.8 CNY) 
(Note 2: The setup of Guangdong Student Union (the No. 4 company) was approved by the Chinese Trade 
Administration on 12 October, 2004. But the company had not gone to claim its licenses from CNTA by the 
end of 2006.) 
 
During the practical survey, only two companies accepted the interview inquiry of this study, 
and they are the first and the fifth companies in the Table 9.3 (bold type). These two 
companies were therefore selected for the case study of this chapter, with interviewees listed 
in Table 9.4. The other three companies were not able to be formally interviewed due to 
different reasons. However, in order to provide a comprehensive view about the FITS sector 
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in Guangdong, this section will introduce the major characteristics of the three firms before 
the two major case studies, which will be used in the conclusion of the chapter. 
 
Table 9.4. The list of interviewees in Guangdong province   
No. Company 
Names 










2 Kuoni Travel 
(China) 
Mr. R. A. J. Willis Chairman July 2007 
Source: the author 
 
 
Shenzhen Shunfeng International Travel service (numbered 3 in the Table 9.3), had closed its 
store and office, as well as its phone lines for almost two years. The only information 
available from the local authority was that the company had not been successful in business in 
China, and this might result in the confiscation of their license by the local tourism 
administration (Mr. Charlie Chan, 02/06/2007). In addition, as the ‘Note 1’ of Table 9.3 stated, 
the setup of Guangdong Student Union was approved by the MOFCOM in late 2004, but the 
company did not claimed its licenses from CNTA until 2007. At the time of this survey, the 
company, as well as Guangdong Wingon International Travel Service, declined to be 
interviewed for having neither interests nor time. 
 
However, Guangdong Wingon Travel Service and Guangdong Student Union Travel Service 
were still questioned through telephone, and thus, some useful information was obtained. 
Combining interview data and some secondary data existing on line or on the news, the whole 
sector will be briefly examined, in order to offer some direct comprehension about FITSs in 
Guangdong, and to build an overall picture of the business sector. Three telephone 
interviewed companies will be studied briefly in this section, followed by a summary focusing 
on the marketing strategy and profitability of the whole sector in Guangdong. However, with 
the supports of Guangzhou Hong Thai and Kuoni Travel (China), two in depth case studies 
are also investigated with more details later in this chapter, with the former being a JV case 
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from Hong Kong, and the later representing a WOFE from Europe. By examining every 
FITS’s operation and performances, we can find out some of the common features of the 
sector, helping to answer the aims of this thesis. 
 
First, on the 26th of November, 1999, Guangdong approved its earliest foreign invested travel 
service companies which were both registered in the city of Guangzhou. The companies were 
Guangzhou Hong Thai Travel Service and Guangdong Wingon Travel Service. Both 
companies were in the form of a JV, with the Chinese investors holding the majority, 51%, of 
the total shares. Moreover, the two Chinese investors both had the same background of being 
state owned, with the two foreign investors both being one of the most famous travel service 
brands in Hong Kong. The RC of the both companies were also the same, 5 million Yuan 
(about US$ 0.64 million), which was the then time minimum RC requirement. 
 
Guangdong Wingon Travel Service (GDWO) was the JV of China International Travel 
Service (Guangdong) (Guangdong CITS) and Hong Kong Wingon Travel (HKWO). As we 
have examined CITS before, it is owned by the China government, being one of the biggest 
travel service companies in the China Mainland. Guangdong CITS was set up in 2002, as the 
subsidiary of CITS for the local markets in Guangdong, with more than 500 staff, 33 chain 
sale outlets in Guangzhou, and an annual receiving capacity of over 0.7 million tourists. Its 
major business was focused on international ticketing, FIT market, and travels for corporative 
purposes (www.citstravel.com.cn , 2007). HKWO was founded in 1964 and listed in the Hong 
Kong stock exchange market in 1997. The company had 23 branches in Hong Kong, Macao, 
Guangdong province, as well as subsidiaries in Canada and the UK in 2007. Ranking as one 
of the biggest travel companies in Hong Kong, HKWO organized more than one thousand 
outbound tour groups to overseas destinations annually. (www.wingontravel.com , 2007)  
 
The JV, GDWO was the third qualified FITS companies in China. According to one of the 
staff (anonymous) of GDWO, the company was dealing with both inbound and domestic 
travel business, with a dominant proportion of business on the leisure tour groups from Hong 
Kong and other Asian countries. The total number of staff was approximately 10 in 2007. 
However, this person also revealed that it has been possible for the company to deal with 
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some Chinese outbound travel business. In fact, an article written by Mrs. Anan Gu, on the 
press, www.cnwnc.com (31 March 2005) also mentioned this possibility that some FITS had 
tried to touch the Chinese outbound market by methods, such as transferring the Chinese 
customers to their company in Hong Kong. This option becomes more feasible in Guangdong, 
as the local citizens in Guangdong are usually very familiar with the short commuting 
between the province and Hong Kong. Although it is not directly breaking the regulations, the 
methods were still operated with great caution.  
 
Shenzhen Shunfeng Travel Service (SSTS) was the first foreign controlled JV in Guangdong, 
starting in May 2004 in Shenzhen, with about 15 to 20 employees. The Chinese investor was 
again CITS’s subsidiary in Shenzhen, possessing 30% of the JV’s total stakes 
(www.eachtravel.com , 2007). However, the Hong Kong partner, Hong Kong Shunfeng Travel 
Service (HKSF) was a small-medium sized travel company in the Hong Kong market, 
specializing in international ticketing and corporate travel. The RC of the JV was as same as 
the minimum then time requirement set by the state, 4 million Yuan (US$ 0.51 million). 
However, the JV was not successful, and its office had been closed down by early 2006. Thus 
this company could not be found nor contacted during the survey.  
 
However, through the records of local newspapers, there were still some details available 
about the company. According to Mrs. Anan Gu, (www.cnwnc.com , 31 March 2005), SSTS 
had encountered difficulties in operating in China, such as the fierce competition in prices, 
and that the business was not developing well. Another earlier article, at www.southcn.com on 
22 April 2004, revealed that the Shenzhen Tourism Administration emphasized a goal that 
‘Shenzhen should make efforts to have its first foreign-invested travel service company 
founded as soon as possible [originally in Chinese]’ at its conference on 3 July 2003. 
Considering that HKSF was not a very strong foreign partner a SOE like Shenzhen CITS 
would have chosen, a hypothesis was raised that the setup of SSTS could rather be a political 
fulfillment rather than a commercial activity. Then, the JV’s name will exist as long as it is 
needed even through its business performance might be poor. This may explain why the JV 
was still kept in the records of the local tourism administration office, but was not traceable in 
practice after it had closed down some years ago. As there had not been any other FITSs 
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located in Shenzhen by the end of 2007, the existence of SSTS can be regarded as a symbol of 
the open and development of the FITS sector for the local government.    
 
Guangdong Student Union Travel Service (GSUTS) obtained its ‘setup’ permission from the 
China Commercial Administration Office on 12 Oct 2004. The two joint partners were Hong 
Kong Student Union Travel Service (HKSUTS), having 60% of the total shares, and 
Guangdong Jingan Auction Limited Company (GJA) which was not professional in the travel 
business, holding the other 40% of the JV. The RC of the GSUTS was 4 million Yuan (about 
US$ 0.51 million). HKSUTS was specialized in student and educational travel market, being 
exclusive issuing office for international students’ ISIC card, young persons’ IYTC card, and 
international teachers’ ITIC card in Hong Kong and Macao region. It had five branches in 
Hong Kong, one in Macao, one in Beijing, and two in Guangdong. (www.hkst.com , 2007) 
However, GJA was a small service company specialized in selling art collections and antiques, 
with less than ten employees in total and around US$ 1.5 million annual turnover. 
 
However, GSUTS did not acquire its licence from the CNTA until the end of 2006, Thus, its 
legal operation started from 2007. According to a member of staff (who did not wish to reveal 
their name) of the JV, GSUTS had about 30 employees in total in 2007. Its main business 
covered both the Chinese inbound and domestic travel market. Providing travel services for 
both leisure and business purposes, the JV has been profitable since July 2007. However, as 
both partner companies declined to be interviewed for this survey, some questions remain as 
puzzles. For example, why did HKSUTS prefer the Chinese partner who was not professional 
in tourism; why did the JV not obtain its licenses from CNTA until its full operation in 2006? 
Hopefully, there may be future studies which could reveal more detail. 
 
Along with the three FITS studied above, there were two more case studies which will be 
presented in more details in later in this chapter. However, some characteristics should be 
noted. First, FITSs in Guangdong were small-sized enterprises, with RC to match minimum 
requests, and 10 to 30 members of staff. Second, the Hong Kong economy deeply influence 
the sector in Guangdong, as all the foreign investors were from Hong Kong, or invested 
through subsidiaries in Hong Kong. Third, the majority of the Chinese investors were SOEs, 
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which indicates that the Chinese governments, at both central and local level, were significant 
players in the FITS sector in the country. Last but not least, the operation and development of 
FITSs seemed to be a hard experience, with one closure and one delay of setup. Moreover, the 
profitability was regarded as a very sensitive topic by all FITSs in Guangdong. However, the 
collected data from FITSs will be reviewed in the next section, and will give a general 
understanding of their performance in Guangdong.  
 
9.4.2. Target Markets and Profitability of FITSs in Guangdong 
By looking at the marketing strategies of the total five FITSs in Guangdong, the information 
in this section will help to address the objective 1E of the thesis (see Chapter Six). According 
to the data obtained from the studied companies, the five foreign invested travel agencies in 
Guangdong province were generally facing difficulties in making profits. Table 9.5 provides a 
brief outline of the five companies regarding their target markets and the situations of 
profitability. SSTS was closed down within two years, which indicates a possibility that the 
company might have been in a continuous loss situation since its setup. Guangzhou Hong 
Thai has experienced both win and loss years, and have been generally even until 2007. 
Kuoni Travel (China) was hoping to have its breakeven, or only a small loss for its first year 
operation in China. The staff in GSUTS claimed the company had been profitable, albeit it 
was not in full operation by 2006. Therefore, as GDWO did not reveal its financial situation, 
only two companies in Guangdong declared to have met profitable year by 2007.   
 
As the five companies all had a foreign mother company from Hong Kong (which has a very 
similar culture and business environment to the local market of Guangdong), both the inbound 
travel market and Chinese domestic travel market were considered as important business 
resources by the FITS sector in Guangdong. In addition, the MICE market was applied as a 
main target market by the sector too. Moreover, as the travel service industry in Hong Kong 
was strongly relying on its outbound market, and having already developed large capacities in 
international travel trade cooperation, low international ticketing prices have become one of 
the most considerable advantages of the Hong Kong invested enterprises operating in 
mainland China.  
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Table 9.5. The target markets and profitability of FITSs in Guangdong (by 2007) 
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Furthermore, the survey found that it was possible for the companies in Guangdong province 
to handle some of the local outbound travel by passing these customers to their mother 
companies in Hong Kong. As mentioned before, the local citizens in Guangdong province are 
generally familiar with Hong Kong as it involves a short journey of various convenient 
transportation methods. Thus, it is not very troublesome for local people to pay for the 
products in Guangdong and to go to Hong Kong as a middle stop during the journey abroad, 
which makes the outbound business possible to operate by FITSs. One of the staff in GDWO 
approved this possibility as already an operating reality. As the Chinese government was 
trying to prevent FITSs from sharing the Chinese outbound travel market by regulations, these 
foreign-invested companies had to figure out additional businesses, such as this type of 
indirect sales, for surviving. According to Mrs. Anan Gu, (www.cnwnc.com , 31 March 2005), 
many FITSs in China, such as Gullivers, also had their branches in Hong Kong. Such sales 
collaboration between Hong Kong and Mainland China was an interesting and unique 
phenomenon among FITSs in China, especially Guangdong. 
 
9.4.3. Local Travel Services and Their Attitudes towards FITSs 
As discussed Guangdong province had a total of 964 travel agencies in total in 2007, 
including 196 international travel agencies and 768 domestic travel agencies. Among the 196 
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international agencies about half were qualified and fully licensed for Chinese inbound, 
outbound, and the domestic travel market. The total number of travel services in Guangdong 
province was greater than those of Beijing and Shanghai. With the same ‘spatially stratified’ 
street visiting method applied in Shanghai and Beijing (explained in chapter six), 50 
questionnaires were collected from the local travel agencies in Guangdong. However, in 
contrast to the other locations, the questionnaires were collected from two cities of both 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen. 
 
Moreover, two local university students were hired to be the research assistants with each 
conducting a survey in one city. According to the ratio of the total numbers of travel agencies 
in the two cities, the researcher decided the numbers of questionnaires that should be obtained 
was 27 from Guangzhou and 23 from Shenzhen. Same as in Beijing and Shanghai, at least 
half of the collected questionnaires were checked by phoning back to the respondents, 
according to their contact methods recorded, in order to control the quality and validity of the 
data. Using the same structure as in the other two cities, the results will be represented in five 
groups: 1) their scale; 2) business fields; 3) relation with FITSs; 4) attitude to FITSs; and 5) 
attitude to the local government offices (see Table 6.8 in chapter six). 
 
The frequency report of the survey in Guangdong province is attached as Appendix 9.1. 
Generally, the respondents in Guangdong province were those relatively large and strong 
travel services in the local market, as 42 respondents qualified as international travel agencies, 
including 37 fully licensed for the Chinese inbound, outbound and domestic travel markets, 
accounting for 84% and 74% of the total respondent numbers correspondingly. Table 9.6 
summarizes the characteristics of the respondent local agencies with reference to their ages 
and scales. 54% of the respondents were young, founded within the past 10 years. Around half, 
48%, of the total had less than 50 staff, with only 14% having more than 400 employees. 
Moreover, 58% of the total had less than 10 branches, including 14 respondents, 28%, having 
only one branch, but only 4% of the all having over 100 outlets. Thus, although the 
respondents were relatively large ones in the local market, they were still young, and small to 
medium sized.  
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Table 9.6.  Summary of characteristics of the respondents in Guangdong 
Item Frequency Percentage of the Total Valid Percent 
Qualified for International 
Travel Service 
42 84% / 
Among the above, 
Qualified for Outbound  
37 74% 88% 
Only for Domestic Service 8 16% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 <= 10 years old 27 54% / 
 >10 years old 23 46% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 1 to 49 Staff 24 48% / 
50 to 99 Staff  8 16% / 
100 to 399 Staff 11 22% / 
400 to 1000 Staff 5 10% / 
More than 1000 Staff 2 4% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 1 Branch 14 28% / 
2 to 9 Branches 15 30% / 
10 to 49 Branches 16 32% / 
50 to 99 Branches 3 6% / 
>= 100 Branches 2 4% / 
Total Respondents  50 100% / 




In terms of the major business fields and income sources of the local travel service companies 
in Guangdong province, the results were very similar to those of Beijing and Shanghai, with a 
common emphasis on both domestic and outbound travel markets, but with a lack of attention 
on the inbound business. Table 9.7 combines the results of two questions concerning the 
major business fields and income resources of the local travel trade sector. Domestic services, 
generally, was chosen by 60% of the total respondents, followed by outbound travel services 
occupying around 28% of the total. But, only 4% of the total respondents applied the Chinese 
inbound market as their major business contents. Moreover, Figure 9.3 shows more clearly the 
results pointing to the weakness of the local travel services in the operation on the inbound 
travel market. 58% of the total claimed that Chinese domestic travel brought them significant 
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Table 9.7. Major business focuses and income sources of the respondents in Guangdong  
Item Frequency Percent of the Total  
Domestic tour groups and individual tours 
as the major business 
30 60% 
Overseas tour groups and individual tours 
as the major business 
14 28% 
Bookings of hotels and flights as the major 
business 
4 8% 
Incoming tourists as the major business 2 4% 
Total Respondents 50 100% 
 Domestic services as the major income 29 58% 
Inbound services as the major income 3 6% 
Outbound services as the major income 18 36% 
Total Respondents 50 100% 
Sources: the author 
 
Figure 9.3.  The importance of outbound, inbound, and domestic travel markets for the local travel 
services in Guangdong.  
Question 5: Which of the following three is your
















Sources: the author 
 
In terms of the communications and relationships between the local travel services and 
foreign capitals, the results are combined in the Table 9.8. Among all the local respondents, 
there were 20 agencies having parent companies. Although seven of the 20 announced that 
their mother companies were involved in foreign projects, none of them was indirectly owned 
by foreign investors. In addition, as examined before, there were 37 respondents permitted to 
operate the Chinese outbound travel business. And among these 37 agencies, 43.2% were 
applying foreign partnerships for the oversea business, together with another 27% using both 
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partnerships and own branches, making up of totally more than 70% who having foreign 
partners. Furthermore, 76% of the total respondents stated that they had cooperating business 
experiences with foreign services. Among them, more than 81% of these agencies had ‘Very 
Good’ or ‘Good’ relationships with the foreign partners, with the rest over 18% giving a 
neutral view. In short, similar as the results in Shanghai and Beijing, the local travel service 
sector in Guangdong also showed a high preference of utilizing international partnerships for 
both overseas and domestic travel business.  
 
Table 9.8. Communications and relationships between the local travel trade businesses and 
international capital investments in Guangdong 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Having parent companies 20 40% / 
       Mother company being involved in 
foreign investments 
7 14% 35% 
Wholly owning a venture in overseas 5 10% 71.4% 
A foreign invested mother company 0 0% 0% 
Having joint investments in overseas 2 4% 28.6% 
Involved in Other Asian countries 1 2% 14.3% 
Involved in Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan 6 12% 85.7% 
Having no parent companies 30 60% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 Permitted for outbound (see Table 9.6) 37 74% / 
    Building foreign partnerships  16 32% 43.2% 
    Setting up own branches 6 12% 16.2% 
    Using the above both ways  10 20% 27% 
    Only solicit tourists in China  5 10% 13.5% 
 Having cooperated with foreign agencies 38 76% / 
    The relationship being ‘Very Good’ 6 12% 15.8% 
    The relationship being ‘Good’ 25 50% 65.8% 
    The relationship being ‘Neutral’ 7 14% 18.4% 
Having not cooperated with foreigners  12 24% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author 
 
Concerning knowledge of the local travel trade sector about the FITS sector, the main results 
were displayed in Table 9.9. Among all the respondents, 39 agencies, 78% of the total, had 
knowledge about incoming foreign entrants, with only one respondent disliking these 
foreigners and about a quarter of the knowing agencies being neutral. Dominantly, the local 
services gave a welcome to FITS companies.  Figure 9.4 also clearly shows the local travel 
services' opinion about the roles of FITSs in the Chinese market. Among the 39 agencies, over 
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half thought that the foreign entrants could be both rivals and partners in the future, with 
about a quarter concerning the foreign services as competitors rather than partners, leaving 
about 20% being more positive and regarding the foreign services as a model to learn from. In 
general, the local travel services showed a slightly higher consideration about competition 
from foreign entrants than cooperation brought by the foreign firms.   
 
Table 9.9.  Local knowledge of and attitudes towards the FITS sector in Guangdong 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Having the knowledge of foreign entrants 39 78% / 
Do not like foreign agencies 1 2% 2.6% 
    Neutral 10 20% 25.6% 
Appreciate foreign agencies 28 56% 71.8% 
Concerning as a considerable rival 
with advanced skills 
6 12% 15.4% 
Concerning  as a new rival with 
different background 
3 6% 7.7% 
Concerning as both a potential 
competitor and partner 
22 44% 56.4% 
Concerning as a valuable model to 
learn from 
8 16% 20.5% 
Having no knowledge of foreign entrants 11 22% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author 
 
Figure 9.4.  The respondents’ thoughts about the role of FITSs in Guangdong  
Question 17: Which is the one best indicating the role of
foreign agents in the Chinese marketplace?
Role of foreign agents
















Sources: the author 
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In terms of the local respondents' views and attitudes towards the local associations and the 
relationship with the government offices, Table 9.10 provides a summary of the relative 
results. 92% of the total respondents have been members of associations of the Chinese 
tourism industry. And among them, 35 agencies, over 76%, joined in the associations which 
were responsible for CNTA. Moreover, among these 35 respondents, over 45% claimed that 
they were ‘Very Satisfied’ or ‘Satisfied’ with the associations, with about 48% being ‘Neutral’. 
And less than 6% showed their dissatisfaction with the governments’ associations. Moreover, 
60% of the total respondents regarded a good relationship with the administrative offices as 
an important issue, with another 38% being neutral. Only 2% of the all respondents expressed 
the negative opinion. As in Shanghai and Beijing, only a small group of companies in 
Guangdong ignored the relationship with the government organizations, and announced their 
dissatisfaction with the public sector.  
 
Table 9.10.  Local attitudes towards governmental organizations in Guangdong 
Item Frequency Percent of the Total Valid Percent 
Being a member of the Chinese 
associations in the tourism industry 
46 92% / 
In the Associations directly under the 
supervision of the government 
35 70% 76.1% 
  Being ‘Very Satisfied’ with the 
    Associations 
4 8% 11.4% 
Being ‘Satisfied’  12 24% 34.3% 
Being ‘Neutral’ 17 34% 48.6% 
Being ‘Unsatisfied’ 1 2% 2.9% 
Being ‘Very Unsatisfied’ 1 2% 2.9% 
Not Being a member of any Chinese 
associations in the tourism industry  
4 8% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
 To have a good relationship with the 
government is ‘Important’ 
30 60% / 
To have a good relationship with the 
government is ‘Neutral’ 
19 38% / 
To have a good relationship with the 
government is ‘ Not Important’ 
1 2% / 
Total Respondents 50 100% / 
Sources: the author 
 
Table 9.11 demonstrates the respondents’ numbers concerning the local satisfaction level with 
the major functions of the local tourism board. The functions of providing consultant supports 
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and of providing channel of networking and communication gained higher satisfaction scores 
than other two functions, both with around 16% being very satisfied, around 40% being 
satisfied and 40% being neutral. The respondents gave lower scores to the functions of 
providing marketing information and of providing arbitration services for the industry, with 
48% and 42% being very satisfied or satisfied with the two functions respectively, while 10% 
and 14% being unsatisfied correspondingly. In general, the majority showed their satisfaction 
with the local tourism board, with about 40% holding ‘neutral’ stand. 
 
 
Table 9.11. Local satisfaction level with the major functions of Guangdong tourism board 
Item Very 
Satisfied 
Satisfied Neutral Unsatisfied Very 
Unsatisfied 
Marketing Research  5 19 21 5 0 
Arbitration 7 14 22 7 0 
Consultant and Aids 8 20 19 3 0 
Networking/Communication 8 19 20 3 0 
Sources: the author 
 
Together with the questionnaire survey conducted in Shanghai and Beijing, the work in 
Guangdong practically completed the questionnaire survey which particularly aimed to 
address Objective 2B (see Table 6.1 in chapter six). Through the survey in Guangdong, basic 
features of the local travel services were discovered, enabling a comparison to be made 
between the three research locations. This is presented in the next chapter. Generally, the 
travel service industry in Guangdong was also young and small, just like the other two 
locations. Although they welcomed the entry of FITSs, worries of competition have also been 
identified. Moreover, the local services in Guangdong also showed a preference to applying 
foreign partnerships for both domestic and overseas travel business, and tend to remain a 
good relationship with the foreign partners. Last but not least, as in Beijing and Shanghai, the 
unbalanced strength of the travel trade sector among three markets, the inbound, outbound 
and domestic, especially the weakness of the inbound market, was also an obvious fact 
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9.5. Case Study of Kuoni Travel (China) 
Kuoni Travel China (KTC) is 100% owned by the Kuoni Group with its headquarters in 
Switzerland. The licensing procedure which commenced in July 2005 was completed in May 
2006. It is the first wholly owned foreign travel service company to be established in the 
Guangdong Province. The Chairman of the company, Mr. Richard A J Willis, accepted the 
interview in the company’s Guangzhou office in July 2007, followed by further questions via 
e-mails subsequently. Mr. Willis has had more than 20 years of experience with the Chinese 
tourism industry, hence he has a very good understanding of the difference between the 
international businesses protocols and the business traditions in China. As he also generously 
provided plenty of data of his company to this research, KTC becomes one of the major case 
studies of this chapter.    
 
9.5.1. The Parent Company and the set up of KTC 
KTC is a 100% investment by the Swiss based Kuoni Travel Group (KTG) which was 
founded by Mr. Alfred Kuoni in Eastern Switzerland in 1906. Being one of the biggest and 
leading travel corporations publicly listed in Europe, KTG is headquartered in Zurich. In 2006, 
KTG generated total turnover of CHF 4082 million (about USD 3,763 million, as ‘1 USD = 
1.08 CHF’) with a worldwide full-time workforce of more than 7500 employees. In 2007, the 
Kuoni group expanded its branch operation to the 30th country, and its travel business was 
then operational in Europe, Asia, Africa Middle East, and North America. Essentially, the 
group’s activity can be divided into two segments: the ‘Leisure Travel’ segment, accounting 
for around 80% of the total turnover, and the ‘Destination Management’ activities for some 
20%. Its leisure travel business is concentrated on outbound tour operating; organizing leisure 
tours of all kinds, with various distribution channels combining a 24 hour call center, and an 
e-booking system. A new generation of branch offices offers lounge areas with travel libraries, 
bars and cafes. However, Kuoni Destination Management is focussing on on-land 
arrangements for inbound tours which are offered to international tour operators. 
(www.kuoni-group.com)  
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KTC commenced full operation in China from October 2006, with a RC of RMB 4 million 
(roughly US$ 0.51 million). However, the company’s earliest business ties in China dates 
back to 1982 when Mr. Willis visited Beijing for the first time to arrange for the visits of 
cruise ships to China. At that time, Mr. Willis was working for the British cruises company, 
P&O (which was later totally purchased by KTG in 2003). Back in 1982, CITS was the only 
official receiving agency and they were not quite prepared to handle cruise ships. Mr. Willis 
(12/07/2007) still remembers what the officer said: ‘who gave you permission to send this 
ship to China?’ However, after a few years, the officer changed attitudes towards the business. 
Mr. Willis (12/07/2007) witnessed the earliest changes,  
‘he [the officer] could see the benefit for China, of the opening up. … Everything in 
those days was done in the name of friendship. … I mean people were making money, 
but they said, ok we are building friendship. That was the good old days. Anyway, 
once opened, China was moving very fast.’  
Thus the P&O’s ships started to come to China from 1983. In 1997 P&O and KTG embarked 
on a 50/50 JV in Hong Kong to capitalize on the future opportunities of investing in the 
Chinese tourism industry. A representative office was established in Beijing in the same year. 
Furthermore, after the Hong Kong JV was entirely purchased by KTG in 2003, the new entity 
in Hong Kong adopted S.K.Y. as its trading name.  
 
In May 2005, KTG submitted the application of setting up a wholly owned travel service 
based in Guangzhou. However, it took the company more than a year to finish all the 
licensing procedure, as the company did not obtain the license until October 2006. According 
to Willis (12/07/2007), for registration and licensing, the company had to go through a lot of 
very complicated procedures. As a WOFE, the applicant had to prove it had an annual 
turnover of US$ 500 million. As an office address was required for the application, they paid 
for the office for a long time before the business was officially approved to start operation.  
 
In fact, KTG’s former partner P&O had tried to find a Chinese partner to establish a JV in 
China, and hoped to bring the company more convenience in handling the local bureaucratic 
matters. They spent several years to talk with five or six Chinese big companies, who were 
mostly state-owned. However, the reason why the JV contract could not be successfully 
achieved was that: 
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‘they [the Chinese companies] want us to invest everything, but they do not want to 
give away anything. We can not find the right partner, we can’t find a partner who 
understands what we wanted, and who is genuinely interested in the business’ (Willis, 
12/07/2007). 
This bad experience might be the reason why KTC had its WOFE when investing in China. 
 
Moreover, he also provided a comment that: 
‘some of the Chinese enterprise do not prefer JVs at the time, but somehow they are 
compelled to consider JVs because they want to get the technological transfer, then 
perhaps parting company with the JV partner at a later stage’ (Willis, 12/07/2007).  
His comment may indicate some cases happened in China, but it was not the only truth of the 
Chinese enterprises with many successful JV examples existing in China. However, it is true 
that as there have not been a lot of big travel companies in the Chinese marketplace, the rare 
big names, such as CITS, CTS, BTG, and Jinjiang, become the ideal choices of a JV partner 
for all the incoming foreign agencies. It is understandable that these Chinese big names, 
would present some advantages when negotiating the contract with the foreign candidates 
about the establishment of joint travel businesses in China.  
 
9.5.2. The Reasons of Investing in China and Setting in Guangzhou 
As Willis (12/07/2007) remarked, China has the biggest population in the world. The Chinese 
market is huge, in terms of the total population and the potential of the market. Moreover, 
China has showed the world its continuous fast growing pace, which means the people are 
getting richer and more educated. Thus, the demands of traveling of the Chinese people are 
also rising. Furthermore, China has abundant tourist resources and world famous heritage 
sites, which makes the country one of the popular destinations of the world tourism industry. 
Last but not least, the Beijing 2008 Olympics, the 2010 world exposition in Shanghai, and the 
2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou further stimulate the confidence about the future 
development of the Chinese tourism industry. All these facts make the Chinese market 
irresistible for tour operators looking at the global tourism business. However, the market and 
the business environment in China are very different from the western world. Therefore, KTG 
firstly consolidated its Hong Kong operation and a Beijing representative office in 1997, in 
order to get market information and to prepare for the Chinese market. The establishment of a 
wholly owned enterprise was not officially proposed until 2005.  
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There were a number of reasons for KTC to choose Guangzhou as the centre, and the 
registered location of its business in China. According to Willis (12/07/2007), the first reason 
was because before KTC, KTG had had an active operation in Hong Kong, which had a large 
turnover and more than 200 employees. With only one and half hour travel distance, it is 
easier for the Hong Kong enterprise to support Guangzhou, supporting in terms of IT, HR, 
and any other financial and accounting needs. The second reason was that the company was 
expecting to get all the supports they need from the local authorities, because KTC was the 
first wholly foreign owned travel service in the province. Last but not least, the business costs 
in Guangzhou are cheaper than Beijing and Shanghai, in terms of the cost of rent, of living 
and of staff.  
 
However, KTC has also set up two offices in Beijing and Shanghai, apart from the office in 
Guangzhou. According to Willis (12/07/2007), the three offices had their distinctive functions. 
The Beijing operation commences in 1997 as a representative office. The Shanghai office 
opened in June 2006, operating with a consultancy license. Guangzhou had the head office of 
the company with the travel trade license, and it is where the support center was located. 
Shanghai and Beijing were more the marketing offices, and the each location had its 
respective markets to cover. For instance, Shanghai was in charge of the European markets, 
while Beijing being responsible for sales from the USA. By then time, KTC has established 
its operation in the three locations in the Chinese eastern coasts. Apart from these settings, Mr. 
Willis also mentioned the possibility of opening another office in Chengdu to develop 
business in middle-western China in the near future. 
 
9.5.3. The Target Markets and Business Performance 
As not all the foreign travel agencies were allowed to operate the Chinese outbound travel 
market, KTC looked at both the Chinese inbound and domestic travel business. In terms of 
the inbound business, KTC focused on the segment of high-end leisure travel market which 
was group tours. On the other hand, efforts were made to develop inbound MICE business. 
The origin of the inbound customers was derived mainly from two categories. The primary 
category is the English-speaking market, including USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, 
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Canada and India. European countries was regarded as the second important markets, as 
sometimes the company found it was difficult to find good European languages speaking 
guides in China. In addition, for the Chinese domestic market, KTC were only interested in 
the MICE segment, targeting totally multinational companies, such as IBM. According to 
Willis (12/07/2007), at the time, the major business of KTC was focusing on destination 
management for inbound tourists, and the domestic MICE only played a minor role in 
revenues.  
 
The company was planning to meet its breakeven point in 2007. However, as in the formerly 
mentioned cruising business, which referred to the handling of land arrangements for ships 
call to China. This has operated as an existing business base under the SKY brand since KTC 
was set up, the cruise business brings KTC certain amount of income every year. Therefore, 
KTC didn’t feel much pressure to make itself survivable. 
 
Meanwhile, KTC was developing slowly, as Mr. Willis (12/07/2007) said, ‘We are in no rush.’ 
There were only three people when preparing for the company’s setup, including Mr. Willis 
and two local staff. When the company was officially founded at the end of 2006, seven staff 
were working for the business. By the interview day, July 2007, the number over doubled to 
15, including everyone in the three locations. However, KTC found this was a somehow slow 
movement, and it was not easy to find the right persons to match the overall requirement of 
the company. The employees needed were those possessing good English-communication 
skills with experience in the MICE business, apart from a good attitude and aptitude.  
 
9.5.4. Local Recruiting 
All the employees in KTC were locally recruited in China, but may come from different cities. 
Mr. Willis also mentioned that as there was a lack of experienced human resources in the 
MICE market in China, people who had worked for hotels became an ideal choice for the 
time being. Additionally, KTC trusted the local employees to perform and develop themselves. 
The local staff were able to take some of the most important positions of the company, such as 
GMs of the Shanghai and Beijing offices.  
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In terms of the difficulty in finding more competent staff, one solution of KTC was to train 
their own staff. In April 2007, KTG and CTS jointly established a specialized training 
programme, the ‘Kuoni Travel Academy’ in Guangzhou. There were also scholarships 
provided by KTG for study in Switzerland. As Willis (12/07/2007) remarked, these exclusive 
training programmes can help the company to own a qualified team in the future, but the 
effects can only be seen after several years. Thus, for the time being, KTC preferred to grow 
slowly, and provided their existing staff with on-hands training, which really means let the 
people learn and do at the same time. 
 
9.5.5. The Relationship between KTC and KTG 
Between KTC and its mother company, KTG, there was a regular communication and a strict 
financial discipline. First, there were monthly financial reports of KTC to KTG, along with Mr. 
Willis’s personal communications with the head office. Second, there was a year-round 
budget and forecast made by KTC. The budget was usually done in August and September, 
which was about KTC’s plan for the next year. As the financial year is from 1st January to 31 
December, there were three forecasts at the end of March, end of June and end of September 
respectively. Third, KTC also needed to make a three-year plan. All these plans and reports 
aimed to provide the mother company a clear view of what KTC was doing and would do 
next. The Swiss head office regularly sent managers to China to discuss problems.  
 
9.5.6. Competition and Cooperation with the Chinese Local Services 
In terms of the issue of competition, Mr. Willis (12/07/2007) thought that the competition for 
KTC in China was not a big challenge yet. He explained that the competition between the 
local services is mainly about the prices, which KTC was not interested in joining. Thus, KTC 
tried to place itself in a unique position by focusing on the high-end leisure and MICE market, 
and by providing their client creative and unique products. In his words, 
‘we think of new ideas. We will try to promote beyond the normal attractions. We 
have a lot of themes. When I say activity-related [products], it may be culture, 
architecture, and religion like Buddhism in China, scenic beauty, or lifestyle. Or, we 
could be just focusing on history. So we will try not just to sell what normal people 
sell. … We rather win by our products rather than price. We win by brand but not by 
price. … We will compete on services, products, contents and the way of delivery’ 
(Willis, 12/07/2007).  
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In addition, KTC enjoyed an advantage of global customer resources with an international 
sales-network based in the US, India, the Middle East and Europe. Therefore, in terms of their 
then time business focus, it was mainly on the Chinese inbound market. In this particular 
target market, the local travel services did not present a threat to KTC. Moreover, as the 
customers were not from the domestic market in China, the competition of other FITSs was 
not regarded as a serious challenge for KTC either (Willis, 12/07/2007).  
 
However, with a view towards the future, the company realized that the brand of Kuoni had 
not yet become a famous and creditable one in China. In Europe, in Hong Kong or in India, 
the good reputation of Kuoni has helped the company acquire a very good market. Although 
building the brand in the Chinese market is definitely on KTC’s planning agenda, as Willis 
(12/07/2007) marked, they would have to do much more market study to find out their exact 
role in the Chinese market in the future. The case was that, by then, they had not been serving 
any Chinese customers, persons nor corporations. Thus, to establish the brand recognition of 
‘Kuoni’ in China may be a task that will take the company years to realize.  
 
KTC gave attention to the opportunity of cooperating with the local travel agencies, as Mr. 
Willis (12/07/2007) said, ‘We try to cooperate as much as possible.’ The major collaborative 
activities concerned between KTC and the local services were about the capacity of supplies, 
such as buses, guides, and sometimes sharing the availability of hotels. Very often KTC 
bought tickets from them. However, as he further claimed that KTC had its own principle 
about the quality of the suppliers, and would stick with their high standard. Thus, according to 
him, based on the cooperation, the local standard of services should also be raised up 




9.5.7. The Major Opportunities and Obstacles 
According to Willis (12/07/2007), there were considerable positive aspects giving KTC 
confidence about the future of their investment in China. First, there was a continuous growth 
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in the Chinese economy and in the people’s incomes, which means a good potential in the 
outbound market in the future. Second, the high- ranking facilities were increasingly available, 
and the overall qualities were upgrading, especially for the demands of business travel, which 
brings an opportunity for increasing quality and variety of the products. Third, the MICE 
market in China was still in the stage of infancy, which allows KTC to find itself a high, or 
even leading, market position from its initial stage, as well as a plenty of spaces to explore in 
the future. Last but not least, more international events, including the Olympic and the world 
exposition, should bring the company more international clients.  
 
On the other side, there were considerable challenges and obstacles for KTC’s future business 
in China. The first obstacle for KTC was considered as the low availability of experienced 
and competent staff. Secondly, the business practice in China was not up to the international 
standard, in terms of many business practices, such as the implementation of contracts. 
Thirdly, the appreciation of the Chinese currency might become an economic threat for 
attracting overseas tourists visiting China. Moreover, another uncontrollable issue concerned 
to the changing international relationships between China and other major tourist origin 
countries, such as the USA and EU countries, connected with events, such as trade surplus or 
human rights. Furthermore, the Chinese administrative structure was considered as being too 
bureaucratic and hierarchical, and inefficient compared to most western systems, in terms of 
setting up business. Last but not least, changes in the Chinese government’s policies can 
always cause essential impacts on the FITS sector. These policies refer not only to the ones 
specific to the industry, but also general ones for visa application or taxation. 
 
 
9.5.8. The Future Objectives 
According to Willis (12/07/2007), KTC’s short-term objective was to make the inbound 
operation profitable as soon as possible, which was concerned to be within two years. In the 
mid-term, three or four years, the company was expecting to see the outbound license being 
granted to the FITS sector. If so, KTC can then make efforts on this market. To build its brand 
as one of the most preferred travel brands in China for both outbound and inbound markets 
was considered as the long-term objective that shall be achieved within five years. It seemed 
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that KTC had believed that the entire opening of the Chinese outbound travel market would 
be realised by 2010. However, even without access to the Chinese outbound market, KTC was 
confident about its profitability within two years (Willis, 12/07/2007).  
 
However, as Willis (12/07/2007) insisted, Kuoni was a long-haul specialist, so KTC would be 
only focus on the up-market, such as senior Chinese executives and government official who 
can afford the price, in the Chinese outbound sector when the license is granted. ‘We are not 
looking for numbers; we are looking for profit and good margin. … I think our objective will 
be to give value for money’ (Willis, 12/07/2007). In addition, he also indicated that KTC 
would most likely to take a role of being wholesalers for the outbound products in China in 
the future, if the future license separating roles of being a wholesaler or retailer. According to 
Willis (12/07/2007), KTC would like to use local small agencies to promote and sell their 
products which are commissionable to them. This was regarded as both an efficient way to 
expand KTC’s market influences, and an active way of helping the local small ones to survive 
and develop too. However, this does not exclude the possibility that KTC may need to build 
its own distribution system by either acquisitions or owning new shops. 
 
9.5.9. Experiences of Doing Business in China 
There were some interesting experiences, and advice provided by Mr. Willis (12/07/2007) 
who has more than 20 years experiences in the Chinese tourism sector. First, there were still 
many bureaucratic issues when doing business in China, so he said ‘you got to realize that 
sometimes it is not according to sort of international accepted practices’ (Willis, 12/07/2007). 
He believed that having useful personal relationship would be good in business circles. But he 
also believed in fairness and efficiency. According to him, a foreign corporation still can win 
in China by branding itself, by building a trustable image of the company, and by providing 
desirable services and creative products,.  
 
Second, specialized tourism, such as adventure travel, health travel, has not been developed 
yet in China, and will be an important area to explore. However, it is very important to 
conduct market research into diverse market demand, and in different locations in China. 
KTC has already invested more than half million Yuan (about US$ 64000) in their own 
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marketing research since the setup. Third, as Mr. Willis (12/07/2007) said, when doing 
business in China, ‘sometimes, you cannot expect or demand deadlines’. This may be because 
things change very quickly in China, and people prefer not to make everything too clear. In 
addition, there were still a lot of grey areas in the Chinese economy. ‘You have to give people 
face. So I always tell people, expect the unexpected’, said Mr. Willis (12/07/2007). Last but 
not least, it is very important to learn how to apply the right etiquette and protocol before 
investing in China, which is about the culture and customs in China (Willis, 12/07/2007). 
 
 
9.5.10. Other Issues and Conclusion 
The first interesting issue is about government intervention. Willis (12/07/2007) remarked that 
‘the government sometimes intervenes in industries in China; it is therefore not really 
an open market situation. The government actually still has control, in other business 
strongly as well, such as insurance business, not just travel’.  
Second, in terms of financial services, foreign banks were preferred, being regarded as more 
efficient than the local Chinese facilities, with more international standardized products 
available. KTC used foreign banks for some overseas transaction and online banking services. 
However, KTC was also a customer of Chinese local banks, with a comment of ‘not too good, 
but ok’ towards their services. Moreover, concerning accounting methods, Willis (12/07/2007) 
specified that ‘we adopt a European (more UK) method integrated with the Chinese 
requirement, as well as the American accounting principles here in China.’ In addition, in 
terms of the tourism development of middle and western areas of China, Willis (12/07/2007) 
revealed that the tourist attractions there had not been well promoted to the global customers, 
with a lack of international standardized facilities to offer. Given the constraints of the limited 
availability of hotels and flights, although there were great and sufficient tourism resources, 
the west region in China was not popular for KTC's customers. Beijing, Shanghai, Xian, and 
Yunnan were regarded as the most attractive destination choices in mainland China, in terms 
of the sales recorded by KTC by the time of being interviewed.  
 
In conclusion, the case KTC provided many valuable insights on a FITS’s business in China. 
First, as a case study of Guangdong, KTC’s story confirmed the important role of the Hong 
Kong tourism market in the development of FITS sector in the province of Guangdong. In 
                                 289
literature (chapter three), we examined the trend of the international retail industry to expand 
usually starting from a nearby marketplace. We can see how the proximity advantage works in 
this case study, as KTC receiving various supports from KTG’s Hong Kong offices. Second, 
being a WOFE, KTC’s experiences showed essential difference from most studied JVs. 
Without the support of a Chinese partner, the licensing process took over a year to complete. 
However, after the setup stage, KTG enjoyed its absolute control over KTC, with less 
complex management structure and communication activities between the mother companies 
and subsidiaries than a JV. Third, KTC was an example of international travel services with 
systematic and efficient management techniques, such as its clear financial principles, HR 
management, and production strategies. These features were rarely seen in the most Chinese 
indigenous services. Last but not least, the power of the state in China was again emphasized 
in this case study.  
 
 
9.6. Case Study of Guangzhou Hong Thai Travel Service 
Guangzhou Hong Thai Travel Service (GHTTS) was a JV found in November 1999, by 
Guangzhou GZL Travel Service (GZL) and Hong Kong Hong Thai Travel Service (HKHTTS). 
The Assistant GM, Mr. James Ng who was assigned by HKHTTS, accepted the interview 
once in the office of GHTTS in June 2007. Although the interview was not allowed to be 
recorded, Mr. Ng did provide a plenty of the JV’s information, and answered some further 
questions by telephone. Moreover, as both parent companies were regarded as the biggest and 
leading travel operators in the local markets of Hong Kong and Guangzhou respectively, the 
JV should be able to represent some common feathers of the Hong Kong-Guangdong joint 
entities. Thus, GHTTS is the second principal case-study of this chapter. 
 
9.6.1. The Parent Companies of GHTTS 
HKHTTS was formed in 1966 with approximately ten employees. It had more than 32 sales 
outlets in Hong Kong, Macao, Guangdong, and Singapore, with total number of staff 
exceeding a thousand by 2007. As Nielsen Media Research’s marketing reports from 2001 to 
2006, HKHTTS has been the travel company who arranged the largest numbers of Hong 
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Kong tourists in the Hong Kong travel market for the continuous six years. HKHTTS was 
dealing with inbound, outbound and Hong Kong domestic travel, covering all aspects of 
tourist demand, as well as bookings of hotels, transportations and flights. 
(www.hongthai.com , 2007) 
 
GZL was originally set up by the Guangzhou local government in December 1980, formerly 
known as Guangzhou Tourist Corporation, and the trademark of GZL was adopted in 
December 2000. Being the biggest travel service company in Guangdong province, GZL was 
licensed for outbound, inbound and domestic travel markets in China, with more than one 
thousand employees within the province. It had more than 100 sales offices covering the Pearl 
River Delta and has established business networks with more than 100 countries and regions. 
The annual customer (receiving) numbers have exceeded one million, with an annual turnover 
of 1.3 billion Yuan (about US$ 167 million). GZL was also known as the first Chinese travel 
agency who applied franchising strategy and expanded rapidly to over 30 cities of the 
southern region in China since 2000. Moreover, GZL established one of the first Chinese 
on-line travel services, cnto.com, with the successful function of on-line payment in 2000. 
The company’s business covers overall market demands, including leisure tours and business 
travels. Especially, its domestic market capacity has been ranked the first in Guangdong, and 
the second within the country. (www.gzl.com.cn , 2007) 
 
GHTTS was formed by HKHTTS and GZL, with a RC of 5 million Yuan (about US$ 0.64 
million) which was the actual initial investment of the two parent companies. The money was 
mainly spent on purchasing the office and equipments, and the deposits for licenses. In the 
corporation, GZL held 51% of the total company’s shares, with the other 49% belonging to 
HKHTTS. In the Board, there were seven seats, with four posts including the Chairman for 
GZL, and three for HKHTTS. In addition, GZL took the position of Financial Direct, in 
charge of the JV’s accounting and other financial events, while the GM post belonging to 
HKHTTS. At the start of business HKHTTS sent two staff to the JV to supervise the actual 
business operation. However, in order to reduce the costs for the JV, three months after the 
setup, only the GM remained. Generally, GZL controlled the financial management of the JV, 
while HKHTTS were in charge of all other business operations.  
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According to Ng (18/06/2007), the reason for HKHTTS to invest in China was that after 
Hong Kong was reclaimed by Mainland China many of their existing customers moved into 
China, especially to Guangdong. Also, they believed that Hong Kong’s future would need the 
supports of China, and the Chinese potential market would be their future business. So, they 
decided to explore the mainland market as soon as possible. Concerning that GZL was the 
biggest and most reliable partner HKHTTS could find in Guangdong, and the two companies 
have established a business relationship since 1992, HKHTTS chose to form GHTTS with 
GZL (Ng, 18/06/2007).  
 
9.6.2.  The Major Business Fields and the Business Development 
GHTTS could only deal with the Chinese domestic and inbound travel market, with a focus 
on the middle and up market demands. As people can very easily commute between Hong 
Kong and Guangdong, the inbound tour from Hong Kong was not a popular business in 
Guangdong. This is a particular difficulty for Hong Kong invested FITSs in Guangdong, as 
most FITSs whose mother companies are from foreign countries can share the overseas 
customer base of the mother’s. Thus, without a sufficient tourist amount from Hong Kong to 
Guangdong, the business of GHTTS continued uneasily. However, HKHTTS was an 
exclusive ticketing agency for more than 50 international airlines, and this enabled GHTTS to 
survive. The international ticketing business made up about 2/3 of the total annual turnover of 
the JV. Among the remaining third, half came from incentive tour products and half from 
leisure tours, with tourists mainly from Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore. (Ng, 18/06/2007) 
 
From the first operational years to 2006, there were both profit and loss years for GHTTS, and 
generally it reached breakeven levels. It was in the first year that the JV started to make 
profits. The most profitable year achieved 200,000 Yuan (US$ 25640) as the net profits, with 
a total turnover of 90 million Yuan (about US$ 12 million). It was clear that the margin was 
very low (Ng, 18/06/2007).   
 
As the most profitable Chinese outbound travel market was not accessible, the business 
development of GHTTS was not easy. There were 20 staff at the beginning in 2000, and this 
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grew to 80 in 2001. However, the JV had to reduce the scale of the company in later years in 
order to minimise costs, and the total number of employees dropped to 30 in 2007. By the end 
of 2007, the JV had established one general office and three sales branches in Guangzhou. 
However, according to Ng (18/06/2007), after relative deregulation, HKHTTS should set up 
its wholly owned travel service in Shenzhen, which has been a fixed plan of HKHTTS by the 
end of 2007.   
 
9.6.3.  The HR Management 
In order to control the cost, GHTTS only used one Hong Kong manager, Mr. Ng, as the GM. 
There were about 30 staff in GHTTS in 2007, and all the employees were locally enrolled. 
The highest position for a local employee was a department manager. In order to maintain a 
high quality of staff, GHTTS provided a series of internal training opportunities, sometimes 
going to the head office in Hong Kong. However, according to Ng (18/06/2007), the 
employees in the mainland cities often changed their jobs frequently. ‘They are not as loyal as 
the employees in Hong Kong’, said Mr. Ng. However, the growth rates of wages in China 
were very high, about 10% per year. In order to maintain competent staff, the JV had to also 
increase the standard of salary every year. This became a big challenge in cost control of the 
JV (Ng, 18/06/2007). 
 
9.6.4.  The Competition and Cooperation in China 
Mr. Ng (18/06/2007) made a comment that the market competition in Mainland China was 
concentrated on price. However, competition was based on an unfair and unregulated market 
environment (Ng, 18/06/2007). There were many non-corporate services who operated as a 
department of licensed travel services, but with an independent financial and operational 
system, as introduced in earlier literature chapters. These non-corporate Chinese services use 
the shell of normal travel companies, operating with low costs, and thus they are able to 
provide very low priced travel products. Thus, Ng (18/06/2007) indicated that the competition 
in the Chinese travel market was always about prices. This meant that most FITSs were 
unable to enter the traditional Chinese market, and so there has not been considerable 
competition between FITSs, including GHTTS, and the local agencies (Ng, 18/06/2007). 
However, there were some opportunities for GHTTS and other Chinese agencies to 
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collaborate, mainly for the company’s inbound leisure and incentive business, and only for the 
tours going beyond Guangdong. Within the province, GHTTS used its own staff. In terms of 
those Chinese ground handling agencies used in other Chinese destinations, they were 
selected primarily according to prices. And usually there were more than two such agencies 
chosen in each destination city. (Ng, 18/06/2007) 
 
9.6.5.  The Major Obstacles 
According to Ng (18/06/2007), GHTTS saw five major obstacles in the way of development 
in the future. First, the primary difficulty for the JV was concerned with the ban on the 
Chinese outbound travel market. Second, there was a lack of qualified labour in the China 
travel market. It was difficult for GHTTS to find experienced staff, as well as to maintain 
them. Third, the competition environment in the Chinese travel trade industry was immature 
and irregular, with a very low average margin.  
 
Furthermore, the original plan of the foreign parent company, HKHTTS, was not successful in 
practice, which caused some disagreement between the two partners. This somehow affected 
the operation of GHTTS. Last but not least, the administrative environment in China was not 
as efficient as that in Hong Kong. For instance, the setting up and licensing process in China 
was very slow and complicated, as well as the inefficient procedure of taxation. GHTTS spent 
more than one year in obtaining all the licenses and permissions. However, Ng (18/06/2007) 
also stated that with the assistance of the Chinese partner, handling governmental issues was 
made easier. But after the setup, GHTTS witnessed little governmental intervention in the 
industry in China, except for the policy constraints on the outbound market (Ng, 18/06/2007). 
 
9.6.6.  The Future Objectives 
According to Ng (18/06/2007), GHTTS planned to stick to the retail business in the future, as 
the business enjoying a good cash flow. In addition, GHTTS wished to see further opening of 
the Chinese travel market, so that Chinese people’s outbound tours and the ticketing business, 
as well as the on-line travel business could together become powerful business engines of the 
JV, boosting the performance of the company. In terms of the short-term objective, the JV was 
to be able to increase the income substantially in two or three years (if the outbound market 
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opened). The midterm objective was to improve the efficiency of the company, gradually 
adopting the management principles of HKHTTS in five years. For the long-term, GHTTS 
planned to establish its brand value in the Chinese market in ten years (Ng, 18/06/2007).   
 
9.6.7.  Other Issues and Conclusion 
According to Ng (18/06/2007), the most important information sources were from the local 
tourism administration office and from other operators in the industry. Therefore, he insisted 
that the personal relationship with other business operators and with government agents was 
very important when doing business in China. However, the relationship with other operators 
would be easier to build than the relationship with local government officers. Furthermore, Ng 
(18/06/2007) claimed that GHTTS joined two travel associations in China. But generally, the 
JV did not see much functions and benefits from the membership, although the membership 
fees were paid every year.  
 
In addition, being a JV, GHTTS had to submit financial reports to the two parent companies 
on a monthly basis. But in fact, more communications were needed, as Mr. Ng reporting to 
HKHTTS every week while to GZL around twice a month. In terms of the financial principle, 
the JV followed a Chinese method of accounting in China. Although GHTTS would like to 
apply overseas banking services for some special needs, they had to stick with Chinese banks 
before the Chinese financial market fully opened (Ng, 18/06/2007). Therefore, there were still 
inconveniences, in terms of the corporate services in China by the time of this research, 2007. 
  
In conclusion, being one of the earliest JVs with a Chinese SOE investor and a largest Hong 
Kong investor, the case of GHTTS showed us some important information about the FITS 
sector in Guangdong. Firstly, it was confirmed that Guangdong’s proximity to Hong Kong 
was the reason for HKHTTS to choose to register in the province. In fact, a Hong Kong travel 
service and a travel service in Guangdong often share a same group of customers who having 
residence rights in the both locations. Therefore, it is the reason why all the foreign investors 
of FITSs in Guangdong were invested by a Hong Kong entity. However, two JV partners with 
similar cultural background do not necessarily promise a success corporation. As Ng 
(18/06/2007) emphasized, being a JV did not show as many advantages as expected.  
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Moreover, as the investment from Hong Kong, GHTTS perceived more competition with the 
Chinese indigenous travel services than an FITS who receiving regular foreign tourists from 
mother companies in other countries. Thus, GHTTS’s income heavily relied on its 
international ticketing sales. This may indicate a common challenge for most Hong Kong 
invested FITSs. Last but not least, the case of GHTTS again proved the important role of 
SOEs in the FITS sector in China. The policy obstacle on the Chinese outbound travel market 
has also resulted in considerable difficulty for the development of GHTTS.   
 
 
9.7.  Conclusion of the Chapter 
As in the chapters focusing on Shanghai and Beijing, this chapter aims to examine the 
development of the FITS sector in Guangdong, and the general market environment in which 
they were operating by 2007. In total, there were five such enterprises registered in two major 
cities of the province, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The chapter firstly investigates the general 
business environment for the FITS sector, and finds that Guangdong had a vast land supply 
closely connected with more advanced economies, such as Hong Kong and Macao. Being 
traditionally the main port of China for foreign trade and communication, international trade 
and FDI have become the most considerable economic contributors of Guangdong, which 
generates high demands for outbound and inbound travels. With one of the highest per-capital 
GDPs within the country, the citizens of Guangdong showed very high levels of consumer 
consumption. In addition, it is also found that Guangdong embraces the best educational 
facilities, a high quality of labour market, a comprehensive and convenient transportation 
system, and sufficient exhibition and office facilities, which are positive determinants of FDI 
(including FITSs). 
 
Moreover, the chapter gives a brief introduction of the tourism industry and its development 
in Guangdong. Abundant tourist facilities, including hotels, travel services and tourist 
attractions were accompanied with a growth of tourist numbers, of which the majority were 
from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Then, the whole sector of FITS in Guangdong is 
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investigated, with introductions on the individual firms and a summary of the market features 
and profitability of the FITS sector. This is followed by a discussion on the local travel service 
sector which is found to be mainly small and young, and relatively weak in the inbound 
market. Moreover, the local sector’ opinions towards the FITS sector and towards the local 
tourism authorities are examined through the analysis of questionnaire data. Finally, two case 
studies, KTC and GHTTS, attempt to provide some insights about the development of the 
firms in China, which is helpful when the aims and objectives of this thesis are addressed.  
 
The FITS sector in Guangdong demonstrated some obvious features, concluded as follows. 
First, the five foreign investors all had a business base in Hong Kong, with four originally 
from Hong Kong and one originally from Switzerland but having a successful business 
presence in Hong Kong. It was understandable that the cultural and geographical proximity 
between Hong Kong and Guangdong influenced their choice of Guangdong as a register 
location. Second, FITSs were all located in the two of the most advanced cities of the 
province, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, where the best tourism facilities, such as airports, were 
available. The capital city of the province, Guangzhou, hosted the majority of FITSs. Third, 
these five FITSs were generally small to medium sized, with the RC between US$ 0.51 to 
0.64 million. Fourth, the earlier four FITSs were in the forms of JVs, with only one being a 
foreign wholly owned venture that was originally from Europe. 
 
In addition, based on the study of the last two chapters, FITSs were seen usually as relying on 
the Chinese inbound travel market. However, in the market of Guangdong, as the foreign 
investors were from Hong Kong, their major inbound tourists were Hong Kong residents who 
can easily travel to Guangdong by using the convenient commuting methods between the two 
locations. Therefore, tour products carrying Hong Kong tourists to Guangdong appeared not 
to be an attractive market, which means there was little advantage in having a Hong Kong 
mother company. Thus, these FITSs experienced greater business pressure for survival. In 
response to this, specialized services, such as MICE and international ticketing, have provided 
opportunities and have become focused business fields for the FITS sector in Guangdong. 
Moreover, the local government played an important role in the development of the FITS 
sector in Guangdong. The earliest FITSs both had state owned Chinese investors, CTS and 
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GZL. Also, it seemed that the local government played an essential role in the formation of 
the first foreign-controlled JV, SSTS. In total, three of the five companies had a Chinese SOE 
as parent company.  
 
In terms of the local travel service sector, through the questionnaire survey conducted in 
Guangdong, some important features are highlighted. First, the local travel services were 
generally small and young, compared to the international marketplace. Second, the primary 
business strength of the local travel trade sector was on the Chinese domestic travel market, 
followed by the outbound sector. The Chinese inbound travel was regarded as the weakest and 
least profitable sector to the local travel companies. Third, local services showed their high 
preference for building good partnerships with foreign companies for both domestic and 
overseas business development. Moreover, the local services gave an overall welcome to the 
entry of foreign operators, regarding them as both competitors and potential partners to learn 
from. Last but not least, the survey revealed that there was a high rate of local travel services 
joining in Chinese industry associations, and they showed high satisfaction level to the 
functions of the local tourism authorities.    
 
The first case study of this chapter is KTC which was invested by the Swiss KTG. KTG did 
not find an ideal JV partner in Guangdong, and thus the Chinese subsidiary was 100% owned 
by KTG. KTC specialized itself in the inbound travel market with a focus on the MICE 
segment before being able to deal with the Chinese outbound market. The overseas sales 
power has helped KTC’s investment in China. KTC expected to have its breakeven within the 
first year operation, although the number of its staff was growing slowly.  
 
The second case study is a JV, GHTTS, invested by the biggest local travel service in 
Guangdong and the biggest Hong Kong travel service. As mentioned early, GHTTS did not 
benefit greatly from the Hong Kong tour groups organized by HKHTTS. However, with the 
capacity of HKHTTS, international ticketing and the inbound MICE market have made up 
major income streams for GHTTS. Although GHTTS has been profitable since the first year 
after its setup, its profitability was not stable. Generally, the operation of GHTTS in China 
was regarded as difficult, being just able to survive. Furthermore, as the Hong Kong parent 
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company, HKHTTS was planning to form its WOFE in Shenzhen, the relationship of the two 
JV partners might not be satisfactory.  
 
A comparison of the two major cases reveals that, the two firms both had a parent company in 
Hong Kong, and both had a small number of staff in 2007 (KTC having 15 staff and GHTTS 
having about30), and both with a RC identical to the minimum requirement at that time. Thus, 
the two FITSs were similarly small-sized. However, KTC believed in absolute ownership and 
control, while GHTTS was in the form of JV. They had respective reasons for the choices of 
investment forms. However they expressed different attitudes to the experiences resulting 
from the choices. In the interview, KTC trusted the choice of being a WOFE, and held a 
positive view about its future. The GM of GHTTS thought that there were less advantages 
HKHTTS gained through the corporation of JV than they had expected (at least from 
HKHTTS’s stand). Thus, a WOFE of HKHTTS in Shenzhen was being prepared. It was a 
problem that without the Chinese outbound market, the local JV partner of FITSs usually 
made little contribution to the JV, except for the licensing process. Moreover, the target 
markets of the two cases were different. As KTC’s mother company originally from 
Switzerland, KTC enjoyed KTG’s inbound tourists from overseas to China, but GHTTS with 
a foreign mother company based in Hong Kong, the benefit from Hong Kong’s inbound tour 
groups was limited. In addition, although they both focusing on the MICE market, KTC were 
focusing on high-end consumers of mainly inbound trips and multinationals in China, while 
GHTTS having wider interests, including local demands. Therefore, GHTTS perceived more 
competitions from the local industry than KTC.  
 
Through the study of this chapter, several important topics are identified. First, as with the 
local travel trade industry (see chapter two), there was no clear boundary between TOs and 
TAs among all FITSs in China. This situation may change after the Chinese outbound travel 
market opened to the FITS sector. Second, the close distance between Guangdong and Hong 
Kong was confirmed as one of the main reasons for the five FITSs who were all invested by a 
Hong Kong company to register in Guangdong. This phenomenon was often seen in the 
international retailing industry (Alexander and Doherty, 2009), and may also be termed as 
location advantages (Dunning, 1977, see chapter three). Moreover, in the two case studies, we 
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can see a trend in FITSs to prefer WOFEs than JVs. In literature, WOFEs were concerned 
with whole control, while JVs related to shared risks and benefits from local experts (See 
Chapter Three). However, the preference of foreign investors for WOFEs in Guangdong may 
indicate the lack of value a local partner could offer, especially when the Chinese outbound 
travel market was barred to the FITS sector. Finally, as SOEs were a dominating power in the 
Chinese tourism industry (see chapter four and five), the Chinese state-owned travel agencies 
were also playing considerable roles in the FITS sector in Guangdong, with the assistance of 
compelling polices over investment forms (FITSs had to be in the form of JVs by 2003).  
 
In this chapter, a comprehensive picture of the marketplace and the FITS sector in Guangdong 
is presented. The key findings of the thesis concerning the investment environment and 
development strategies of FITSs in China in the decade of 1998 to 2007 can be derived from 
these. Together with understandings about the markets of Shanghai and Beijing, the next 
chapter is about to provide further analysis and comparisons between the FITS sectors in the 
three main research locations.  
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Chapter 10 
Comparison and Reflection on the Findings 
 
10.1.  Introduction 
Based on the previous three chapters’ study of the three research locations in Shanghai, 
Beijing, and Guangdong province, it is now possible to compare the three locations and FITSs. 
This chapter not only investigates primary data collected in the survey, but also aims to link 
the research results presented in the chapters with the literature studied in the earlier chapters. 
By combining the information, making comparison with analysis, this chapter provides a 
framework of answers with which to address the aims and objectives of this thesis. As 
explained in chapter six, interview data contributes to the examination of Objectives 1A, 1B, 
1C, 1D, 1E, 1F, 2A, 3A and 3B, with questionnaires being an essential data resource of 
Objective 2B and also used for Objectives 1A, 3A and 3B.   
 
This chapter firstly provides a summary and comparisons of the main case studies of the three 
locations, which will provide important insights for further analysis. Then, the chapter 
compares the major features of the three research locations and the diverse development 
approaches of FITSs in the three marketplaces, which serves the investigation of the 
Objective 1A. Following this, the FITS sector is examined as a whole, so that their common 
experiences or different approaches can be outlined. This section helps investigate all the 
objectives and aims of the thesis (see chapter six). The objectives are discussed and addressed 
individually, supported by both primary data and related secondary data. The results from the 
questionnaire survey regarding the indigenous travel services in the research areas are also 
analyzed, particularly to address Objective 2B. Before the conclusion, there is a discussion of 
the problems, trends, and suggestions, related to the development of FITSs in China. These 
issues are considered as crucial for the future of the FITS sector in the country.  
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10.2. Summary of the Major Case Studies 
In total there were seven cases studied in the last three chapters, including three in Beijing, 
two in Shanghai and two in Guangdong. In the Beijing chapter, JTBNC, CYTS Travelport, 
and CITS AMEX were chosen. Additionally, Shanghai was used to apply the case studies of 
NTA China and HRG JinJiang, with Guangdong examining the development of KTC and 
GHTTS. These case studies were chosen from diverse categories of the sector, for example, in 
terms of the nationality of the foreign investors, two cases with investors from Japan, along 
with two from America, two from European countries, and one from Hong Kong. Moreover, 
the seven case studies included three Chinese-controlled JVs, two foreign controlled JVs and 
two WFOEs. Although in the last three chapters, very detailed descriptions about these cases 
were given, it is important to recall and emphasize some of most impressive features or 
experiences of the companies. 
 
JTBNC and JTB Shanghai gave their great attention on the branding programme of the “Look 
JTB” focusing on the affluent market. The brand was originally imported from its Japanese 
mother company, and now was planning to be applied to the Chinese high-end travel market. 
The branding programme required the Chinese subsidiaries to be responsible for outsourcing 
destination suppliers such as hotels and representatives, designing of routes and travel 
brochure, pricing, marketing and advertising activities. The meaning of traveling for the 
“Look JTB” was to be different from traditional Chinese perspectives, for example, design for 
a small group trip with two people, high budget accommodations and other recreational 
facilities like Spa treatment, and advance reservation behaviour was encouraged. Fostering the 
value of the brand and making itself unique in the marketplace was an important experience.  
 
CYTS Travelport was not a successful JV and the only case study failure. The reasons for the 
failure may be due to factors such as the market competition, or changes in the foreign mother 
company in the USA. However it is important to consider that the two partners were entering 
the JV with very different purposes. For CYTS, they valued the opportunity of being able to 
learn skills and technology about on-line travel business, and to establish its top position in 
the Chinese on-line travel service market. However, Travelport's formal owner, CC, was 
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aiming to achieve huge capital return in the short to medium term, by public listing the JV. 
Since the business was not growing as expected, together with the change in the ownership of 
Travelport, the JV could not obtain further support from the foreign partner. This situation 
resulted in the loss of confidence on both investing sides about future collaboration and 
development, hence the eventual breakup in two years. Therefore, choosing the right partner 
and ensuring both partners benefited from each other was a difficult but essential issue in the 
success of a JV.  
 
CITS AMEX featured a strong HR department. In fact, the company experienced threats of 
the sudden loss of an entire team moving to a rival’s company. Since that time they learnt the 
lesson that to increase the level of staff commitment and engagement is a very important 
mission for the JV, especially when the labor load and salary level are fixed. The major 
missions of its HR department, (except for recruiting and training), were to create a belief that 
the company is like a family where everyone is friendly, like sisters and brothers. They also 
promise staff improvements and career development in the company in the future. Although 
such a programme may not completely stop the floating of employees, a relatively stable and 
smooth internal platform was being established. Caring about its staff in excess of 800 was 
considered as vital by the leaders of the company. In addition, as customer satisfaction level 
largely depend on the services provided by its staff, a good employee retention rate and staff 
satisfaction level were regarded as a sovereign challenges to the future success of the venture.    
 
The Japanese invested in NTA China and emphasized their aims for the purpose of quality 
control. Being a common feature of Japanese enterprises, every requirement towards the 
services provided by local ground agencies had to be written in paper and included as a part 
of the contract between NTA China and suppliers. These requirements included very detailed 
matters related to services, including uniforms, greeting languages and manners, speed of 
transportations, the rules of reactions towards different customer requests or emergencies. In 
addition, they also applied other methods to secure a continuous high standard of services, 
such as inspections of the services of local partners, and regular meetings and training for all 
contracted local service providers. The strict and circumspect attitude towards the services for 
customers forced NTA China to hold tight control upon the partnership with the Chinese local 
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services contracted in different locations and upon the whole service system designed for 
customers. They believed that this attitude would help them reach high customer satisfaction 
and market reputation in both Japan and China.  
 
HRG JinJiang had its only company registered in Shanghai focusing on the corporate travel 
business, but it has established a large network of business partnership for serving their clients 
in more than 50 most important cities of the country. Instead of investing in their own 
subsidiaries throughout China, the company aimed to find and contract the best agencies in 
different locations to be the service providers for their customers who may have offices 
throughout the country. When the expanding initiative was constrained by the policy maker of 
the country, applying contracted partnerships became the most efficient way to avoid political 
obstacles while developing national clients. Undeniably, this is a quick and economic way for 
the young entity to grow in the marketplace. HRG JinJiang also saw it as a challenge that it is 
difficult to control a stable and identical standard of service.  
  
KTC reinforced an idea of producing different travel experience from others in the 
marketplace of China. KTC’s experience when facing competition was to create different 
products from time to time, and to keep being creative and going ahead of other rivals. KTC 
believed that there should always be something new and fresh for customers, which would 
prevent them from competing with others via low prices. Especially for the MICE clients, a 
creative proposal was regarded as the best weapon they could have in the fight for contracts. 
However, the challenge always rests as an issue for the people who create creative services. In 
fact, to be creative is not just to have a new idea. It is about a challenge of having talents, who 
understand the world’s tourism resources, and having sufficient tour management experience, 
as well as being able to recognize opportunities among different tourist mentalities and create 
unique and feasible tour plans.  
 
GHTTS was one of the largest travel agencies in Hong Kong, and particularly focusing on the 
outbound travel market of the area. However, as the outbound travel market in mainland 
China was banned for foreign agents, the company found themselves another business field 
where they can take advantages of their existing business experiences and resources. That was 
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an international air-ticket trading business, selling tickets to both tourists and to other agents, 
as GHTTS was able to get very cheap flight tickets from international airlines with the backup 
of their annual tourist volumes in Hong Kong. The ticketing business has made the JV 
profitable since its first year of operation. Although the air-ticketing business was not the 
original investment plan of the foreign investor, the business helped GHTTS survive and 
reach breakeven point by 2007. Therefore, foreign services should value and apply every 
business resource to achieve viability in China, (especially prior to the open of China’s 
outbound market).  
 
Among the seven cases, NTA China and JTBNC were invested in by Japanese travel 
companies. The Japanese entities preferred to apply WOFEs in China. Very detailed operation 
manuals were an important feature of FITSs with Japanese investors. In terms of cases of 
invested by capital from western countries, including HRG Jin Jiang, CYTS Travelport, CITS 
AMEX, and KTC, the changes in the ownership of foreign mother companies happened 
frequently. This could then cause serious problems in the subsidiaries in China. JVs with 
majority control, or WOFEs were regarded as the most preferable forms when investing in 
China. These FITSs usually were fed with large numbers of inbound tour groups into China, 
sent by the investors’ company overseas businesses.  
 
Moreover, GHTTS was the only major case with a foreign investor originally from Hong 
Kong. As examined in the last chapter, FDI of Hong Kong travel companies was still very 
concentrated in the province of Guangdong, resulting from the short geographical and cultural 
distance between the two marketplaces. However, also due to the proximity, the mother 
company in Hong Kong could it could not offer much support to inbound businesses to the 
Chinese subsidiary. Therefore, GHTTS, with a Hong Kong background, paid more attention 
to the Chinese local markets than that of other FITSs from overseas countries.  
 
In general, the seven case studies also displayed some major common features in their 
operation and expansion experiences in China by 2007. First, the firms had very similar target 
markets. Given the Chinese policy of limited access to the Chinese outbound travel market for 
FITSs, the firms had to rely on the Chinese inbound market. Although they were also allowed 
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to operate in the Chinese domestic travel business, they were only interested in the Chinese 
high-end market, including luxury leisure holidays, MICE, the travel market of foreign people 
living in China, and the corporate travel market. This was due to the chaos and low price war 
in the local marketplace (examined in chapter five). Second, in terms of licensing and setup 
process in China, the cost of setup was generally regarded as low by the seven firms. However, 
the licensing process sometimes took rather different lengths of time, especially between 
WOFEs and JVs; for example, JTBNC (a JV) spending a few months for the licensing while 
over a year for KTC (a WOFE). Having a Chinese SOE partner seemed to offer advantages to 
the JVs in this aspect.  
 
Third, it was clear that all the case studies showed a clear functional division between the 
board level and the management level, which ensures an efficient management framework 
and operational mechanism. Thus, they possess obvious advantages of internal management 
skills when compared to small and medium sized local services. Moreover, the reliance on 
key foreign managers and the arrangement of subordinate local assistant managers were seen 
as a commonly applied tactics in all the case studies. Finally, the challenge of local 
recruitment and staff retention was also a common feature of the studied firms. 
 
 
10.3. Comparisons among the Three Locations (Objective 1A) 
10.3.1. Geographical and Economical Features of the Three Locations 
The previous three chapters investigated background information regarding Shanghai, Beijing, 
and Guangdong province. In order to have a comparable view of the information, Table 10.1 
summarizes major facts of the three locations with a focus on their geographical and 
economic features. In general, as studied in Chapter Four, Beijing, Shanghai and the two cities 
in Guangdong, Guangzhou and Shenzhen (a earliest SEZ), are commonly regarded as the 
most prosperous areas of Mainland China. From the geographical view, these cities are all 
located in the Chinese eastern coastal line, situated from north to the middle, and to the south. 
In terms of FDI, they have been the most popular Chinese destinations receiving overseas 
capital since the launch of the reform and open policy. 
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Table 10.1.  Geographical and economic features of the three locations in 2007 




Land Areas (km2) 6,341 16,410 179,757 7,434 
Population (million) 18.58 16.33 94.49 10.05 
History 960 AD 1000 BC 206 BC 
GDP (US$ billion)* 160.81 118.81 410.08 100 
Total Imports and 
Exports (US billion) 
520.91 192.95 634 73.49 
Retail Sales of 
Consumer Goods 
(US$ billion) * 
49.33 48.72 153 37.6 
FDI Projects 4206 2177 9506 959 
FDI Contractual 
Value (US$ billion) 
14.87 / 33.94 7.04 
FDI Actual Usage 
(US$ billion) 
7.92 5.07 17.13 3.29 
Office Rental (US$ / 
m2 / month) * 
35 24 / 15 









political center of 
China;  
Having the best exhibition 
facility of China; Close to Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; 
Foreign investments and trades 
playing a vital role in the local 
economics. 
Sources: based on the data published by the local Bureaus of Statistics in Beijing, Shanghai and the 
Guangdong Province (2008)  
(Note 1: * indicates that the figures of these items were applying exchange rate, US$ 1= CN¥ 7.8;  
Note 2: the figures of ‘Office Rental’ in the table were the average figures of those found from various 
information resources.)  
 
However, there are apparent differences. Firstly, Guangdong being a province, the 
geographical size of the market is much larger than the two cities, Shanghai and Beijing, in 
terms of the land areas and populations. Thus, in the Table 10.1, the relevant information of 
the capital city of Guangdong, Guangzhou, was also provided to facilitate the comparison. It 
is true that due to the proximity to Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and being the Chinese 
window to other countries cross the Pacific Ocean, foreign trade has always been a major 
resource for the development of the local economy in Guangdong province. Especially, 
consistent with Alexandra (1997, 2009)’s concept on FDI’s proximity tendency in the retail 
industry, which emphasize the positive determinant of close geographical and cultural 
distance for foreign movements of retailers, FDI from Hong Kong made up the majority of 
FITSs in Guangdong. 
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Moreover, Shanghai has the highest population density among these cities, which indicates 
that the city is the most active and popular choice for living, working, as well as for 
investments. It was also a popular location for the headquarters of most multinationals. 
Furthermore, Beijing is the oldest city among the three locations, and had the most significant 
status as the capital of the country for centuries. In a communist economy controlled by one 
strong central government, a presence in the capital city is vital for most foreign investors, 
especially for those large projects or politically sensitive businesses, such as the travel trade 
industry.   
 
Table 10.1 also draws a clear comparison between the economic performances of the three 
locations. Obviously, Shanghai possessed the strongest economic capacity for development, in 
comparison with the other two cities, Beijing and Guangzhou. And the total value of retail 
sales of consumer goods in Shanghai was also the highest among the three cities, which 
indicates the strong consumption power of the city. However, if compared with the figures of 
the whole province of Guangdong, Beijing and Shanghai were then surpassed. Moreover, in 
terms of office rentals, Shanghai and Beijing require much more capital investment than 
Guangzhou. In fact, the rental in Guangzhou was less than half of that in Shanghai. Through 
the study, it was confirmed that the different characteristics of the three locations listed in the 
Table 10.1 have also been the major concerns of the foreign investors of FITSs, and have not 
only impacted their decisions when choosing registered locations, but also influenced their 
business performances in later practices.  
 
10.3.2. Comparison about the Tourism Industries of the Three Locations  
As examined in chapter five, the tourism industry in China was originally started as a means 
to serve political purposes; for example, to introduce the history or achievements of the CPC. 
Therefore, Beijing, as the capital of China, played a crucial role both in the administration and 
the practical operation of the tourist businesses in the country. As Beijing developed the 
industry earlier than other Chinese cities, Beijing had more hotels than other major cities in 
China (see Table 10.2). 
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Table 10. 2. The size of the tourism industry in the three locations (2007) 




Star-rated Hotel Numbers 320 806 1171 209 
5 Star Hotels 32 42 58 8 
4 Star Hotels 47 114 168 31 
3 Star Hotels 128 257 575 101 
2 Star Hotels 105 330 344 66 
1 Star Hotels 8 63 26 3 
Total Travel Agency Numbers 829 816 964 167 
Domestic Licensed Agencies 776 627 768 108 
International  
licensed Agencies  
53 189 196 59 
Among the above, Outbound 
licensed Agencies  
40 98 100 / 
International Tourist Numbers 
 (million)  
 6.65  4.35 206.57 33.38 
Earnings from International 









Other Features China’s 
Second 
biggest city 




biggest city in 
tourism 
The biggest Chinese province 
in terms of the tourism 
industry;  Many tourists from 
HK, Macao, with less spends 
than foreigners. 
Sources: based on the data published by the local Bureaus of Statistics in Beijing, Shanghai and the 
Guangdong Province (2008) 
 
However, in the travel service sector, although Shanghai had a greater gross number of 
agencies than Beijing, the licenses granted for outbound travel business in Shanghai was less 
than half of that in Beijing and Guangdong in 2006. The outbound travel market in China is 
more profitable than the domestic and inbound markets. Usually, the outbound license is 
given to those big and creditable travel services, such as SOEs. The limited number of 
outbound travel services in Shanghai probably means a less strong and mature travel trade 
sector in Shanghai than Beijing and Guangdong. 
 
Moreover, the total numbers of hotels and travel agencies in the Guangdong province was the 
largest within the country at the provincial level. Especially the annual international tourist 
numbers in Guangdong were much higher than those of Beijing and Shanghai (see the Table 
10.2). However, the tourists into Guangdong contained a major proportion from Hong Kong, 
Macao, or Taiwan who may not stay in hotels. This was the main reason why the earnings 
from tourism in Guangdong were slightly higher than Beijing and Shanghai. In general, the 
status and scale of Beijing is the most considerable among all the Chinese cities. However, at 
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10.3.3. Comparison of the FITS Sectors in the Three Locations  
In terms of the foreign travel service industry in the three locations, some differences were 
found. With reference to the developed tourism industry in Beijing, the city witnessed the 
earliest development in the FITS sector starting from 1999. Also, as discussed in the Beijing 
chapter, the development approach of the FITS sector in the city showed a pattern of very 
quick reaction following policy changes. Such phenomena suggest that the capital cities were 
regarded as the most popular registered locations to FITSs. In practice, as Table 10.3 reveals, 
Beijing was chosen by more than half of the all foreign travel trade operators in China by 
2007. This, in fact, suggests that the government’s policies were deeply affecting the 
development patterns of the FITS sector in its first decade of development (since 1998 to 
2007). 
 
Table 10.3 summarizes the profiles of FITSs in the three locations, with 15 in Beijing area, 6 
in Shanghai area, and 5 in Guangdong province. As mentioned earlier, Beijing hosted most 
FITSs, being the most desirable location of the sector in China, regarding its political 
influences. In terms of profitability of FITSs, although each location had a failed case, Beijing 
had most of the profitable FITSs. This may partly result from the advantage of having a large 
number of tourist facilities, especially hotels. A well established network between the travel 
services in Beijing and the supporting ground services in other Chinese destinations 
contributed to the high profitability of the FITS sector in the city. Moreover, in terms of 
Shanghai, it saw the later commercial development of FITSs with the first JV formed in 2004. 
However, Shanghai was regarded as the most important location by FITSs who had focused 
on the corporate travel market. Furthermore, Guangdong was aware that all the foreign 
investors of FITSs were either original from Hong Kong, or through a subsidiary of 
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Table 10.3. The FITS sectors in the three major locations (by 2007) 
Comparison Items Shanghai Beijing Guangdong Province 
Numbers of Foreign 
Invested Travel Services 
6 (including one in 
Wuxi) 
15 (including one 
in Tianjin) 
5 
Sino Controlled JVs 1 5 2 
Foreign Controlled JVs 1 3 2 
Foreign Wholly Owned  4 6 1 
Start Year of the Sector 
(first application) 
2001 (Wuxi);  
2004 (Shanghai) 
1999 1999 
Numbers of Profitable 
(or Breakeven) Ventures  
2 11 2 
Non-Profitable Ventures 3 3 2 
Shut-down Cases 1 1 1 
Other Features Being the center of 
corporate travel 
market in China 
The city most 
quickly reflecting 
the policy changes 
Foreign mother 
companies all from 
Hong Kong 
Sources: based on CNTA’s registration recorder, and author’s research findings (2007) 
 
However, there was a common phenomenon among almost all FITSs in China. It seemed that 
the three locations were often regarded as the must-have markets in China, as many FITSs 
who registered in one of the three locations also set up companies or offices in the other two. 
However, the policy constraints imposed by the Chinese government on FITS's setting up 
branches within China was not actually removed until the end of 2007. Thus, alternative 
licenses were applied by FITSs as a temporary approach to expand in China; for example, 
using a title of consultant companies, or air ticketing retailers. Both American Express and 
Kouni applied temporary methods in the early stages of development, although this resulted in 
some inconveniences in practical operations, such as accounting. There was one exception, 
the Japanese giant, JTB group, who have successfully established three subsidiaries in the 
three locations under travel service licenses by 2008, with JTB Shanghai in 2006. This might 
be an experiment set by the Chinese authority, or a specially given privilege for a political or 
diplomatic reason. However, further deregulation steps after 2007, including that on the 
branch setup, will bring substantial changes in the distribution of FITSs in China in the future. 
 
 
10.4. Major Findings 
10.4.1. Setting Up of the Business (Objective 1B) 
As investigated in earlier chapters, 27 FITSs have registered within Mainland China by the 
end of 2007. As Table 10.4 shows, they were mainly located in Beijing, Shanghai and 
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Guangzhou, or the nearby cities, although the first FITS was located in Yunnan province 
which is a famous and popular tourist destination in China. After investigation, it was found 
that more than half of the entire industry was registered in Beijing, while Shanghai and 
Guangdong equally shared the remaining numbers. Among the 27, two were shut down as 
failed investments (marked as ‘9*S’ and ‘19*S’ in Table 10.4), and one could not be found or 
traced but remained registered (marked as ‘13*’ in the Table 10.4). Therefore, the total 
number of the registered FITSs should be counted as 25, with 24 actually in operation by the 
end of 2007. It was undeniable that the total number of companies was very small for such a 
rapidly expanding economy. 
 
Table 10.4. Registered FITSs in China (by the end of 2007) 








1 Yunnan Diethelm 
 Travel 
05 / 98 Yunnan 
province 
SC-JV 0.67 million 
2 Guangzhou HongThai 11 / 99 Guangzhou SC-JV 0.64 million 
3 Guangdong Wingon 11 / 99 Guangzhou SC-JV 0.64 million 
4 JTB New Century  01 /00 Beijing SC-JV 0.67 million 
5 Morning Star New Ark 04 / 00 Beijing SC-JV 0.67 million 
6 BTG Accor 08 / 00 Beijing SC-JV 0.81 million 
7 Tianjin SA Tours  12 / 00 Tianjin SC-JV 1 million 
8 CITS AMEX 11 / 01 Beijing SC-JV 2.5 million 
9 *S Wuxi Weilin Holiday 12 / 01 Wuxi SC-JV 1 million 
10 Flight Center-Comfort 02 / 02; 12 / 05 Beijing SC-JV 0.76 million 
11 JPI China 10 / 03 Beijing WOFE 0.6 million 
12 CTS TUI 11 / 03 Beijing FC-JV 6.1 million 
13 * Shenzhen Shun Feng 03 / 04 Shenzhen FC-JV 0.51 million 
14 ANA China 06 / 04 Beijing WOFE 0.6 million 
15 Gullivers (GTA) China 06 / 04 Beijing WOFE 0.61 million 
16 Star Cruises China 07 / 04 Shanghai WOFE 2.85 million 
17 HRG JinJiang 07 / 04 Shanghai FC-JV 3.4 million 
18 NTA China 10 / 04 Shanghai WOFE 0.51 million 
19*S CYTS Travelport  10 / 04 Beijing FC-JV 20 million 
20 Guangdong Student 
Union 
10 / 04 Guangzhou FC-JV 0.51 million 
21 NorthStar KwanKin 03 / 05 Beijing  FC-JV 0.54 million 
22 Hankyu Express China 07 / 05 Beijing WOFE 0.6 million 
23 KIE China 07 / 05 Beijing WOFE 0.53 million 
24 Shun Tak International 11 / 05 Shanghai WOFE 0.51 million 
25 Grand Circle China 11 / 05 Beijing WOFE 0.33 million 
26 Kuoni China 11 / 05 Guangzhou WOFE 0.51 million 
27 JTB China Shanghai 03 / 06 Shanghai WOFE 0.73 million 
Sources: based on CNTA’s registration recorder (2007)  
Note: ‘SC-JV’ stands for Sino Controlled Joint Venture; ‘FC-JV’ stands for Foreign Controlled Joint 
Venture; and ‘WFOV’ stands for Wholly Foreign Owned Venture.  
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With reference to the policy obstacles explained in Chapter Five, by 2007, not only the 
number of FITSs, but also their forms of investments in China were somewhat limited. From 
the Table 10.4, it is clear that FITSs were all originally green field investments started from 
1998; each took the forms of either JVs or WOFEs. Other FDI modes studied in Chapter 
Three, such as franchising or acquisitions, have not been popularly applied methods for 
foreign investors in the Chinese travel trade sector up to 2007, mainly because of the tight 
regulatory environment. 
 
Moreover, in Chapter Three, the thesis examined different reasons of FDI. In this study, 
market demand and profit pursuit were seen as two most relevant reasons for FITSs to invest 
in China in the earliest development decade by 2007. Many FITSs started the corporations in 
China because their overseas clients wanted to use their services in the country. Especially in 
the corporate travel market, many multinationals were seeking international travel services to 
provide internationally identified services to their businesses in China. As profitability was a 
major future objective of most FITSs, the monetary purpose was clear. 
 
Furthermore, it was common in the interviewed companies that the setting-up costs in China 
were considered low, with spends mainly on the deposit to the administration office for 
licensing, office rental and furnishing, and on staff recruiting and training. In addition, in 
terms of establishing subsidiaries or branches, FITSs all felt that it was very difficult to 
expand business in the country due to relative policy obstacles. A common approach for them 
was to form an air service or consultancy company in cities outside of their registered location, 
which then caused accounting problems in the practical operation. Thus, the setting up and 
expansion processes were still not easy in China when compared to most capitalist countries. 
However, as the government has already removed almost all policy obstacles since May 2009, 
foreign operators are now able to establish their branches and subsidiary entities freely within 
the country. 
 
Additionally, there were some foreign tour operators who started their business in China with 
other licenses rather than the travel service one. For example, Carlson Wagonlit formed a JV 
with China Air Service in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou with air service licenses in 2003, 
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focusing on corporate air ticketing services. Also, the biggest Italian tour operator, Boscolo, 
opened its wholly owned travel consultant companies in both Beijing and Shanghai in 2005. 
This was because fewer policy obstacles to FDI were seen in the air services and consultant 
business areas rather than in the travel trade industry.  
 
In addition, there have been hundreds of foreign travel operators in the Chinese market in the 
name of representative offices, waiting for a better and more open market environment. In 
fact, before the official setup of the studied FITSs, foreign travel services, such as American 
Express, JTB, or Kuoni, were all in the form of representative offices which are forbidden 
from sales contracting and transaction activities and only providing functions of information, 
marketing or communications. Therefore, it is estimated that given further deregulation in 
2009, the FITS sector should experience a considerable increase, in terms of both number and 
business volume, in the foreseeable future. 
 
10.4.2. Countries of Origin and Relative Features (Objective 1C) 
Most of the foreign agents who have registered a FITS in China by 2007 were from Asian 
countries or regions, including Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. Table 10.5 
summarizes all the 27 foreign operators who were officially registered in the country by 2007. 
The largest numbers were from Japan and Hong Kong with eight each, together with one each 
from Singapore and Malaysia, making up a total of 18, 2/3 of the all, from Asian areas. The 
third largest group was from America with three companies, followed by two Swiss 
companies. Apart from these, there were others from European countries such as Britain, 
France, and Germany, and one from Australia.  
 
It is understandable that the major foreign investors were from Japan and Hong Kong, as the 
communications and collaboration of travel trade businesses between the two economies and 
China have been developing for decades. In 2007, total FDI from Hong Kong amounted to 
US$ 27 billion, more than all other countries/regions, with FDI from Japan ranked forth 
totaled US$ 3.5 billion (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2008). Companies from Japan 
and Hong Kong have become more familiar with the business environment of mainland China, 
and thus, more active in investing in China, compared with other countries’ investors. For the 
                                                                                                                    314 
operators from other countries, the travel trade industry of China was regarded as attractive, 
but the general business environment was considered as neither friendly nor free enough, 
mainly due to the existing regulatory constraints. By 2007, only some of the biggest names 
from the western countries have entered the marketplace, but the majority of the foreign 
players were still standing and waiting at the edge of Chinese travel trade market.  
 
There were different preferences for the foreign operators from different origins. First, 
Japanese companies tended to show a common belief in establishing wholly owned ventures. 
Also for Japanese companies, to provide their Japanese tourists with a satisfactory travel 
experience and high quality of services was commonly regarded as one of the most important 
purposes of having a subsidiary in China at that time (by 2007). Second, Hong Kong’s 
investors would be more likely to set up their first entity in Guangdong, where people share 
the same language and similar culture of their own. However, for most western investors, 
their first attempts were more likely to be a JV with one of the strongest and most creditable 
local brands, but holding majority control over the entity. In addition, almost all FITSs relied 
heavily on inbound tour business sent from their original countries/regions as a major 
business ingredient, waiting for the entire opening of the local outbound market. However, for 
the Hong Kong invested FITSs registered in Guangdong, the inbound tour groups from Hong 
Kong mother companies were regarded as less reliable.   
 
Table 10.5. The countries/regions of origin of FITSs by 2007 
Original 
Countries/Regions 




Names of Foreign 
Mother Company 
Japan (8) NTA  Hong Kong (8) ShunTak 
JTB (Beijing) Kwan Kin 
JTB (Shanghai) Morning Star 
JPIC Gullivers 
ANA Student Union 
Hankyu Shunfeng 
KinKi Wing On 
Weilin Hong Thai 
America (3) American Express Switzerland (2) Kuoni 
Travelport Diethelm 
Grand Circle Australia FCM 
Britain  BTI Singapore  SA Tours 
France Accor Germany TUI 
Malaysia Star Cruises   
Sources: based on CNTA’s registration recorder (2007) 
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10.4.3. Ownerships (Objective 1D) 
It seemed to be a shift that the ownership structure of the foreign invested travel services 
changed from the Sino-controlled JVs to foreign-controlled JVs and to WOFEs as soon as 
they were allowed. This shift can be seen quite clearly through Table 10.4. There were never 
any Sino-controlled JVs since 2003 to 2007 after foreign-controlled JVs or WOFEs were 
allowed. Since July 2005 to 2007, WOFEs have been the only investment form used by FITSs. 
This shift may result from three main reasons. First, the policies have influenced the choices 
over different time periods, (see Table 5.6 in chapter five). Second, the foreign agents usually 
had more experiences and more advanced knowledge about the international travel business 
than the Chinese partners, and so they were supposed to hold more control over the JVs than 
the Sino side. This may partly explain the shift from Sino-controlled to foreign-controlled JVs. 
Third, the number of Chinese agencies who are strong and reliable to match the foreign 
partners was limited. There were only a few large indigenous travel services in the Chinese 
travel market, which are mainly state-owned and having national outlets in the country. 
However, they had all found their foreign partners and formed FITSs by the year 2007. Thus, 
later entering foreign operators might find more difficulties in finding ideal local business 
partners to collaborate with. This probably was also the reason for the foreign agents’ 
preference shifting to WOFEs after 2005.  
 
Moreover, it was obvious that most FITSs were formed following a strict international 
approach of corporation and management. In FITSs, the structure of the Board and the board 
meetings were playing a decisive role reflecting the ownership rights, and relationship of the 
partners (in the case of JVs). Clearly defined responsibilities between the owners and the 
managers, and between the Board members and executive leaders, were a commonly regarded 
strategy in FITSs, which not only establishes an efficient operational platform for the firms, 
but also imposes pressure on the key managers. However, in most Chinese local travel 
services, usually with a single owner of various government bodies or organizations, there is a 
lack of decision and inspection functions of the board, which often results in the bad 
performances of companies and benefits for key individuals. In addition, the knowledge 
management of finance and HR was another apparent strength of FITSs, compared to Chinese 
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local services. In general, there was no doubt that the overall competency and efficiency of 
the FITS sector was much higher than those of the Chinese indigenous sector.  
 
10.4.4. Target Markets and Profitability (Objective 1E) 
According to the Chinese regulation of the FITS sector, the registered foreign companies can 
only conduct the travel trade business in the Chinese domestic and inbound market during the 
first development decade prior to 2007. However, most foreign operators knew little about the 
Chinese domestic travel market, and did not want to compete with the local agencies in prices. 
Therefore, they gave most of their attention to the inbound business sector. Moreover, the 
FITS sector can be divided into two segments, leisure and corporate travel, with both 
segments covering the MICE market which is known as the most profitable area of the 
business. In addition, there was another common feature of FITSs that the foreign mother 
companies usually were supporting their Chinese subsidiaries via either gigantic inbound 
tourist volumes or a network of existing international contracts, except for those Hong Kong 
invested FITSs located in Guangdong. However, in terms of a JV, the foreign investor often 
gave more business support than the Chinese side, with the Chinese mainly taking 
responsibility for political issues, such as access to information about policy changes. 
 
To increase the profitability of the business, it was common for FITSs to exploit new business 
fields, such as the travel needs, including outbound travel demand, of foreign expatriates 
living in China, and the high end travel market of rich Chinese people. Maintaining service 
quality, while reducing the overall cost at the same time was a big and also common challenge 
for all the foreign operators. However, the survey showed a different result on the number of 
beneficial cases in the three locations. Beijing saw around 70% of the total FITSs having been 
profitable in China, higher than Shanghai and Guangdong where the rate was around 50%. 
Perhaps, the mature tourism networks in Beijing are a key influencing factor, given the early 
start of the industry in the city. 
 
Moreover, we examined the different roles of TOs and TAs who together make up the travel 
trade industry in Chapter Two. In this research, we found that the FITS sector in China did not 
show a clear boundary between TOs and TAs, just like the Chinese indigenous travel service 
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sector. However, most of the interviewed FITSs had an intention to be a TO in the future 
while applying local TAs via acquisitions, franchising, or partnerships. Furthermore, by 2007, 
few FITSs in China were successfully specialized in the on-line travel market, except for 
Gullivers Travel Association (GTA) China which saw itself as a TO focusing on the B2B field. 
However, as discussed in Chapter Two, the growing application of the Internet and relative 
ICTs in tourism is an inevitable trend of future, which, in fact, has caused considerable 
impacts on the travel industry in China too, especially since 2008. Therefore, there should be 
much more space for FDI to play in the e-travel sector in the future, for example Kuoni 
acquired an equity holding of about 32% of the Chinese Et-china in June 2009. 
 
10.4.5. Human Resource (HR) Management (objective 1F)  
A common feature was found that almost all FITSs advocated the application of local 
employment. The benefits of doing this were not only to reduce costs, but also to serve the 
strategy of a sustainable and long-term development in China. This survey found that the 
foreign mother companies usually assigned no more than three foreign people in charge of 
setting up matters, and would often reduce the number of the foreign staff after one-year’s 
smooth operation. Moreover, in most cases, it was also common that the foreign 
representatives would take the top management positions in the Chinese subsidiaries, such as 
CEO, CFO, or, Chairman. However, a trend was also found that when the Chinese local 
employees become qualified with the appropriate management skills and professional 
experiences, they will eventually take over the top management power from the foreign 
managers. In fact, in a few cases, such as NorthStar Kwan Kin and Tianjin SA Tours, the seats 
of GM/CEO have already been Chinese appointments. It was believed that a Chinese GM 
usually possess a better understanding of local business environment, and thus would be able 
to make more proper decisions and reactions toward market dynamics than foreign managers.   
 
Through the survey, it was also found that the interviewed FITSs generally agreed with the 
overall satisfying quality of Chinese employees, but with a lack of specialized and 
professional talents, such as experts in the MICE business. In order to increase the staff’s 
professional skills and efficiency, and to establish the companies’ unique culture, as well as 
the companies’ internal engagement, many types of training opportunities were provided in 
                                                                                                                    318 
FITSs, covering subjects including languages, operational techniques, management skills, and 
so on.  
 
However, many FITSs have also encountered the problem that it was difficult for them to 
maintain trained staff that would easily be poached by other companies via higher salary 
offers. Thus, training programmes were sustained continuously. In addition, some large and 
internationally celebrated travel companies, such as Kuoni, JTB, and AMEX, have intervened 
into local universities or colleges to set up professional courses, in order to satisfy their future 
needs of skilled staff. In short, HR has been a focus of competition between the foreign travel 
services and local agencies. How to find right people and develop talents has been an essential 
challenge for the success of every travel service company in China.  
 
10.4.6. Competition and Collaboration (Objective 2A) 
As discussed by 2007, FITSs were mainly relying on the Chinese inbound travel market, as 
well as some specified fields of domestic travel business, as their major business focus. 
However, it is better to distinguish two categories of the FITS sector, leisure travel and 
corporate travel, when discussing the competition issue. The finding is that generally, the 
corporate travel market has witnessed stronger competition amongst major players than in the 
leisure travel market, although the former was a relatively new business concept in the 
Chinese travel industry.  
 
In the leisure travel market, it was found that the inbound tourists into China, sent by the 
foreign mother companies from the original countries, usually brought FITSs the majority of 
their turnover. In fact, as most FITSs had had representative offices in China to serve their 
inbound foreign tourists before FITSs were formed, this portion of business has been existing 
there for a long time. FITSs had simply inherited the business of which the total volume 
mainly depended on the sales performance in the original countries. As the Chinese inbound 
market was the major business of the FITS sector at the time, FITSs functioned more like a 
destination service management facility rather than normal travel trade companies. Thus, as 
FITSs had stable volume of inbound tourists and needed to find local handling agencies in 
different cities or tourist sites, they saw more opportunities of collaborations with local firms 
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than competitions. However, once the strict policy constraints upon the Chinese outbound 
market removed, the FITS sector will have to directly face the rivalry of local large travel 
services which have been operating in the market for a long time. Thus, competition for FITSs 
in the leisure market was not great by 2007. However, this situation will change sooner or 
later by the further opening of the Chinese outbound market.  
 
However, in terms of the corporate travel market in China, FITSs commonly have already felt 
strong competitions between them and several local agencies. The concept of corporate travel 
management was brought into China by foreign services, such as Carlson Wagonlit, AMEX, 
FCM, and HRG, after 2002. So it was a very young business sector in China. In fact, most 
Chinese enterprises still could not fully understand why they should pay for an agent to buy 
travel products for them, and what the benefits were by doing so. Therefore, the multinational 
companies were the primary target market for all FITSs who were focusing on the corporate 
travel market. Although the competition among these foreign rivals was strong, the number of 
the rivals was limited to certain names.  
 
However, more and more local services have started to learn the operation of corporate travel 
management, and they are learning very fast by hiring skilled staff from the foreign rivals and 
by developing similar specialized technologies for the business. These local agents, like Ctrip 
and E-long, have become a considerable threat for FITSs; especially for medium sized 
enterprise clients. The prices provided by the Chinese local services were much cheaper than 
the foreign services with techniques not showing great differences, and thus, were more 
attractive than the foreign services. By 2007, FITSs still possessed some advantages when 
competing with Chinese rivals for large multinational clients, benefiting from their 
internationally identical standard. However, once the services of Chinese local agencies 
become acceptable to the multinationals, the competition in this market will increase and 
possibly become very cruel. As the day is not very far away, FITSs should assess the situation 
and plan ahead.  
 
10.4.7.  Findings Concerning the Local Travel Services 
The last three chapters have investigated each location respectively, including a section of 
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SPSS analysis about the local travel services in each location. This section will compare the 
data collected from each location, and outline some differences between them. Thus, the 
findings in this section will help investigate objective 1A which was discussed earlier in this 
chapter.  
 
As much of the collected information was suitable for non-parametric tests/statistics, the 
comparison was conducted mainly by using cross-tabs and chi-square tests. Sometimes, in 
order to get a valid result, some values had to be regrouped. With a sample number of 50 for 
each location, was rather small, chi-square test was not applicable at all the time (often with 
more than 20% of cells showing an expected count lower than 5). However, the comparison 
of the questionnaire data provided some useful findings, especially for addressing the 
Objective 2B, as well as 2A, 3A, and 3B (see Table 6.1 in chapter six). Generally, the 
questionnaire survey helped develop the understanding of the Chinese local travel service 
business, as well as the relationship between the local services and FITSs by 2007.  
 
10.4.7.1. The Local Attitudes towards the FITS Sector (Objective 2B)  
Figure 10.1 reveals the different levels of knowledge of the indigenous travel service 
companies in the three locations about the opening process of the Chinese travel trade 
industry and the entry of foreign services. According to the chi-square value 6.459 (p<0.05), 
there is a significant association between the locations and the local knowledge about the 
foreign sector. It seemed that the agencies in Guangdong had more understanding of the trend 
than Beijing, and much more than Shanghai. In fact, the results in Beijing and Guangdong 
were broadly similar, but the main difference was with Shanghai. This probably explains why 
the data seemed to be significantly different. In accordance with this result, Guangdong and 
Beijing also saw much higher level of cooperative working experiences with foreign service 
providers than Shanghai, which will be demonstrated later (see Table 10.8).  
 
Moreover, Figure 10.2 and Figure 10.3 further investigated the attitudes and opinions of the 
respondents who knew of changes in the industry in each location. The chi-square tests of the 
both figures shows no significant difference between the three locations. However, it can be 
seen in the figures and results with the highest rate, about 70% of the respondents in 
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Guangdong welcomed this change, while the rates in Beijing and Shanghai were at about 50%, 
with only one case in each location disliking the opening. In terms of the opinions about the 
roles of FITSs, the three locations showed rather similar results. In total over half of the 
responses concerned FITSs as both rivals and future partners. The local industries generally 
held a slightly higher opinion concerning the competitions of the foreign entrants than the 
cooperative opportunities.  
 
 
Figure 10.1. The knowledge of the local travel services about the incoming FITSs in the three 
locations (Part One) 






















Chi-Square Tests (Part Two) 
  Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.459(a) 2 .040 
Likelihood Ratio 6.333 2 .042 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.653 1 .017 
N of Valid Cases 150   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  
Sources: the author 
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Sources: the author  
 
Thus, to address the Objective 2B, the general answer is structured as follows: First, a total of 
46 respondents in the three research locations, almost 1/3 of all respondents, did not know of 
the change of opening and the entry of FITSs, which suggests that FITSs had not influenced 
the local industry by 2007. Second, in terms of the attitudes of the Chinese indigenous 
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services towards the opening and the coming foreign entrants, the results showed that most 
respondents welcomed this trend, especially in Guangdong, with most of the rest respondents 
maintaining a neutral stand. Third, most of the local respondents who knew the opening trend 
recognized both opportunities and threats in the future marketplace, thinking of FITSs as both 
partners and rivals. However, generally speaking, worries about the increasing competition 
were slightly higher than the positive thoughts among the local services.     
 
10.4.7.2. Other Major Findings about the Local Travel Services  
Table 10.6 shows the general scales of the responding local travel services in the three 
locations, in terms of the number of branches, the ages of the companies, and the number of 
full-time staff. The figures in bold show the cases where the biggest volumes were found. So, 
it is clear to see that most responding agencies in the three locations were small to medium 
sized with less than ten branches and less than 100 employees. As the chi-square test showed 
p<0.05 for the comparison of ‘Branches’ and ‘Full Time Staff’, there were differences 
between the overall scales of the local travel services in the three locations. In general, Beijing 
witnessed more respondents being the largest travel services among the three locations, with 
12 having over 50 branches and 18 having over 400 staff, followed by the scales of 
respondents in Guangdong, and then Shanghai. In addition, the figures show that Guangdong 
and Beijing both had the largest group of respondents having over 10 years operation history, 
while the biggest group in Shanghai aged five to ten year old. This matches the examples of 
Beijing and Guangdong who started the development of the tourism industry earlier than 
Shanghai where the travel businesses were the smallest and youngest.  
 
 
Table 10. 6.  The general scale of the operations of the local travel services in the three locations 
(Part One)  
Location&Count Branches/Sales Sites Years Full Time Staff Total 
Cases 










SH Observed 38 5 7 13 20 17 33 11 6 50 
BJ Observed 24 14 12 20 10 20 24 8 18 50 
GD Observed 29 16 5 16 11 23 32 11 7 50 
Total  Observed 91 35 24 49 41 60 89 30 31 150 
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 Chi-Square Tests  (Part Two) 







Asymp. Sig. Of 
Full Time Staff 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4 .014 .144 .029 
Likelihood Ratio 4 .010 .158 .035 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1 .354 .725 .805 
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  
Sources: the author  
 
The three locations showed a common market feature about the major business focus and the 
major sources of income of the local travel trade sector (see Figure 10.4 and Figure 10.5). It is 
obvious that the domestic travel market was the most important component of the local travel 
services in the three locations, being also the biggest origin of the turnovers of the sector. 
Then, the outbound travel market was the second important business ingredient for the local 
travel services in the three locations, providing the local industries with the second largest 
source of income. However, it was also noted that the Chinese inbound travel market was 
regarded as less important than the domestic and outbound ones making modest contributions 
to the industries’ gross revenue in the three locations. Moreover, a small difference can be 
traced between the three locations. Beijing witnessed a higher proportion of respondents 
giving respects to the inbound market than the other two areas, implicating a more mature and 
balanced industry platform in the city. However, in short, although the three research locations 
represented the most advanced tourism markets in China, the travel trade sector was still in 
the infant stage. Thus, there are considerable potential and opportunities in both outbound and 
inbound markets in China for foreign players.  
 
Moreover, through the collected data, there was one case in Shanghai found to have indirect 
foreign ownership from Hong Kong, as one of the firm’s owners was a Sino-Hong Kong 
jointly invested restaurant in Shanghai. Thus, there was no foreign ownership shown in the 
registration of the firm. Given the possibility of such indirect foreign ownership, there is an 
important issue to be considered: in order to hedge over the high entry barrier existing in the 
FITS sector in China. Some small foreign travel operators could have entered the Chinese 
travel market by applying the strategy of indirect investment, such as investing under the 
name of their local subsidiaries or other connections (usually families or relatives, or partner 
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companies), or by applying the local tradition called 'Chengbao' system as explained in 
chapter five. 
 


























Sources:  the author  
 


























Sources:  the author 
 
In addition, through the survey, it was noted that the Chinese indigenous travel services held a 
relatively high preference towards the application of partnerships when developing overseas 
business. Table 10.7 shows the information about the numbers of respondents who were 
permitted for the operation of the Chinese outbound travel market, and the methods they used 
for the overseas development. Although the chi-square value of 4.321 (p>0.05) gives an 
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indication that there is no significant difference between the three locations, Beijing witnessed 
the highest volume, 38 respondents with the permission, and around 90% of them applying 
foreign partnerships. Guangdong saw a similar total volume of such respondents numbered 37, 
but with a lower percentage, 70%, of such respondents using foreign partnerships. Moreover, 
80% of the total outbound licensed respondents in Shanghai believed in foreign partnerships, 
with a total of 20 such respondents. The lower percentage of those using foreign partnerships 
in Guangdong possibly suggests a higher confidence in the local services of foreign trades 
than the other two locations. 
 






Overseas Approaches Total Number of 
Responses Having 
been Permitted 











SH Observed 16 4 20 





26 11 37 
Total Observed 76 19 95 
 Chi-Square Tests   (Part Two) 
  Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.321(a) 2 .115 
Likelihood Ratio 4.453 2 .108 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.485 1 .223 
N of Valid Cases 95     
a  1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. 
Sources: the author  
 
Table 10.8 suggests that there were significant associations between locations and the 
opportunity of local services to collaborate with foreign services (the chi-square value is 
16.167, and p<0,05). Guangdong had the biggest number, 38 respondents who had the 
cooperative working experiences with foreign agencies, followed by 33 in Beijing and only 
19 in Shanghai. This result is in accordance with the early findings about the local services’ 
knowledge on the FITS sector. It is understandable that more cooperative experiences with 
foreign services results in more knowledge about the foreign sector. Moreover, Shanghai 
experienced low levels of communication between the local and foreign services in the three 
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markets. This probably attributed to the small scales and age of the local travel services in the 
city. 
 
Table 10.8. The comparison of the numbers of respondents who have worked cooperatively with 












SH Observed 19 31 50 
BJ Observed 33 17 50 
GZ&SZ Observed 38 12 50 
Total Observed 90 60 150 
 Chi-Square Tests (Part Two) 
  Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.167(a) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 16.286 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 14.941 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 150   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.00. 
Sources: the author  
 
In addition, Figure 10.6 further investigates the maintenance of the collaboration relationships 
between local and foreign services in the three locations, with the answers from those local 
respondents that had the cooperative working experiences with foreign agencies. The result 
shows an interesting phenomenon that none of the respondents claimed a bad relationship 
with foreign partners, and in fact, mostly the relationship was regarded as ‘good’ or ‘very 
good’. It seemed that a good relationship with foreign traders was respected by the Chinese 
indigenous travel services in each locations. This should contribute to a friendly market 
environment for FITSs in China. Foreign investors may have more advantages than the 
Chinese side in negotiation processes if the majority of the Chinese travel services would like 
to form a partnership with foreigners.  
 
Moreover, in terms of the attitudes towards a good relationship with government 
organizations, the three locations gave very similar answers, regarding it as either important 
or neutral (see Figure 10.7), with the chi-square test revealing no significant difference 
between the three locations. In total, more than half of the local respondents regarded the 
relationship as an important matter, with Guangdong holding the highest rate of 60% 
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supporting this view, and almost all the rest respondents holding a neutral opinion. This result 
provides another view on the important roles of the Chinese government and its 
administrative power upon the travel trade industry in China. 
 
Figure 10.6. The relationship between the local respondents and foreign cooperating agents in the 






















Sources: the author 
 
Figure 10.7. The opinions of respondents about the importance of having a good relationship with 



















Sources:  the author  
 
In conclusion, there are three most important findings from the questionnaire survey. First, it 
was found that the local travel service sector generally welcomed foreign entrants, as not only 
the competition for the FITS sector was perceived, but also was the cooperative opportunities 
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with FITSs. Second, the indigenous travel services in the three locations, especially in 
Shanghai, were mostly small to medium sized and young, compared to the international 
market. Third, the inbound market which was the major business composition of the FITS 




10.5. The General Investment Environment for FITSs 
10.5.1.  The Political and Economic Environment (Objective 3A)  
Economically, with the continuous growth of China's economy, the consumption demand of 
the Chinese market was increasing dramatically, which was certainly true in the Chinese 
tourism industry. The growth was especially obvious in the Chinese outbound market, 
although many countries still limit the access of Chinese tourists. The number of Chinese 
people's outbound trips saw some 40 fold growth over the last two decades. According to 
WTO's (2001) estimation, China will be the No.1 tourism destination and the No.4 tourist 
origin country in the world by 2020, which very likely to happen earlier than estimated. As 
China has achieved its fundamental reform process of SOEs and the introduction of market 
mechanisms into the economy (examined in chapter four), a further growth is foreseeable. In 
short, during the decade from 1998 to 2007, the general economic environment for the FITS 
sector was ideal and shows much potential. 
 
However, from a political view, some considerable investment constraints during the decade 
are summarized as follows. First, there was still a high entry barrier and policy obstacles for 
FITSs by 2007, as the foreign applicants should be already operating as a travel agency or 
tour operator with annual worldwide turnover exceeding US$ 40 million (see chapter five). 
Although the Chinese government has fulfilled all its promises made for the accession to 
WTO1 in 2001 and constantly deregulated the market, FITSs needed to pay an RMB 0.6 
million deposit to the tourism authority for licensing, apart from the required RC. Most 
considerably, the fertile Chinese outbound travel market was still closed to FITSs. Second, the 
improvement of the Chinese legal system for foreign investors had not been completed, and 
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thus operations like mergers and acquisitions by foreigners had not been well regulated by 
2007. Third, the dominance of SOEs and strong government influence in tourism (see chapter 
five) limited the investment forms of FITSs.  
 
As the sector of FITS did not exist in China until late 1990’s, and it had not yet been fully 
deregulated by the end of 2007, the changes of relative polices was always a sensitive issue 
for FITSs. Between 1998 to 2007, there were five major deregulations announced by the 
government. First, in December 2001, the Chinese government allowed the setting-up and 
operating of Sino-foreign JVs in China. Second, foreign controlled JVs and WOFEs were 
allowed in July 2003. Then, the requirement of RC was lowered, and the limitation upon 
locations for registration was removed in February 2005. Furthermore, the constraints upon 
investors from Hong Kong and Macao were largely released in December 2005. In addition, 
in July 2007, the government promised to allow FITSs to set up their branches and 
subsidiaries within the country. However, the Chinese outbound market, the most profitable 
area of the Chinese travel industry, was still protected from FITSs by 2007.  
 
Through this survey, it is evident that the development of the FITS sector in China was deeply 
impacted by Chinese administrative methods through policies in the first development decade. 
Commonly, almost all the respondents who accepted the interviews remarked that the Chinese 
policies had been a major influence or a primary obstacle for their development in China. 
Moreover, for all of the interviewees, what they wanted most was to see the entire opening of 
the Chinese market as soon as possible. However, although the new rules on the Chinese 
travel service industry announced on 1st May 2009 considerably eased the setup and 
expansion of FITSs, the Chinese people’s outbound travel market was still an untouchable 
business area for the FITS sector.  
 
It is evident that FITS cases or selected zones may be used by the Chinese authority as a test 
to experience the opening of the outbound market earlier than others in the next several years. 
The Chinese government and the tourism authority have showed their positive attitudes 
towards the enhancement of foreign influences in the Chinese travel industry. Therefore, 
despite the existing policy constrictions on the outbound market, the future trend is optimistic, 
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and the opening will continue. The general economical and political environment of China for 
the entry and development of FITSs has become more friendly than ever. 
 
 
10.5.2.  Opportunities and Challenges for FITSs (Objective 3B) 
The research revealed some positive opportunities for the development of the FITS sector. 
First, as discussed, the overall economical and political environment of China for FITSs are 
improving. Given the overall background of the Chinese reform and open process, the FITS 
sector will see a more free and less regulated market environment, and eventually meet a time 
of prosperity in the near future. Second, through the questionnaire survey, the Chinese local 
travel services generally showed a welcoming attitude towards foreign entrants, with an 
obvious preference to the establishment of international partnerships. This will provide FITSs 
with choices for expansion, either via acquisitions or partnerships, and more advantages when 
negotiating with numerous Chinese local services. Furthermore, as the research showed 
different business foci of the Chinese indigenous services mainly upon the Chinese domestic 
and outbound travel market, the advantage of FITSs in the Chinese inbound sector is apparent. 
Last but not least, the most recent deregulation in 2009 has lowered the RC requirement of the 
FITS sector to RMB 0.3 million (about US$ 43,478) with a deposit of only RMB 0.2 million 
(US$ 28,985), which are equal treatments as the Chinese indigenous services. The obstacle 
upon setting up branches of FITSs has also been officially removed since 2009. Thus, FITSs 
should witness an easier and more efficient setup procedure in China in the future. 
 
However, there are also remarkable challenges for the future development of the FITS sector. 
Most considerably, the Chinese people’s outbound travel market is still forbidden to the FITS 
sector, and an entirely opened market is not literally promised by the Chinese government. 
Also, the Chinese government will still play an essential and sensitive role through policies, 
regulations and through direct ownerships of major market players, including SOEs. For 
example, the monopoly of the Chinese distribution system named TravelSky which was the 
only GDS functioning within the country may still cause difficulty for FITSs in applying 
many more advanced management technologies within the Chinese marketplace. The second 
challenge lies with local recruitment and the retention of trained staff. It was found that HR 
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management has been a key topic for most top managers of FITSs, when concerning the 
future success of their investments in China. In fact, competition for skilled staff has been a 
considerable challenge not only among foreign players, but also between foreign and local 
services.  
 
Moreover, as the Chinese indigenous travel services are improving themselves and learning 
from the foreign services quickly, FITSs will see more competition from Chinese services in 
the future, especially in some specialized market areas, such as the luxury leisure travel 
market, or MICE, or online travel searching and reservation business. Furthermore, there were 
issues about differences in business principles and traditions between the Chinese companies 
and foreigners, such as the attitudes towards contracts. Last but not least, other financial 
challenges were also detected during this research, including the appreciation of the 
investment costs in labour and offices in China, and risks from exchange rates. 
 
10.5.3.  Key Emphases for the Future Development of FITSs  
The findings of this research revealed that the first development decade of the FITS sector 
from 1998 to 2007 in China was difficult and slow, which is a very different picture from 
most of the other industries in the country. The major reason for the slow development 
approach is due to the tight control of the government authorities on the FITS sector, 
especially regarding access to the Chinese outbound travel market. Although the future 
market environment is likely to be less restricted for FITSs in China, the Chinese marketplace 
will still be considerably different from the capitalist markets of most western countries even 
after the outbound market opened. This is the essential meaning of the term ‘a socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics’ which was explained in chapter four. It is important for 
FITSs who intend to seek a sustainable future and success in China to consider these 
characteristics. Therefore, with the understanding of the FITS sector and the local economic 
and political environment in China, this section will offer some suggestions concerning 
FITSs’ operational strategies in China in the future. The purpose of these suggestions is to 
strengthen the examination of Aim Three and the related objectives. 
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First, FITSs may need to understand the government influences and bi-roles in China. This 
thesis provides evidence of the considerable influence of the Chinese government upon the 
FITS sector by the means of its policies. The policies made during the decade from 1998 to 
2007 aimed to protect the interests of the Chinese indigenous industry, and thus were not 
preferential for FITSs. Confined by the policy barriers explained in chapter five, the number 
of FITSs in China by 2007 was only 27, and the financial returns of their investments were 
not steady, although many have been profitable. Therefore, it is clear that government policies 
have the power to directly affect the business performance of the FITS sector in China.   
 
Moreover, it is essential to realise that the Chinese government is playing bi-roles in the 
marketplace, of not only a strongest player in the Chinese travel trade market, but also an 
industry administrator within the country. In fact, to some extent, the Chinese policies could 
be seen as made for serving the needs of the state-owned (including local government owned) 
travel companies. Table 10.9 listed all the 16 Sino-foreign JVs registered by the end of 2007. 
From the table, it is not difficult to see that the majority of the Chinese investors were 
government possessions. Some of the Chinese names have had several Sino-foreign JVs with 
different foreign partners. This may result from the fact that most of the Chinese 
private-owned travel agencies were too small and too weak to be the joint partners of those 
bigger foreign investors. However, it is also obviously true that the Chinese travel trade 
industry is still dominated and strongly influenced by the Chinese government and its SOEs. 
It is necessary for FITSs to understand that this situation cannot be changed in a short time.  
 
Furthermore, FITSs may not be able to see an entirely free travel market in the near future, as 
the opening process will have to go on gradually, especially after the major deregulations in 
2009. There may eventually be a ‘Chinese featured free market’, where the bi-roles of the 
Chinese government, being both major market player and policy maker, may remain for as 
long as needed. Thus, it is meaningful for FITSs in China to pay attention not only to the 
changes of the Chinese policies affecting the industry, but also the actions of the major 
Chinese SOEs. These SOEs, including local government owned ones, are usually the largest 
travel services in the Chinese tourism industry, and they will become the most considerable 
rivals to the FITS sector in the future. However, legitimized by the Chinese reform and open 
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policy, the ownership reforms of SOEs may also bring valuable opportunities to FITSs in 
China to expand via methods such as acquisitions and mergers.  
 
Table 10.9.  The Chinese partners of all Sino-foreign JVs in the FITS sector (2007) 
No. Names Chinese Partners Attributes 
1 Yunnan Diethelm Travel Yunnan Tourism Group & 
China CITS 
State-owned (SO) 
2 Guangzhou Hong Thai Guangzhou GZL SO 
3 Guangdong Wingon Travel Guangdong CITS SO 
4 JTB New Century China CITIC SO 
5 Morning Star New Ark BTG SO 
6 BTG Accor BTG SO 
7 Tianjin SA Tours Tianjin Tourism Group SO 
8 CITS AMEX China CITS SO 
9 Wuxi Weilin Holiday Wuxi Holiday International 
Travel Service 
SO 
10 Flight Center-Comfort Comfort International (BTG) SO 
11 CTS TUI China CTS SO 
12 Shenzhen Shunfeng Shenzhen CITS SO 
13 HRG JinJiang Shanghai JinJiang SO 
14 Guangdong Student Union Jingan Auction Private-owned (PO) 
15 CYTS Travelport China CYTS SO 
16 NorthStar Kwan Kin Beijing North Star PO 
Sources: based on CNTA’s registration recorder and author’s findings (2007) 
 
 
Second, chapter four has studied regional difference within China, especially in terms of FDI 
distribution in the country. Clearly, understanding the differences, most importantly the policy 
differences, among the investment destinations in China is vital. For example, realizing 
Guangdong’s special status and potential may bring considerable opportunities to FITSs. By 
now, the FITS sector in Guangdong seemed to be less active than Beijing, and no better than 
Shanghai. However, fast growth of the FITS sector in the province of Guangdong may be 
imminent. This point of view is supported by Guangdong’s foreign oriented economic base 
with its higher GDP, larger population, and wider economic tiers than Beijing and Shanghai. 
Also, the province is geographically and culturally similar to the more advanced economies of 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. As presented in Chapter Four, Guangdong has always been 
regarded being at the forefront of the Chinese reform and open policies, such as the 
designation of China’s earliest SEZs within the province. Given the implementation of the 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between Guangdong and Hong Kong, the 
province will witness more privileges than other Chinese locations. Therefore, it is reasonable 
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that Guangdong may be the earliest location to experiment in developing the Chinese 
outbound travel market.  
 
Similar to Guangdong, the nearby province of Hainan was another emerging location for 
FITSs as 'The State Council on promoting international tourism in Hainan Island, construction 
and development of a number of comments' announced in 2009 clearly demonstrates many 
opportunities for tourism development on the island. In addition, the development of the vast 
middle-west region in China has also been raised as a primary issue by the Chinese 
government. These policy movements will substantially change the business environment for 
FITSs, and thus the development approaches of the FITS sector in China in the future. 
 
Third, an association of FITSs may be need to stand for the common interests of the sector. 
Based on the data collected from the survey, it seemed that many FITSs were experiencing 
similar problems. However, they also seemed to know little about what was happening to 
other foreign pioneers, except for the Japanese companies who were very much engaging and 
trusting in Japanese business associations in China. For the future of the FITS sector in China, 
an association of their own would be able to bring benefits to all FITSs. A professional 
organization in the sector can represent the stakeholders and members, and bargain with the 
industry administrator, striving for the benefits of the group with considerable power gathered 
as a whole. However, the challenges are apparent, as it is not usual in China to have an 
association formed by the industry itself. This will need one of the industry leaders, such as 
CITS AMEX to make the first effort on the proposal. Hopefully, the Chinese tourism 
authority could embrace, and support the establishment of such a mechanism which would 
facilitate communications between the administrator and the FITS sector.  
 
 
10.6. Conclusion of the Chapter 
The purpose of this chapter is to make comparisons and conclusions by combing the major 
research results of the previous chapters. Mainly, the results presented in this chapter are 
derived from the primary data analyzed in the last three chapters which focusing on the major 
                                                                                                                    336 
research locations, including Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong. In addition, some 
phenomena studied in the literature chapters were also referred in this chapter. Thus, the three 
aims and the objectives (see chapter six) are examined in a more comprehensive way than the 
previous chapters, by combining relative results found in the three locations. 
  
The chapter firstly compares the seven major case studies of the three locations, and discusses 
some basic differences and commonalities of the sector, followed by a comparison of the three 
locations. In general, to answer Objective 1A, the three locations had different roles in the 
Chinese economy with various geographical and economic features. In terms of the tourism 
industry, it is found that Beijing had the most comprehensive and the soundest tourism 
platform for the future development when compared with other Chinese cities. Given that the 
travel trade sector in China was strongly influenced by the Chinese government, Beijing was 
regarded as the best registered location by 14 FITSs, more than half of the whole sector. 
Moreover, highest proportion of profitable cases was seen in the location.  
 
Moreover, at the provincial level, the tourism industry in Guangdong operated at the biggest 
scale within the country, in terms of the numbers of businesses. The industry in Guangdong 
started to grow as early as Beijing. All FITSs in Guangdong were invested by a Hong Kong 
travel service. And thus, the location witnessed increasing collaboration and communication 
opportunities with more advanced and nearby economics like Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan. Moreover, in terms of Shanghai, the city saw a later start time than the other locations 
for the development of the FITS sector. In practice, most FITSs who focused on the corporate 
travel market made the city their headquarters in China.  
 
According to the questionnaire survey, the local travel service sectors in the three locations 
were young, small and immature, and there was no clear division between wholesalers and 
retailers. In additional, the results in all locations emphasized the important status of the 
government administration in the Chinese tourism industry Moreover, the three locations all 
showed their weakness in the Chinese inbound market. However, Shanghai had a smallest and 
youngest travel trade sector among the three locations. Beijing saw a more balanced and 
mature relationship develop among the domestic, outbound and inbound markets. 
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Furthermore, although the three locations displayed an overall welcome attitude to the entry 
of FITSs and a common interest in forming partnerships with foreign services, Guangdong 
witnessed more respondents having cooperative experiences with overseas services than 
Beijing and Shanghai.  
 
In short, although there were differences between the three locations, the FITS sector by 2007 
was concentrated in these three markets. It is clear that the three locations were regarded as 
must-occupy markets by FITSs. The concentration will continue in the near future, although 
the 2009 enabled FITSs to set up branches throughout the country. 
 
The chapter also discusses general results about the development approaches of FITSs in 
China, according to collected interview data from the firms. By comparing and analyzing the 
data, some major development features of FITSs before 2007 are explained, and the 
objectives of the thesis are addressed one by one. Following this, the chapter emphasizes that 
the most significant obstacle in the FITS sector during the decade (1998 to 2007) came from 
the government intervention via policies and regulations. In this aspect, there are three 
comments concerning the future of the FITS sector. First, an FITS should understand the 
important status of the government administrator and the numerous SOEs in the Chinese 
travel trade industry. Second, the important role of different regional policies within China 
should also be respected. Third, for the benefits of all FITSs, an association of the sector 












11.1.  Introduction 
This thesis aims to investigate the major development strategies and features of the FITS 
sector in China, and the essential local business environment in the decade from 1998 to 2007. 
In the previous ten chapters, both relevant literature and collected primary data were 
presented. This chapter reviews the previous chapters by connecting the literature with the 
major findings derived from the primary data. The key findings of each aim and the related 
objectives are discussed in the following section. This leads to a summary of the contributions 
of this thesis, both academic and practical. Moreover, this chapter also discusses the 
limitations of the research, concluded by some suggestions for future research.  
 
 
11.2.  Key Findings 
11.2.1. Key Findings to Aim One and Associated Objectives 
According to both the examined secondary data and the collected primary data in the previous 
chapters, all the objectives of the thesis were addressed in chapter ten. In this chapter, the 
findings are summarized by connecting with relative theories examined in the thesis. Three 
sections of key findings serve the three aims respectively, starting with the discussion of Aim 
One as follows: 
 
11.2.1.1.  Key Findings to Aim One 
Aim One: ‘To analyse the features of development approaches and operational experiences 
of the FITS sector in China in the decade from 1998 to 2007’  
 
To address this aim, six objectives were designed covering some fundamental aspects of 
FITSs’ earliest development in China. In general, the development of the sector in China 
during 1998 to 2007 was slow and constrained, resulting from the Chinese government’s tight 
control and protectionist policies upon the FITS business. The sector’s major features in the 
decade included: the concentration of register location in the three most prosperous markets in 
China, especially in Beijing; the popularity of applying alternative licences to overcome the 
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difficulty of obtaining a FITS licence; the majority from Asian countries/regions with western 
investors being less active; the dominance of green field investments in the sector with a shift 
of major investment forms from Sino-controlled JVs to foreign controlled JVs and then to 
WOFEs; their business foci on the inbound and some high-end domestic market segments 
with unstable profitability; and their overall dependence on the local labour and expatriate top 
managers. As mentioned in chapter five, Gao (2004), Li (2005), and Lin (2008) have 
introduced some of the above phenomena by describing basic facts of a few FITSs. The 
findings of this thesis expand the understanding of the FITS sector with a series of more 
detailed data and more comprehensive comparisons on the businesses.  
 
In fact, all, excluding the employment aspect, of the above concluded features of the FITS 
sector are somehow influenced by the Chinese policies. Thus, Ali et al (2006, p41)’s proposal 
that foreign investors’ international experiences may not be applicable to their investment in 
China because of a variety of problems the foreign firms may not have encountered before is 
found to be rational in this study. In short, the development of the FITS sector in China has a 
unique approach when compared to ‘free economies’. Although the opening of the sector is 
continuing, an entirely free Chinese travel trade market is not literally promised by the 
Chinese authority, and may not be seen in the near future. 
 
11.2.1.2.  Key Findings to Objective 1A 
Objective 1A: ‘To research the reasons of FITSs’ selection of investment locations in 
China in the decade (1998-2007), and the major differences in their operational strategies 
related to the choices of registered locations’ 
 
The objective is investigated with the primary data collected from both interviews and 
questionnaires. In general, key papers, such as Grillet’s (2003) ‘four regions’ concept in 
chapter four, as well as the collected interview data, showed that the three major locations, 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong, played different roles in the Chinese economy which 
resulting in diverse development approaches of the FITS sector in the three markets during 
the first development decade from 1998 to 2007.  
 
Beijing represented the most mature market of the Chinese tourism industry, hosting over half 
of the total FITSs. However the situation was essentially shaped by political force, mainly via 
policies, of the Chinese administration office. Shanghai being the most internationally 
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business oriented market, was regarded as the actual national center of all FITSs specialized 
in the corporate travel market. However, Guangdong (also business orientated) was strongly 
connected with and influenced by the Hong Kong travel trade market. By 2007, the fact that 
the travel trade sector was strongly impacted by the Chinese policies (Guo & Turner, 2002; 
Qian, 2003; and Qu et al, 2005), was testified in this study. Thus, it is understandable that the 
capital city, Beijing was the most popular location chosen by most FITSs for government 
cooperation purpose. Benefiting from the mature market connections between the city and 
other Chinese regions, Beijing also saw the highest profitability rates among the three 
locations. 
 
Moreover, the questionnaire survey analyzed by locations, showed some commonalities in the 
three markets, when reflected in the local travel service sector. Mainly, they were all young, 
small and immature in comparison to the international travel trade industry, and with no clear 
division between wholesalers and retailers, supporting Qian (2003)’s study. In addition, the 
local services all showed weakness in the Chinese inbound market. Moreover, they showed an 
overall welcome attitude to the entry of foreign services and a common interest in forming 
partnerships with foreign agents. Last, but not least, the important status of the government 
administration in the Chinese tourism industry was detected in the three local markets, which 
is again consistent with the findings of Guo & Turner (2002), Qian (2003) and Qu et al (2005). 
However, some differences, revealing their diverse development histories, were also noted. 
First, the travel trade sector in Shanghai was found to be smaller and younger than Beijing 
and Guangdong, in terms of average ages, staff and branch numbers. Second, Beijing had the 
most balanced relationship among the domestic, outbound and inbound travel markets. Third, 
Guangdong experienced more local services having cooperative experiences with foreign 
agents than Beijing and Shanghai. 
 
In short, the FITS sector in China was concentrated in the three most prosperous locations by 
2007, which were regarded as must-occupy markets for most FITSs. This follows Guimaraes 
et al (2000)’s comments that agglomeration economies are decisive location factors and 
service agglomeration has a notably strong effect on FDI. The concentration on these 
locations also reflects that the large market size, best infrastructure, high policy stability and 
free trade zones (Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Lim, 2001; Hong and Chin, 2007), as well as high 
R&D intensity (Chung and Alcacer, 2002) are important location determinants for FDI in 
China.   
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However, given the fact that the 2009’s deregulation has enabled FITSs to set up branches 
throughout the country freely and legally, the distributions of FITSs may change in the future. 
Despite this, the three locations should still be able to maintain their more advanced and 
attractive status for FDI than most other Chinese regions for many years. Moreover, along 
with the confirmed power of the Chinese government and its policies that strongly influence 
the Chinese economy and its tourism industry (Haley, 2003; Guo & Turner, 2002; Qian, 
2003), different regional policies will also demonstrate the power to affect the future 
distribution of FITSs throughout China.  
 
11.2.1.3.  Key Findings to Objective 1B 
Objective 1B: ‘To study the concerns and reactions of FITSs towards the business 
registration process in China, and special strategies applied in the sector for set-up’ 
 
The examination of this objective is mainly based on the interview data. It should be noted 
that with the policy obstacles explained in Chapter Five, not only the number of FITSs, but 
also the forms of their investments in China were limited by 2007. FITSs were all new formed 
green field investments after 1998, with forms of either JVs or WOFEs. It was rare to see 
other FDI modes, such as franchising or acquisitions, in the FITS sector in China by the year 
of 2007. It is also clear that during the decade, FDI in the Chinese travel trade industry could 
not take much location and ownership advantages in the Chinese marketplace. According to 
Dunning’s (1977, 1988) OLI (ownership, location and internalization advantages) framework, 
a foreign firm must possess some types of advantages specific to the nature and ownership of 
its nationality, in order for the firm to operate competitively in a overseas market. However, 
without being able to access the Chinese outbound travel market, FITSs could not fully apply 
their advantages in other destination countries for their production base in China. Thus, the 
concept of ‘strategic investors’ (Luo and O’connor, 1998) or ‘strategical reactions and 
investments’ (Moon and Roehl, 2001) is suggested to be the better explanation of the FITS 
sector in China in the decade. Moreover, differing from previous research into firm-specific 
determinants of foreign entry mode choice, such as Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2004) and Wei 
et al (2005), this study testified that a host of government’s policy on ownership restrictions 
can substantially affect the entry mode and performance of FDI in the host country (Makino 
and Beamish, 1998; Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001; Mattoo et al, 2004; Globerman and Nielsen, 
2007).  
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Furthermore, in this research, to better serve the market demand, to pursue profits and reduce 
costs were seen as two most relevant reasons for FITSs to invest in China in the first 
development decade by 2007. Thus, both horizontal and vertical FDI determinants (Lim, 2001) 
were recognized to be effective in this research setting. Generally, the setting up cost of FITSs 
was considered as low, mainly for the licensing and offices. However, it is important to note 
that given the regulatory obstacles in obtaining a travel trade licence for branches, many 
foreign investors had to apply for alternative licences, including consultancy or air services, 
when expanding in different cities in China. In fact, in regard of the policy obstacles in the 
Chinese travel trade sector, many foreign travel companies, such as Carlson Wagonlit and 
Boscolo, were only operating consultant or air services in China by 2007. 
 
11.2.1.4.  Key Findings to Objective 1C 
Objective 1C: ‘To investigate the counties/regions of origin of FITSs, as well as particular 
operational patterns or characters related to their original background’ 
 
The examination of this objective is derived from the interview data. By 2007, the majority of 
FITSs in China were from Asian countries and regions, including eight from Japan, eight 
from Hong Kong, one from Singapore and one from Malaysia, making up a total of 18, about 
2/3 of the whole sector. Then there were three FITSs from America, two from Switzerland, 
and one each from Britain, France, Germany, and Australia (see Table 11.1).  
 








Names of Foreign 
Mother Company 
Japan (8) NTA  Hong Kong (8) ShunTak 
JTB (Beijing) Kwan Kin 
JTB (Shanghai) Morning Star 
JPIC Gullivers 
ANA Student Union 
Hankyu Shunfeng 
KinKi Wing On 
Weilin Hong Thai 
America (3) American Express Switzerland (2) Kuoni 
Travelport Diethelm 
Grand Circle Australia FCM 
Britain  BTI Singapore  SA Tours 
France Accor Germany TUI 
Malaysia Star Cruises   
Sources: based on CNTA’s registration recorder (2007) 
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It is apparent that the major foreign investors were from Japan and Hong Kong, as the 
communications and collaboration of travel trade businesses between these two economies 
and China had been developing for decades. In general, companies from Asian countries and 
regions were more familiar with the business environment of mainland China, compared to 
western investors. Thus, for most western investors, the travel trade sector of China was 
attractive, but the general business environment was considered as neither friendly nor free 
enough to enter, mainly due to the existing regulatory constraints. Therefore, geographical 
and cultural distances between FDI origin countries and the host country (Grosse and Trevino, 
1996; Li et al, 2001) are found to have certain impacts on the FITS sector in China.  
 
Moreover, consistent with empirical evidence provided by Grosse and Trevino (1996); and 
Ford et al (2008), that source countries of FDI can cause different effects in the investments in 
the host countries, diverse preferences of FITSs among different origins were seen in China 
during the decade, although these differences may not be the case in other industries. First, 
Japanese companies tended to show a common belief in establishing wholly owned ventures. 
Also, to provide their Japanese tourists with a satisfactory travel experience and high quality 
of services was commonly regarded as one of the most important purposes of having a 
subsidiary in China by the Japanese FITSs. Second, Hong Kong’s investors preferred to set up 
their first entity in Guangdong, where people share same language and similar culture of their 
own. However, for most western investors, such as American Express, or TUI and HRG from 
Europe, their first attempts were more likely to be a JV with one of the strongest and most 
creditable Chinese brands, but with the majority control over the JV. In addition, almost all 
FITSs were relying on the Chinese inbound business sent from their original countries/ 
regions as a major business ingredient, waiting for the opening of the local outbound market. 
However, for those Hong Kong invested FITSs registered in Guangdong, the inbound tour 
business from Hong Kong mother companies became much less reliable. Therefore, the origin 




11.2.1.5.  Key Findings to Objective 1D 
Objective 1D: ‘To research the corporate strategies of FITSs, in terms of the formation of 
entities in China, including the ownership and management structures of the companies’  
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This objective is addressed using the collected interview data. Generally, the major forms of 
ownership structure of the FITS sector shifted from Sino-controlled JVs to foreign-controlled 
JVs, then to wholly foreign owned entities, following the deregulation steps of the authority 
during 1998 to 2007. One reason for this shift was because of the policy indication given by 
the Chinese authority, as shown in Table 5.6 in Chapter Five. Also, the shift shows the 
preference of FITSs on the majority control of their investments in China. Moreover, the lack 
of choices on the suitable Chinese partners might also be one of the causes of the shift. Thus, 
this study follows Deng’s (2001) proposition that FDI in China tended to prefer WOFEs 
searching for better control and less risk. But, the mode of JVs still has its legitimacy 
(Alcantara et al, 2006) in the Chinese travel trade market, although it was confirmed that trust 
between the parent companies influences JV performances in China (Ng et al, 2007). It should 
be noted that the policies regarding the ownership structure of FITSs in China have ensured a 
number of major state owned Chinese travel services with at least one JV with strong foreign 
brands by 2007.  
 
Furthermore, as almost all FITSs were following an international way of corporation and 
management, the FITS sector has announced its much higher overall competency and 
efficiency than the Chinese local travel services by 2007. In terms of a JV, it was usually the 
case that the foreign side investor occupied the top management seats, such as CEO and GM 
in the JV, while the Chinese partners taking vice positions under foreign managers. However, 
taking care of public relation, especially concerning political issues, was a major task of the 
Chinese partners. Moreover, for a WOFE, the top management positions were normally taken 
by foreign managers assigned by the foreign investors. However, generally, the number of 
such foreign managers in one FITS, except for CEOs and GMs, was limited and being 
reduced to cut costs during the decade of 1998 to 2007. This study confirmed that emerging 
market economies such as China are having a drastic shortage of local management talents 
(Farrell and Grant, 2005; Lenartowicz and Johnson, 2007). Although limited success of 
expatriate managers were observed in global business (Harvey et al, 2001), FITS firms, 
perceiving either geographical or cultural distance from their original backgrounds, indeed 
‘rely more on expatriates in institutionally distant environments for reasons related to the 
efficient transfer of management practices and firm-specific capabilities’ (Gaur et al, 2007, 




11.2.1.6.  Key Findings to Objective 1E 
Objective 1E: ‘To understand the similarities and differences in the selection of target 
markets of FITSs, and the reasons and features of their marketing strategies (as well as the 
financial results/profitability of the companies if applicable)’ 
 
The investigation on this objective is mainly based on the interview data collected from the 
survey. By 2007, the major business fields of the FITS sector were still heavily relying on the 
Chinese inbound travel market with the majority of business provided or supported by the 
foreign parent company who sending overseas tourists mainly from their original 
countries/regions to China. In the first decade, the Chinese domestic travel market were 
neglected by most FITSs, as they were neither familiar with the local market, nor willing to 
compete with local services in low prices. However, the consuming power of some high end 
segments of the domestic travel market, especially the business travel and MICE segments, 
has already been examined and targeted by some FITSs by 2007. In terms of the Chinese 
outbound travel market, it was still strictly banned for the entry of the FITS sector ten years 
after opening, as examined in chapter five. This kind of protectionist policy was said to be a 
crucial challenge to FDI in China (Tan, 2002; Walters and Samiee, 2003; Gilboy, 2004; Tao, 
2005), and it became a substantial obstacle to the development of the FITS sector in China 
before 2007.    
 
In addition, the FITS sector could be generally divided into two segments, the leisure segment 
and the corporate travel segment. However, both segments tried to cover MICE business 
which was known as the most profitable area at that time. In order to increase turnover and 
profitability, most FITSs tried to explore new business fields, such as foreign expatriates’ 
travel demand in China and going abroad, and rich Chinese people’s luxury travel demand. 
However, on-line travel market had not attracted enough attention from the FITS sector in 
China by 2007, and was not as competitive as the international travel trade market explored 
by Barnett and Standing (2000), Buhalis and Licata (2002), and Cheyne et al (2005). 
 
In general, among the operating FITSs, about half have experienced profitable years in China 
by 2007, with Beijing seeing the highest rates of 70%. However, the profitability of the sector 
was not stable, resulting from the limited market accessibility and the challenge of increasing 
costs of local resources like labour and offices. Moreover, no clear division between TOs and 
TAs was seen in the FITS sector in China by 2007, as was the case in the Chinese indigenous 
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travel service sector (Qian, 2003). However, most FITSs intended to be TOs in China in the 
future, and were planning to expand via modes including partnerships, acquisitions and new 
establishments.  
 
11.2.1.7.  Key Findings to Objective 1F 
Objective 1F: ‘To examine the major employment strategies of FITSs in China, and their 
desires or concerns relating to the local labour market’ 
 
This objective was addressed mainly by the use of interview data. The study testified that HR 
management, especially cultural difference between expatriate and local staff, was one of the 
most crucial challenges of FDI projects (Harvey et al, 2001; Chen and Tjosvold, 2005; Hong 
et al, 2006; Lenartowicz and Johnson, 2007; Pan et al, 2007). Utilising local employment was 
commonly regarded as an essential development strategy of the FITS sector in China, in order 
to reduce costs, as well as to pursue a sustainable future in China. As discussed, for most of 
FITSs, only a limited number of top positions were occupied by foreign appointments, such as 
CEO or CFO. It was also considered that these top positions would eventually be taken by 
Chinese managers. Therefore, as Farrell and Grant (2005) revealed, China was experiencing a 
shortage in the supply of local management talents. This and a combination of HR strategies, 
including the employment of host country nationals, parent country nationals, or third country 
nationals (Lenartowicz and Johnson, 2007), was witnessed to work in the FITS sector in 
China by 2007. 
 
Although the overall labour quality in China was satisfactory, it was found necessary to offer 
to local employees both pre-job and on-job training programmes which were advocated by the 
study of Lenartowicz and Johnson (2007) from a perspective focusing on emerging market 
economies. This study revealed that there was a lack of specialized talents, such as experts in 
the MICE business, and travel consultants with multi-language skills, in the Chinese tourism 
industry by 2007. This resulted in fierce competition for skilled and trained staff, not only 
among FITSs, but also between the FITS sector and the local service sector. Thus, some large 
foreign investors have established their own training courses in local educational institutions, 
in order to secure a future supply of local employees. Indubitably, these actions will improve 
the overall quality of the local labour market in the Chinese tourism industry in the 
foreseeable future.  
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11.2.2. Key Findings to Aim Two and Associated Objectives 
11.2.2.1.  Key Findings to Aim Two  
Aim Two: ‘To investigate the relationship between the FITS sector and the Chinese 
indigenous travel trade sector from 1998 to 2007’  
 
Two objectives were designed to look at both the impacts of the FITS sector on the local, and 
the local services’ attitudes to FITSs. In general, the entry of the FITS sector appeared to be 
making positive contributions to the Chinese indigenous travel trade industry by 2007, 
including bringing the local market more cooperation opportunities than competitions, and 
educating local labour with improved services of the industry. In addition, FITSs also 
transferred more advanced knowledge and management skills to the Chinese local services 
intentionally or unconsciously. Conversely, the local travel services welcomed the entry of 
FITSs, probably because the two sectors had completely different business foci by 2007. Thus, 
the FITS sector and the local travel trade sector witnessed a generally peaceful relationship in 
the decade from 1998 to 2007. However, as the FITS sector has shown more advanced 
management skills and overall higher competency than the local sector, there were worries for 
the future market positions of the local businesses. As further market deregulations continue, 
competition between the two sectors will increase. However, it is believed that in the long 
term, the opening is beneficial to the industry and all tourists. 
 
11.2.2.2.  Key Findings to Objective 2A 
Objective 2A: ‘To research the competition and collaboration between the FITS sector and 
Chinese indigenous services, as well as the impacts of the entry of FITSs upon the local 
industry’ 
 
The material for this objective was based on the data collected from both interviews and 
questionnaires. Generally, the FITS sector could be divided into two segments, the leisure 
segment and the corporate travel segment, with the both segments covering MICE business. 
Thus, MICE was regarded as the most competitive market within the FITS sector by 2007. 
However, as the main business focus of the FITS sector was confined within the Chinese 
inbound market, the competition among FITSs was not yet perceived as strong in the Chinese 
marketplace by 2007. Also, the competition between the local and the FITS sector was not yet 
perceived as fierce either, mainly because of the diverse business foci of the two sectors, with 
the local services’ strength on the domestic and outbound markets while FITSs’ on the 
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inbound market of China. However, the competition for both customers and staff seemed to 
be more intensive in the corporate travel market than in the leisure market by 2007, with 
competition coming from both within the FITS sector and from local services (the corporate 
travel market was newer than the other in China). 
 
Collaboration was commonly seen between the FITS sector and Chinese local services in the 
first decade, with a focus on ground handling contracts in China. It was also detected that 
many local travel services were learning production and management technologies quickly 
from FITSs, especially in the corporate travel market. This indicates positive knowledge 
spillovers by multinationals (Jacob and Groizard, 2007). As the local services offer clients 
lower prices and similar services, their competence has been growing gradually. It was 
believed that competition between the FITS sector and the indigenous services would increase 
dramatically in the near future. 
 
In general, this study witnessed the government policy’s substantial impacts on the market 
strategies and business performances of the FITS sector in China in the decade. Golub’s 
(2003) examination on the restrictive measures of limitations on market access in the host 
countries was testified in the Chinese FITS sector. A typical instrument via the reservation of 
certain supplier markets (the outbound market in this study) for national firms (Altenburg, 
2004) was confirmed in this study. In this context, competition and collaboration in the 
marketplace were essentially influenced by political force, rather than market force. Moreover, 
in terms of the effects of FITSs on the local industry, both positive and negative impacts exist 
(Lall, 2000). This study found evidence of knowledge transfer from FITSs to local services 
(Young and Lan, 1997; Lin et al, 2009), mainly through vertical relations (with horizontal 
transfers in JVs). Although negative competition effects (Konings, 2000) were not detected in 
the FITS sector by 2007, there have been signs of increasing tenseness for competitions in the 
industry.  
 
11.2.2.3.  Key Findings to Objective 2B 
Objective 2B: ‘To investigate the attitudes and relative reactions of the Chinese local travel 
services towards the entry of FITSs’ 
 
The results of this objective are based primarily on the collected data of the questionnaire 
survey. Rare previous studies were found investigating the preference of local firms, as most 
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relevant literatures focused on the relations between foreign firms and local government and 
policies. As noted, the local travel service sector was young, small and immature, without a 
clear division between wholesalers and retail distributions. In general, they were weak in 
enrolling inbound business, where FITSs were focusing on and having overall advantages. 
Therefore, by 2007, the local travel trade sector had encountered little increase in competition 
from the FITS sector. In general the indigenous travel services welcomed the entry of foreign 
services, probably for greater opportunities to establish partnerships with international 
businesses. However, worries about increasing market competition in the future were also 
arising in the local travel trade sector between 1998 to 2007.  
 
In short, the overall slow development of Chinese travel services can be regarded as an 
opportunity for the FITS sector in the Chinese marketplace, as they provide sufficient 
resources for cooperation or merges in the future. The preference of local services on 
partnerships with foreign services was also good news to the FITS sector. However, potential 
competition between the two sectors should be anticipated. 
 
11.2.3.  Key Findings to Aim Three and Associated Objectives 
11.2.3.1.  Key Findings to Aim Three 
Aim Three: ‘To research the general investment environment for the FITS sector in China 
from 1998 to 2007, as well as the opportunities and challenges for the sector in the future’  
 
In general, this thesis argues that the overall economic environment of the Chinese tourism 
market was alluring for FDI. However, the travel trade industry was still tightly controlled by 
the Chinese government and the development of the FITS sector in China was essentially 
constrained by the Chinese policies concerning qualification, licensing, and the limited access 
to the outbound travel markets by 2007. These policies were introduced to protect the 
interests of major Chinese indigenous players, mainly the SOEs in the travel trade industry. 
Thus, the political environment for the FITS sector by 2007 was not optimal. 
  
However, the most recent deregulation in 2009 suggests that the opening process in the 
Chinese travel trade market will continue, although it may be in a gradual fashion in the 
future. The FITS sector will encounter both great opportunities and considerable challenges 
when developing and expanding in China in the future. The opportunities include the 
continuous improvements in the investment environment in China, friendly attitudes of the 
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local businesses, the abundant potential of the Chinese inbound and outbound travel markets, 
an anticipated more open travel trade market in the future. However, the future obstacles 
mainly result from the policy ban on the Chinese outbound market, increasing competition, 
the challenges of local employment, the conflicts of different business cultures, and, other 
financial risks resulting from the appreciating costs of local resources.   
 
However, there are some issues to be considered seriously by FITSs when planning their 
future. First, as the case during 1998 to 2007, the government intervention in the Chinese 
travel trade industry via policies and SOEs will continue to be a unique feature of the market, 
meaning both opportunities and obstacles for FITSs in the future. Competition and 
collaboration with major Chinese state owned travel services will become one of the most 
essential tasks in FITSs’ operation in the future. Second, different regional policies, especially 
in the vast middle-west region of China and Guangdong and Hainan provinces, can result in 
diverse business performances for FITSs in the future. Thus, foreign investors should 
carefully research this before choosing business locations. Third, the thesis proposes to form 
an association of the FITS sector, which should be owned and organized by the sector itself. 
Being a bridge of communication with the Chinese authority, this association may help FITSs 
to improve local knowledge with shared costs, and to lobby for their common interests. 
 
In short, through the study on the Chinese travel trade industry, it is clear that the investment 
environment in China is a unique and complex subject. The opening trend of the Chinese 
travel trade market is inevitable. However, the outbound travel market in China may not be 
entirely open to all FITSs in the near future. Thus, strategically, a FITS should plan a long-
term development scheme to wait for the sector’s boom with patience. Understanding the 
double roles of the Chinese government will be important in solving problems encountered in 
the Chinese travel trade sector. 
 
11.2.3.2.  Key Findings to Objective 3A 
Objective 3A: ‘To analyse both the economic and political environment in China for the 
entry and expansion of international travel trade businesses’ 
 
The findings of this objective mainly refer to the data collected from interviews, as well as the 
questionnaires. Generally, consistent with previous literature, for example Cui and Liu (2000); 
Branstetter and Feenstra (2002), being one of the biggest emerging markets, the economic 
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environment in China was attractive for FDI. By 2007, the Chinese reform and open policy 
has brought the country almost 30 years of continuous boom, and assuring changes and 
business opportunities in almost every industry. Even during the global financial crises in the 
late 1990s and most recently since late 2007, China demonstrated the ability to maintain the 
growth. In terms of tourism, the continuous increasing annual international and domestic 
tourist numbers and the improvement of tourist services and facilities was evidence of the 
great potential of the Chinese tourism industry. As positive determinants (lim, 2001), both 
political and economic stability have increased the confidence of multinationals to invest in 
China. Therefore, this thesis suggests that following China’s accession into WTO1 in 2001, the 
Chinese marketplace has become an essential part of the global economy (Walters and Samiee, 
2003; Gilboy, 2004; Gu et al, 2008, Hsu, 2008). It cannot be denied that the huge gross 
economic scale of the Chinese travel market was enticing for FITSs. However, it is also 
proven that the economic components and regime in China is still considerably different from 
that of other major member countries (Cui and Liu, 2000; Ali et al, 2006). 
  
However, the Chinese government established high barriers for the FITS sector to enter and 
expand in China. Most considerably, the FITS sector had not been allowed to operate the 
Chinese outbound travel business by the end of 2007. Moreover, consistent with the assertion 
of previous studies, there was the imperfection of the Chinese legal system, as well as the 
dominance of SOEs in the Chinese tourism industry (Qian, 2003; Zhang, 2003; Su et al, 2007), 
which substantially limited the choices of investment modes of the FITS sector in China. 
Gastanaga et al (1998), Chow (2002), and Siqueira et al (2009) indicate the strong 
government intervention and influences upon the marketplace via tools of policies and SOEs. 
This study confirms the important role of the Chinese government administration in its 
tourism industry according to the questionnaire data from the Chinese indigenous travel 
services. The interviews in the FITS sector also suggested that the Chinese administration was 
the most significant power influencing the development approaches of the FITS sector in the 
country during the decade. China’s protectionist policies substantially constrained the growth 
of FITSs from 1998 to 2007.  
 
11.2.3.3.  Key Findings to Objective 3B 
Objective 3B: ‘To identify facilitative influences and key barriers existing in the Chinese 
travel trade industry for the further development of FITSs in China’ 
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Positive opportunities for the development of FITSs in the Chinese marketplace were 
observed in this thesis. These include the establishment of a more opened and regulated 
market environment that is encouraged by the Chinese government and the friendly attitudes 
of the local services that were big in number, but small in size and weak in dealing with 
international travel businesses. Moreover, the most recent deregulation in 2009 has 
substantially removed all other policy obstacles for the FITS sector, except for the 
inaccessibility of the Chinese outbound travel market. It is estimated that FITSs may be 
conditionally allowed to enter the outbound market in the next two years (china.ibtimes.com, 
19 Mar, 2009). A more attractive and free market is foreseeable.  
 
However, it is clear that there are also considerable challenges for the future development of 
FITSs in China. These include political obstacles (Qian, 2003; Li, 2005; Lin, 2008), as the 
entire opening of the Chinese outbound travel market has not been promised by the Chinese 
authority until now. Also, the monopoly of some government owned assets, such as the 
Chinese GDS, TravelSky, will still be seen in the Chinese marketplace. Moreover, there is 
still a lack of skilled and professional local employees in the tourism industry, especially in 
some specialized business area. Furthermore, it is believed that the competitions for both 
customers and qualified staff in the travel trade sector in China will increase dramatically in 
the near future. In addition, the differences of business protocols between China and other 
countries, and other risks, such as the volatile information system (Haley, 2003), the 
increasing management costs and the appreciation of Chinese currency, have to be considered 
seriously by FITSs when making their future plans in China.  
 
 
11.3.  Major Contributions of the Thesis 
11.3.1. Academic Contributions  
This thesis attempts to reach an overall understanding of the FITS sector in China during the 
first opening decade from 1998 to 2007, focusing on three main topics, including their 
development approaches and operational experiences, the relationship between the sector and 
the local services, and the general investment environment in China for FITSs. With an array 
of primary data collected from mainly interviews and questionnaires, this thesis’s main 
contribution has been to provide for the first time detailed empirical evidence of FDI in 
China’s travel trade industry, through theoretically informed empirical work, rather than 
explicitly testing any particular theory. Although there have been a few Chinese papers 
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focusing on the FITS sector previously, they were mainly from a government perspective, 
simply discussing the actions of several FITSs, or a change in the government policies. 
However, this research was conducted independently, employing methods combining both 
primary data and secondary data through different types of information sources. Almost all 
FITSs registered by 2007 were questioned either by formal meetings or by phones. Thus, the 
findings of this thesis about the FITS sector in China are the most comprehensive to date, 
covering the first decade development from 1998 to 2007. By investigating both macro 
business environmental and micro operational issues of the FITS sector, this thesis makes a 
unique contribution to both international and Chinese tourism academia.  
 
Moreover, although this is essentially an empirical research, its four literature chapters discuss 
a wide range of related theories. The purpose of this work is not to test any of these theories. 
However, the thesis suggests that the Chinese marketplace has many unique attributes and 
approaches, such as the blurred boundary between the TO and TA business sectors (Qian, 
2003), contrary to theories which mainly based on western researches. In other words, this 
thesis may also contribute to academia by indentifying relative academic gaps or connections 
between the phenomena in China and theories in developed economies. Thus, it is worthwhile 
to summarize some theoretical issues contained in this thesis and the relative findings, which 
may raise questions and inspire future research.  
 
In Chapter Two, the different roles of TOs and TAs were examined, and it was revealed that 
one significant feature of the travel trade sector in China was that there was no clear division 
between TOs and TAs (Qian, 2003). Through this study, it seems that the FITS sector in 
China, just like the local travel services, had no boundary between TOs and TAs by 2007 
either. Probably, it was because of the policy obstacle in China upon access to the outbound 
market. The lagging outbound travel market and the primacy of the inbound market featured 
China as a typical developing economy approach for tourism development, observed by 
Tamamura (2002). Moreover, contrast to many researchers’ observations, such as Barnett and 
Standing (2000); Buhalis and Licata (2002); Cheyne et al (2005), on the global travel trade 
industry, the online travel distribution business in China was still an under-developed sector, 





The findings of this thesis support some of the literature discussed in chapter three. The prior 
reasons for FITSs to invest in China were confirmed as for profits and market demands (Hill, 
2003). Large market size, best infrastructure high policy stability and free trade zones (Cheng 
and Kwan, 2000; Lim, 2001), as well as high R&D intensity (Chung and Alcacer, 2002) were 
found to be the positive determinants for FDI inflows in China too. However, given limited 
profits and market access in the marketplace in 1998 to 2007, this thesis asserts that the 
conception of ‘strategic investors’ (Luo and O’connor, 1998) or ‘Strategical reactions and 
investments’ (Moon and Roehl, 2001) may be the best explanation of FITSs’ involvement in 
the Chinese tourism market during the time. Moreover, the preference of FITSs in China to 
the form of WOFEs than JVs (Deng, 2001) was also evident. In this context, the thesis 
testified that a host government’s policy on ownership restrictions can substantially affect the 
entry mode and performance of FDI in the host country (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Asiedu 
and Esfahani, 2001; Mattoo et al, 2004). Additionally, this study also indicates that the 
application of the local labour market, and the communications between local staff, foreign 
investors and foreign managers, were indeed a most considerable challenge for FDI in 
China’s travel trade sector (Harvey et al, 2001; Lenartowicz and Johnson, 2007).  
  
Chapter four and chapter five introduced the important roles of the Chinese government and 
its SOEs in the country’s economy, especially in the Chinese tourism industry (Haley, 2003; 
Guo and Turner, 2002; Qian, 2003; Qu et al, 2005). This was found to be true in the Chinese 
travel trade industry, as the government policies and the performance of SOEs were 
substantially affecting the development of the FITS sector. Moreover, Chapter Four revealed 
the unbalanced distribution of FDI in different Chinese regions (Cui and Liu, 2000; Wu, 
2006), which was found also being a major feature of the FITS sector in China with three 
concentrated locations observed in the thesis. Furthermore, the chapter examined the zoned 
opening method of the Chinese government during the last three decades (Wu, 2006), and this 
method was actually also used as a tool to control the development of FITSs in China in the 
decade. In addition, as Chapter Four and Chapter Five revealed, the open and reform process 
in China followed a gradual fashion (Sito, 2000; Haley, 2003; Datamonitor, 2004; Qian, 2003; 
Gao 2004). This was found to be the trend in the FITS sector too in this thesis. Last but not 
least, after comparing China’s promises for the accession to WTO1 (see Table 5.7 in chapter 
five) to its practical actions, the thesis found that China had fulfilled all its promises by 2007. 
However, concerning the findings and the remaining policy obstacles in the FITS sector, the 
thesis suggests that the management strategy of the authority upon the FITS sector during 
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1998 to 2007 mainly followed space-oriented and community-oriented (but mainly 
representing SOEs’ interests) traditions ( Getz, 1987; Hall, 2000) in China.  
 
11.3.2. Potential Policy and Practical Contributions 
In addition to the academic contributions, this thesis also attempts to contribute to the future 
development of the travel trade industry, both FITSs and local services, in China. Moreover, 
the researcher has submitted a summarized report to some of the major leaders of the Chinese 
tourism administration office, CNTA. Hopefully, they may also gain some information from 
the findings presented in this thesis. For example, the thesis confirmed that the entry of FITSs 
had brought many positive impacts to the Chinese local industry, such as the improvement of 
service quality in the local travel services, and the transferring of management skills via 
employment flows. In addition, more communication channels between the authority and the 
FITS sector seem to be needed. The improvement of the legal system in tourism, and the rise 
of efficiency of industry associations are also recommendations derived from this thesis for 
the attention of the Chinese administrative organizations. 
 
 
11.4.  Research Limitations 
As an independent piece of academic research, limited funding and resources presented a 
considerable challenge. These unavoidably resulted in limitations some of which are 
summarized as follows. First, there was a difficulty in finding secondary data that related to 
the FITS sector in China. As mentioned, only a limited amount of previous articles could be 
found on the similar topic, which means a lack of theory to refer to. Moreover, the Chinese 
government’s monopoly of almost all essential statistics should be considered too. As most 
Chinese research papers were based on desk surveys with uniform figures announced by the 
Chinese authorities, few independent research institutions can provide comparable data. This 
may be a critique for almost all studies about China, in terms of statistics. In addition, many 
of the interviewed FITSs had not yet established their Chinese websites properly by the time 
of data collection. Therefore, there was a lack of helpful on-line information about these 
companies’ development in China. All these elements resulted in limitations in the application 
and credibility of some secondary data utilized in this thesis.  
 
Second, there are limitations in the primary data collected from both interviews and 
questionnaires. The primary data were based on respondents’ personal opinions, and it is 
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inevitable that some answers might only be the responders’ personal subjective thoughts. 
Moreover, as some Japanese managers speak neither English nor Chinese, an interpreter had 
to be employed during the interviews. Thus, the interviews became less efficient, and the 
recorded answers might reveal reduced or misleading sentences after transcription. 
Furthermore, not all FITSs agreed to formal interviews. In the case of JVs, the researcher 
gave prime attention to the foreign investors. In most cases, the researcher tried to reach the 
highest level manager available in the responding firms, whether from the Chinese or foreign 
side. However, it would be more convincing if all FITSs could be formally interviewed, and 
the opinions of the both sides of the JVs could be covered. With limited time, financial budget, 
and availability of key personnel of the companies, the scale of the research could not be 
further expanded. In general, the limitations question the validity of the primary data used in 
this research.  
 
Third, there are limitations in the methodology of this thesis. It was difficult for the researcher 
to apply a cross-case analysis approach among the seven in-depth case studies, and even more 
difficult with others. It often appeared that there was some data relevant in each case but that 
it was not entirely comparable. For example, being qualitative data, it is difficult to simply say 
one company’s HR management strategy is better than another’s. The preference of 
interviewees to talk far more about some subjects and less for others, and the fact that this 
varied among them also caused difficulties in comparisons. However, the researcher sought to 
overcome these problems by using a variety of information, such as on-line data, interview 
data, and data from the questionnaire survey.  
 
 
11.5.  Potential for Future Studies 
As one of the first detailed empirical studies focusing on FDI in the Chinese travel trade 
industry, the thesis has raised some important issues worthy of future study. Significant topics 
discussed in the early section of academic contributions, concerned the gaps and connections 
between the industry in China and the theories which have mostly emerged in more developed 
economies. While the development of new theoretical perspectives was not the principal aim 
of this thesis, it is clear that there is a need to develop more nuanced and sophisticated 
theoretical approaches which recognize significant differences in institutional and cultural 
settings. More specifically, the research undertaken in this thesis leads to the identification of 
four aspects which were considered as the most meaningful areas for future investigations. 
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First, this thesis only investigated the development of FITSs within the first opening decade 
(1998-2007). In order to maintain the focus, this thesis has ignored the statistics of the 
Chinese tourism industry for the years following 2007 to maintain the comparability of data. 
It will be meaningful to continue the observations on the sector’s post 2007 evolution. This 
study suggests that in the years after 2007, the FITS sector will experience gradual and zoned 
opening in the Chinese outbound travel market, which follows the usual experimental pattern 
for opening applied by the policy maker. After some years, given the development of the 
FITS sector, the Chinese travel trade market may experience a series of dramatic changes, and 
a new market order may emerge in its original shape. However, changes in the industry 
should happen after the changes in policies. Thus, it will be important to follow both policy 
changes and market dynamics in different time series in China after 2007. By doing so, a clear 
chronological database of different development stages of the FITS sector in China will be 
established, which will be a considerable contribution to the world tourism academia.  
 
Second, there is a need to make in-depth case studies on the operations and decisions of 
FITSs through more detailed case studies and ethnographic research in the future. This thesis 
has aimed to investigate the different operational patterns and characters of FITSs, according 
to their countries of origin (see Objective 1C). However, with limited data collected on this 
topic, the result of this thesis could not represent clear differences between diverse origin 
countries/regions. According to the collected data, future studies may design a comparable 
data set to examine different FITSs in five major categories: Japan, Hong Kong (including 
Macau and Taiwan), America, Europe, and Other Asian countries. Depending on the changes 
in the FITS sector, other categories may be applied. For example, if there is increasing 
number of African companies in the sector, a category of FITSs from Africa can be added. A 
particularly fruitful approach would be for researchers to spend a relatively long period of 
time in the offices of a company, as an observer or participant observer, attending meetings, 
observing business practices, and interviewing staff at different levels within the organization, 
in order to collect sufficient data to illuminate practices within and differences between 
companies. This is a relatively under developed academic area which requires more attention. 
 
Third, it is interesting to study the supply or value chains of the FITS sector, and to focus on 
the relationships between FITSs and other service providers, such as hotels, airlines, and 
ground handling agencies, and the relationships with customers. In this context, two issues are 
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particularly important. First, it is meaningful to see whether the role of FITSs will tend to be 
wholesalers or distributors, or remaining blurred, and how the changes will happen. Second, if 
the Chinese outbound market gradually opened to the FITS sector, the value chains between 
FITSs, service providers, and customers will become more complicated. The difficulty of 
building these chains between overseas companies and Chinese services is an important and 
interesting subject.  
 
Finally, it will also be meaningful to focus on the changes of investment forms of FITSs, 
especially to look at mergers and acquisitions between FITSs and SOEs in the Chinese travel 
trade market in the future. This thesis found that the mode of WOFE was more a preferable 
entry mode than JVs in the FITS sector prior to 2007. However, the marketplace is about to 
experience further opening in the future, with a better legal environment promised by the 
government. Foreign firms should soon be able to apply M&As in the Chinese travel trade 
market. If so, the aggregation activities of FITSs and some of the largest Chinese SOEs will 
dramatically change the old market structure. Thus, key M&A cases and relative market 
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Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 1 These Rules are formulated according to the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Foreign-funded enterprises.  
Article 2 Foreign-funded enterprises shall be subject to and under the protection of Chinese Law. 
Foreign-funded enterprises engaging in business in the People's Republic of China must abide by 
Chinese laws and regulations and must not harm the social and public interests of China.  
Article 3 A foreign-funded enterprise to be established must benefit the development of China's 
national economy and be capable of gaining remarkable economic results. The state encourages 
foreign-funded enterprises to use advanced technology and equipment, engage in the development of 
new products, realize the upgrading of products and the replacement of old products with new ones, 
economize energy and raw materials, and it is also encouraged to establish foreign-funded 
enterprises which are export oriented.  
Article 4 Trades in which the establishment of foreign-funded enterprises is forbidden or restricted 
shall be determined and established according to the provisions regarding state guidance for foreign 
investment orientation and guiding catalogue of industries for foreign investment.  
Article 5 No application for the establishment of a foreign-funded enterprise shall be approved if the 
proposed enterprise is under any of the following circumstances:  
(1) injuring China's sovereignty or social and public interests;  
(2) endangering China's national security;  
(3) in violation of Chinese laws and regulations;  
(4) not in keeping with the requirements of China's national economic development; 
(5) may result in environmental pollution.  
Article 6 A foreign-funded enterprise shall, within the approved scope of business, have its 
autonomy in operation and management, and be free from any interference.  
 
Chapter II Establishment Procedures  
Article 7 The application for the establishment of a foreign-funded enterprise shall be subject to the 
examination and approval by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the 
People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the MFTEC), which shall issue a certificate of 
approval to those approved.  
If any applications for the establishment of a foreign-funded enterprise is under any one of the 
following circumstances, the State Council shall authorize the people's government of the relevant 
province, autonomous region, municipality directly under the Central Government, city directly 
under State planning or special economic zone to conduct the examination and approval and issue a 
certificate of approval to those approved: 
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(1) the total amount of investment is within the limits of power for the examination and 
approval of investment stipulated by the State Council;  
(2) the enterprise shall not need any raw materials to be allocated by the state, and not influence 
unfavorably the national comprehensive balance of energy resources, communications and 
transportation and export quotas for foreign trade. 
The people's government of the relevant province, autonomous region, municipality directly under 
the Central Government, city directly under State planning or special economic zone that has, within 
the authorization by the State Council, approved any application for the establishment of a 
foreign-funded enterprise shall, within 15 days since the approval has been issued, report to the 
MFTEC for record (hereinafter the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the 
people's government of the relevant province, autonomous region, municipality directly under the 
Central Government, city directly under State planning and special economic zone shall be, in 
general, referred to as the examining and approving authority).  
Article 8 With regard to any foreign-funded enterprise that applies for establishment, if its products 
shall involve export license, export quota, import license or the import of which is restricted by the 
state, a prior consent shall be obtained from the competent authority of foreign economic relations 
and trade in accordance with the relevant administrative power.  
Article 9 Before submitting any application for the establishment of a foreign-funded enterprise, the 
foreign investor shall submit to the local people's government at or above the county level at the 
place where the foreign-funded enterprise is to be established a report regarding matters such as the 
purpose of the enterprise, its scope and scale of business, products, technology and equipment, land 
area to be needed and related requirements, conditions and quantities of water, electricity, coal, coal 
gas or other energy resources required, and requirements to public facilities.  
The relevant local people's government at or above the county level shall, within 30 days from the 
date of receiving the report submitted by the foreign investor, give him a reply in writing.  
Article 10 Any foreign investor who wishes to establish a foreign-funded enterprise shall submit an 
application to the examining and approving authority through the relevant local people's government 
at or above the county level at the place where the foreign-funded enterprise is to be established, 
together with the following documents:  
(1) a written application for the establishment of the foreign-capital enterprise;  
(2) a feasibility study report; 
(3) the articles of association of the foreign-funded enterprise;  
(4) a list of legal representative (candidates for the future board of directors) of the 
foreign-funded enterprise;  
(5) the legal documentation and credit certificate of the foreign investor;  
(6) the written reply given by the relevant local people's government at or above the county 
level at the place where the foreign-funded enterprise is to be established; 
(7) an inventory of goods and materials that shall be imported; 
(8) other documents as may be required.  
Documents of (1) and (3) of the preceding paragraph must be prepared in Chinese, while those of 
(2), (4) and (5) of the same paragraph may be written in a foreign language but the corresponding 
Chinese translations should be attached.  
If two or more foreign investors jointly apply for the establishment of a foreign-funded enterprise, 
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they shall submit a copy of the contract between them two to the examining and approving authority 
for record.  
Article 11 The examining and approving authority shall, within 90 days from the date of receiving 
all the documents required for the application for the establishment of a foreign-funded enterprise, 
make a decision on whether to approve or disapprove the application. When finding that the 
documents mentioned above are not complete or that some of them are inappropriate, the examining 
and approving authority may demand supplementation and corrections to be made within a 
prescribed time limit.  
Article 12 The foreign investor shall, within 30 days from the date of receiving the approval 
certificate issued by the examining and approving authority, apply for registration with and obtain 
business license from the administrative department for industry and commerce. The date of issue of 
the business license of the foreign-funded enterprise shall be the date of its establishment.  
If the foreign investor fails to apply to the administrative department for industry and commerce for 
registration within 30 days from the date of receiving the approval certificate for the establishment 
of the foreign-funded enterprise, the approval certificate shall become invalid automatically.  
The foreign-funded enterprise shall, within 30 days from the date of establishment, conduct taxation 
registration with the tax authorities.  
Article 13 Any foreign investor may appoint a Chinese service agency for foreign-funded enterprises 
or any other economic organization to handle the affairs stipulated in Article 8, in the first paragraph 
of Article 9 and Article 10 of these Rules, provided that a contract of entrustment shall be concluded 
between them.  
Article 14 A written application for the establishment of a foreign-funded enterprise shall contain:  
(1) the name, domicile, place of registration of the foreign investor, and the name, nationality 
and position of its legal representative;  
(2) the name and domicile of the foreign-funded enterprise that is to be established;  
(3) the scope of business, products and production scale; 
(4) the total amount of investment, registered capital, source of funds, form of investment and 
duration of the foreign-funded enterprise;  
(5) the form of organization, internal departments and legal representative of the foreign-funded 
enterprise; 
(6) the primary production equipment to be used and the degrees of depreciation thereof, 
production technology and the level thereof, as well as the sources of all of them;  
(7) sales orientation and territories, as well as sales channels and methods, of the products;  
(8) arrangements for the revenues and expenditures of foreign exchange;  
(9) relevant establishments of the internal departments and sizes of the personnel thereof, 
arrangements for matters such as the recruitment, training, salaries and wages, welfare, 
insurance and labor protection of and for workers and staff members; 
(10) the degrees of possible environmental pollution and measures for solving this problem;  
(11) the site of the enterprise and the area thereof;  
(12) funds, energy, raw materials to be needed in capital construction and in production and 
operations, and the solutions thereof; 
(13) schedule of the project;  
(14) duration of the foreign-funded enterprise that is to be established.  
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Article 15 The articles of association of a foreign-funded enterprise shall contain:  
(1) the name and domicile;  
(2) the aim and scope of business;  
(3) the total amount of investment, registered capital, and the time limit of capital subscription; 
  (4) the form of organization;  
(5) the establishments of the internal departments and their functions and powers and rules of 
procedures, duties and power limits of the legal representative and of other persons such as
the general manager, chief engineer and chief accountant;  
(6) the principles and system of financial affairs, accounting and auditing;  
(7) labor management;  
(8) the operating period, termination and liquidation of the enterprise;  
(9) procedures for amending the articles of association.  
Article 16 The articles of association of a foreign-funded enterprise shall become effective upon the 
approval by the examining and approving authority. The same procedure shall apply whenever any 
amendment thereto is made.  
Article 17 Any division or merger of foreign-funded enterprises or any of their significant changes in 
capital resulting from any other causes shall be subject to the approval by the examining and 
approving authority, and for which changes, the relevant enterprises shall engage a Chinese certified 
public accountant to make verification and render a capital verification report; upon approval by the 
examining and approving authority, the enterprises shall go through the procedures for the change of 
registration with the administrative department for industry and commerce. 
 
Chapter III Form of Organization and Registered Capital  
Article 18 The form of organization of a foreign-funded enterprise shall be a limited liability 
company. Other liability forms may be adopted by approval.  
In case of a limited liability company, the foreign investor shall be liable for the enterprise to the 
extent of what he has contributed for the capital.  
In case of any other liability form, the foreign investor shall be liable for the enterprise according to 
Chinese laws and regulations.  
Article 19 The total amount of investment of a foreign-funded enterprise refers to the total amount of 
funds required for opening the foreign-funded enterprise, i.e. the sum total of the funds invested in 
capital construction in accordance with the production scale and the circulating funds for production. 
Article 20 The registered capital of a foreign-funded enterprise refers to the total amount of capital 
registered with the administrative department for industry and commerce for the purpose of 
establishing the foreign-funded enterprise, i.e. the total amount of investment that the foreign 
investor undertakes to contribute.  
The amount of registered capital of a foreign-funded enterprise must be in keeping with the 
enterprise's operation scale, and the ratio between the registered capital and the total amount of 
investment shall conform to the relevant Chinese provisions.  
Article 21 In its operating period, no foreign-funded enterprise may reduce their registered capital. If 
however, it is really needed to make such reduction due to some changes such as those in the total 
amount of investment or production scale, it may be reduced upon the approval by the examining 
and approving authority.  
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Article 22 Any increase or assignment of the registered capital of a foreign-funded enterprise shall 
be subject to the approval by the examining and approving authority, and then the enterprise shall go 
through the procedures for change of registration with the administrative department for industry and 
commerce.  
Article 23 Where any foreign-funded enterprise intends to mortgage or assign its assets or right and 
interests to a third party, the case shall be submitted to the examining and approving authority for 
approval, and then to the administrative department for industry and commerce for record.  
Article 24 The legal representative of a foreign-funded enterprise is the person-in-charge who, in 
accordance with the enterprise's articles of association,executes his/her functions and powers on 
behalf of the enterprise. 
If the legal representative is unable to execute his/her functions and powers, he/she shall entrust in 
writing an agent with the execution of his/her functions and powers.  
 
Chapter IV Form of Investments and Time Limit for Contributing Investments  
Article 25 The foreign investors may make their investments with convertible foreign currencies, or 
with machinery and equipment, with industry property rights and proprietary technology by 
appraising the values of them. 
Upon the approval by the examining and approving authority, the foreign investors may also make 
their investments with their profits in Renminbi from any other enterprises established in China with 
their investments.  
Article 26 Machinery and equipment to be contributed by the foreign investor as investment must be 
those needed for the production of the foreign-funded enterprise.  
The appraised value of the machinery and equipment may not be higher than the normal price of 
machinery and equipment of the same kind in international market at that time.  
An inventory must be made for all the machinery and equipment to be contributed as investment, it 
shall include the name, type, quantity and appraised value of the machinery and equipment, and shall 
be submitted to the examining and approving authority together with the application for the 
establishment of the foreign-funded enterprise as an attachment to the application.  
Article 27 The industry property rights and proprietary technology to be contributed as investment 
by the foreign investor must be owned by the foreign investor.  
Such industrial property rights and proprietary technology must be appraised in accordance with the 
relevant international rules, and the value amount of them may not exceed 20% of the registered 
capital of the foreign-funded enterprise.  
Detailed information must be prepared for the industrial property rights and proprietary technology 
appraised to be contributed as investment, including the copy of certificate of the title, validity of the 
title, and their technical performance, practical value, and the basis and standard on and according to 
which the value has been appraised, and it shall be submitted to the examining and approving 
authority together with the application for the establishment of the foreign-funded enterprise as an 
attachment to the application.  
Article 28 Upon arrival at any port of China of the machinery and equipment contributed as 
investment, the foreign-funded enterprise shall apply for inspection to China's commodity inspection 
authority, which shall render an inspection report.  
Where the machinery and equipment contributed as investment are inconsistent with those listed in 
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the inventory submitted by the foreign investor to the examining and approving authority in type, 
quality or quantity, the examining and approving authority may demand corrections by the foreign 
investor within a prescribed time limit.  
Article 29 After the industrial property rights and proprietary technology appraised have been put to 
use, the examining and approving authority shall have the power to inspect them, and demand 
corrections by the foreign investor, within a prescribed time limit, if they are inconsistence with the 
industrial property rights and proprietary technology prescribed in the information submitted by the 
foreign investor.  
Article 30 The time limit for the foreign investor to make his investment contributions must be 
clearly indicated in both the application for the establishment of the foreign-funded enterprise and 
the enterprise's articles of association. The foreign investor may contribute the investment in 
installments, provided that the last installment shall be made within three years from the date of 
issue of the business license. The first installment may not be less than 15% of the total amount to be 
contributed by the foreign investor, and shall be made within 90 days from the date of issue of the 
business license of the foreign-funded enterprise.  
If the foreign investor fails to make the first installment within the time limit prescribed in the 
preceding paragraph, the approval certificate for the foreign-funded enterprise shall become invalid 
automatically, and the foreign-funded enterprise shall go through the procedures for cancellation of 
registration and hand in the business license for cancellation with the administrative department for 
industry and commerce or, if the foreign-funded enterprise fails to go through the procedures for 
cancellation of registration and fails to hand in the business license for cancellation, the 
administrative department for industry and commerce shall revoke the business license and make an 
announcement to the public.  
Article 31 The installments other than the first one shall be made by the foreign investor within each 
prescribed time limit.  
If an installment has not been made 30 days after the time limit, the second paragraph of the Article 
30 shall apply.  
If the foreign investor has any reasonable ground for the extension of time for making an 
installment, he should get the approval by the examining and approving authority and the extension 
of time shall be submitted to the administrative department for industry and commerce for record.  
Article 32 For each installment made by the foreign investor, the foreign-funded enterprise shall 
engage a Chinese certified public accountant to make verification and render a capital verification 
report, which shall be submitted to the examining and approving authority and the administrative 
department for industry and commerce for record.  
 
Chapter V Use of Land and the Land Use Fee  
Article 33 The local people's government at or above the county level at the place where the 
foreign-funded enterprise is to be established shall make arrangements for the land to be used by the 
foreign-funded enterprise after examination and verification in the light of the local conditions. 
Article 34 The foreign-funded enterprise shall, within 30 days from the date of issue of its business 
license, go through the procedures for use of land with and obtain land certificate from the 
department of land administration of the people's government at or above the county level at the 
place where the foreign-funded enterprise is to be established, by presenting the approval certificate 
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and business license. 
Article 35 The land certificate shall be a legal certificate by which the foreign-funded enterprise may 
use a certain piece of land. In its operating period, no foreign-funded enterprise may assign its right 
to use land without authorization.  
Article 36 For obtaining land certificate, the foreign-funded enterprise must pay land use fee to the 
department of land administration at the place where the enterprise is to be established.  
Article 37 For using developed land, the foreign-funded enterprise must pay land development fee.  
The land development fee mentioned in the preceding paragraph includes the expenses for 
requisition of the land, and expenses for demolition and resettlement allowances, as well as expenses 
for the construction of infrastructure needed by the foreign-funded enterprise. The land development 
fee may be calculated and collected by the land development enterprise once for all or in yearly 
installments.  
Article 38 Where a piece of land not yet developed is to be used, the foreign-funded enterprise may 
either develop the land by itself or entrust a relevant Chinese enterprise to develop the land. The 
people's government at or above the county level at the place where the foreign-funded enterprise is 
to be established shall make overall arrangements for the construction of infrastructure.  
Article 39 The standards for calculating and collecting the land use fee and land development fee 
paid by foreign-funded enterprises shall abide by the relevant provisions of China.  
Article 40 The term for land use by the foreign-funded enterprise shall be the same as the approved 
operating period of this enterprise.  
Article 41 In addition to the present Chapter, a foreign-funded enterprise may obtain the right to use 
land in accordance with other regulations in China.  
 
Chapter VI Purchasing and Marketing  
Article 42 Any foreign-funded enterprise may make decisions by itself on the purchase, for its own 
use, of machinery and equipment, raw materials, fuels, parts and components, auxiliary equipment, 
primary parts, means of transportation, office appliance (hereinafter referred to as goods and 
materials in general).  
When purchasing goods and materials in China, any foreign-funded enterprise shall enjoy the same 
treatment as that enjoyed by Chinese enterprises under the same conditions.  
Article 43 Any foreign-funded enterprise may sell its products in Chinese market. The state 
encourages all foreign-funded enterprises to export their products.  
Article 44 Any foreign-funded enterprise may export their products either by themselves or by 
entrusting a Chinese foreign trade company or a company outside China with the sale of their 
products.  
A foreign-funded enterprise may sell their products in China either by themselves or by entrusting 
any commercial organization with the sale of their products. 
Article 45 Where any machinery and equipment contributed by a foreign investor as his investment 
is subject to import license according to the Chinese provisions, the relevant foreign-funded 
enterprise shall, by presenting the relevant approved inventory of equipment and goods and materials 
to be imported, apply for import license to the license issuing authority either directly or through an 
agency.  
The foreign-funded enterprise shall prepare their annual import plans for goods and materials that 
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are to be imported for their own use and necessary to their production within the approved scope of 
business, and apply for the import license to the license issuing authority every six months, if the 
import of goods and materials is subject to import license according to the Chinese provisions.  
The foreign-funded enterprise shall prepare their annual export plans for products that are to be 
exported, and apply for the export license to the license issuing authority every six months, if the 
export of products is subject to export license according to the Chinese provisions.  
Article 46 The price of goods and materials and any technical service imported by the 
foreign-funded enterprise shall not be higher than the normal price for goods and materials and 
technical services of the same kind in international market at that time. The price for the export 
products of a foreign-funded enterprise shall be determined by the enterprise itself in the light of the 
relevant prices in international market at that time, provided that they shall not be lower than 
reasonable export prices. If any enterprise evades taxes by importing products at a high price or 
exporting products at a low price, the legal responsibility of the relevant enterprise shall be 
investigated according to tax law by the tax authority.  
Article 47 Any foreign-funded enterprise shall provide statistical data and submit statistical 
statements to the departments concerned in accordance with the provisions of the Statistics Law of 
the People's Republic of China and the relevant provisions of China concerning the statistical system 
for the utilization of foreign capital. 
 
Chapter VII Taxation  
Article 48 Any foreign-funded enterprise shall pay taxes in accordance with Chinese laws and 
regulations.  
Article 49 Workers and staff members of a foreign-funded enterprise shall pay individual income tax 
in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations.  
Article 50 Taxes on the following goods and materials imported by a foreign-funded enterprise shall 
be exempted or reduced in accordance with Chinese tax law:  
(1) machinery and equipment, parts and components, materials for construction, and materials 
needed for installing and fixing the machinery, which are contributed as investment by the 
foreign investor;  
(2) machinery and equipment, parts and components, means of transportation for production, 
and production management equipment, which are imported, for their own use in 
production, by the foreign-funded enterprise with funds within its total amount of 
investment; 
(3) raw materials, auxiliary materials, primary parts, parts and components and packing 
materials imported by the foreign-funded enterprise for producing export products.  
Where any goods and materials imported as mentioned in the preceding paragraph are, upon 
approval, resold in the territory of China or used for producing products to be sold in China, the 
relevant foreign-funded enterprise shall, in accordance with Chinese tax law, pay the taxes that were 
exempted or reduced. 
Article 51 The export commodities produced by the foreign-funded enterprises may enjoy tax 
reduction, exemption or refund according to the relevant provisions of Chinese tax law, except those 
whose export is restricted by China.  
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Chapter VIII Foreign Exchange Control  
Article 52 Foreign exchange affairs of a foreign-funded enterprise shall be handled in accordance 
with Chinese regulations concerning foreign exchange control.  
Article 53 A foreign-funded enterprise shall, on the strength of the business license issued by the 
administrative department for industry and commerce, open an account at a bank in China that may 
handle foreign exchange business, which shall supervise the foreign exchange receipts and payments 
by the foreign-funded enterprise.  
The foreign exchange revenues of the foreign-funded enterprise shall be deposited to its account and 
the foreign exchange expenditures of the enterprise shall be made from its foreign exchange account. 
Article 54 Where any foreign exchange account is to be opened at a bank outside China as required 
by its production and operation, the foreign-funded enterprise shall submit the case to the Chinese 
administrative department for foreign exchange control for approval and, according to the provisions 
of the latter, make regular reports on its receipts and payments of foreign exchange, and provide 
bank statements.  
Article 55 Wages and salaries as well as any other legitimate income in foreign exchange of foreign 
workers and staff members, or of the workers and staff members from Hong Kong, Macao or 
Taiwan, of a foreign-funded enterprise may be remitted outside China freely after the income tax is 
paid according to Chinese tax law.  
 
Chapter IX Financial Management and Accounting  
Article 56 A foreign-funded enterprise shall, in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations and 
provisions of the financial authority, set up its own financial and accounting systems and submit 
them to the local financial and tax authorities for record.  
Article 57 A fiscal year of any foreign-funded enterprise shall begin from January 1 and end on 
December 31 of Gregorian calendar.  
Article 58 A foreign-funded enterprise shall retain certain amount from its profits after the income 
tax has been paid in accordance with Chinese tax law as reserve funds, bonus and welfare funds for 
workers and staff members. The amount retained for the reserve funds shall not be less than 10% of 
the profits (profits after the income tax has been paid), the withdrawal may stop when the 
accumulated amount withdrawn has been up to 50% of the registered capital of the enterprise. The 
amount retained for bonus and welfare funds for workers and staff members shall be determined by 
the foreign-funded enterprise itself.  
No foreign-funded enterprise may distribute its profits unless and until its deficits of previous fiscal 
years have been made up; undistributed profits of the previous fiscal years may be distributed 
together with the distributable profits of the current fiscal year.  
Article 59 Accounting vouchers, account books and accounting statements made by a foreign-funded 
enterprise shall be prepared in Chinese; if they are written in any foreign language, notes in Chinese 
are required.  
Article 60 A foreign-funded enterprise shall conduct their business accounting independently.  
A foreign-funded enterprise shall prepare annual accounting statements and liquidation accounting 
statements in accordance with the provisions of Chinese financial and tax authorities. If an 
accounting statement is prepared in a foreign currency, a corresponding accounting statement in 
which the foreign currency is converted into Renminbi shall be prepared at the same time.  
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A foreign-funded enterprise shall engage Chinese certified public accountants to verify its annual 
accounting statements and liquidation accounting statements, and render verification reports 
accordingly.  
The annual accounting statements and liquidation accounting statements of a foreign-funded 
enterprise, stipulated in the second and third paragraphs, as well as the relevant verification reports 
rendered by Chinese certified public accountants, shall be submitted within the prescribed time limit 
to the financial and tax authorities, and to the examining and approving authority and the 
administrative department for industry and commerce for record.  
Article 61 Any foreign investor may engage Chinese or foreign accountants to audit the account 
books of the relevant foreign-funded enterprise, and shall bear the expenses.  
Article 62 A foreign-funded enterprise shall submit their annual statements of assets and liabilities 
and annual profit and loss statements to the financial and tax authorities, and to the examining and 
approving authority and the administrative department for industry and commerce for record.  
Article 63 The foreign-funded enterprise shall set up account books at the place where it is located, 
and shall be subject to the supervision by the financial and tax authorities.  
If there is any violation of the preceding paragraph, the financial and tax authorities may impose a 
fine, and the administrative department for industry and commerce may order a suspension of 
business or revoke the business license, on or of the violating foreign-funded enterprise.  
 
Chapter X Workers and Staff Members  
Article 64 The foreign-funded enterprise employing workers and staff members from China shall 
conclude labor contracts with the workers and staff members employed in accordance with Chinese 
laws and regulations. The contract shall contain such matters as employment, dismissal, 
remuneration, welfare, labor protection and labor insurance.No foreign-funded enterprise may 
employ child laborers.  
Article 65 A foreign-funded enterprise shall be responsible for the vocational and technical training 
of its workers and staff members, set up checking and appraisal system, and make the workers and 
staff members capable of meeting the needs of the production and development of the enterprise.  
 
Chapter XI Trade Union  
Article 66 Workers and staff members of any foreign-funded enterprise shall be entitled to set up 
grass-roots trade union organizations and carry out trade union activities in accordance with the 
Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China.  
Article 67 The trade union in a foreign-funded enterprise, represents the interests of the relevant 
workers and staff members, and shall have the right to conclude labor contracts, on behalf of the 
workers and staff members, with the enterprise, and shall supervise the execution of such labor 
contracts.  
Article 68 The basic tasks of the trade union in a foreign-funded enterprise shall be: to safeguard 
lawful rights and interests of the workers and staff members in accordance with the provisions of 
Chinese laws and regulations, and to assist the enterprise in making proper arrangements for and use 
of the welfare and bonus funds for worker and staff members; to organize for the workers and staff 
members political study, and study of scientific, technical and professional knowledge, and to carry 
out recreational and sports activities; to educate the workers and staff members to observe labor 
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disciplines and strive to fulfill the economic tasks of the enterprise.  
The representative of trade union in a foreign-funded enterprise shall have the right to attend, as an 
observer, meetings held to discuss and decide matters regarding rewards and punishment to workers 
and staff members, salary and wage system, welfare, labor protection and labor insurance, etc. The 
foreign-funded enterprise shall heed the opinions of the trade union, and win the cooperation thereof. 
Article 69 The foreign-funded enterprise shall give an active support to the work of the trade union, 
and in accordance with the provisions of the Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China, 
provide the trade union organization with housing and facilities necessary for office use, meeting, 
and carrying out collective undertakings of welfare, culture and sports for the workers and staff 
members. The foreign-funded enterprise shall, at a monthly basis, appropriate a sum of 2% of the 
actual total amount of wages and salaries of the workers and staff members, as funds of the trade 
union, which shall be used by the trade union in accordance with the relevant measures of All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions for the management of funds of trade unions.  
 
Chapter XII Duration (Operating Period), Termination and Liquidation  
Article 70 The duration of a foreign-funded enterprise shall, in the light of the circumstances of the 
specific trade and enterprise, be proposed by the relevant foreign investor in the application for the 
establishment of the foreign-funded enterprise, and shall be subject to the approval by the examining 
and approval authority.  
Article 71 The duration of a foreign-funded enterprise shall be calculated from the date of issue of its 
business license 
In case of an intention to extend the duration of a foreign-funded enterprise, an application for such 
extension shall be submitted 180 days prior to the expiration of the duration to the examining and 
approving authority, which shall, within 30 days from the date of receiving the application, make a 
decision of approving or disapproving of the extension.  
If the application for the extension of duration is approved, the foreign-funded enterprise shall, 
within 30 days from the date of receiving the approval, go through the procedures for change of 
registration with the administrative department for industry and commerce. 
Article 72 A foreign-funded enterprise shall be terminated, if it is under any of the following 
circumstances:  
(1) upon the expiration of its duration;  
(2) if the foreign investor decides to dissolve it because of poor management and serious losses; 
  (3) if the business cannot be carried on because of heavy losses resulting from force majeure      
such as natural disasters and wars; 
(4) if it becomes bankrupt; 
(5) if it is cancelled according to law due to its violation of Chinese laws and regulations or due 
to its harming the social and public interests; or  
(6) if any other cause for dissolution, stipulated in the articles of association of the 
foreign-funded enterprise, has occurred.  
In case of circumstances of (2), (3) or (4) of the preceding paragraph, the foreign-funded enterprise 
shall, on its own initiative, submit an application for termination to the examining and approving 
authority for approval. The date of approval after verification by the examining and approving 
authority shall be the date of termination of the enterprise.  
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Article 73 In case of termination under (1), (2), (3) or (6) of Article 72 of these Rules, the 
foreign-funded enterprise shall, within 15 days from the date of termination, make a public 
announcement and notify the creditors of the termination and, within 15 day from the date of such
announcement, put forward liquidation procedures, principles and candidates for the liquidation 
committee, submit them to the examining and approving authority for verification and approval and, 
upon such approval, carry out the liquidation.  
Article 74 The liquidation committee shall be composed of the legal representative of the 
foreign-funded enterprise, representative of creditors and representatives from the competent 
authorities concerned, and Chinese certified public accountants and lawyers shall also be engaged to 
participating in the liquidation.  
Article 75 The liquidation committee shall execute the following functions and powers:  
(1) to convene meetings of creditors; 
(2) to take over and liquidate the property of the enterprise, and to prepare the statement of 
assets and liabilities and inventory of the property; 
(3) to propose a basis for the valuation and computation of the property of the enterprise;  
(4) to work out a liquidation plan; 
(5) to recover and discharge debts;  
(6) to recover payments payable but not yet paid by shareholders;  
(7) to distribute the residual property;  
(8) to institute and respond to actions on behalf of the enterprise.  
Article 76 The foreign investor may not remit or carry the enterprise's money out of the territory of 
China, nor dispose of the enterprise's property privately, until the liquidation of the foreign-funded 
enterprise is gone through.  
The net assets and residual property of a foreign-funded enterprise, after the liquidation is gone 
through, shall be treated as profit and subject to income tax in accordance with Chinese tax law.  
Article 77 When the liquidation is completed, the foreign-funded enterprise shall go through the 
procedures for cancellation of registration with and hand in its business license for cancellation to 
the administrative department for industry and commerce.  
Article 78 Chinese enterprises and other economic organizations shall, under equal conditions, have 
the right of preemption to assets to be disposed of during the liquidation of any foreign-funded 
enterprise.  
Article 79 In case of termination of a foreign-funded enterprise under (4) of Article 72 of these 
Rules, the liquidation shall be conducted by reference to Chinese laws and regulations. 
In case of termination of a foreign-funded enterprise under (5) of Article 72 of these Rules, the 
liquidation shall be conducted in accordance with the relevant Chinese provisions.  
 
Chapter XIII Supplementary Provisions  
Article 80 All foreign-funded enterprise shall buy their various insurances from insurance companies 
in China.  
Article 81 All contracts between a foreign-funded enterprise and other company, enterprise or 
economic organization and individual shall be governed by the Contract Law of the People's 
Republic of China.  
Article 82 Enterprises, which are wholly owned by any company, enterprise or other economic 
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organization or individual from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan or by any overseas Chinese, 
established with his total capital in the mainland of China, shall be handled by reference to these 
Rules.  
Article 83 Foreign workers and staff members, workers and staff members from Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan, of any foreign-funded enterprise may carry into the mainland of China means of 
transportation and articles for daily use that are within reasonable quantities and for their own 
use,and shall go through import formalities.  
Article 84 These Rules shall come into force as of the date of promulgation.  
 
Sources: www.fdi.gov.cn , 2007 
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Appendix 4.2 
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries  
(Amended in 2007) 
 
Part 1: Catalogue of Encouraged (Permitted) Foreign Investment Industries 
Part 2: Catalogue of Restricted Foreign Investment Industries 
Part 3: Catalogue of Prohibited Foreign Investment Industries 
 
Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries 
I. Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery Industries (1) Improvement of low and medium yielding field 
(2) Planting, development and production of woody edible oil, ingredient and industrial raw material (3) Planting 
technology, without social effects of pollution, of vegetables (including edible fungus and melon-watermelon), 
dried fruits, teas and serial development and production of these products (4) Development and production of new 
technology of sugar-yielding crops, fruit trees, forage grass (5) Production of flowers and plants, and construction 
and operation of nursery base (6) Planting of rubber, sisals and coffees (7) Cultivation of traditional Chinese 
medicines (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (8) Reusing in fields and comprehensive 
utilization of straws and stalks of crop, development and production of resources of organic fertilizers (9) Planting 
of forest trees (including bamboo) and cultivation of fine strains of forest trees and cultivation of new breed 
varieties of polyploid trees and genetically engineered forest trees (10) Breeding of aquatic offspring (excluding 
precious quality varieties peculiar to China) (11) Construction and operation of ecological environment protection 
projects preventing and treating desertification and soil erosion such as planting trees and grasses, etc. (12) 
Breeding of aquatic products, cage culture in deep water, large-scale breeding of aquatic products and breeding of 
eco-ocean products 
II. Mining and Quarrying Industries (1) Prospecting, exploitation and utilization of coal-bed gas (limited to equity 
joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (2) Venture prospecting and exploitation of petroleum, natural 
gas(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (3) Exploitation of oil and gas deposits (fields) 
with low osmosis(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (4) Development and application of 
new technologies that can increase the recovery factor of crude oil(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual 
joint ventures) (5) Development and application of new technologies for prospecting and exploitation of 
petroleum, such as geophysical prospecting, well drilling, well-logging and downhole operation, etc.(limited to 
contractual joint ventures) (6) Prospecting and exploitation of such conventional oil resources as oil shale, oil 
sand, heavy oil and super heavy oil(limited to contractual joint ventures) (7) Prospecting, exploitation, and 
beneficiation of iron ores and manganese ores (8) Development and application of new technologies for improving 
the utilance of tailings and the comprehensive utilization of recovery technology of the mine ecology (9) 
Prospecting and exploitation of submarine flammable ice(limited to contractual joint ventures)  
III. Manufacturing Industries 1. Farm Products Processing Industry (1) Development and production of biology 
feeds, straws and stalks feeds and aquatic feeds (2) Aquatic products processing, seashell products cleansing and 
processing, and development of function food made from seaweed (3) Storage and processing of vegetables, dried 
fruits, fowl and livestock products 2. Food Manufacturing Industry (1) Development and production of fond for 
babies and agedness, as well as function food (2) Development, production and processing of forest food (3) 
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Production of natural addictive for foodstuff and food ingredients(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual 
joint ventures) 3. Drinks Manufacturing Industry (1) Development and production of drinks of fruits, vegetables, 
albumen, tea, coffee and vegetables 4. Tobacco Processing Industry (1) Production of secondary cellulose acetate 
and processing of tows(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (2) Production of tobacco 
slices in the way of paper making(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (3) Production of 
filter rods (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) 5. Textile Industry (1) Production of 
special textiles for industrial use with high and new technology (2) Weaving and dyeing as well as post dressing of 
high-grade loomage face fabric (3) Processing of special natural fiber products satisfying the requirement of 
comprehensive utilization of ecology and resources and environment protection(including other animal fiber, 
fibrilia, bamboo fiber, mulberry silk and colored cotton other than wool) (4) Production of clothes with computer 
integrated manufacturing system (5) Production of top-grade carpet, embroider and drawnwork product 6. Leather, 
Coat and Feather(Down and Feather) Products Industry (1) Cleaning processing of leather and fur (2) Post 
ornament and processing of leather with new technology (3) Top-grade leather(sofa leather and car cushion 
leather) 7. Lumber Processing Industry and Wood Bamboo, Bine, Palm, Grass Products Industry (1) Development 
and production of new technology and products for the comprehensive utilization of "sub-quality, small wood and 
fuel wood" and bamboo in the forest area 8. Paper Making and Paper Products Industry (1) Project based on the 
mode of integration of forest and paper with an annual production capacity of over 300 thousand tons of chemical 
wood pulp or an annual production capacity of over 100 thousand tons of chemical mechanical wood pulp 
(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) 9. Petroleum Refining and Coking Industry (1) Deep 
processing of needle coke and coal tar 10. Chemical Raw Material and Products Manufacturing Industry (1) 
Production of ethylene with an annual production capacity of 600,000 tons or over (The Chinese party shall hold 
relative majority of shares) (2) Processing and manufacturing of derivatives of downstream products of ethylene 
and comprehensive utilization of ethylene side-products such as C4-C9 (3) Production of ethylene with an annual 
production capacity of 200,000 tons or over Polyvinyl chloride resin (in the way of ethylene) (4) Production of 
further processed products of sodium-process bleaching powder, polyvinyl chloride and organosilicon (5) 
Production of basic organic chemical industrial raw materials such as the of benzene, methylbenzenc, 
dimethylobenzene, etc. and its derivatives (6) Production of supporting raw materials for synthesized materials: 
bisphenol-A production and production of propylene oxide in the way of oxidizing propylene with hydrogen 
peroxide ) (7) Production of synthetic fibre raw materials: precision terephthalic acid, vinyl cyanide, caprolactam, 
nylon 66 salt and polyurethane elastic fiber (8) Production of synthetic rubber: liquid butadiene styrene rubber by 
butadiene method(excluding styrene-butadiene rubber), butyl rubber, isoamyl rubber, polyurethane rubber, acrylic 
rubber, chlorophydrin rubber, ethylene-propylene-rubber, fluororubber, silicon rubber and other special rubber 
production) (9) Production of engineering plastics and plastic alloys: PPO, engineering plastic nylon of 11 and 12, 
polyurethane, polysulfone, PAR, liquid crystal polymer and other products (10) Fine chemistry industry: new 
products and technology for catalytic agent, auxiliary and addictive; processing technology for the 
commercialization of dye (pigment); production of high-tech chemicals for electronics and paper-making, food 
additives, feed additives, leather chemical products (excluding N,N-dimethylformamide), oil-well auxiliaries, 
surface active agent, water treatment agent, adhesivcs, inorganic fibre, inorganic nano material production and 
deep processing of pigment encapsulation. (11) Production of low hysteresis and high abrasion carbon black (12) 
Production of environment-friendly printing ink and environment-friendly arene-oil (13) Production of nature 
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spices, synthetic spices and single ion spices (14) Production of high capability coatings, water automotive 
coatings and assorted water resin (15) Production of chlorofluorocarbon substitution (16) Production of organic 
fluorine chemical products(excluding CFC/HCFC and tetrafluoroethylene) (17) Production of fluorine recycling 
from phosphorus chemicals and aluminum smelting (18) Production of mass coal chemical industrial products(The 
Chinese party shall hold the majority of shares) (19) Development and production of new technology and products 
for the forestry chemicals (20) Production of ion film for caustic soda, abio-filtration membrane and function 
membrane (21) Development and production of inorganic, organic and biologic films for environment protection 
(22) Development and production of new-type fertilizer: biologic fertilizer, high-density fertilizer, compound 
fertilizer, controlled release fertilizer, compound microbial inoculant, Compound microbial manure, degradation 
agent for stalks and garbage and microbial preparation of special functions (23) Development and production of 
new varieties of effective, safe agriculture chemicals and pesticides (24) Development and production of 
biopesticide and bio-control products: microbial insecticide, microbial fungicide, agricultural antibiotic, insect 
pheromone, enemy insect and microbial herbicide (25) Comprehensive utilization and disposal of exhaust gas, 
discharge liquid, waste residue (26) Production of organic polymer material: organic silicone modified coatings for 
ship shell, covering film for plane, rare earth cerium sulphide red dye, lead-free in electronic packages, serials of 
special sizing agent by photoetching for color Plasma Display Panel, small diameter and large specific surface 
area superfine fibre, high precision fuel filter paper, Li-ion battery membrane, multi-function compound accessory 
ingredient for plastic processing, citric acid diglyceride, fludioxonil, cyazofamid 11. Medical and Pharmaceutical 
Products Industry (1) Production of new type compound medication of active composition medication (including 
bulk drug and preparation) (2) Production of amino acids: serine, tryptophan, hstidine, methionine for feed (3) 
Production of new anti cancer medication, new cardio-cerebrovascular medication and new nervous system using 
medication (4) New type, high effective and economical contraception medication and instrument (5) Production 
of new type medication using bioengineering technology (6) Production of high physillogical active medication 
heterocyclic fluoride containing fluorine, like heterocyclic fluoride, and intermediate (7) Production of genetic 
engineering bacterin (AIDS bacterin, third bacterin, contraception bacterin) (8) Production of biology bacterin (9) 
Production of bcg vaccine and poliomyelitis vaccine (10) Exploitation and production of marine drug (11) Drug 
preparation: production of new formulation using new technologies of sustained-release, release, targeting and 
percutaneous absorption (12) Exploitation and production of new type of pharmaceutic adjuavant (13) Production 
of biomedicine material and ware(except flesh body, sample, human organ tissue and sample processing) (14) 
Production of animal using antibacterial raw material drug (15) Exploitation and production of animal using 
antibacterial drug, insect repellent, pesticide, anticoccidial drug and new formulation (16) Production of new 
diagnosis reagent 12. Manufacturing Industry of Chemical Fiber (1) Production of hi-tech chemical fiber of 
differential chemical fiber, aramid, carbon fiber, polyethylene of high-strength and high-mode, polyphenylene 
sulfide(PPS) and so on (2) Production of Environmental Protection chemical fiber of New Solvent cellulose fiber 
(3) Production of new style of fiber and non-fiber polyester: PTT, PEN, PBT (4) Production of new style fiber 
material made use of renewable resources, biomass technology: PLA, PDO (5) Production of polyamide, single 
line production capacity of 100 ton a day (6) Production of meridian tyre aramid fiber and tyre cord 13. Industry of 
Plastic Products (1) Exploitation and production of new technology and new production of agricultural 
film(photodegradable film and multi-function film) (2) Digestion and recycle of waste plastics (3) Exploitation and 
production of new technology and new production of plastic soft package (high barrier, multi-function film and 
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material) 14. Non-metal Mineral Products Processing Industry (1) Develop and produce new energy-saving, 
environment-protecting architecture material: lightweight high-intensity and multi-function materials for wall, 
high-level environment protecting decorating and finishing materials, high quality water-proof and airproof 
materials, and effective thermal insulation materials. (2) Use plastic to replace steel and wood, energy-saving and 
high-efficient chemical architecture material production. (3) Produce more than 10,000,000 sq.m. elastomer, 
plastic changeable asphaltum waterproof coiled materials，high-quality width(more than 2 meters) EPDM 
waterproof coiled materials and matched materials, durable PVC coiled material, TPO waterproof coiled 
materials. (4) Production of screen electromagnetic wave glass, micro-electronics glass base plate, penetrating 
infrared nonlead glass, electron grade large spec quartz glass pervasion pipe, exceeding two generation and three 
generation microchannel plate, optic fiber panel and inverse image implement and glass fiber. (5) Production of 
glass fibre (product line with technology of wire drawing in tank furnace) and glass fibre reinforced plastic 
products with an annual capacity of 50,000 tons or more. (6) Production of sequential fiberglass original silk felt, 
fiberglass surface felt, micro-electronics fiberglass cloth and thin felt. (7) Production of coherent fiber bundle and 
laser medical optic fiber. (8) Production of sanitation porcelain with an annual production of 1,000,000 pieces or 
over (9) Standardization refine of ceramic material and production of high-level decorative materials used for 
ceramics. (10) Production of high-level refractory material used in furnaces for cement kiln, top 
grade(electronic)glasses, ceramics and glass fiber. (11) Production of ceramic carrier, AIN ceramic base piece, 
multiple-hole ceramics use in car catalyzing equipment. (12) Production of inorganic, non-metal materials and 
products: artificial crystal, carbon/carbon complex materials, special kind of ceramics, special kind of airproof 
materials, quick oil sealed materials, special kinds of cementation materials, special type latex materials, water 
rubber materials, heat-transfer coefficient is or less than 0.025W/mK under normal temperature heat insulation 
materials and so on. (13) Production of high tech compound materials: sequential fiber increasing thermoplasticity 
compound materials and prepreg, endure heat > 300℃ colophony compound material moulding craftwork 
assistant materials, colophony compound material oar, colophony compound material top grade sports articles, 
special capability glass steel tube(pressure > 1.2MPa), special function compound materials and products, deep 
water and diving compound material products，medical and healing use compound material products, 
carbon/carbon compound materials and brake piece, high capability ceramic compound materials and products, 
metal compound materials and products, metal layer compound materials and products, pressure≥320MPa super-
high-pressure compound rubber pipes, air bus aviation tyres. (14) Production of precise high capability ceramics 
and functional ceramic materials: carborundum super-minute powder(purity > 99%, average granule diameter < 
1μm), Si3N4 super-minute powder(purity > 99%, average granule diameter < 1μm), high pure and super-minute 
alumina powder(purity > 99%, average granule diameter < 0.5μm), low temperature sintered zirconia 
powder(sintered temperature < 1350℃) ,high pure AlN powder(purity > 99%, average granule diameter < 1μm), 
rutile TiO2 powder(purity > 98.5%), white char black(average granule diameter < 100nm＝, barium titanate 
(purity > 99%, average granule diameter < 1μm＝. (15) Production of diamond film tools, thickness is 0.3mm or 
less super-thin artificial diamond saw piece. (16) Deep processing of non-metal mineral products (super-thin 
comminution, high level pure, fine production, modification) (17) Production of super high power black lead 
electrode. (18) Production of pearlite mica(granule diameter: 3-150μm). (19) Production of multiple dimension and 
multiple direction integer weaving fabric and profile modeling fabric. (20) Use new dry cement kiln to 
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innocuously dispose combusting industry castoff and life garbage. 15. Non-Ferrous Metallurgical Smelting and 
Rolling Processing Industry (1) Production of diameter > 200mm silicon single crystal and polishing piece, 
multiple crystal silicon. (2) Production of high tech non-ferrous metallurgical materials: new type high capability 
hydrogen storing materials, lithium hydronium battery electrode materials, compound semiconductor 
materials(gallium arsenide, gallium phoshpide, gallium Reexplanation, gallium nitride), high temperature 
superconduct materials, memory alloy materials(titanium nickel，copper and iron memory alloy materials) , super 
minute(nanometer) calcium carbide and super minute(nanometer) crystal hard ally, superhard compound 
materials, noble metal compound materials, aluminum foil used for radiator, middle and high pressure cathode 
capacitance aluminum foil, special kind of large aluminum alloy materials, aluminum alloy precise model forge 
product, electrization railway built on stilts leads, super-thin copper strip, erosion proof heat exchanger copper 
alloy material, high capability copper nickel, copper and iron alloy strip, beryllium copper strip, thread, tube and 
stick process material, high temperature bearable tungsten filament, magnesium alloy cast, non-lead solder, 
magnesium alloy and its applicable products, bubble aluminum, titanium alloy strip materials and titanium 
jointing pipes, atomic energy grade sponge zirconium, tungsten and molybdenum deep machining products. 16. 
Metal products industry (1) Production of lightened car, automobile and environment protecting new materials 
(bodywork aluminum board, aluminum magnesium alloy materials, automobile aluminum alloy frame and so on). 
(2) Development and production of high-grade hardware for construction, hot-water heating equipment and 
hardware parts. (3) Production and processing (including painting and processing inner and outer surface of the 
products) of metal packing products (thickness < 0.3mm) used to pack all kinds of grain, oil and food, fruits, 
vegetables, beverages, daily using materials and such contents. 17. General Machine-building Industry (1) 
Manufacturing of numerically controlled machine tools of high level and key spare parts: numerically controlled 
machine tools which exceed quintuple linkage, digital control coordinate spindle processing centre，digital 
control system which exceeds quintuple linkage and servomechanism installations, high-speed and super-strong 
knifes for exact digital control manufacturing. (2) Manufacturing of multi-station forging forming machine of 
1000 tons or more (3) Manufacturing of equipments for braking up and smashing retired cars (4) Manufacturing of 
soft FTL product line (5) Manufacturing of vertical articulated industrial robots, welding robots and welding 
equipments thereof (6) Manufacturing of special processing machines: complete sets of laser cutting and welding 
equipments, exact processing laser equipments, digital-control and low-speed wire-cuts, submicron cracker (7) 
Manufacturing of wheel or crawler crane of 300 tons or more (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint 
ventures) (8) Design and manufacturing of high pressure plunger pumps of pressure(35-42MPa) and engine, 
design and manufacturing of low-speed big torquey engine of pressure(35-42MPa) (9) Manufacturing of electro-
hydraulic proportion servo elements (10) Design and manufacturing of integrated multi-path valves of 
pressure(21-31.5MPa) , pneumatic solenoid valves of less than 0.35W high-frequency electrical control valves of 
more than 200Hz (11) Design and manufacturing of hydrostatic drive device (12) Development and manufacturing 
of non-contacting gas film seal of pressure more than 10MPa, dry gas seal of pressure more than 10MPa 
(including experience device) (13) Development and manufacturing of macromolecule material device for 
automobiles(rub piece, changed phenol aldehyde plunger, non-metal liquid pressure mother pump and so on) (14) 
Manufacturing of car boss axletree of 3 and 4 generation(function elements of boss axletree of flange and 
transducer inside or outside of the axletree，digital control machine tool or processing centre axletree of high or 
mid class(the processing center should have more than three axis interlocking function and 3-4μm repeated 
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precision) ，high-speed wire or board rolling mill axletree(assistant axletree and roller axletree of single-wire 
rolling mill of more than 120m/s and of thin-board rolling mill of more than 2mm) ，high-speed railway 
axletree(with speed of more than 200km/h) ，low-noise axletree of vibration of less than Z4(Z4, Z4P, V4, 
V4P) ，level P4, P2 axletree of various axletree (15) Production of high temperature resistant and insulation 
material (with F, H insulation class), as well as insulation shaped parts (16) Development and manufacturing of 
fluid pressure rubber sealing (17) Manufacturing of high binding spares of 12.9 level or more (18) Manufacturing 
of casting and forging workblanks for cars and motorcycles (19) Remanufacturing of machine tools, spare parts of 
cars(except five matured varieties)and project machines. 18. Special Equipment Manufacturing (1) Manufacturing 
of mine trolley mining, loading and transporting device：mechanical drive tipper for mine of 100 tons or more, 
mobile crusher，wheeled digger of 3000m3/h or more，loading machine for mine of 5 m3 or more， electric 
driving mining machine of 2000 kw or more and so on (2) Manufacturing of geophysical, logging equipment: 
MEME geophone, digital telemetry seismograph, digital imaging, computerized logging system, horizontal wells, 
directional wells, drilling rig equipment and apparatus, MWD logging while drilling (3) Manufacturing of oil 
exploration, drilling, gathering and transportation equipment: floating drilling systems and floating production 
systems which will work in more than 500 meters of water depth, working depth greater than 600 meters undersea 
oil production, gathering and transportation equipment, power of winch greater than 3,000 kilowatts, top driving 
force greater than 850 kilowatts, drilling pump more than 1,800 kilowatts of power by deep-sea oil rig, drilling 
depth of 9,000 meters above the desert land drilling rig and oil rig, 10 million tons / year oil refining installations 
with 80 tons and above Pistons edge reciprocating compressor, NC oil Sham Tseng logging, oil Drilling Mud 
Hole solid operating highway tunnel monitoring equipment, ventilation, disaster prevention and relief system 
equipment manufacturers (4) Design and manufacturing of skeleton shield integrated system with diam of 6 
meters, TBM system integrating with diam of 5 meters; manufacturing of large digging drilling of caliber of 1 
meter and depth of 30 meters, design and manufacturing of push bench with diam of 1.2 meters or more, 
manufacturing of large complete non-digging pipeline laying device with pulling power of 200 tons or more, 
manufacturing of consecutive wall underwater drilling machine, manufacturing of automatic vertical drilling 
system (5) Design and manufacturing of large lifting machine of 100 tons or more 320hp (6) Design and 
manufacturing of pedrail soil shifter of ground pressure of 0.03MPa or less, power of 220 hp or more，large soil 
shifter of 520 hp or more (7) Design and manufacturing of purge machine of 100 m3/h or more, digging device in 
digging vessel of 5000 tons or more (8) Design and manufacturing of tuffcrete diosmosing-proof wall for flood 
control bar (9) Manufacturing of machine for underwater mass：soil shifter, loader and digger 9 miles under water 
(10) Manufacturing of devices of road bridge maintaining and automatic testing (11) Manufacturing of devices of 
road tunnel supervision, winding, disaster control and rescuing system (12) Design and manufacturing of the large-
scale railway construction, and operation of large-scale road maintenance machinery and safety equipment (13) 
Manufacturing of (asphalt) shingles equipment, galvanized steel and other metal roof production equipment (14) 
Manufacturing of spot spraying polyurethane waterproof thermal insulation system equipment which could 
protect environment and conserve energy, technology and equipment of polyurethane sealant paste preparation, 
technology and production equipment of modified silicone sealing paste preparation (15) Design and 
manufacturing of thin-slab continuous casting machine, high-precision strip mill (with thickness of precise 10 
microns) (16) Manufacturing of devices of direct reverting iron and liquation reverting iron (17) Manufacturing of 
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high power DC electric arc furnace of 50 tons or more (18) Manufacturing of colorful panting or plating board 
devices (19) Manufacturing of selecting device for multi-element, fine-powder and hard-selecting mine (20) 
Manufacturing of key devices of 800000 tons/year or more of oxene complete devices：air compressor of 
pyrolysis gas, oxene and elemicin, complicated powder making machine of 1000000 tons/year, centrifuge with 
diam of 800 millimeter, unattackable pump and valve that can work under conditions of temperature250℃ and 
pressure 15Mpa, valve that can work under conditions of temperature -55℃ or less and so on(limited to equity 
joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (21) Manufacturing of large complete devices of chemical processing 
of coal(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (22) Design, manufacturing and maintaining 
of metal product moulds(such as extrusion moulds of pipe, stick and shape of copper, aluminum, titanium and 
zirconium) (23) Design and maintaining of punching mould of cover elements of automobile outside, clamp and 
test tools of automobile and motorcycle (24) Design and maintaining of punching mould with precision of more 
than 0.02 millimeter (including 0.02 millimeter), precise mould with precision of more than 0.05 millimeter 
(including 0.05 millimeter) and mould standard elements. (25) Design and manufacturing of nonmetal product 
moulds (26) Manufacturing of beer filling device of 60000 bottles /h or more, drink mid or high hot filling device 
of 5 bottles /h, asepticism filling device of 36000 bottles /h or more (27) Manufacturing of producing technologies 
and key equipments for aminophenol, zymi, food addiitive and so on (28) Manufacturing of complete feed 
processing equipment of 10tons/h or more and key parts thereof (29) Manufacturing of light board and box device 
of 0.75-millimeter high or less (30) Manufacturing of single in folio colorful lithographic printing machine with 
speed of more than 16000 pages in folio /h(720×1020 millimeters) , diprosopia in folio colorful lithographic 
printing machine with speed of 13000 pages in folio /h(720×1020 millimeters) , colorful lithographic in folio 
printing machine with speed of 13000 pages in folio /h(1000×1400 millimeters) (31) Manufacturing of single roll 
lithographic printing machine with speed of more than 75000 pages in folio /h(787×880 millimeters) , diprosopia 
single roll lithographic printing machine with speed of more than 170000 pages in folio /h(787×880 millimeters) , 
(32) Manufacturing of colorful soft printing machine with speed of 300meters/m or more and coverage of 1000 
millimeters or more (33) Manufacturing of computer mass color pre-coordination systems, mass color remote 
handling systems, mass speed following systems, prints quality automatic testing and following systems, no-axis 
turning technologies, high-speed automatic splicer, paper giving machine and high-speed and automatic remote 
handling paper folding machine, automatic overprinting system, cooling device, silanion putting system, bias-
adjusting device and so on. (34) Deep processing technique and equipment manufacturing of plate glass (35) 
Special high-tech Industrial sewing machines manufacturing (36) Manufacturing of complete set of new type of 
paper (including pulp) making machines (37) Manufacturing of equipment with new technique for post ornament 
and processing of leather (38) Development and Manufacturing of new agriculture processing and storage 
equipment: new equipment for the processing, storage, preservation, classifying, packing, and drying of food, oil, 
vegetables, diried fruits and fresh fruits, flowers, meat and aqua-products; agricultural product quality testing 
equipment ; the quality detection equipment of agricultural products' damage; Rheometer; Farinograph; ultrafine 
pulverization equipment; Highly efficient dewatering equipment ; 5-grade plus high efficient fruit juice 
condensation equipment；equipment for Disinfection of powder food in Media; Aseptic packaging equipment for 
Semi-solid and solid food; Packaging Materials for Aseptic packaging, DVS Bacteria Starter for Dairy 
Production, Disc-type Separation centrifuges (39) Manufacturing of Agricultural machinery: facility agriculture 
equipment(greenhouse Automatic irrigation equipment, Autocontrol configuration and fertilization Equipment of 
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Nutritious Liquid, Efficient vegetable nursery equipment, Soil nutrient analysis instruments ), Tractor and 
associated farm tools with 120 kilowatts and above Matching engine power, Low fuel consumption, low noise and 
low-emission diesel engine, Spray Machines with Residual fog tablets Recovery Unit matching of large tractor, 
High-performance rice transplanter, Cotton harvesting machine, Adapted to a variety of row-spacing Self-moving 
Maize Reaping Machine(Hydraulic drive or mechanical drive) (40) Manufacturing of new technical forestry 
equipment (41) Manufacturing of equipment for reusing in fields and comprehensive utilization of straws and 
stalks of crop, Manufacturing of equipment for comprehensive utilization of Rice Husk (42) Manufacturing of 
equipment for comprehensive utilization of waste agriculture products and waste fowl and livestock products 
which are bred in scale (43) Manufacturing of festival fertilizer, pesticide section, water-saving technical 
Agriculture equipment (44) Manufacturing of cleaning equipment for electromechanical wells and equipments for 
Laundering drug production (45) Manufacturing of electronic endoscopes (46) Manufacturing of Fundus Cameras 
(47) Manufacturing of Medical imaging equipments' Key components(high magnetic field intensity and 
superconduct MRI, CT, X-ray computed tomography, type-B ultrasonic ) (48) Manufacturing of Medical 
Ultrasonic Transducer(3D) (49) Manufacturing of boron neutron capture therapy equipments (50) Manufacturing 
of X-ray Stereotactic Radiotherapy System (51) Manufacturing of Hemodialysis, Blood Filter (52) Manufacturing 
of equipment for auto elisa immuno system (including the functions of application of sample, elisa photo meter, 
wash plate, incubation, data, post treatment, etc.) (53) New techniques of quality control of medicine products and 
new equipment manufacturing (54) New analytical techniques and extraction technologies, and equipment 
development and manufacturing for the effective parts of traditional Chinese medicines (55) Producing and 
manufacturing of new packing materials, new containers for medicine, and advanced medicine producing 
equipment (56) Development and Manufacturing of equipment of new type of knitting machines, Key parts and 
Textile testing, laboratory equipment (57) Manufacturing of Computer Jacquard artificial fur machine (58) 
Manufacturing of Special Equipments for solar cell production (59) Development and Manufacturing of Pollution 
control equipments (60) Manufacturing of City Waste disposal equipments and equipments for Comprehensive 
Utilization of Rural organic waste (61) Manufacturing of Waste plastics, electronics, rubber, battery Recycling 
Equipments (62) Technology of hydrophily ecological system for protecting environment and equipment 
manufacturing (63) Development and Manufacturing of 100,000 cubic meters and above Daily production 
seawater desalination and recycling cooling technology and complete sets of equipments (64) Manufacturing of 
special Meteorological observation and analysis equipments (65) Development of Seismic station, Seismic 
Network, and Mobile seismological observation technology System, and Manufacturing of equipments (66) 
Manufacturing of three-drum radial tire building machines (67) Manufacturing of Rolling resistance testing 
machine and Tire noise lab (68) Manufacturing of new Heating measurement and Temperature Control Device 
Technical equipments (69) Manufacturing of preparation, storage and transportation equipment and inspection 
systems of hydrogen energy (70) Manufacturing of new Heavy residue gasification Atomization Nozzle, Steam 
leakage rate of 0.5 percent and below efficient Steam Traps, 1000 ° C and above high-temperature ceramic heat 
exchanger manufacturer (71) Manufacturing of Comprehensive Utilization of waste tire equipments 19. 
Communication and Transportation Equipment Industries (1) Manufacturing of complete automobiles (foreign 
investments shall not exceed 50%)and construction of automobiles research and development organization (2) 
Manufacturing of automobile engine, reused manufacture of engines and construction of engine research and 
development organization：gasoline motor with output per litre not lower than 50 kw, diesel motor with output 
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per litre not lower than 40 kw and discharge capacity below 3 liters, diesel motor with output per litre not lower 
than 30 kw and discharge capacity above 3 liters, motor driven by such new resources as fuel cells and compound 
fuel (3) Manufacturing of key spare parts for automobiles as well as research and development of key 
technologies: complete disc brakes, complete driving rods, automatic gearboxes, fuel pumps of diesel engine, 
inhalant supercharger of engines, adhesive axial organ(used for four-wheel drive), hydraulic tappet, electronic 
cluster gauge, crankshaft and connecting bar(diesel motor above 8 liters), Anti－Lock Brake System(ABS, ECU, 
valve body, sensor) , ESP, BBW, electronic braking distribution system(EBD) , driving control system, gas 
generator for automobile airbags, electronic fuel injection system, sprays technology on fuel common rail 
technology(utmost spray pressure above 1600 pa) , VGT, VNT, discharge control equipment of motor meeting the 
pollutant discharge standard of the fourth phase of China, ITM and coupler assembly, Steer-by-Wire System, 
Diesel Particulate Filter(DPF), intelligent cylinder, special rubber automobile components (4) Production as well 
as research and development of automobile electronic devices: engine and underchassis control system as well as 
key spare parts, in-vehicle electronic technology (automobile information system and navigation system)，
automobile electronic network technology (limited to equity joint ventures)，components for the input (sensor 
and sampling system) and the output(actuator) of electronic control system, EPS electronic controller(limited to 
equity joint ventures) ，embedded electronic integration system(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual 
joint ventures) , electronic-controlled air suspension, ECS，electronic valve system equipment，electronic 
throttle, power cell(NiH and Li-con) and control system(limited to equity joint ventures) ，integrated motor and 
control system(limited to equity joint ventures) ，wheelboss motor, multifunction controller(limited to equity 
joint ventures) ，fuel cell and spare parts thereof, hydrogen storing systems for automobiles，testing system for 
experiment and maintaining of automobile and motorcycle models (5) Manufacturing of key parts for 
motorcycle：technology of electrical control fuel injection for motorcycle(limited to equity joint ventures or 
contractual joint ventures) , engine discharging device which satisfy motorcycle discharging criteria stage Ⅲ of 
China (6) Equipment for railway transportation(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) ：
research and development, design as well as manufacturing of complete train and key spare parts (drive system, 
control system, brake system) of rapid transit railway, railway of passenger special line, intercity railway, trunk 
railway and equipment for urban railway transportation； research and development, design as well as 
manufacturing of passenger service facilities and equipment for rapid transit railway, railway of passenger special 
line, intercity railway and urban railway transportation，design as well as research and development of related 
information system in the process of construction of information age；research and development, design as well 
as manufacturing of railway and bridge facilities and equipments for rapid transit railway, railway of passenger 
special line, intercity railway，manufacturing of equipment and fixtures for electrical railway, research and 
development of technologies for controlling railway noise and vibrating, manufacturing of discharging equipment 
for trains, manufacturing of safety monitoring equipment for railway transportation (7) Design, manufacturing and 
maintaining of civil plane: those of trunk and branch lines(Chinese part shall hold the majority of shares) ，
general ones(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) (8) Production and maintaining of 
spares parts for civil planes (9) Design and manufacturing of civil helicopters： those of three tons or more 
(Chinese part shall hold the majority of shares), those of less then three tons (limited to equity joint ventures or 
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contractual joint ventures) (10) Production of spares parts for civil helicopters (11) Manufacturing of ground and 
water effect plane(Chinese part shall hold the majority of shares) (12) Design and manufacturing of no-people 
plane and aerostat(Chinese part shall hold the majority of shares) (13) Design, manufacturing and maintaining of 
plan engines and spare parts as well as air assistant power systems(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual 
joint ventures) (14) Design and manufacturing of civil air-borne equipment(limited to equity joint ventures or 
contractual joint ventures) (15) Design and manufacturing of civil rocket launcher(Chinese part shall hold the 
majority of shares) (16) Manufacturing of flight ground equipments: civil airfield facilities, support equipment for 
civil airfield work, ground equipment for flight test, equipment for flight simulation and practice, equipment for 
aeronautic testing and measuring, equipment for aeronautic ground testing, comprehensive testing equipment for 
machines, special equipment for aeronautic manufacturing, equipment for pilot manufacturing aeronautic 
materials, ground receiving and applying equipment for civil aircraft, ground testing equipment for rocket 
launcher, equipment for dynamic and environmental experience for rocket launcher (17) Manufacturing of 
mechanical and electrical products for aircrafts, temperature control products for aircrafts, test equipment for 
planet products and structure and organization products for aircrafts (18) Manufacturing of light gas-turbine engine 
(19) Design of vessels and equipment for ocean project of high and new technologies(limited to equity joint 
ventures or contractual joint ventures) (20) Maintaining, design and manufacturing of vessels (including stages) 
and equipment for ocean project(Chinese part shall hold the majority of shares) (21) Design and manufacturing of 
diesel engine for vessel of low, mid and high speed(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) 
(22) Design and manufacturing of spare parts for diesel engine for vessel(limited to equity joint ventures or 
contractual joint ventures) (23) Design and manufacturing of crankshafts of low and mid speed for diesel engine 
for vessel(Chinese part shall hold the majority of shares) (24) Design and manufacturing of stateroom machine and 
deck machine for vessels(Chinese part shall hold the relative majority of shares) (25) Design and manufacturing of 
communication and directing systems for vessels：communication systems, electronic directing equipment, 
vessel radar, electric compass automatic pilot, public broadcasting systems inside vessels and so on (26) Design 
and manufacturing of overseas fishing vessels and cabin cruiser (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual 
joint ventures) 20. Electric Machinery and Equipment Industries (1) Manufacture of the pivotal equipment of 
super-critical units of over 600,000 KW，and over 1,000, 000KW of fire and electricity station (limited to equity 
joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures): boiler-feedwater pump, circular water pump, valve of main steam 
loop high temperature and pressure which is over 400℃work temperature and 20Mpa of work pressure (2) 
Manufacture of the equipment of Over million kilowatt Nuclear-power plant (limited to equity joint ventures and 
cooperative joint ventures) Pump and valve of Nucleus, Nucleus Ⅱ (3) Manufacture of the technic and equipment 
of Fire- electricity plant to decoke and saltpeter, hop-pocket dust catcher (4) Design and manufacture of the 
equipment of nucleus-electricity and fire-electricity airproof (5) Manufacture of the equipment of nuclear-power 
of great model casting-forge (6) Power transmitting and transforming equipment (limited to equity joint ventures 
and cooperative joint ventures): non-brilliant form transformer, high voltage implement great bushing, high 
voltage on-off operation implement, and freedom integer arc contact, direct current transmit electricity dried 
reactor, 6 inch direct current convertor clique high-power grain-valve tube, electrical apparatus contact material, 
and non-Pb, non-Cd solder accorded with EU command of RoHS (7) Manufacture of the equipment of New 
energy electricity-power (limited to equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures): photovoltaic power , 
geothermal power generation, tidal power generation, wave power generation, rubbish power generation, methane 
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power generation, wind power generation over 1.5M (8) Manufacture of stirling generating set (9) Empolder and 
manufacture of straight line and plane motor and drive system (10) Manufacture of solar air conditioning, heating 
system, solar dryer (11) Manufacture of biomass drying pyrolysis system, biomass, gasification unit (12) 
Manufacture of ac-fm voltage regulation drawbar (13) Manufacture of intelligent moulded case circuit ,( 3800V, 
1000A), large project intelligent cabinet or drawer type circuit breaker, belt- type intelligent electronic control 
distribution device 21. communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment manufacturing (1) 
Digital video camera, digital sound-playing equipment and player equipment manufacturing (2) Manufacture of 
flat panel display such as TFT-LCD, PDP, OLED, FED(including SED) and the material of flat panel display (3) 
Manufacture of such parts as optical engine, light source, projection screen, high-resolution projection tube and 
LCOS module used in large screen color projection display (4) Manufacture of digital audio and visual coding or 
decoding equipment, digital broadcasting TV studio equipment, digital cable TV system equipment, digital audio 
broadcast transmission equipment, digital television converter, digital television broadcasting Single Frequency 
Network(SFN), satellite digital TV up-linking station, front-emd equipment manufacturing of SMATV (5) 
Manufacture of high-performance single-lens reflex with more than 6 million pixels (6) Design of integrate circuit, 
and manufacture of large digital integrate circuit with its wire width less than 0.18 micron, manufacture of 
simulated and digital analogy integrate circuit less than 0.8 micron and the encapsulation and test of such 
advanced equipment as BGA, PGA, CSP, MCM (7) Large and medium-sized computer, high-performance 
computer with its operation more than 100 trillion times, portable micro computer, high-rank server with its 
operation more than 1 trillion times per second, large scale simulated system, large industrial controller and the 
manufacture of controller (8) Manufacture of computer digital signal process system and board card (9) 
Manufacture of figure and image recognition process system (10) Development and manufacture of large-
capability optical and disk driver (11) Manufacture of high-speed storage system and intelligent storage equipment 
with its capability more than 100 TB (12) Manufacture of large-breath( more than 900mm) high-definition colored 
printing equipment, high-definition colored printer head with its precision more than 2400dbi, and large-
breath( more than 900mm) high-definition colored Xerox equipment (13) Manufacture of Computer Assistance 
Design(three-dimensional CAD) , Computer Assisted Testing (CAT) , Computer Aided Manufacture(CAM) , 
Computer Aided Engineering(CAE) and other computer application system (14) Development and manufacture of 
software product (15) Development and manufacture of specialized electronic material( excluding the 
development and manufacture of optical fibre perform rod ) (16) Manufacture of specialized equipment, testing 
equipment, tools and moulds (17) Manufacture of new type electronic components and parts :slice components, 
sensitive components and sensors, frequency monitoring and selecting components, mix integrated circuit, 
electrical and electronic components, photoelectric components, new type components for machinery and 
electronics, high-density interlinked build-up board, multilayer flexible board, flexible printing circuit board and 
packaging substrate (18) High-tech green battery manufacture: dynamic zinc and nickel storage cell, zinc and 
silver storage cell, lithium-ion batteries, high-capability, air-proof and repair-free lead-acid battery, solar battery, 
fuel battery, column-shaped zinc-air battery and etc. (19) High-brightness LBD with its luminous efficiency more 
than 501m/W, epitaxial slice LBD(blue) with its luminous efficiency more than 501m/W, white luminous tube 
with luminous efficiency more than 501m/W and its power more than 200mW (20) Development and manufacture 
of RFID chip (21) Development and manufacture of key components and parts used in high-precision digital CD 
drive (22) Reproduction of read-only compact disk and manufacture of recordable compact disk (23) Design and 
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manufacture of civil satellites {Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares} (24) Manufacture of civil 
satellites effective payload (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares) (25) Manufacture of spare pans for 
civil satellites (26) Manufacture of telecommunication system equipment for satellites (27) Manufacture of 
receiving equipment of satellite navigation and key components (28) manufacture of optical communication 
measurement and instrument and light transceiver with its speed more than 10Gb/s (29) Ultra Broad Band (UWB) 
communication equipment manufacture (30) Manufacture of wireless Local Area Network(Wide Area Network) 
(31) Manufacture of Optical Cross Connect(OXC) , Automatic Switch Optical Network(ASON) , optical fiber 
communication and transmission equipment more than 40G/sSDH and Coarse Wave Division 
Multiplexing(CWDM) (32) Manufacture of Asynchronous Transfer Mode(ATM) and IP digital communication 
system (33) Development and manufacture of third-generation and the following mobile communication system 
mobile phone, base station, core network equipment and network testing equipment (34) Development and 
manufacture of high-end router, network switcher more than 1 kilomega (35) Manufacture of air traffic control 
system equipment(limited to joint venture and cooperation) 22. Machinery Industries for Instrument and Meter, 
Culture and Office (1) Manufacture of field-bus control system and its key components and parrts (2) Development 
and manufacture of large-scale sophisticated instruments: including electron microscope, laser scanning 
microscope, scanning tunneling microscope, laser with its power more than 2kw, industrial chromatograph, 
GC/MS, nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer, energy dispersive analysis system, X-ray fluorescence 
spectrometer, diffraction analysis system, industrial CT, large-scale balance measuring machine, automatic testing 
system of on-line mechanical quality, ultra-speed centrifuge with its rotating speed more than 100000r/min, large-
scale metallurgical microscope, three coordinate measuring machine, laser comparator, electrical prospecting 
instrument, airborne electrical prospecting and gamma-ray spectrometry measuring instrument more than 500 m, 
borehloe gravimetry and 3-dimensional magnetograph, high-precision microgal and aviation gravity gradiometer, 
High-performance welding rare earth material with permanent magnetism, portable geological radar (3) 
Manufacture of high-precision digital voltmeter, current meter(with measuring range of seven bit and a half and 
above) (4) Wattless Power manufacture of automatic compensation equipment (5) Manufacture of two-phase 
flowmeter and solid flowmeter (6) Manufacture of automatic plating machine for electron gun (7) Manufacture of 
industrial NDT X-ray equipment governing the volt more than 800 kv (8) Manufacture of new technical 
equipment for safety production and environmental protection (9) VXI bus automatic test system (in accordance 
with IEEE1155 international standards) (10) Development and manufacture comprehensive management system 
for under-mine monitoring and disaster-forecasting apparatus and coal safety measurement (11) Manufacture of 
the equipment for engineering measurement and global geographical observation equipment: digital triangle 
surveying system, Digital programmed system for three-dimensional topography model (acreage>1000×1000mm, 
horizontal error<1mm, altitude error <0.5mm), ultral wideband seismograph(φ < 5cm, frequency band0.01-50HZ, 
equivalent quaking speed noise<10-9m/s), integrated earthquake data processing system, extensive under-well 
earthquake and auspice observation apparatus, sophisticated controllable epicenter system, engineering velocity 
measuring system, high-precision GPS receiver (precision 1mm + 1ppmm), INSAR graphics receiving and 
processing system, absolute gravimeter with the precision less than 1 microgal, satellite gravimeter, Doppler 
weather radar adopting coherent technology or double polarization technology, visibility measuring apparatus, 
meteorological sensor, (including temperature, pressure, humidity, wind, precipitation, cloud, visibility, radiation, 
frozen earth, depth of snow), anti lightning stroke system, multilevel soot and dust sampler, three-dimension 
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supersonic anemoscope, high-precision intelligent total station machine, three-dimensinal laser scanner, high 
performance diamond bit used for drilling, laser rangerfinder without cooperative target, wind profiler(affixed 
with RASS)， GPS electronic probe system, CO2/H2O general observation system, boundary layer laser doppler 
radar, granule chromatography, (3nm-20μm) , high-performance data collector, under-water glider (12) 
Manufacture of new-tech equipment of environmental-protection testing instrument: air quality testing, water 
quality testing, new-tech equipment of fume on-line detecting instrument, apparatus for emergency treatment and 
complete-set new differential coefficient analysis system, automatic calibration, composite, low-drift, on-line 
remote measurement and remote controlled apparatus and system and etc. (13) Manufacture of air-pollution 
prevention and control equipment: high-temperature-proof and erosion-proof filtering material, wet 
desulfurization complete-set equipment in coal-fueling factory, low-NOX fueling equipment, catalysts for 
denitrification of fuel gas and complete set of denitrification equipment, purified equipment for the polluted 
organic gas, purified equipment for gas expelled from diesel-driven automobile (14) Manufacture of equipment for 
water-pollution prevention and control: horizontal screw centrifugal dehydrator, membrane and its material, 
ozonizer more than 10kg/h, NO2 generator with more than 10kg/h, ultraviolet disinfection device, small domestic 
sewage treatment device in the rural area (15) Manufacture of the equipment for treating solid refuse: earth- leak-
proof membrane in refuse burying factory, the device for treating dangerous solid waster, methane-for-electricity 
equipment in refuse burying factory, the equipment for comprehensively using the domestic animal and fowl 
waste in large scale (16) Manufacture of environment motoring apparatus: SO2 automatic sampler and calcimeter, 
NOX, NO2 automatic sampler and calcimeter, O3 automatic monitor, CO automatic monitor, automatic sampler 
and calcimeter for soot and dust, automatic sampler and calcimeter for soot, portable calcimeter for harmful and 
toxic gas, automatic analyzer for organic pollutants in the air, COD automatic online monitor, BOD automatic 
online monitor, automatic online monitor for turbidity, DO automatic online monitor, TOC automatic online 
monitor, Automatic online monitor for ammonia nitrogen, radiation dose monitor, ray analyzer (17) Manufacture 
of instrument and equipment for hydrological data collecting, processing, transmitting and flood warning (18) 
Manufacture of ocean exploring apparatus and equipment: deep-sea underwater video camera and underwater 
camera, multi-beam explorer, shallow and deeper subbottom profiler, navigation warm-salt profiler, fluxgate 
compass, hydraulic wire line winch, underwater airproof electronic connector, energy recycle device used in 
filtration-proof seawater desaltation with its efficiency more than 90%, high-pressure pump used in filtration-
proof seawater desaltation with its efficiency more than 85%, filtration-proof seawater desaltation 
membrane( desaltation rate more than 99.7%), low-temperature multifunction distilled seawater desaltation 
equipment with its daily production more than 20, 000 tons, Marine ecosystem inspection buoy, section probing 
buoy, disposable measuring instrument of electrical conductivity, temperature and depth (XCTD), on-the-spot 
water quality measuring apparatus, intelligent chemical transducer for measuring the water quality of the ocean 
(continues work for 3-6 months), electromagnetic current meter sensor, navigating acoustic Doppler current 
profiler(self-contained, direct-read, used-in-ship), electricity conductivity rate deep-section profiler, acoustic 
responding emancipator(set deep into the ocean) 23. Other manufacturing industries (1) Development and 
utilization of clean-coal technical product (coal gasification, coal liquefaction, water-coal, industrial lump-coal) 
(2) Coal ore dressing by washing and comprehensive utilization of powered coal (including desulphurized plaster), 
coal gangue (3) Production of the all biodegradable material  
IV. Production and Supply of Power, Gas and Water 1. Construction and operation of electricity power by 
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employing the clean fuel technology of integral gasification combined circulation (IGCC), circulating fluidized 
bed more than 0.3 million kw, Pressurized Fluidized Bed Combustion Combined Cycle(PFBC) more than 0.1 
million kw 2. Construction and operation of back pressure combined and heat power 3. Construction and 
management of hydropower stations with the main purpose of power generating 4. Construction and management 
of nuclear-power plants (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares) 5. Construction and management of 
new energy power plants (solar energy, wind energy, magnetic energy, geothermal energy, tide energy and 
biological mass energy, etc.) 6. Utilization of sea water(direct use of sea water, seawater desaltation),using 
industrialization to recycle industrial sewage 7. Construction and operation of urban water-supply plant  
V. Communication and Transportation, Storage, Post and Telecommunication Services 1. Construction and 
management of grid of national trunk railways (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares) 2. Construction 
and management of feeder railways, local railways and related bridges, tunnels and ferry facilities (limited to 
equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) 3. Comprehensive maintenance of infrastructure of high-speed 
railway, special railway line, intercity (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares) 4. Construction and 
management of highways, independent bridges and tunnels 5. Road freight transportation companies 6. 
Construction and management of public dock facilities of ports 7. Construction and management of civil airports 
(the Chinese party shall hold the relative majority of shares) 8. Air transportation companies (Chinese partner shall 
hold the majority of shares) 9. General aviation companies for agriculture, forest and fishery (limited to equity 
joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) 10. International liner and tramp maritime transportation business (the 
Chinese party shall hold the relative majority of shares) 11. International containers inter-model transportation 12. 
Construction and management of oil (gas) pipelines, oil (gas) depots and petroleum wharf 13. Construction and 
management of the facilities of coal delivery pipelines 14. Construction and management of storage facilities 
relating to transportation services  
VI. Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry 1. Wholesale, retail and logistic distribution of general goods 2. Modern 
logistics  
VII. Rent and business service 1. Accounting and auditing ((limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint 
ventures) 2. Information consulting agencies of international economy, science and technology, environmental 
protection 3. Engaged in such information technology and business flow outsourcing services as system 
application management and maintenance, information technology supportive management, bank background 
service, financial settlement, human resource service, software development, call center, data processing by means 
of accepting service outsourcing  
VIII. Scientific research, technology service and geological exploration 1. Biological engineering technique and 
bio-medical engineering technique 2. Isotope, irradiation and laser technique 3. Sea development and sea energy 
development technology, comprehensive technology of sea chemical resources, development of the relevant 
products and deep-processing technology, sea medicine and biochemical product development technology 4. Sea 
surveying technology( sea tidal wave, meteorology, environmental monitoring) sea bed probing, exploration and 
evaluation technology of ocean resource 5. Comprehensively use the high chemical additional value technology to 
distill chemical potassium, bromine, magnesium from dense sea water after desaltation and its deep procession 6. 
Development of energy-saving technology 7. Technology for recycling and comprehensive utilization of resource, 
development and application of the recycling technology of the waste dispelled by enterprises 8. Technology for 
environment pollution treatment and monitoring 9. Energy-saving and consumption-reduction in chemical fiber 
  386
production and the new technology to deal with polluted air,water and solid waste 10. Technology for preventing 
from desertification and desert improvement 11. Comprehensive management technology for balancing grass and 
domestic animal 12. Application technique of civil satellite 13. Research and development centers 14. Incubator for 
hi-tech, new products developing, and incubation of enterprises  
IX. Water, environment and public facility management industry 1. Construction and management of key water 
control projects for comprehensive utilization (the Chinese party shall hold the relative majority of shares) 2. 
Construction and management of urban access-controlled roads 3. Construction and management of metro and 
city light rail (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares) 4. Construction and management of treatment 
plants for sewage, garbage, the dangerous wastes (incineration and landfill), and the facilities of environment 
pollution treatment  
X. Education 1. Advanced educational institution (only limited to joint venture or cooperative)  
XI. Public health, social security and social welfare 1. Service agencies for the elderly, the handicapped and 
children 
XII. Culture, sports and entertainment 1. Operation of the performance site ((the Chinese party shall hold the 
relative majority of shares) 2. Operation of the gymnasium, body-fitting, competition performance, sports training 
and agency service  
 
Catalogue of Restricted Foreign Investment Industries  
I. Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery Industries 1. Breeding and seeds developing production of 
new train crop breed (Chinese party shall hold the majority of shares) 2. Processing of the logs of precious 
varieties of trees (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) 3. Cotton (raw cotton) processing  
II. Mining Industries 1. Exploring and mining of special and scarce coals exploration (Chinese partner shall hold 
the majority of shares) 2. Exploring and mining of barite (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint 
ventures) 3. Exploring and mining of precious metals (gold, silver, platinum families) 4. Exploring and mining of 
precious non-metals such as diamond 5. Exploring and cradling of phosphorite 6. Mining of szaibelyite and 
szaibelyite iron ores 7. Mining of Celestine 8. Mining of Ocean Manganese Nodule(Chinese partner shall hold the 
majority of shares)  
III. Manufacturing Industries 1. Farming Subsidiary Foodstuff Industry (1) Processing of soybean, rapeseed edible 
oil (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares), deep-processing of corn (2) Manufacturing of biology 
liquid fuel 2. Beverage Manufacturing Industries (1) Processing of green lea and special tea with China's 
traditional crafts (2) Carbonic acid beverage manufacturing 3. Tobacco Industries (1) Manufacturing of threshing 
and curl tobacco leaf 4. Printing and Copy of Recording Vehicle (1) Print of publication (Chinese partner shall 
hold the majority of shares, except packing and presentation) 5. Petroleum Processing and Coking Industries (1) 
Construction and management of refineries which annual produce less than 800 ten thousand tons 6. Chemical 
Raw Material Products Manufacturing Industry (1) Sodium hydroxide and potash production (2) Production of 
sensitive materials (3) Production of benzidine (4) Production of chemical products from which narcotics are easily 
made (ephedrine, 3, 4-idene dihydro phenyl-2-acctonc, phenylacetic acid, 1-phenyl-2-acetone, heliotropin, safrole, 
isosafrole, acetic oxide) (5) Production of fluorine-chlorocardon, hydrogen- fluorine-chlorocardon, 
tetrafluoroethylene, fluorination-aluminum and hydrofluoric acid (6) Production of polybutadiene, emulsion 
polymerization buna S, thermoplastics buna S (7) Production of sulfate process titanium dioxide, open hearth 
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process permanganate (8) Production of baron, magnesium, iron ores (9) Barium salt production 7. Medical and 
Pharmaceutical Products Inidustry (1) Production of chloramphenicol, penicillin G, lincomycin, gentamicin, 
dihydrostreptomycin, amikacin, tetracycline hydrochloride, oxytetracycline, medemycin, kitasamycin, ilotyin, 
ciprofloxacin and offoxacin (2) Production of analgin, paracetamol, Vitamin B1, Vitamin B2, Vitamin C, Vitamin 
E (3) Production of immunity vaccines, bacterins, antitoxins and anatoxin (BCG vaccine, poliomyelitis, DPT 
vaccine, measles vaccine, Type-B encephalitis, epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis vaccine) which included in the 
State's Plan (4) Production of material medicines for addiction narcotic and A class psychoactive drug (Chinese 
partner shall hold the majority of shares) (5) Production of blood products (6) Production of non-self-destructible 
expendable injectors, transfusion systems, blood transfusion systems, blood bags 8. Chemical Fibre Production 
Industry (1) Production of chemical fibre drawnwork of conventional chipper (2) Production of rayon staple 
viscose fibre 9. Rubber Products (1) Old tire recondition (not including radial tire), and production of industrial 
rubber fittings of low-performance 10. Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting and Rolling Processing Industry (1) Non-
ferrous metal refining of tungsten, molybdenum, stannum (except tin compounds), antimony (including antimony 
oxide and antimony sulphide) (2) Non-ferrous metal refining of electrolytic aluminium, copper, lead, zinc and 
another non-ferrous metal (3) Smelting and separation of rare earth metal (limited to equity joint ventures or 
contractual joint ventures) 11. Metal Manufacturing (1) Manufacture of containers 12. Common Purpose 
Equipment Manufacturing Industry (1) Manufacture of all kinds of general (p0) axletree and accessory (steel ball, 
cage), rough (2) Manufacture of wheeled model, crawler crane less than 300 tons 13. Special Purpose Equipment 
Manufacturing Industry (1) Production of low or middle class type-B ultrasonic displays (2) Manufacture of 
equipment for producing long dacron thread and short fibre (3) Manufacture of crawler dozers of less than 320 
horsepower, hydraulic excavator less than 30 tons, wheel loader less than 6tons, grader of less than 220 
horsepower, road roller, fork-lift truck, non-calzada dumper truck, road surface milling rework machinery, garden 
machine and tools, production of commodity concrete machinery (pump, agitating lorry, pump vehical) 14. 
Manufacturing of transport and communication facilities (1) Repairing, design and manufacture of common ship 
(including subsection) (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares) 15. Manufacturing of Communication 
Apparatus, Computers and another Electric Installation (1) Production of satellite television receivers and key 
parts (2) Manufacture of fiscal cash register  
IV. Production and Supply of Power, Gas and Water 1. Construction and management of conventional coal-fired 
power of condensing steam plants whose unit installed capacity is less than 300,000kW, within the small power 
grid in Xizang, Xinjiang, Hainan province, and the coal-fired power of condensing-extraction steam plants with 
dual use unit cogeneration 2. Construction and management of power network  
V. Communication and Transportation, Storage, Post and Telecommunication Services 1. Railway freight 
transportation companies 2. Railway passenger transportation companies (Chinese partner shall hold the majority 
of shares) 3. Corporate of highway passenger transport 4. Corporate of enter-leave country fleet operation 5. 
Corporate of water transportation (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares) 6. General aviation 
companies engaging in photographing, prospecting and industry (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of 
shares) 7. Tele communication companies: telecommunication increment service (the foreign capital less than 50 
percent), motion tone and data service in basic telecom, interior business and international business (the foreign 
capital less than 35 percent,49 percent no later than 11th in December in 2007 is permitted )  
VI. Wholesale and Retail Trade Industries 1. Commercial companies of commodity direct selling, mail order 
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selling, Internet selling, franchising, commissioned operation, commercial management 2. Wholesale, retail and 
logistic distribution of grain, cotton, vegetable oil, sugar, medicines, tobaccos, automobiles, crude oil, capital 
goods for agricultural production(Chinese should hold the majority of shares of the multiple shops which have 
more than 30 branch stores and sale different kinds and brands of commodities from multi-suppliers) 3. 
Distributing and selling of audiovisual products (excluding movies)(joint venture or Chinese should hold the 
majority of shares) 4. Commodity auctions 5. Ship agent (Chinese should hold the majority of shares), tally for 
foreign vessels (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) 6. Wholesaling product oil and 
construction and operation of gasoline stations (Chinese should hold the majority of shares of the multiple shops 
which have more than 30 branch stores and sale different kinds and brands of commodities from multi-suppliers)  
VII. Banking and Insurance Industries 1. Banks, financial leasing companies, finance companies, trust investment 
companies, currency brokerage companies 2. Insurance companies (the share of life-insurance companies is less 
than 50%) 3. Security companies (confined to A share consignment-in, B share, H share and government and 
company bonds consignment-in and transaction, the foreign-capital is less than one-third), security investment 
fund management companies (the foreign-capital is less than 49%) 4. Insurance brokerage companies 5. Futures 
companies (Chinese should hold the majority of shares)  
VIII. Real Estate Industry 1. Development of pieces of land (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint 
ventures) 2. Construction and operation of high-ranking hotels, villas, high-class office buildings and international 
exhibition centers 3. Real estate transaction in second-grade market and medium and brokerage companies  
IX. Leasing and Commercial Service Industry 1. Legal consulting 2. Market Research (limited to equity joint 
ventures or contractual joint ventures) 3. Status enquiry and grade service companies  
X. Scientific Research and technical Services Industries, Geological Prospecting 1. Mapping companies (Chinese 
partner shall hold the majority of shares) 2. Inspection, verification and attestation companies for imported and 
exported goods 3. Photography service (including trick photography like airphotograph, except maping aerial 
photography, limited to equity joint ventures)  
XI. Irrigation, environment and public utilities management 1. Construction and management of fuel gas in big 
city, heating power and water supply and sewage net  
XII. Education 1. Common high school education mechanism  
XIII. Public Health, Sports and Social Welfare Industries 1. Medical treatment establishments (limited to equity 
joint ventures or contractual joint ventures)  
XIV. Art, Sports and Entertainment Industries 1. Production and publication of broadcasting and TV programs and 
film-making (limited to contractual joint ventures) 2. Construction and operation of cinemas (Chinese partner shall 
hold the majority of shares) 3. Construction and operation of large theme park 4. Brokering agency of stage 
performances  
XV. Other industries restricted by the State or international treaties that China has concluded or taken part in  
 
Catalogue of Prohibited Foreign Investment Industries  
I. Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery Industries 1. Cultivation of China's rare precious breeds 
(including tine genes in plants industry, husbandry and aquatic products industry) 2. Production and development 
of genetically modified plants' seeds 3. Fishing in the sea area within the Government jurisdiction and in in-land 
water  
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II. Mining and Quarrying Industries 1. Exploring and mining of tungsten, molybdenum, tin, antimony, fluorite 2. 
Exploring, mining and dressing of radioactive mineral products 3. Exploring, mining and dressing of rare earth 
metal  
III. Manufacturing Industry 1. Beverage Industry (1) Processing of green lea and special tea with China's traditional 
crafts (famous tea, dark tea, etc.) 2. Medical and Pharmaceutical Products Industry (1) Processing of traditional 
Chinese medicines that have been listed as the Regulations on Conservation and Management of Wild Chinese 
Medicinal Material Resources and Rare and Endangered Plants in China (2) Application of preparing technique of 
traditional Chinese medicines in small pieces ready for decoction, like steam, frying, moxibustion, calcining, and 
production of the products of secret recipe of traditional Chinese patent medicines 3. Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting 
and Rolling Processing Industry (1) Smelting and processing of radioactive mineral products 4. Special Equipment 
Manufacture Industry (1) Manufacture of Weapons and Ammunition 5. Electric Machinery and Equipment 
Manufacture Industry (1) Manufacture of open-lead-acid cells, mercury Button Type Silver Oxide Cells, paste 
dioxide-zinc battery and nickel cadmium cells 6. Industry Products and Other Manufacturing Industries (1) Ivory 
carving (2) Tiger-hone processing (3) Production of bodiless lacquerware (4) Production of enamel products (5) 
Production of Xuan-paper (rice paper) and ingot-shaped tablets of Chinese ink (6) Production of carcinogenic, 
teratogenic, mutagenesis and persistent organic pollutant products  
IV. Production and Supply of Power, Gas and Water 1. Construction and management of conventional coal-fired 
power of condensing steam plants whose unit installed capacity is less than 300,000kW, within the small power 
grid in Xizang, Xinjiang, Hainan province, and the coal-fired power of condensing-extraction steam plants with 
dual use unit cogeneration  
V. Communication and Transportation, Storage. Post and Telecommunication Services 1. Companies of air traffic 
control 2. Companies of postal services  
VI. Leasing and Commercial Service Industry 1. Social investigation  
VII. Scientific Research and technical Services Industries, Geological Prospecting 1. Development and application 
of human stem cells and gene diagnosis therapy technology 2. Geodetic survey, marine charting, mapping aerial 
photography, administrative region mapping, relief map of map compilation and navigation electronic map 
compilation of common map compilation  
VIII. Irrigation, environment and public utilities management 1. Construction and management of nature reserve 
and international signify marshy 2. Development of resources about wild animals and plants be native to domestic 
protected by nation  
IX. Education 1. Institution of compulsory education and special education, like military, policeman, politics and 
party school  
X. Art, Sports and Entertainment Industries 1. News agencies 2. Business of publishing, producing, master issuing, 
and importing of books, newspaper and periodical 3. Business of publishing, producing, master issuing and 
importing of audio and visual products and electronic publications 4. Radio stations, TV stations, radio and TV 
transmission networks at various levels (transmission stations, relaying stations, radio and TV satellites, satellite 
up-linking stations, satellite receiving stations, microwave stations, monitoring stations, cable broadcasting and 
TV transmission networks) 5. Companies of publishing and playing of broadcast and TV programs 6. Companies 
of films making, issuing, business 7. News website, network audiovisual service, on line service location, internet 
art management 8. Video screening companies 9. Construction and management of golf course 10. Gambling 
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industry (including gambling turf) 11. Eroticism  
XI. Other Industries 1. Projects that endanger the safety and performance of military facilities  
XII. Other industries restricted by the State or international treaties that China has concluded or taken part in  
 
   
State Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce 2007-10-31    
 




Interim Provision on the Establishment of Foreign Holding and 
Wholly Foreign-owned Travel Agencies 
 
Article 1   In order to adapt to new situation upon China's accession to the WTO and further 
open tourism to the outside world and promote the development of travel agency industry, the 
Provision is formulated in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of China on 
foreign-invested enterprises, the Regulation on Travel Agency Management and the relevant 
provisions. 
 
Article 2   The Provision is applicable to the foreign holding and wholly foreign-owned 
travel agencies established in China during transition period prior to the scheduled term 
committed by China upon its accession to the WTO. 
 
Article 3   The foreign investor for establishing a foreign holding agency shall be eligible 
for the following conditions: 
(1)Being a travel agency or an enterprise mainly undertaking tourism; 
(2)With total annual amount of tourism more than USD40m; 
(3)Being a member of the national (regional) association of tourism; 
(4)Being in good international credit with advanced management experience of travel 
agency;(5)Abiding by Chinese laws and the relevant Chinese regulations of tourism. 
 
Article 4   For the foreign investor of wholly foreign-owned travel agency, besides meeting 
the conditions prescribed in Article 3 (1), (3), (4) and (5) of the Provision, the annual total 
amount of tourism prescribed in (2) should be more than USD500m. 
 
Article 5   The Chinese investor of a foreign holding agency shall meet the conditions 
prescribed in Article 29 of the Regulation of Travel Agency Management. 
 
Article 6   The foreign holding and wholly foreign-owned travel agency to be established 
shall meet the following conditions: 
(1)In compliance with development planning of tourism; 
(2)In compliance with the requirements of tourist market; 
(3)With investors meeting the conditions prescribed in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Provision; 
and 
(4)With registered capital no less than RMB4m. 
 
Article 7   The eligible foreign investor can establish a foreign holding and wholly foreign-
owned travel agency in the national tourist and holiday area approved by the State Council 
and 5 cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Xi'an. 
 
Article 8   In general, for an investor applying for establishing foreign holding and wholly 
foreign-owned travel agencies, only one agency will be approved. 
 
Article 9   The Application for establishing foreign holding and wholly foreign-owned 
travel agencies shall be processed by reference with the procedure for examining and 




Article 10   The foreign holding and wholly foreign-owned travel agencies may not directly 
or in disguise engage in tourism businesses relating to going abroad of Chinese citizen or 
Chinese people in other regions going to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan regions. 
 
Article 11   The responsibility for interpretation of the Provision shall be vested with the 
State Administration of Tourism and the Ministry of Commerce. 
 
Article 12   The Provision shall come into force 30 days after their promulgation. 
 
The State Administration of Tourism, the Ministry of Commerce 2003-06-12 
 
 
Sources: www.fdi.gov.cn , 2003. 
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Appendix 5.2.  Distribution of the Tourism Resources in Different Chinese Provinces and Cities 
 







































1 Beijing 310.38 266.45 6 28 6 572 26 554 166 388 
2 Tianjin 50.60 45.32 0 7 1 81 1 231 19 212 
3 Hebei 47.36 42.70 2 30 11 267 1 630 31 599 
4 Shanxi 24.80 16.15 3 10 18 217 0 406 23 383 
5 Inner 
Mongolia 
43.94 43.45 1 8 20 124 2 205 28 177 
6 Liaoning 92.94 79.42 1 32 24 347 8 803 57 746 
7 Jilin 29.40 25.94 2 6 17 158 4 239 42 197 
8 Heilongjiang 71.74 66.95 1 9 44 217 2 366 62 304 
9 Shanghai 272.53 215.94 0 15 2 319 20 588 41 547 
10 Jiangsu 222.63 138.97 1 40 13 575 14 996 72 924 
11 Zhejiang 204.10 121.08 0 38 24 723 7 855 46 809 
12 Anhui 45.91 23.88 2 10 25 272 3 480 36 444 
13 Fujian 184.82 52.80 1 22 15 284 5 470 38 432 
14 Jiangxi 24.09 6.57 1 9 23 182 0 399 22 377 
15 Shandong 97.68 74.14 2 19 30 401 8 1172 55 1117 
16 Henan 41.01 25.45 1 26 21 308 2 626 30 596 
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17 Hubei 102.43 75.57 2 20 18 473 2 460 30 430 
18 Hunan 56.62 22.38 1 16 24 319 6 439 35 404 
19 Guangdong 1525.88 298.06 0 29 14 926 31 680 176 504 
20 Guangxi 136.34 65.93 0 16 14 258 5 340 50 290 
21 Hainan 38.94 16.52 0 5 6 196 7 157 39 118 
22 Chongqing 46.15 31.09 1 17 18 109 3 203 23 180 
23 Sichuan 66.72 41.15 4 14 25 294 3 498 50 448 
24 Guizhou 22.81 8.45 0 4 11 82 0 142 12 130 
25 Yunnan 130.36 78.13 2 18 25 560 6 422 40 382 
26 Tibet 14.23 12.96 1 6 2 49 0 45 22 23 
27 Shaanxi 85.01 71.81 2 17 17 178 4 307 33 274 
28 Gansu 23.68 16.27 2 6 15 125 1 218 27 191 
29 Qinghai 4.35 1.91 0 3 5 39 0 101 11 90 
30 Ningxia 0.60 0.41 1 3 4 35 0 63 7 56 
31 Xinjiang 27.54 23.37 1 3 10 190 4 266 41 225 
Totality   31 486 502 8,880 175 13,361 1,364 11,997 
Sources: Based on CNTA statistics (2005)    
Notes:  
1. □ indicates 5 autonomous regions; □ indicates 4 municipalities; □ shows normal provinces; □  Guangdong as an important province. 
2. There have been 31 the World’s Heritages approved in China by the year of 2005. However, some approved items have sites located in several different 
provinces. For example, the Great Wall, registered as one heritage project, extends localities of Beijing, Heilongjiang, and xinjiang, etc. 
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Appendix 5.3 
The World Heritages in China by 2010 
 
World Heritage List Category Year 
Mount Wutai Cultural 2009 
Fujian Tulou Cultural 2008 
Mount Sanqingshan National Park Natural 2008 
Kaiping Diaolou and Villages Cultural 2007 
South China Karst Natural 2007 
Yin Xu Cultural 2006 
Sichuan Giant Panda Sanctuaries – Wolong, Mt Siguniang 
and Jiajin Mountains Natural 2006 
The Historic Center of Macao Cultural 2005 
The Capital Cities and Tombs of the Ancient Koguryo 
Kingdom  
Cultural 2004  
Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan  Natural 2003  
Yungang Grottoes in Datong, Shanxi Province  Cultural 2001  
Imperial Tombs of the Ming and Qing Dynasties  Cultural 2000 2003 
2004  
Longmen Grottoes  Cultural 2000  
Xidi and Hongcun Villages, Museums of Ming-Qing 
Architecture in Southern Anhui  Cultural 2000  
Mount Qingcheng and the Dujiangyan Irrigation System  Cultural 2000  
Dazu Rock Carvings  Cultural 1999  
Mount Wuyi  Natural & Cultural 1999  
The Temple of Heaven  Cultural 1998  
The Summer Palace  Cultural 1998  
The Ancient Town of Lijiang  Cultural 1997  
Classic Gardens in Suzhou  Cultural 1997  
The Old Town of Pingyao  Cultural 1997  
Mount Emei and the Leshan Giant Buddha  Natural & Cultural 1996  
Mount Lushan  Cultural 1996  
Taoist Buildings on Mount Wudang  Cultural 1994  
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The Confucian Temple, Cemetery and Family Mansion in 
Qufu  Cultural 1994  
The Potala Palace  Cultural 1994 2000 
2001  
Mountain Resort and Outlying Temples, Chengde  Cultural 1994  
Wulingyuan Scenic Area  Natural 1992  
Scenic Wonders of Huanglong Scenic Area  Natural 1992  
Jiuzhaigou Scenic Area  Natural 1992  
Mount Huangshan  Natural & Cultural 1990  
Mount Taishan  Natural & Cultural 1987  
The Mausoleum of the First Emperor of the Qin Dynasty 
and Terracotta Warriors and Horses  Cultural 1987  
The Mogao Grottoes  Cultural 1987  
Zhoukoudian, Home of Peking Man  Cultural 1987  
Imperial Palaces of the Ming and Qing Dynasties in Beijing 
and Shenyang  Cultural 1987 2004  
The Great Wall  Cultural 1987  
Sources: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2010) 
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Appendix 6.1 
Interview Questions to Foreign Invested Travel Agencies  
 
Part One: Background 
1. Could you firstly give a brief introduction about your parent company? (Please specify both 
the Chinese side and foreign side.)(Check out from the webs in advance) 
Name: 
Original country: 
Major business area: 
Scale of the parents (capital, total staff, and invested countries) 
 
2. When and where did you set up your company’s first Chinese branch? Why did you choose 
that city as your first entry? Which cities have you had branches by now? Over the next five 
years, which cities would you plan to open branches?   
 
3. How much is your Registered Capital? What was the total amount of initial investment 
when forming the company? How was the investment structure?  
 
4. Could you summarize the major reasons of investing in China? (What did you concern as 
the most important benefits or advantages for you to expand in China?) And why did you 
make the decision on your chosen form of investment, being Sino-foreign joint ventures or 
being wholly owned ventures? (for the joint ventures) Why did you choose each other to be 
business partner for competing in the market?  
 
Part Two: Operation 
5. How many staffs did you have at the beginning? Among them, how many were from the 
foreign parent company (or from the Chinese side)? How has the numbers changed by now? 
How many staffs do you have now in total? And how many are from the foreign parent 
company (and how many from the Chinese side)? 
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6. Could you specify the major positions that are occupied by the foreign (or Chinese) 
representatives from parent’s companies? What is your primary strategy on the management 
of human resource while competing in the Chinese market?  
 
7. What do you think are the most considerable aspects while competing with Chinese local 
travel agencies? What are your advantages and disadvantages while competing? 
 
8. Could you summarize the relationship between the parent companies, and/or between 
parent company and the new company? How often do you have to report to the parent 
companies? (And, what events have to be reported to the parents, to whom, and what is the 
general process of decision-making in the new company?) 
 
9. What are your major business areas now? Who are your focused markets/customers? How 
much is your annual turnover? (Please show us the historical recorder from the year of setting 
up until now.) How important are the different types of business for you correspondingly, 
including outbound, inbound, domestic sectors, and other sideline sectors, such as Visa 
application (may be presented in percentages)? Do you profit or lose in the Chinese operation 
until now? 
 
10. Do you cooperate and collaborate with other local travel agents when dealing with the 
business in China? If yes, in which fields? And is there any successful case or previous 
experience? It is a crucial issue for your future operation in China?  
 
11. What do you concern as the most considerable three main external elements when 
considering the decision-making process and performance of your company in China? 
Choices could be made from:  
A) Chinese policies;  B) Chinese business culture;  C) Marketing environment; 
D) Financial benefit;  E ) Human resources management; F) Brands and reputation; 




                                              399
Part Three: Difficulties and Challenges 
12. Have you met any obstacle and difficulty since the company’s setting up until now? If yes, 
what are they? And which three phenomena do you think are the most considerable barriers 
for your business to expand further in China? 
 
13. How do you think about the government influence and intervention upon your business 
operation in China compared to other countries? Please choose from: very strong, strong, 
neutral, weak, very weak. Why do you keep this opinion? Could you give any example of the 
forms/methods of the governance and intervention that you have experienced in China?  
 
14. Do you think it is difficult and complex to get registered and to obtain all the licenses and 
permissions in order to set up and operate the business of travel service in China? Please 
choose from: very difficult, difficult, neutral, easy, very easy. How long time did you spend in 
such preparation before you are formed? 
 
15. Do you think that a good personal relationship between the company and the government 
administrations or local authorities is very necessary for the viability and success of your 
business in this country? Why and could you give any example? 
 
16. Have your company joined in any Chinese industrial consortium or association after 
setting up in China? If yes, who are they? And how many of them are formed or managed by 
the Chinese government? What do you think about the consortiums and associations that you 
are participating in (are they efficient and productive)?  
 
17. When operating in China, what are the major sources of your knowledge and information 
about the market and business environment of the country? Are they from the Internet, books, 
newspapers, other media, or public networks? Is it difficult to get in touch with the Chinese 
government agencies, and to find the valuable information about the policies upon the 
industry during your operations here in China? (Choose: very difficult, difficult, neutral, easy, 
very easy.) 
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Part Four: Development Strategies 
18. Is there any difference between your operation in China and in your home country? If 
there is, could you briefly explain what it is/they are? (Explain the most impressive three 
difference, including production, target markets, pricing strategies, human resource strategies, 
promotion methods.)  
 
19. There is popularly recognized difference between whole sellers (tour operators) and their 
distribution (travel agencies) in the world’s travel service sector. What do you think about this 
difference? What is your aiming position or role in the future operation in China? What will 
be your focused services and products, and your long-term, mid-term and short-term 
objectives in China?  
 
20. Do you have any interest or intention in operating the business of other tourism sectors, 
for example, hotels or tourist attractions, or even business outside the tourism industry in 
China? If yes, could you specify what it is/they are? 
 
21. Generally, compared to when you first set up the company, what aspects of performance 
do you think have been improved, and what are still unsatisfied? (Such as financial 
performance, market shares, employment qualities) 
 
22. How important do you think it is for your company to expand into the middle western part 
of China? Have you started any development and expansion projects? If yes, where and when? 
Could you give some specification on it? What is the general result of such investment 
(profitable and successful or not)? If you have not had any expanding investment in the 
middle western part of China, do you have any plan or intention to do so? If yes, what is it 
about in general? How soon will this begin, within one year, in 1 to 3 years, in 3 to 5 years, or 
after five years?  
 
 




The Example of Pre-Letter and Alternative Questions Applied for the 
Telephone Interviews in the Period Three 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Letter For the Enquiring  
 
Dear Madam/ Sir 
 
My name is Jian Yu, who is working on a Ph,D research programme, focusing on the foreign 
invested travel trade sector in the People’s Republic of Chine. I attached a letter which 
introducing my research purposes, and hopefully it will help you to know more about what I 
am doing.  
 
It would be my most pleasure if I could have chances to interview your General Manager. 
When I was in Beijing in June, I sent your company, CTS TUI, my request. However, I could 
not achieve such a meeting. Now, I have done the most part of my survey with the helps from 
some other agencies. But in order to complete some basic classification and analyses of the 
research, I will need to obtain some information of your company with the help and 
understanding of you. Your support should be sincerely appreciated. Hopefully, the results of 
my research will bring the whole sector some useful ideas soon.  
 









Some Questions to Beijing CTS TUI   
 
1. How much is the register capital of the joint venture in China? How was the investment 
structure?  
 
2. How much were the initial actual investments from the both parent companies?  
 
3. When did the JV set up? How many staff were there at the beginning, and how many are 
now? 
 
4. Has the company been profitable since its setup? If yes, when did it start, and how much 
was the annual profit approximately? 
 
5. What are your target markets in China? (Please choose your answers from each row with 
one or more answers.) 
l Inbound     /  Outbound    /  Chinese Domestic Market 
l MICE and/or Corporate Market    /  Leisure and Holidays 
l Packaged tours    /    individual travelers 
 
6. How many countries are your customers coming from, in terms of the inbound visitors 
into China? And please specify the names of the countries and regions. 
 
7. Your company was officially registered in Beijing. Is Beijing the most important city and 
market for your company’s business in China? Have you had any other branches and 
offices in China? If yes, which cities are they in? Besides of the above mentioned cities, 
do you plan to expand into any other cities/markets of China? 
 
8. Could you please specify your company’s full name in both English and Chinese? Could 
you please specify your company’s websites used for the Chinese market, and for the 




Sources：the author  
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Appendix 6.3 
The Pre-Letter Applied for Interview Survey 
 
 
Dear Madam/Sir  
 
It would be greatly appreciated if you could spend a few minutes of your valuable time 
reading this letter, and afterwards take part in this research programme. I am studying a PhD 
at the Tourism Management Center of the University of Exeter in the UK. The research is 
entitled ‘The strategy of overseas tour companies and the transformation of the travel service 
industry in China’, and it examines the development approaches of foreign invested travel 
agencies in China, and their influences upon the marketplace in this sector. Until now, 27 
foreign invested travel agencies have been registered or are being registered to operate as a 
corporation in this market in the China mainland. As you are one of these firms, your 
participation is vital, in terms of fulfilling the purposes of this research. Therefore, my 
research team sends you this letter to show our best regards and our eagerest wish to meet you 
in order to know more about your firm and the changing nature of this sector.  
 
The tourism industry in China is witnessing a period of increasing prosperity. The business is 
being embraced by enormous development opportunities. However, there is also a lack of 
databases and information resources about the industry itself in the country, which could 
become a major obstacle to further growth and improvement. This is the reason why most 
business operators have been keen to communicate with each other, in order to know what the 
market is like and how it is going to develop in the future. My Ph,D research is therefore not 
only trying to realize a personal achievement, but will also make a contribution to a better 
understanding of the Chinese travel trade industry. The research has received the instructions 
and supports of some senior members of China National Tourism Administration (CNTA), 
China Social Science Academy (CSSA ), and other national bodies.  
 
The success of the research programme ultimately depends on the participation of individuals 
such as you. It will therefore be invaluable to receive your opinion on the topics covered in 
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this survey. We will try to contact you again by telephone within the next two weeks, in order 
to make an appointment with your general manager who we assume is likely to be the 
individual having the best overview of your company’s operations in China from the time of 
first setup to the present. If you have any question or inquiry about the research, you can 
contact our Chinese assistant by telephone: 0086-13501658345 . Moreover, you may want to 
obtain a copy of the questions that you will be asked during the interview. If so, please do 
contact me by e-mail: J.Yu@exeter.ac.uk . In order to show our appreciation, we will be very 
happy to provide one copy of our final findings of this research if you require. This should 
become available during 2007, and we will inform you as soon as it is ready.  
 
We would like to thank you again for your kind participation and efforts. We wish you every 




Jian Yu   
 
PhD candidate  
Tourism Management Center  
The School of Business and Economies 
The University of Exeter, UK 
Tel: 0044- (0)7766128928 






Your Name: Your Position: 
The Address of Your Chinese Head Office:
Telephone:
1.
Less than one year >= 1 and <= 5 years >5 and<=10 years
>10 and<=20 years More than 20 years
2.
1 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 49 50 to 99
100 to 199 200 to 399 400 to 699
700 to 1000 More than 1000
3.
1 2 to 4 5 to 9 10 to  29
30 to 49 50 to 99 100 to 199 200 to  300
More than 300
4.
Domestic Packaged Tour Groups Domestic Independent Tourists
Overseas Packaged Tour Groups Overseas Independent Tourists
Bookings of Hotels and Flights Handling with Incoming Visitors
Other  Sideline Services (Please specify):
Appendix 6.4 (English Vision)
The Questionnaire Survey on the Business and
Competition in the Chinese Travel Service Sector
Please specify the full name of your company, your name, and your job title
firstly. (If applicable, please write in both English and Chinese.)
How many years has your company been in existence?
(Please tick one answer.)
What is your most important business field?  (Please tick one answer.)
How many full-time staff are employed by your company (including all
the branches)?   (Please tick one answer.)
How many branches or sell points do you have or manage in mainland
China?    (Please tick one answer.)
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5.
Domestic Travel Services Inbound International Travel Services
Outbound International Travel Services
6. 
  Yes No (If 'No', please move onto question 10. )
7.
  Yes No (If 'No', please move onto question 10. )
8.
Direct Capital Investment A Foreign Invested  Mother Company  
Owning  Loans from Overseas Having Joint Investment in Overseas
Others (Please specify):
9.
North American Countries European Countries
South American Countries African Countries
Middle-East Countries Other Asian Countries
HongKong, Macau and Taiwan Australia and New Zealand 
Others (Please specify):
10.
  Yes No (If 'No', please move onto question 13. )
11.
  Yes No (If 'No', please move onto question 13. )
If 'Yes', could you also specify the general form of the concerned
foreign investment of the companies? (Please tick the most important one.)
Could you tell us the  original regions/countries of the concerned
foreign partners? (Please tick one answer.)
If 'Yes', do you have an administrative permision for dealing with the
outbound travel business?
Are you qualified as an international travel agency in China?
Do you have parent companies?
If 'Yes', have your parent companies ever been involved in any direct
or indirect foreign investment project?
Which of the following three is your most important source of
income?  (Please tick one answer.)
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12.
Build foreign partnerships to collaborate and work together
Deal with it by setting up our branches in the destinations 
Use both the above two approaches according to the difference of destionations 
Only solicit tourists in China, and then hand them over to other agents
Others (Please specify):
13.
  Yes No (If 'No', please move onto question 15. )
14.
Very Good Good Neutral 
Difficult Very difficult
15.
  Yes No (If 'No', please move onto question 18. )
16.
I do not like this situation, as it leads to more intense competition.
Neutral. Because it brings the sector both competition and opportunities.
I appreciate it, as it can improve the whole sector's overall capacity.  
17.
A considerable rival with more advanced international management experience
A new rival with different cultural base and management experience  
Not only a competitor but also a potential partner to ally with
A valuable model with good international business experience to learn from 
Others (Please specify):
If 'Yes', which approach do you use in the overseas business?
(Please tick one answer.)
If 'Yes', what is your overall attitude towards the foreign agents coming
into China? (Please tick one answer.)
Which of the following do you think best indicates the role of the
foreign travel agencies in this market in China? (Please tick one answer.)
Does your company have to work cooperatively with foreign travel
agents sometimes?
If 'Yes', how would you describe the maintenance of the relationship
between your company and the foreign partners? (Please tick one answer.)
Did you know that foreign agents would be permitted to provide the
same services as that of Chinese local agents?
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18.
  Yes No (If 'No', please move onto question 21. )
19.
  Yes No (If 'No', please move onto question 21. )
20.
Very Satisfied (1) Very Unsatisfied (5)
1 2 3 4 5
21.
Important Neutral Not Important
22.
Very Satisfied (1) Very Unsatisfied (5)
1 2 3 4 5
Network/Communication
If 'Yes', how satisfied are you with the activities of the governmental
associations in practice?  (Please tick one level.)
Are you a member of any Chinese association/consortium belonging to
the tourism industy or travel service sector?
Sources : the author
Marketing Research
If 'Yes', have you joined an association organized and managed by the
Chinese government or its agencies?
Arbitration
Consultant And Aids
What is your view about maintaining a good relationship with the
government agencies and the administration offfices of the industry ?
(Please tick one answer.)
Is your company satisfied with the efficiency of your local tourism
administration office in the following aspects?
(Please tick one answer for each aspect.)




















































                                               英国 EXETER学院 









Sources: the author 
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Appendix 7.1 
A Research on Shanghai’s Investment Environment for 
Enterprises-Overview 
9 August 2006 
 
The survey with the questionnaire for enterprises with foreign funds on Shanghai's investment 
environment, sponsored by Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission and organized by the 
Shanghai Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment and the Shanghai WTO Affairs 
Consultation Center, aims to explore the perspectives of the Shanghai-based enterprises with 
foreign investment (foreign-invested enterprises) on Shanghai's investment environment. The 
questionnaire is composed of three parts: Part I is on respondents?background, Part II on 
Shanghai's comprehensive investment environment and Part III on specific investment 
environment. 
 
All field work for the anonymous survey was conducted from February to March in 2006. 
Approximately 800 copies of questionnaires have been handed out and 215 returned, 213 are 
valid. Based on the analysis of these returned valid questionnaires, the Shanghai WTO Affairs 
Consultation Center and the Shanghai Association of Enterprises with Foreign Funds 
concluded as follows: 
 
(1) Foreign-invested enterprises expressed general satisfaction with Shanghai's investment 
environment and continued to deem Shanghai the most investor-friendly city in China. Asked 
to score on Shanghai's comprehensive investment environment for enterprises with foreign 
funds, roughly nine in ten marked more than 70 (100 marks), including 70% marking more 
than 80. Up to 90% (virtually 89.7%) of the respondents favored Shanghai as their best choice 
of investment destination in comparison with other mainland cities.  
 
(2) Respondents also expressed great satisfaction with Shanghai's implementation, over the 
past five years, of China's WTO commitments, with two thirds of them scoring more than 80 
and altogether 87.3% marking more than 70. 
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(3) In addition to their positive comments on Shanghai's comprehensive environment, 
Foreign-invested enterprises surveyed were also optimistic about the improvement of the 
investment environment in Shanghai, which are reflected in the following three aspects: 
Firstly, close to 95% respondents felt confident about the improvement of Shanghai's 
investment environment; Secondly, Shanghai's popularity can be revealed by the fact that 
more than 70% respondents have either established or plan to establish their regional 
headquarters in Shanghai; Last but not least, more than seven-in-ten of the companies are 
going to increase their investment in Shanghai in the next three years.  
 
(4) Foreign-invested enterprises attributed Shanghai's international competitiveness as a land 
for investment to its sound urban infrastructure and qualified labor. On the other hand, 
problems adversely affecting Shanghai's competitiveness, according to the respondents, 
included its high business costs and incompleteness in its legal system and lack of 
transparency.  
 
(5) It was believed that both Shanghai's priority given to the development of modern service 
industry and Shanghai's hosting of the 2010 World Expo would have positive impact on 
foreign investment in Shanghai. 62% respondents believed that Shanghai's priority given to 
the development of modern service industry would have very positive or substantial impact 
on Shanghai as a land for investment, and even more respondents, up to three quarters agreed 
that Shanghai's host of the 2010 World Expo would have "very positive" or "positive" impact 
on Shanghai's foreign investment.  
 
 
 (6) 80% to 90% foreign enterprises surveyed believed that relative policies regarding 
Pudong's being a pilot base of overall concomitant reform on foreign investment in Shanghai 
and the construction of Yangshan Deepwater Port would greatly influence Shanghai's 




(7) According to the foreign-invested enterprises, what have attracted them most to invest in 
Shanghai can be cited as preferential policies, business opportunities, including extensive 
links with the international market, as well as free competition. 
 
 (8) Energy and power and transportation were deemed as the top two factors that would 
severely constrain Shanghai's development as a land for investment.  
 
(9) On government policies and institutions concerning foreign investment, although foreign 
investors surveyed expressed general satisfaction with services provided by the administrative 
departments, there continued to be complaints about "government efficiency, policy 
transparency and government administrative system? Reform and improvement on 
government efficiency have been highly expected. 
 
(10) General positive comments were given by foreign-invested enterprises on the protection 
of intellectual property rights in Shanghai, with 87.3% respondents agreed that the situation 
had been improved. 
 
 
Sources：Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission，Shanghai Association of Enterprises with Foreign 





A Research Assessing Shanghai’s Investment Environment 
9 August 2006 
 
(1) On Shanghai's overall performance on the implementation of the WTO Accession 
commitments  
It has been almost five years since China's accession to the World Trade Organization. 
Respondents showed positive attitude toward Shanghai's overall performance on the 
implementation of the WTO accession commitments (See Chart 14-9). Up to two thirds 
respondents scored more than 80 (totally 100 marks), 17.8% scored "90 to 100" 47.4% "89 to 
89"22.1% "70 to 79"and 4.2% "60 to 69"Only 2.8% marked below 60. That is to say, those 
scoring above 70 accounted for 87.3% of all respondents, which suggested that 
foreign-invested enterprises had been very much satisfied with Shanghai's overall 
performance on the implementation of the WTO accession commitments.  
 
Chart 14-9  How would you score China's overall performance  
on the implementation of the WTO Accession commitments (100 marks) 
 
(2) On Shanghai's comprehensive investment environment for foreign-invested enterprises 
Foreign investors?attitude toward Shanghai's comprehensive investment environment showed 
a positive sign (See Chart 14-10). More than seven-in-ten scored above 80 (totally 100 marks), 
with "100 to 90"17.8% and "89 to 80"52.6%. Together with the 19.2% selecting "79 to 70" 
there were roughly nine-in-ten (89.7%) investors scoring more than 70 marks. Among the 
remaining 10% respondents, 6.6% marked "69 to 60" Only 0.9% respondents marked "below 
60" The result indicated that the majority of the investors surveyed had been very much 




Chart 14-10  How would you score Shanghai's comprehensive investment  
environment for enterprises with foreign fund?(100 marks) 
 
 
(3) On the most ideal investment destination 
Shanghai has been deemed to be the most investor-friendly city in China by nearly 90% 
respondents (see Chart 14-11). In addition, 6.6% favored Suzhou and those preferred 
Shenzhen and Beijing accounted for 4.7% and 1.4% respectively. (As multiple selections are 
possible and most of those who selected Shenzhen and Beijing also selected Shanghai, the 
total may exceed 100%).  Dalian and Chengdu were selected by a few respondents 
  
Chart 14-11  Which mainland city do you think is  the best choice for investment? 
 
(4) On key factors contributing to Shanghai's international competitiveness 
Approximately 70% respondents attributed Shanghai's international competitiveness in terms 
of investment environment to its sound urban infrastructure. 56.8% to its high caliber labor 
force, 46.5% to its relatively developed modern manufacturing, 45.1% to the "relatively 
efficient government"and 19.7% to the "government financing?(See Chart 14-12). 
 
Chart 14-12  Which of the following do you think is/are the comparative advantage(s) of 





(5) On their plans to establish regional headquarters in Shanghai 
 
Up to the survey time, 37.1 % respondents had already established their regional headquarters 
in Shanghai. Moreover, 6.6% had got such plans under application or preparation and 27.7% 
under future consideration. This meant more than 70% of the respondents had established or 
planned to establish their headquarters in Shanghai. Among the remaining ones, 16.9% 
enterprises had not encountered the headquarter issue and only 7.5% said they didn't have 
such intention. 4.2% respondents skipped this question (See Chart 14-13). 
 






(6) On the expectation of the improvement of Shanghai's investment environment. 
On their expectation of Shanghai's improvement of its investment environment, 13.6% 
respondents answered"very optimistic" 55.4% "optimistic? 25.8% "cautiously optimistic" and 
the other 3.8% chose to "wait and see" However, no respondent held a pessimistic view. 
Hereby, we draw the conclusion that close to 95% foreign investors surveyed had confidence 
in the improvement of Shanghai's investment environment.  
 
Chart 14-14  What's your expectation on Shanghai's investment environment 
 
 
(7) The impact of Shanghai's priority given to the development of modern service industry on 
investment in Shanghai. 
The impact of Shanghai's priority given to the development of modern service industry on 
their investment activities in Shanghai were believed to be very positive by 12.7% 
respondents. Close to half of the respondents (49.3%) believed the impact should be 
"positive" 1/3 "moderate"and those who believed "there is no change?or the impact would be 
"negative"took 2.8% and 0.5% respectively (See Chart 14-15). 
 
Chart 14-15  The impact of Shanghai's priority given to the development  




(8) On problems adversely affecting Shanghai's international competitiveness 
The biggest problem that would adversely affect Shanghai's international competitiveness was 
believed to be its high business cost (by 54.5% respondents). In addition, 43.2% respondents 
chose "inadequate laws, decrees and regulations" Those who complained about the lack of 
transparency made up 23.9%. Moreover, 10.3% showed their frustration on the performance 
of contracts. Another 6.6 % cited other factors or just skipped this question.  
 
Chart 14-16  What do you think is (are) the biggest challenge(s) 
 for Shanghai's international competitiveness compared with other countries(Multiple 
selections possible) 
 
Source：Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission，Shanghai Association of Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment， and Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center （2006） 
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Appendix 7.3 
List of 4A and 3A State-Standard Tourist Attractions in Shanghai 
 
4A State Standard Tourist Attractions  
1. The Oriental Pearl Radio and Television Tower 
2. The Century Park 
3. Shanghai Jingmao Building - 88th Floor Sightseeing Hall  
4. Shanghai Sheshan Hill National Holiday Resort 
5. Shanghai Zoological Park 
6. Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Hall 
7. Shanghai Museum 
8. The Grand View Garden Area of Shanghai 
9. Shanghai Wild Animal Park 
10. Shanghai Sun Island International Club 
11. Dongping National Forest Park 
12. Shanghai Yuyuan Garden 
13. Chenyun’s Former Residence – Memorial Hall of Qingpu Revolution 
14.Shanghai Gongqing Forest Park  
15. Shanghai Zhujiajiao Ancient Town Tourist Area 
16.Shanghai Guyi Garden 
17.Shanghai Science and Technology Museum  
 
3A State Standard Tourist Attractions  
1. Shanghai Pudong Shooting Entertainment Area 
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Split File <none> 





Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES 
   VARIABLES=ref.no years 
ftstaffs branches busfield income 
parentco foreignp 
   forms origin qualify permisio 
approach cowork relation knowfore 
attitude 
   role member chinasso satisfy 
view localof1 localof2 localof3 localof4 
   /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
  
Resources Elapsed Time 0:00:00.07 











 Ref  No 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 






  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Less than one year 2 4.0 4.0 4.0 
>=1 and <=5 years 11 22.0 22.0 26.0 
>5 and <=10 years 20 40.0 40.0 66.0 
>10 and <=20 years 11 22.0 22.0 88.0 
More than 20 years 6 12.0 12.0 100.0 




 Full time staff 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 5 to 9 7 14.0 14.0 14.0 
10 to 49 22 44.0 44.0 58.0 
50 to 99 4 8.0 8.0 66.0 
100 to 199 2 4.0 4.0 70.0 
200 to 399 9 18.0 18.0 88.0 
400 to 699 3 6.0 6.0 94.0 
More than 1000 3 6.0 6.0 100.0 










 Branches/Selling points 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 13 26.0 26.0 26.0 
2 to 4 20 40.0 40.0 66.0 
5 to 9 5 10.0 10.0 76.0 
10 to 29 5 10.0 10.0 86.0 
50 to 99 4 8.0 8.0 94.0 
100 to 199 1 2.0 2.0 96.0 
200 to 300 1 2.0 2.0 98.0 
More than 300 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Business field 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Domestic Packaged Tour 
Groups 
34 68.0 68.0 68.0 
Domestic Independent 
Tourists 
5 10.0 10.0 78.0 
Overseas Packaged Tour 
Groups 
7 14.0 14.0 92.0 
Bookings of Hotels and 
Flights 
3 6.0 6.0 98.0 
Handling with Incoming 
Visitors 
1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Source of income 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Domestic Travel Services 38 76.0 76.0 76.0 
Inbound International 
Travel Services 
2 4.0 4.0 80.0 
Outbound International 
Travel Services 
10 20.0 20.0 100.0 





 Parent companies 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 15 30.0 30.0 30.0 
No 35 70.0 70.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Any foreign projects 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 4 8.0 8.0 8.0 
No 11 22.0 22.0 30.0 
No Need of Answering 35 70.0 70.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Foreign investment forms 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Direct Capital Investment 2 4.0 4.0 4.0 
A Foreign Invested Mother 
Company 
1 2.0 2.0 6.0 
Having Joint Investment in 
Overseas 
1 2.0 2.0 8.0 
No Need of Answering 46 92.0 92.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Original regions/countries 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid European Countries 1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
HongKong, Macau and 
Taiwan 
3 6.0 6.0 8.0 
No Need of Answering 46 92.0 92.0 100.0 






 Qualified as international 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 25 50.0 50.0 50.0 
No 25 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Permision for outbound 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 20 40.0 40.0 40.0 
No 5 10.0 10.0 50.0 
No Need of Answering 25 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Overseas business 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Build foreign parterships 13 26.0 26.0 26.0 
Set up its own branches 3 6.0 6.0 32.0 
Use both the above two 
ways 
3 6.0 6.0 38.0 
Only solicit tourist in China 1 2.0 2.0 40.0 
No Need of Answering 30 60.0 60.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Work cooperatively 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 19 38.0 38.0 38.0 
No 31 62.0 62.0 100.0 








 maintenance of relationship 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Good 7 14.0 14.0 14.0 
Good 10 20.0 20.0 34.0 
Neutral 2 4.0 4.0 38.0 
No Need of Answering 31 62.0 62.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Do you know foreign entrants 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 28 56.0 56.0 56.0 
No 22 44.0 44.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Attitude to foreign agents 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Do not like it 1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Neutral 13 26.0 26.0 28.0 
Appreciate it 14 28.0 28.0 56.0 
No Need of Answering 22 44.0 44.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Role of foreign agents 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid A considerable rival 4 8.0 8.0 8.0 
A new rival 1 2.0 2.0 10.0 
Both competitor and 
partner 
18 36.0 36.0 46.0 
A valuable model 5 10.0 10.0 56.0 
No Need of Answering 22 44.0 44.0 100.0 





 Membership of associations 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 39 78.0 78.0 78.0 
No 11 22.0 22.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Chinese association 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 24 48.0 48.0 48.0 
No 15 30.0 30.0 78.0 
No Need of Answering 11 22.0 22.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 How satisfied with China gov. 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 2 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Satisfied 6 12.0 12.0 16.0 
Neutral 14 28.0 28.0 44.0 
Unsatisfied 2 4.0 4.0 48.0 
No Need of Answering 26 52.0 52.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Maintaining relationship with gov. 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Important 27 54.0 54.0 54.0 
Neutral 23 46.0 46.0 100.0 









 Satisfaction with Marketing Research 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 12 24.0 24.0 24.0 
Satisfied 13 26.0 26.0 50.0 
Neutral 19 38.0 38.0 88.0 
Unsatisfied 6 12.0 12.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Satisfaction with Arbitration 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 11 22.0 22.0 22.0 
Satisfied 13 26.0 26.0 48.0 
Neutral 22 44.0 44.0 92.0 
Unsatisfied 3 6.0 6.0 98.0 
Very Unsatisfied 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Satisfaction with Consultant And Aids 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 16 32.0 32.0 32.0 
Satisfied 13 26.0 26.0 58.0 
Neutral 15 30.0 30.0 88.0 
Unsatisfied 6 12.0 12.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Satisfaction with Network/Communication 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 14 28.0 28.0 28.0 
Satisfied 11 22.0 22.0 50.0 
Neutral 20 40.0 40.0 90.0 
Unsatisfied 4 8.0 8.0 98.0 
Very Unsatisfied 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 




Sources: the author 
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Appendix 7.5  




Sources: HRG Jin Jiang (2008) 
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Appendix 7.6 
The Uniforms and Applications Applied for a NTA Partner, and the 
Brand Logo “Best” 
 
 
Sources: NTA China (2007) 
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Split File <none> 





Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES 
   VARIABLES=ref.no years 
ftstaffs branches busfield income 
parentco foreignp 
   forms origin qualify permisio 
approach cowork relation knowfore 
attitude 
   role member chinasso satisfy 
view localof1 localof2 localof3 localof4 
   /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
  
Resources Elapsed Time 0:00:00.10 












 Ref  No 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 







  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid >=1 and <=5 years 20 40.0 40.0 40.0 
>5 and <=10 years 10 20.0 20.0 60.0 
>10 and <=20 years 15 30.0 30.0 90.0 
More than 20 years 5 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Full time staff 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 to 4 1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
5 to 9 4 8.0 8.0 10.0 
10 to 49 13 26.0 26.0 36.0 
50 to 99 6 12.0 12.0 48.0 
100 to 199 4 8.0 8.0 56.0 
200 to 399 4 8.0 8.0 64.0 
400 to 699 6 12.0 12.0 76.0 
700 to 1000 5 10.0 10.0 86.0 
More than 1000 7 14.0 14.0 100.0 







 Branches/Selling points 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 9 18.0 18.0 18.0 
2 to 4 7 14.0 14.0 32.0 
5 to 9 8 16.0 16.0 48.0 
10 to 29 10 20.0 20.0 68.0 
30 to 49 4 8.0 8.0 76.0 
50 to 99 5 10.0 10.0 86.0 
100 to 199 2 4.0 4.0 90.0 
200 to 300 2 4.0 4.0 94.0 
More than 300 3 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Business field 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Domestic Packaged Tour 
Groups 
31 62.0 62.0 62.0 
Domestic Independent 
Tourists 
1 2.0 2.0 64.0 
Overseas Packaged Tour 
Groups 
11 22.0 22.0 86.0 
Bookings of Hotels and 
Flights 
1 2.0 2.0 88.0 
Handling with Incoming 
Visitors 
5 10.0 10.0 98.0 
Other Sideline Services 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Source of income 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Domestic Travel Services 29 58.0 58.0 58.0 
Inbound International 
Travel Services 
8 16.0 16.0 74.0 
Outbound International 
Travel Services 
13 26.0 26.0 100.0 






 Parent companies 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 13 26.0 26.0 26.0 
No 37 74.0 74.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Any foreign projects 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 7 14.0 14.0 14.0 
No 6 12.0 12.0 26.0 
No Need of Answering 37 74.0 74.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Foreign investment forms 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Owning Loans from 
Overseas 
1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Having Joint Investment 
in Overseas 
6 12.0 12.0 14.0 
No Need of Answering 43 86.0 86.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Original regions/countries 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid North American Countries 3 6.0 6.0 6.0 
European Countries 3 6.0 6.0 12.0 
Other Asian Countries 1 2.0 2.0 14.0 
No Need of Answering 43 86.0 86.0 100.0 







 Qualified as international 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 42 84.0 84.0 84.0 
No 8 16.0 16.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Permision for outbound 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 38 76.0 76.0 76.0 
No 4 8.0 8.0 84.0 
No Need of Answering 8 16.0 16.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Overseas business 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Build foreign parterships 19 38.0 38.0 38.0 
Use both the above two 
ways 
15 30.0 30.0 68.0 
Only solicit tourist in China 4 8.0 8.0 76.0 
No Need of Answering 12 24.0 24.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Work cooperatively 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 33 66.0 66.0 66.0 
No 17 34.0 34.0 100.0 









 maintenance of relationship 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Good 16 32.0 32.0 32.0 
Good 16 32.0 32.0 64.0 
Neutral 1 2.0 2.0 66.0 
No Need of Answering 17 34.0 34.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Do you know foreign entrants 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 37 74.0 74.0 74.0 
No 13 26.0 26.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Attitude to foreign agents 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Do not like it 1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Neutral 16 32.0 32.0 34.0 
Appreciate it 20 40.0 40.0 74.0 
No Need of Answering 13 26.0 26.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Role of foreign agents 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid A considerable rival 7 14.0 14.0 14.0 
A new rival 3 6.0 6.0 20.0 
Both competitor and 
partner 
21 42.0 42.0 62.0 
A valuable model 6 12.0 12.0 74.0 
No Need of Answering 13 26.0 26.0 100.0 




 Membership of associations 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 33 66.0 66.0 66.0 
No 17 34.0 34.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Chinese association 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 28 56.0 56.0 56.0 
No 5 10.0 10.0 66.0 
No Need of Answering 17 34.0 34.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 How satisfied with China gov. 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 6 12.0 12.0 12.0 
Satisfied 13 26.0 26.0 38.0 
Neutral 7 14.0 14.0 52.0 
Unsatisfied 1 2.0 2.0 54.0 
Very Unsatisfied 1 2.0 2.0 56.0 
No Need of Answering 22 44.0 44.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Maintaining relationship with gov. 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Important 28 56.0 56.0 56.0 
Neutral 22 44.0 44.0 100.0 








 Satisfaction with Marketing Research 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 11 22.0 22.0 22.0 
Satisfied 20 40.0 40.0 62.0 
Neutral 16 32.0 32.0 94.0 
Unsatisfied 3 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Satisfaction with Arbitration 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 14 28.0 28.0 28.0 
Satisfied 18 36.0 36.0 64.0 
Neutral 15 30.0 30.0 94.0 
Unsatisfied 2 4.0 4.0 98.0 
Very Unsatisfied 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Satisfaction with Consultant And Aids 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 22 44.0 44.0 44.0 
Satisfied 12 24.0 24.0 68.0 
Neutral 10 20.0 20.0 88.0 
Unsatisfied 6 12.0 12.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Satisfaction with Network/Communication 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 20 40.0 40.0 40.0 
Satisfied 14 28.0 28.0 68.0 
Neutral 13 26.0 26.0 94.0 
Unsatisfied 3 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Sources: the author 
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Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 50 
Missing Value 
Handling 
Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES 
   VARIABLES=ref.no years 
ftstaffs branches busfield income 
parentco foreignp 
   forms origin qualify 
permisio approach cowork relation 
knowfore attitude 
   role member chinasso 
satisfy view localof1 localof2 localof3 
localof4 
   /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
  
Resources Elapsed Time 0:00:00.06 






 Ref  No 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 










  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid >=1 and <=5 years     2.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 
>5 and <=10 years 11 22.0 22.0 54.0 
>10 and <=20 years 11 22.0 22.0 76.0 
More than 20 years 12 24.0 24.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Full time staff 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 5 to 9 3 6.0 6.0 6.0 
10 to 49 21 42.0 ᆔ2.0 48.0 
50 to 99 8 16.0 16.0 64.0 
100 to 199 5 10.0 10.0 74.0 
200 to 399 6 12.0 12.0 86.0 
400 to 699 3 6.0 6.0 92.0 
700 to 1000 2 4.0 4.0 96.0 
More than 1000 2 4.0 4.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Branches/Selling points 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 14 28.0 28.0 28.0 
2 to 4 8 16.0 16.0 44.0 
5 to 9 7 14.0 14.0 58.0 
10 to 29 9 18.0 18.0 76.0 
30 to 49 7 14.0 14.0 90.0 
50 to 99 3 6.0 6.0 96.0 
200 to 300 1 2.0 2.0 98.0 
More than 300 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
















 Business field 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Domestic Packaged 
Tour Groups 26 52.0 52.0 52.0 
Domestic Independent 
Tourists 4 8.0 8.0 60.0 
Overseas Packaged 
Tour Groups 12 24.0 24.0 84.0 
Overseas Independent 
Tourists 2 4.0 4.0 88.0 
Bookings of Hotels and 
Flights 4 8.0 8.0 96.0 
Handling with Incoming 
Visitors 2 4.0 4.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Source of income 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Domestic Travel Services 29 58.0 58.0 58.0 
Inbound International 
Travel Services 3 6.0 6.0 64.0 
Outbound International 
Travel Services 18 36.0 36.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Parent companies 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 20 40.0 40.0 40.0 
No 30 60.0 60.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Any foreign projects 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 7 14.0 14.0 14.0 
No 13 26.0 26.0 40.0 
No Need of Answering 30 60.0 60.0 100.0 









 Foreign investment forms 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Direct Capital Investment 5 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Having Joint Investment in 
Overseas 2 4.0 4.0 14.0 
No Need of Answering 43 86.0 86.0 100.0 




 Original regions/countries 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Other Asian Countries 1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
HongKong, Macau and 
Taiwan 6 12.0 12.0 14.0 
No Need of Answering 43 86.0 86.0 100.0 




 Qualified as international 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 42 84.0 84.0 84.0 
No 8 16.0 16.0 100.0 




 Permision for outbound 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 37 74.0 74.0 74.0 
No 5 10.0 10.0 84.0 
No Need of Answering 8 16.0 16.0 100.0 















 Overseas business 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Build foreign parterships 16 32.0 32.0 32.0 
Set up its own branches 6 12.0 12.0 44.0 
Use both the above two 
ways 10 20.0 20.0 64.0 
Only solicit tourist in China 5 10.0 10.0 74.0 
No Need of Answering 13 26.0 26.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Work cooperatively 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 38 76.0 76.0 76.0 
No 12 24.0 24.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 maintenance of relationship 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Good 6 12.0 12.0 12.0 
Good 25 50.0 50.0 62.0 
Neutral 7 14.0 14.0 76.0 
No Need of Answering 12 24.0 24.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Do you know foreign entrants 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 39 78.0 78.0 78.0 
No 11 22.0 22.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Attitude to foreign agents 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Do not like it 1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Neutral 10 20.0 20.0 22.0 
Appreciate it 28 56.0 56.0 78.0 
No Need of Answering 11 22.0 22.0 100.0 








 Role of foreign agents 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid A considerable rival 6 12.0 12.0 12.0 
A new rival 3 6.0 6.0 18.0 
Both competitor and 
partner 22 44.0 44.0 62.0 
A valuable model 8 16.0 16.0 78.0 
No Need of Answering 11 22.0 22.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Membership of associations 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 46 92.0 92.0 92.0 
No 4 8.0 8.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 Chinese association 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 35 70.0 70.0 70.0 
No 11 22.0 22.0 92.0 
No Need of Answering 4 8.0 8.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 How satisfied with China gov. 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 4 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Satisfied 12 24.0 24.0 32.0 
Neutral 17 34.0 34.0 66.0 
Unsatisfied 1 2.0 2.0 68.0 
Very Unsatisfied 1 2.0 2.0 70.0 
No Need of Answering 15 30.0 30.0 100.0 













 Maintaining relationship with gov. 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Important 30 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Neutral 19 38.0 38.0 98.0 
Not Important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Satisfaction with Marketing Research 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 5 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Satisfied 19 38.0 38.0 48.0 
Neutral 21 42.0 42.0 90.0 
Unsatisfied 5 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Satisfaction with Arbitration 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 7 14.0 14.0 14.0 
Satisfied 14 28.0 28.0 42.0 
Neutral 22 44.0 44.0 86.0 
Unsatisfied 7 14.0 14.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Satisfaction with Consultant and Aids 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 8 16.0 16.0 16.0 
Satisfied 20 40.0 40.0 56.0 
Neutral 19 38.0 38.0 94.0 
Unsatisfied 3 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
 
 Satisfaction with Network/Communication 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very Satisfied 8 16.0 16.0 16.0 
Satisfied 19 38.0 38.0 54.0 
Neutral 20 40.0 40.0 94.0 
Unsatisfied 3 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0  
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